

## Addressing Post-Accord Social Crime by Civil and Military Means

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### ABSTRACT

This article discusses peace accords in terms of the transition from political violence to social crime and posits one potential way this can be minimized: through civil-military cooperation. Social crime impedes the implementation of accords and is oftentimes used by actors as a mechanism to perpetuate fighting and increase bargaining potential. First, the complexity of social crime and the effects are discussed. This includes the difficulty created for both peacekeeping and non-governmental organizations in the stabilization and reconstruction process. Second, case studies from Bosnia, Tajikistan, Guatemala, and Mozambique are used to illuminate the problem. A discussion of the nonformal segments of the economy that drive social crime and the nonlegitimate actors involved follows. Last, this study outlines the actions civil and military groups can apply to address this ever-present threat to implementation in post-war transition.

### INTRODUCTION

In concert with the implementation of peace accords in post-war transition is the lurking problem of social crime. While there is international acknowledgment of this threat, little work has been done in either the academic or practitioner world on this topic. At the same time, the international community is grappling with the means for greater effectiveness in multidimensional peacekeeping. This article posits that social crime spikes in the implementation stage due to complex and interrelated factors present both externally and on the ground after a peace process and de facto cease-fires.

It is not surprising that political violence is discussed more than social crime. If social crime is mentioned, it is described as common crime or banditry. This is far too simplistic and cursory of a notation. During transitions from war to peace, concern is expressed by society, but not as measurably by the international community, a short-hand term used in this article that includes nation-states and international and non-governmental organizations. Perhaps political violence receives paramount attention because it is the main reason the UN and other states involve themselves in a nation's internal politics. Additionally, a peacekeeping mission's main goal is to stop political violence. However, awareness of social crime's disruptive effects on peace accord implementation is rising. For this reason, attempts to address it have become more common in some peacekeeping missions.

Three main types of social crime witnessed in the post-war transition stage are outlined here: random and spontaneous, economic, and masked political violence. Both main internal and external actors are discussed in terms of their management and contribution to social crime; these categories are not exclusive though since they are linked. This study maps the complexities in the post-accord stage and establishes the kaleidoscopic patterns of social crime and the actors involved. The problem of social crime will be examined in four different case studies that involve peacekeeping missions: Bosnia, Guatemala, Mozambique, and Tajikistan. The conclusion is that social crime is a multi-faceted phenomenon, which cannot be viewed through a static lens. This article asserts that with greater political will, civil and military actors can create more effective policies to minimize its damaging effects on transition society.

## FROM WAR TO RECONSTRUCTION

Social crime proliferates wildly because the state is in transition in the post-accord stage. First, a pathology of crime is present, meaning the society is used to crime as a regular aspect of life. Second, because of their participation in the conflict and internal security matters (i.e. government-sponsored violence), the security forces lack legitimacy, be they military or some form of police. The public does not trust these former combatants to protect them from crime since they may continue to use violence or attempt to profit from their positions. Third, in the transition, there are more incentives for criminal — not civil — behavior. With severe economic devastation, crime becomes a major means of survival and profit. Additionally, without civil institutions that deliver certain “public goods,” crime is a preferred avenue. Lastly, the reality of war is that there are an abundance of individuals trained in violence and the ways in which to circumvent the rule of law. With all of these characteristics working in concert, crime becomes endemic in the transition stage.

While peace accords set in place the mechanisms and structures that will stabilize and nation-build, these provisions take time due to the vestiges of war. With the signing of the agreement and the attempt to reestablish normal politics vis-à-vis the state, types of violence conducted during the war are no longer allowed. However, while many crimes existed during the violent campaign, some were never acceptable actions during the war, like human rights violations, but unless there is political will to prosecute individual disputants, these actions go unpunished. Political violence can continue in the reconstruction phase by combatants, government officials, and other groups resistant to the accords, but it is often masked to make it harder to categorize and trace.

A majority of the crime types witnessed in the post-accord stage existed during the conflict. Keen states:

*war is . . . a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection . . . conflict can create war economies, often in the regions controlled by rebels or warlords and linked to international trading networks; members of armed gangs can benefit from looting; and regimes use violence to deflect opposition, reward supporters or maintain their access to resources* (11).

Such a system is difficult to change, especially in the transition phase. Informal economies and mafia trades proliferate during a conflict and act as both suppliers and financiers to the disputants; this encapsulates the sometimes forgotten concept of war profiteering. After a peace process, these networks are entrenched and serve definitive interests and actors in society. Such links are difficult to disentangle. I will argue in this paper that good guy/bad guy stereotypes misrepresent actual reality. These networks involve women and children as well as men in desperate straits. Let us move on to defining social crime and listing the common types of social crime in post-war transition.

#### **EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CRIME ON PEACE IMPLEMENTATION**

Social crime can best be defined as actions that pose a threat to public welfare, which are illegal. Random and spontaneous crime can stem from an inability of people to deal with conflict without using violence after existing in a war system. Economic violence involves profit; Keen defines two important categories: “‘top-down,’ which is mobilized by political leaders and entrepreneurs; and ‘bottom-up’, where violence is embraced by ‘ordinary’ people, either by civilians or low-ranking soldiers” (12). The networks between these actors can create long-term profit systems. The demarcation of different actor levels is a crucial point. Masked political violence is carried out as a form of bargaining or intimidation, but is conducted in more stealthy ways. Social crime may be either organized or unorganized. Organized crime, as stated in a report to the UN Commission on Crime Prevention is “a form of economic commerce by illegal means, involving the threat and use of physical force and violence, extortion, intimidation or corruption and other methods, as well as the use of illicit goods and services” (Wardrop, 60).

Now that I have explained the categories of social crime, let me outline some specific crimes. Table 1 denotes possible crime actions in post-war transition. The two middle columns identify those crimes that can fall into more than one of the main categories. Upon observation, most of the crimes fall in between categories. Due to the limitations of a two-dimensional table, rape falls into both random and political columns, but that could not be represented in such a way. Boxed items denote the replication in another category. Additionally, italicized items are crimes against persons. Other types are crimes involving property or economic goods, which may indirectly or directly people.

Political		Economic		Random
<i>Rape</i>				<i>Rape</i>

<i>Assassination</i>	Theft	Drug trafficking	Theft	<i>Domestic Violence</i>
<i>Torture</i>	Vandalism Looting <i>Lynching</i> <i>Beating</i> <i>Intimidation</i> <i>Shooting</i> <i>Stabbing</i>	Arms trafficking <i>Prostitution</i> <i>Human trafficking</i> Car-jacking Smuggling Black marketeering	Vandalism Looting <i>Lynching</i> <i>Beating</i> <i>Intimidation</i> <i>Shooting</i> <i>Stabbing</i>	
	<i>Kidnapping</i> <i>Bribery</i> Arson Bombing <i>Extortion</i>		<i>Mugging</i> <i>Murder</i>	

*Table 1: Social Crime: Between the Margins.*

There are two possible explanations for the existence of social crime in the transition stage. First, there is a *real* increase in the actual number of crimes committed, above and beyond the actions conducted during the war. Second, an increase is only a *perception* and the real numbers have actually fallen. The first is very hard to prove. Reliable statistics on social crime are patchy and inconsistent from both state actors and NGOs because of under-reporting due to the lack of faith in the police and also due to the selective investigative quality of police in transition. State actors have an interest in social crime statistics. One, they can inflate the numbers to create more security concerns, or two, they can deflate statistics to ensure that international aid for the peace accords continues to flow into the country. This premise assumes that the civilian police would accurately report social crime occurrences, but as we have already outlined, their involvement with social crime makes such reporting implausible.

Additionally, human rights NGOs' main methodology does not specifically address social crime. NGOs typically only report on political violence — both masked and blatant — which is one of the three crime categories. Human rights reports do often indicate political violence's interrelatedness to economic crime; they are of valuable use, but only provide a limited scope. The State Department Human Rights Report (SDHRR) has a unique methodology since its mission is to outline the country's stability so Congress can make decisions that affect US policy; its report includes more social crime aspects, making it a valuable source for this study.

The second reason — perception — creates security fears in post-war transition. As the real numbers are problematic, the idea that social crime has increased cannot be disproved. Certain actors enjoy the outcome of this dilemma. The government can rally public support for its interim crime policy — retaining the military in internal security, which may be in direct opposition to the peace accords. Individuals remain fearful and little can be done to rationally disprove their perception. Increased social crime could be either real *or* imagined. Problems of perception permeate conflict and often act as causes of violence.

There are many assumptions about solving social crime, but few are tested in a rigorous manner. One of the main notions is that with the establishment of a police force and a strong judiciary, the vacuum of social order will be corrected, thus decreasing crime. These actions are not quick fixes, however, so what can be done in the meantime as constituencies are gripped with fear about social crime?

Crime can have a psychological impact on society. According to criminology studies, “. . . those victimized by crimes involving personal contact and violence—such as rape, robbery, and mugging—express heightened levels of fear” (Scheingold, 41). Crimes against persons will make a different impression than crimes against property like theft and arson. In a society where combatants used terror as a tool of oppression and recruitment, the seeds of fear are firmly in place. With the signing of peace accords and a cessation of fighting, the expectations of civil society are raised that violence will decrease. When this does not occur right away and social crime perpetuates, individuals can withdraw their support for reconstruction.

Social crime can inhibit effective civil and military actors from carrying out accord provisions. These tasks could include: humanitarian relief, demilitarization/ demobilization/ disarmament, economic development, integration of combatants, building of infrastructure, creation of civilian police, international verification and monitoring, establishment of an effective judiciary, and protection of human rights. Let us outline some of the effects crime has on these various items.

In delivering humanitarian assistance, relief supplies may become political or economic currency especially when economic crime is widespread (Keen, 60; Durch and Schear, 229), thus prompting theft of relief materials. Demilitarization also becomes difficult as increased security concerns undermine a safe environment in which combatants can turn in their weapons to international monitors. Thus, large caches of weapons exist around the country, enabling the arming of more individuals. Unemployment seriously impacts peace building measures. It creates the avenue whereby violence is the primary outlet for survival or frustration. This climate in turn decreases the likelihood of investment or formalized entrepreneurial activities. It also undermines the integration of soldiers as they do not have job opportunities. Even with UN job training, soldiers with skills rarely can find jobs, and thus, turn back to the known space of soldiering, which involves economic and other crime types.

One of the main factors contributing to the proliferation of social crime is the inherent impunity in fledgling judicial systems after conflict; this characteristic explains why creating a strong judiciary is typically a main item in some peace accords. Judiciaries that settle disputes peacefully or restrain abusive authorities, which are up to international standards, are difficult to create in a system of corruption. Thus, impunity acts as a powerful instigator of crime as individuals know they will not be held accountable for illegal actions. Those gaining profit from an impunious system will go to great lengths to ensure the judiciary remains weak, resorting to bribery, intimidation, kidnapping, and other crimes.

Additionally, in a system where one party was excluded from government positions, there will be a lag in the number of professionals from that group, which may impact any power-sharing agreement between the two conflicting parties. The lack of qualified legal officials can lead to poor policy generation, thus removing the teeth from any judiciary. Of all the

provisions, except perhaps economic development, this is the most difficult to achieve and takes the longest, which maintains the climate of social crime.

Now that we have explored the negative effects of social crime on implementation, let us turn to the causes that perpetuate it. A more integrated view would map the following: poverty and starvation, unemployment, inflation, unintegrated military fighters, scarcity, lack of state control, insufficient infrastructure, inadequate laws, impunity, abysmally low annual incomes, an undeveloped formal economy, environmental degradation, weak or nonexistent civil police, debt, high levels of corruption, porous borders, inadequate financial regulations, decentralization of business and commercial activity, new inexperienced government personnel, and insufficient government and oversight mechanisms.

Such a laundry list exposes the difficulty in addressing social crime. Considering the economic collapse of states after violent conflict, desperate measures are taken by individuals and groups to ensure survivability. While not all crime is perpetrated by economically depressed and unemployed civilians or former combatants, their presence presents challenges. For some people, social crime and participation in black markets are their only means to feed their families and themselves. Accord provisions are not implemented immediately and a change in the overall devastation of the conflict area is not seen quickly. The longer crime lingers, the more danger it is to accord implementation. Thus, people do not feel safer or see conditions improving, decreasing the support for peace, and prompting calls for violence once again. Breaking that chain is the goal of the civil and military actors who become involved in the implementation stage. We now turn our attention to those actors.

### **THE ACTORS: PART OF THE PROBLEM AND SOLUTION**

The actors involved in post-war transition create various coordination and interaction structures. While civil and military actors work towards rebuilding the state, other actors perpetrate social crime, sometimes deliberately or unintentionally. Civil and military actors are a main component of post-accord building, but even they can be engaged in social crime. Thus, social crime actors function in both legitimate and shady spaces with a great deal of blurring at the boundaries. Peacekeeping actors who use their power to extend impunity undermine the credibility and success of the mission. On the other hand, internal peace representatives are also sometimes complicit in illegal enterprises, adding to a climate of instability.

This circumstance is what can be termed a “war lag,” causing both relationships and behaviors perpetrated during the war to exist in the new peace. Keen says, “war can involve cooperation between ‘sides’ at the expense of civilians; peace can see adversaries striking deals that institutionalize violence, corruption and exploitation” (11). Nordstrom describes the mobility of actors and linkages that extend from war to peace:

*Consider, for example: foreign strategists and advisors, arms and suppliers, soldiers, mercenaries, power brokers, and development and interest groups move among countries; guerrillas and soldiers travel to other countries for*

*training and strategic planning; refugees and displaced people flow across borders time and again; and black marketeers negotiate networks of profit on everything from land, ivory, drugs to computer technology and nuclear weapons components. Wars are dependent upon these international networks—public and private; political, military, and civilian; legal and illegal (1997, 100).*

Since these interactive networks are still in place, both internal and external actors can pursue personal and group gain in post-war transition. Strange states that criminal gangs are created when state authority is weakened and the government has lost the consent of its constituents (116). Additionally, “profitability is always increased when a trade in goods or services is declared illegal” (Strange, 114). Thus, clearly organized crime bands exist in a system which has made their actions illegal, thus increasing their profits. However, the counterbalancing measures that are supposed to make the risks to crime higher — a strong judiciary and police force — are not firmly in place, causing a proliferation of social crime as opposed to a reduction. Internal experts possess human and intelligence networks that allow them to continue to exploit the conditions in the transition stage, thus making it difficult for dedicated internal and external peace actors to be effective.

To address social crime, all actors and linkages need to be pursued. The international community has been reluctant to map the complete picture, preferring to focus on their main interests: violence reduction, protection of human rights, economic development, and stability. Perceptions about external actors involvement in the implementation stage tend to be largely drawn from stereotypes. External actors like peacekeepers and INGOs work for peace. International crime syndicates, if even mentioned in the mainstream, are seen in “godfather” terms. However, the diversity of actors does not present us with clear-cut patterns. The stress here is that actor profiles are more complex.

The number of accounts written on peacekeepers implicated in social crime is growing. Roberts writes, “there have been reports of UN personnel being involved in the illicit sale of diesel oil, use of child prostitutes and illegal smuggling” (114). Such cases sometimes involve the removal of the accused by their national governments. As credible enterprises, UN and other implementers have key power positions as overseers of demobilization and the shipment of supplies. Thus, these actors have an interest in secrecy, lawlessness, and impunity so that they may continue to profit from social crime.

High level, external crime actors thrive and survive based on complex networks, autonomy, deep pockets, secrecy, and punishment (Spar, 3). The more “legitimate” an entity or individual is perceived, the more able it is to participate in underworld activity if it can maintain these characteristics. Gelbard states “the rapid transition to democratic goals, however, produces political and institutional conditions favorable to the interests of drug and organized crime syndicates” (174); socio-economic conditions do so as well.

Thus, the variety of actors in transition society present a vibrant tapestry. In both external and internal spaces, there are actors working for good and ill, often simultaneously. People may participate in social crime simply to eat or make millions of dollars. “Top-down” and “bottom-up” actors exist in an area under reconstruction with characteristics more favorable to crime than peace. It is the role of the perceived “legitimate” actors, both local and international, to rebuild the area. Any undermining of the peace accords should be

addressed. Understanding the involvement of actors and their interests is the first approximation for creating policies that inhibit social crime.

### CIVIL AND MILITARY ACTORS IN THE FIELD

After signing the peace accords and requesting a peacekeeping mission, reconstruction actors arrive on the scene. Durch terms this process multidimensional peacekeeping and describes it in the following manner:

*These operations often have a mandate not only to facilitate the reduction of tensions between former foes (as in traditional peacekeeping), but also to help implement a peace accord that address the causes of the underlying conflict. In most cases, and unlike traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional operations have an implementation schedule and a timeline. When the tasks on the schedule have been completed, the operation folds its tenets and departs . . . Because multidimensional peace operations primarily involve the settlement of internal conflicts, they operate in a much more complex domestic political environment than does traditional peacekeeping . . . Multidimensional UN operations have civilian components that may outnumber the military (4).*

The complexities facing external actors create differing degrees of cooperation and expectations about roles. Often due to the newness and difficulty of these missions, social crime is either considered an off-the-table agenda item or one not addressable by external actors. With the increase in multidimensional peacekeeping, military and civilian groups are working together more than ever before. “The success of a peacekeeping mission largely depends upon the effectiveness of this previously untested collaboration” (Williams, 13).

However, this is no small or uncomplicated task. How can cooperation between groups as different as these two be achieved? Durch discusses the various civil and military roles and assignments in the implementation stage:

*The civilian components may include administrators, election supervisors and/or poll watchers, an information section to educate the public about the electoral processes and help develop grass-roots democratic institutions, a refugee and displaced persons resettlement unit, a component to monitor and report human rights abuses, and civilian police observers. The military help to maintain a secure environment in which the civilian components can work, a role that may involve a number of tasks not found in traditional peacekeeping, such as guarding polling stations, transporting refugees to resettlement areas, and assisting with the demobilization and disarmament of local forces (4).*

Fractious relations between these two groups can stem from various sources. The military culture and conception of “the mission” are different from civilian groups. In recent peacekeeping efforts, however, the military is being drawn more into civil spheres. Their unique approaches influence across-group interaction. As groups tend to think in perceptual terms, examining stereotypes is a useful heuristic device. The military relies on secrecy,

discipline, top-down policy implementation, and organization. Civil organizations are more transparent, less formal, democratic, and stress localized and creative solutions to problems.

These roles play out differently based on the mission type. Is it peacekeeping or a type of peace enforcement? This is a useful organizing principle as interactions between civil and military spheres will be different in each. More traditional peacekeeping, which involves the consent of both parties, is more likely to favor cooperation between these groups as there are less overwhelming security concerns, which seem to trump civilian plans. In peace enforcement, where consent is tenuous or nonexistent and the commitment of parties to peace weak, larger security concerns loom as various groups cheat on the ceasefire, disarmament, and other demobilization provisions. The main objective for the military, which is hard to achieve in an enforcement situation, is stopping political violence and securing the area. Until this is completed, it is difficult for the civil side to execute its tasks effectively.

The cases highlight that noting the mission type is the first step in understanding the probable interaction between civil and military actors. Clearly, they are both dependent on each other if they are to realize their goals. Civil groups require the security military forces can provide in the transition phase from war to peace. By the same token, the military depends on the civilian branches to implement the long-term provisions of the accords, which will allow them to eventually withdraw. This interdependence has not been realized by all the players yet, but the more multidimensional peacekeeping becomes the norm, the more such notions will become accepted.

## CASES

As already noted, this article examines the following cases: Bosnia, Tajikistan, Guatemala, and Mozambique. All have conducted peace processes and generated peace pacts after intense internal wars, which left the countries devastated economically and structurally; additionally, the UN created some form of peacekeeping. Social crime was a noted problem in the implementation stage. In Bosnia and Tajikistan, peace enforcement was a key component. The UN sub-contracted out the military-oriented peacekeeping functions to NATO in the case of Bosnia and Russia in the case of Tajikistan. In Guatemala and Mozambique, the UN largely drove reconstruction and has since exited the countries without a renewal of hostilities. Each case will include a description of the parties to the peace accords, the tasks of civil and military officers, the internal and external actors, and the specific social crime problems that affect implementation. It is important to note that only the aspects of implementation that are affected by social crime will be discussed.

To begin, let us explore a key indicator for the extensive nature of economic interests by country: items that are traded on the black market. As Table 2 demonstrates, the types of goods are a watershed of necessities to luxury items. Specific actors will seek out different goods, depending on their interests. The chart below lists only some of the interests by country.

<i>Guatemala</i>	<i>Bosnia</i>	<i>Mozambique</i>	<i>Tajikistan</i>
Drugs	Drugs	Drugs	Drugs
Arms	Arms	Arms	Arms

Oil	Oil	Oil	Oil
Prostitution rings	Prostitution rings	Prostitution rings	Prostitution rings
Livestock	Livestock	Livestock	Livestock
Timber	Timber	Timber	Aluminum
Illegal immigrants	Clothing	Second-hand clothing	Machinery
Diesel gasoline	Relief supplies	Seafood	Agricultural products
Nickel	Mineral resources	Diamonds	Natural gas
Exotic animals	Compact disks	Rhino horn	Uranium
Indigenous products	Cigarettes	Medicine	Textiles
Sugar	Alcohol	Exotic animals	Cotton
Coffee	Automobiles	Ivory	Silver
Seafood	Gasoline	Teak	Gold

*Table 2: Organized Crime Interests (Black Market).*

The types of goods and services run from the exotic to the mundane, denoting the difference between top-down and bottom-up economic social crime. It also highlights the goods that are common across countries. Additionally, it demonstrates how pervasive the economic interests fueling social crime are throughout these societies, especially in post-war transition. Nordstrom states, “even in peace, a country or region continues on war-defined footing until its institutions and practices are actively redefined towards different ends” (“Out of the Shadows,” 1998, 8).

## BOSNIA

The Dayton Agreement, signed on November 21, 1995, set into place a framework to resolve the ethnic conflict that waged from 1992 to 1995. Various military and civil components are involved in the implementation of the agreement. The NATO-led international peacekeeping force (IFOR) consisted of 60,000 troops to implement and monitor the aspects of the peace accords. A smaller peacekeeping mission, SFOR (Stabilization Force), later took over. SFOR (and IFOR before conclusion) support civil agencies, but their tasks were largely technical, and included the following: “identifying the requirements for repairing transport and infrastructure; establishing an SFOR information campaign on democracy; providing communications expertise; and supporting the OSCE education campaign” (Williams, 62).

The Office of the UN High Representative (OHR) is responsible for civilian implementation, which includes monitoring, facilitating differences, and coordinating the activities of the civil organizations; other official overseers include the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF). Additional civil duties include reconstruction, the return of refugees and displaced persons, elections, and maintaining the freedom of movement. IPTF is in charge of retraining the police force. The UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), begun in December 1995, is composed of 1,976 civilian police and 3 military-support personnel.

The structural devastation in both urban and rural areas and the plethora of land mines still present have added to the overall sense of economic havoc facing the country. Unemployment is still high at fifty percent, but it is down from ninety percent (SDHRR, 2). The return of refugees seeking employment is predicted to compound this problem, but violence by other ethnic groups against persons attempting to return to home has made this accord provision problematic. Frequent tactics include murder, assault, arson, theft, vandalism, confiscation, mob obstruction, and intimidation. The control of housing served as a “major instrument of political influence-peddling and enrichment” (SDHRR, 8). Local and high level authorities, ethnic groups, and individuals tend to be involved at some level in making this provision difficult to implement.

High levels of government corruption exist (AI). Intimidation to government members, especially judges, is still a problem (AI). Widespread fraud in elections has been a problem. In addition, intimidation and threats to voters as well as harassment of other parties and attempts to impede their campaigns is common (SDHRR, 13). Police officers participated in bombings against various ethnic groups. Mob violence undermined local stability. Peacekeeping units and their facilities have been the subject of violent attacks. Both international and local journalists have also been threatened (SDHRR, 11).

The tenuous environment on the ground shapes the ways in which peacekeepers both aid and participate in social crime. While not a direct form of social crime, IFOR and SFOR’s non-interference stance added to the sense of impunity. However, this reluctance to enter into the civil policing affairs largely came from the dangerous position such actions would bring to international forces, who previously had been attacked by local bands, specifically during the UNPROFOR mission. This has prompted the use of the Multinational Police Force like the carabinieri by NATO command, whose tasks in Bosnia are to quash riots, accompany refugees home, and squelch violence towards peacekeepers and ethnic groups (Myers, October 6, 1998). On the other side, peacekeepers in Bosnia have been implicated directly in social crime. Implementation actors have also been charged with corruption. Journalist Maggie O’Kane cited abuses by peacekeepers as early as 1993. She writes:

*The UN soldiers are making themselves and the Sarajevo mafia rich. The locals are the middlemen for a trade in cigarettes, alcohol, food, prostitution and heroin, worth millions of pound (Sept. 5, 1993).*

There are other suggestions that implicate peacekeepers in social crime. “In 1996, reports emerged of black-marketeering . . . and violence . . . by Canadian peacekeepers in Bosnia; some 34 soldiers face disciplinary action” (Williams, 51). Nordstrom also writes of the varied goods in the black market trade, “not only luxury items flowed along these channels. Tanks and weapons rumbled along these pathways . . . ” (“Shadow Sovereigns,” 1998, 23).

Bosnia is well represented by international crime syndicates. The informal economy is an important aspect of post-war transition. The area has strong connections to drug trafficking organizations. Bosnia is a transit point for minor regional marijuana and opiate trafficking routes (CIA Factbook, 10). Additionally, Sicilian connections to arms dealers in the former Yugoslavia have been maintained through German brokers (Sterling, 172). Arms trafficking is a main profit source. Sterling also writes that guns were being smuggled into the area

under the guise of blankets as part of a relief supply convoy (210). Tobacco is another noted commodity that travels throughout Bosnia. Originating from Italy, the mafia routes tobacco through a system of countries, the former Yugoslavia included, for sale on its international black markets (Sterling, 82-83). Locally, Arizona Market, presumably the largest “known” black market in Europe about twenty minutes from Bràcko, is a space where any good or service can be traded. Mercedes Benz cars are sold for around 1500DM. Ukrainian prostitutes, possibly from the white slavery market, service clients in Russian mafia-owned brothels in the market place (Feirrell interview). There is concern that the international presence is creating an “artificial” economy, which may have devastating consequences if the forces ever exit the country without leaving a stable economic structure in place.

Despite the cooperation between the UN and NATO in the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, the complex environment presented challenges that impacted successful implementation of the peace accords. Social crime became a threat to security and peace in the area as violent and illicit actions continued on the ground. Despite the force contingent and the use of the Multinational Police Force, peacekeepers largely remained removed from any internal policing function, making civil implementation difficult. Williams concluded: “the military’s determination to keep its distance from Dayton’s civilian aspects weakened the position of the High Representative and ultimately undermined efforts to implement the Accords” (64). A more integrated strategy would have been appropriate, but the dangerous condition of the mission made the military aspects in practice more important, with the civil side taking a second place to security and containment of violence. Peacekeeping missions that have a peace enforcement corollary will continue to face such challenges, thus making implementation a slow process in an environment of social crime, making the local population wonder if there will ever be real peace.

## TAJIKISTAN

After five years of civil war, the Tajik government and United Tajik Opposition (UTO) signed the General Agreement on Peace and National Accord in June 1997. It established the National Reconciliation Commission, whose tasks were new parliamentary elections in 1998, the allotment of thirty percent of government positions to UTO members, the integration of UTO forces into the army, the return of refugees, and the implementation of a general amnesty (AI, 1). The UN Mission of Observers to Tajikistan (UNMOT) was formally established by the UN in December 1994, but the Joint Force, specifically CIS peacekeepers, mostly composed the Russian Army’s 201st Motorized Division, have been in the area since 1993. In addition, the Russian Border Guard Force (RBF), composed of CIS forces, principally patrols the Tajik/Afghan border. Russia and other CIS states intervened because they feared that violence would spill over into other states and might involve Afghan Islamic groups (O’Prey, 417).

The economic conditions make implementation difficult. Tajikistan had never enjoyed prosperity, being the most underdeveloped republic in the former Soviet Union. Currently, unemployment is around thirty percent (SDHRR, 1) with inflation at forty percent and climbing (CIA Factbook, 6); inflation is no where near the triple digits it was in recent years, but there is concern over more economic setbacks. Continued shortages of natural gas for heating and industry (SDHRR, 2) produced the need for it on the black market.

The internal environment is plagued with crime. Government forces have been responsible for looting, extortion, intimidation, beatings, and the killings of citizens while opposition forces also conducted kidnappings, murder, extortion, and types of intimidation (SDHRR, 2). Local and regional warlords — some independent and some tied to either the government or UTO — conducted economic and political killings (SDHRR, 3); these actors have seized control and function as the law in the area of their dominance. Atkin writes about the situation in Tajikistan:

*In addition to the politically motivated violence, ordinary crime heightened the sense of insecurity . . . Violent crime rapidly increased during 1998, as organized gangs fought each other and carried out kidnappings and bombings. Among the more conspicuous crimes were . . . the beating and robbery of two UN military observers and their interpreter, and the robbery at gunpoint of employees of the Save the Children Fund (15).*

For peacekeepers and international organizations, working in Tajikistan is a dangerous enterprise. Even as recently as "July 1998, two UN military observers, a civilian advisor, and their translator were seized while on patrol, tortured, shot, and dumped in a ravine, apparently by renegades from the UTO . . ." (Atkin, 14-15). Such actions present grave problems for implementation. When constantly threatened, organizations may decide to leave the area. Without international assistance, the peace process will fall into chaos once again

The government, run by former communists and Kulobi elites, is plagued with infighting and challenges to its authority not only by the UTO, who has yet to be given its share of government positions, but also by regional and military warlords. Impunity is a problem due to a lack of resources, political pressure, and training (SDHRR, 4). Corruption, such as bribe taking and drug involvement, is a problem despite attempts by some government leaders to remove suspected personnel. Elections have been plagued with threats and ballot stuffing (SDHRR, 10). The reasons for the increase in social crime were the general weakness of the government and the continual decline in social order (SDHRR, 2).

The presence of an independent media is nonexistent in Tajikistan, which reduces the amount of information being reported on the actual conditions. At one point, it had the highest rate of foreign journalist deaths in the world, only currently surpassed by Chechnya, another area of Russian involvement. Atkin writes: "according to one calculation, 62 journalists have been killed in Tajikistan since 1992 and more than 100 have been hounded out of the country for reporting which displeased those in power" (9). The strategy of targeting journalists and other actors that would monitor and report on the situation extends secrecy that favors powerful actors.

Drug trafficking is a leading organized crime interest in Tajikistan. It cultivates opium and cannabis and is a major transshipment point for drugs from Southwest Asia to Russia and Western Europe (CIA Factbook, 8). Additionally, Sterling writes that heroin couriers pass through Tajikistan "with forged papers, radio telephones, and paramilitary protection . . ." (106). Ruggiero and South note that "drugs are a common means of barter" (97). The Tajik/Afghan border, which is guarded by the RBF, is a common site for drug smuggling

(Atkin, 20). Refugees crossing the border act as couriers. CIS peacekeeper involvement in the drug trade is pervasive with ties to the Russian mafia.

Tajikistan presents an interesting case of social crime and the involvement of peacekeeping actors. While the peace accords are recent, refugees and displaced persons have returned. However, the power sharing agreement has yet to be enacted by the government, causing a faltering of UTO faith in the government's commitment to the peace process. The demobilization and reintegration process progressed slowly, being undermined by unemployment. The parties excluded from the peace process are a threat to the implementation of the accords through their violent challenge to the government and UTO's quest for peace. The continuation of crime threatens stability, especially as international actors involved in the process are targets of violence, making their tasks harder to execute. The role of some legitimate actors in violence and black market activities will continue as the institutional arrangements are ill-equipped with the proper mechanisms to address them. Thus, the road to peace in Tajikistan may be more a cover of other activities as opposed to a true commitment to cease violence and establish the promises of the accords.

## GUATEMALA

After thirty-six years of internal conflict, the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) and the government signed the final peace accord in December 1996. The accords include provisions for the return of refugees, land reform, the creation of civil police, human rights, the rights of indigenous people, integration of combatants, and socio-economic issues. The UN Verification Mission to Guatemala (MINUGUA) was created in 1994 to oversee the implementation of a human rights accord. Upon the final signing of all peace accords, MINUGUA's mandate was extended. From January to May 1997, 155 military observers came to Guatemala to oversee implementation of military-related provisions.

Despite progress in disarming combatants, economic circumstances threaten peace. While inflation in 1998 was down to nine percent and unemployment was five percent, poverty and income inequality are constant problems, which the accords pledge to address. UNDP estimates that eighty percent of the Guatemalan population lives in poverty, sixty percent of which are employed (SDHRR, 16).

The increase in social crime has led to public concern over not only the government's inability to control it, but also the judicial system's contribution to the state of impunity through its corruption and inefficiency. Intimidation of witnesses through murder, harassment, and beatings are common (SDHRR, 3). One indication of the level of threats to judges and other law professionals was the Supreme Court's request that the president of Guatemala, Alvaro Arz', provide them with increased security (SDHRR, 7). Court cases that involved human rights violations, drug trafficking, and official corruption prompt the most threats. The peace accord commission set up to assist the new judiciary struggled with its implementation tasks.

The fear of increasing social crime can be seen in the proliferation of private security forces "as a 'reserved domain' of the affluent, meting out personal justice" (McCleary, 141). Such forces serve as one employment area for former combatants. The wave of kidnappings

in Guatemala has led sociologists to comment that such crimes have “profoundly affected the public’s sense of security, as faith in the ability of the authorities to control crime is at an all time low” (*Mesoamérica*, 1996, 3). Both former and active army personnel are key actors in the kidnapping business. One Guatemalan newspaper reported:

*It’s the ideal combination for the underworld. Retired army personnel operate with the protection of people in public posts, which hinders investigations greatly . . . The suspects escape . . . because they have previous knowledge of security forces operations* (Guatemala News and Information Bureau or GNIB, Dec. 1997).

Many Guatemalans have charged the government for the crime wave as a way of legitimizing the continued use of the military in internal affairs; additionally, army officers have been accused of arming the organized gangs in Guatemala (GNIB, April 1997). The rise in crime has prompted the government to allocate more military to internal security once again. The army also recognizes the linkages between former combatants and organized criminal bands (Schirmer, 12). The return to internal military policing has violated the demobilization provisions of the peace accords as well as harming the full implementation of the civil police force.

Both the presence and absence of the new police force, The National Civilian Police (PNC), created difficulties in post-war Guatemala. “Corruption continued to be a problem with the old police force, and there were credible allegations of involvement by some individual police in criminal activity, including kidnapping” (SDHRR, 6). Due to the slow implementation of the new civil police force, parts of Guatemala were still without a police force. A recent Amnesty International (AI) Report stated the following:

*High rates of violent crime, including kidnappings, “social cleansing,” attacks on street children and lynchings were reported . . . In some areas, people responded to the increasing crime rate by taking the law into their own hands, lynching suspected petty criminals* (2).

About ninety people were lynched for crimes from murder to theft; half of the victims were executed by mobs (AI, 3). The murder of Bishop Juan Gerardi in April 1998 by an assailant with a brick in his garage is an example of masked political violence at the highest level. The number of street children who reside mostly in urban areas is reported to be around 1,500 to 5,000; “criminals — reported to include private security guards and corrupt police or military personnel — often recruit these children into thievery or prostitution rings” (SDHRR, 12). The 1997 government statistics on crime are worth citing.

*Police reported more than 2,500 deaths by firearms or weapons—almost 15 a day—but only 278 people were arrested for homicide . . . 134 lynchings and almost 200 kidnappings. Bank robberies, which came into vogue near the end of the year, numbered 52* (GNIB, Feb. 1998).

It is impossible to state with certainty how accurate these statistics are, but as Gurr states, police reports tend to be minimal representatives to the number of actual crimes due to under-reporting and other causes (17).

Knowing the real social crime culprit is often difficult. The government has blamed drug trafficking and looting on the opposition when they were responsible. Keen writes:

*There is evidence that, with Guatemala's role in the cocaine trade growing in the 1990s, the Guatemalan Army has falsely blamed the URNG for its own drug trafficking activities. Drug profits contributed to a real-estate boon from which Army officers benefited (24).*

Guatemala is a transit country for the shipment of cocaine and produces opium and cannabis (CIA Factbook, 9). Thus, there is a strong presence of international cartels in Guatemala, who have an interest in perpetuating violence and instability. With the ambiguity of who is at fault and a lack of accountability, social crime will continue to harm the implementation of the peace accords as the privatization of security becomes a major business that will continue to institutionalize the presence of violence and corruption in Guatemalan society. Thus, social crime is a major problem in Guatemala, which may limit any form of desirable peace to take shape.

## MOZAMBIQUE

After sixteen years of civil war, the parties to the conflict — RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Mocambicano) and FRELIMO (Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique) — signed the General Peace Agreement (GPA) on October 4, 1992. The UN outlined four major task areas in the implementation stage for ONUMOZ (the UN Operation in Mozambique): political, humanitarian, electoral, and military. The four areas entailed specific functions for peacekeepers. The military had the duty of monitoring the cease-fire, the separation of forces, demobilization, disarmament, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and the disbanding of private armies (Reed, 282-3). The humanitarian force conducted the return and integration of refugees, soldiers, and displaced persons. The Electoral Division was to ensure the freedom of organization and access to the parties running for election, serve as educator and legal advisor of the process, and verify that the elections were free and fair. The political tasks mainly included overseeing the creation of the Mozambique civil police. Overall, the mission consisted of 255 international civilian staff, 565 local hires, 1,200 short-term UN election observers, and 6,843 military and civilian police personnel (Reed, 286 & 289). Despite the presence of UN personnel to stabilize the country, social crime was a rampant problem that threatened implementation. ONUMOZ existed from December 1992 to December 1994.

With an annual income of \$100 per person, Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world. The lack of stable economic indicators was so significant that the World Bank and other international organizations measured the resilience of the formal post-war economy by how well formal bank rates met black market rates (Nordstrom, 1998, 14). Adult unemployment is estimated to be around fifty percent (SDHRR, 19). Economic conditions fuel social crime. Oosthuysen blames unemployed, but armed former soldiers, who not only function in the cities, but also form roving bands in the countryside who rob and loot; these soldiers also use violence publicly as a bargaining strategy through strikes and riots to demand more government assistance (79). Reed notes:

*Although Mozambique settled into general peace after the GPA was signed, banditry increased throughout the country as a consequence of the ready availability of weapons, the country's general state of disarray, and the presence of large numbers of now underemployed and underpaid soldiers and guerrilla fighters. Because they contributed to a sense of lawlessness and instability, incidents of banditry posed a greater threat to the peace process than cease-fire violations (292).*

As for the role of formal, internal actors in social crime, the police forces in Mozambique are deeply involved. Even now, large caches of weapons are in criminal hands (AI, 1998), largely due to the assistance of the police. Gun shops and gunsmiths are illegal in Mozambique, so the way to obtain a weapon is through corrupt police officers; this policy increases the power of the black market for weapons because it makes acquisition easier and cheaper (Oosthuysen, 65). The State Department cited extensive police force corruption, which included extortion, bribe taking, harassment, rape, theft, car jacking (an accusation that police also arm car jackers), and the beating and killing of women, street children, and other citizens (1998). Additionally, the Director of the Criminal Investigation Police, Domingos Maltos, "publicly stated that the police forces are infiltrated by crime syndicates" (SDHRR, 4).

States in transition are full of contradictions. Take the following examples that involve children. A sector accused of corruption is the educational system in Mozambique, which is said to demand bribes from parents in order for school children to receive passing grades (SDHRR, 16). This charge demonstrates the extent to which corruption permeates the society, making tasks like education even unmanageable. Child prostitution and the use of children to either settle disputes or accounts in rural areas are also noted problems (SDHRR, 17).

As for the implementation of free and fair elections, not surprisingly, charges of fraud, embezzlement, and the registration of minors and foreigners existed (Reed, 300). Concern over the weapons still at large also impacted the electoral process, as former combatants threatened violence. The elections did proceed successfully after some last minute recalcitrance by RENAMO, but international observers monitored and gave their stamp of approval.

One of the most challenging implementation tasks in Mozambique was the integration of combatants. The UN set up forty-nine assembly points for demobilization. In all, 90,000 soldiers were demobilized and:

*supplied with transport to the district of their choice, as well as eighteen months' salary . . . However, the general lack of economic opportunity in Mozambique has made this integration problematic. Evidently, demobilized soldiers have sold their weapons to support their families . . . The sale of weapons spells cash to buy transportation, food, shelter and medical equipment . . . (Cock, 106).*

Both parties relinquished weapons that were in poor condition, complying with disarmament in a cursory manner. While it has been noted that the collection of weapons was not the responsibility of ONUMOZ, this mission provision has been criticized heavily.

Weapons are also a principal source of trade for profit and survival through regional networks. Mozambique is a main weapons supplier for other African states (Oosthuysen, 74); Reasons for this market stem from the corruption in the new military, which is plagued by low salaries, deficient discipline, low morale, and the ready markets in other African states (Cock, 105), as weapons can either be traded for actual currency or goods. Lest this not be categorized into stereotypical terms, women trade AK-47s for second hand clothing and food like chickens (Cock, 108).

On the international side, there are accusations that weapons handed over to peacekeepers during demobilization were largely lost or stolen when the UN abandoned weapons storehouses upon exiting the country (Oosthuysen, 65). Cock states these storehouses were unguarded “with no independent verification of the storage” (105). Can this be simply a case of incompetence on the part of peacekeepers or did they have an interest in seeing these weapons so readily available? This is not something that can be linked with evidence, but it does beg the question. Were ONUMOZ peacekeepers involved in either turning a blind eye to the theft of weapons or did they participate in some manner? Whatever the answer, such loose disarmament strategies made demobilization less accurate.

Even on a minor level, accusations of violence and abuse to the local people by peacekeepers seriously affect implementation. *Reuters News Service* reported the following:

*Sixteen Nampula {Mozambique} residents accused Portuguese UN soldiers of racism, violence and sexual abuse. The signatories said they did not want to go as far as Somalis have gone against UN forces, but added: “We will not allow Portuguese blue helmets to beat us up and humiliate our girlfriends as if they were tramps. If they continue, we will take action ourselves at our own risk” (October 8, 1993).*

Not only does this highlight abuses by some peacekeepers, but it also demonstrates the effect such actions have on the population. These residents are quoted as saying they will respond (and violence is suggested) if peacekeepers continue. Relationships between peacekeepers and the local populations are better served by respect and trust as opposed to animosity and violence.

Some ex-combatants participate in international organized crime rings with the cooperation of legitimate enterprises. Two main interests for the informal markets are the animal trade (both actual animals and exotic parts) and drugs. Former soldiers function as poachers in the trade of ivory and other specialized animal products (Cock, 98). Poaching is also done in Kruger National Park by Mozambican meat syndicates (Oosthuysen, 83). With its prime geographic location on the Indian Ocean, Mozambique is a significant transit point for drugs (Gelbard, 177), such as South American cocaine, but it is also a producer of hashish and methaqualone or mandrax (CIA Factbook, 8). Additionally, heroin crosses through Mozambique, largely through the same smuggling routes established during the civil war (Venter, 185). All segments of society participate. Women are coerced to be couriers by armed gangs who hold their children for ransom until their successful delivery and return. Yet again, the complex environment of organized crime presents great challenges to the international community.

Perhaps one of the ways in which the UN failed to address social crime was by not treating it as its problem. Reed writes:

*ONUMOZ extended its military patrols outside the main corridors in response but its mandated tasks remained limited to patrolling, observing, and reporting. Force Commander da Silva, who interpreted the mandate narrowly, was reluctant to become involved in dealing with banditry, once reprimanding an Italian commander for intervening in a robbery and delivering the perpetrators to the Mozambican police (292).*

The concern of da Silva's is understandable, but could not a more extensive UN deployment have served to counter some lawlessness even if not completely? Thus, an ONUMOZ mission that dealt with social crime was missing. Due to the lack of trust in the police force by the local populations and the proper skills by the indigenous police, a mission component that addressed the task of creating civil order may have been appropriate. While the UN would be hesitant to use its infantry divisions for such a purpose, military police might be more feasible. However, in the long run, the UN civil police might be an appropriate answer, "but the UN needs to do much more in the way of screening and training to improve both the competence and the image of the police components that it deploys in peacekeeping operations" (Reed, 302).

While the UN mission in Mozambique conducted elections and dispersed humanitarian assistance, demobilizing combatants and creating a civil police force proved difficult. Had more energy gone into addressing social crime, instead of turning a blind eye and saying that it was not in the mandate, perhaps an environment of stability could have been created, which would have resulted in a more successful implementation of the peace accords. Even years after the signing, there is still cause for concern over social crime, but as is often the case in limited peacekeeping missions, the UN is no longer there, and the problem continues. With ongoing monitoring and assistance, civil and military branches might have addressed this topic so that peace could be fully implemented in Mozambique as opposed to a peace filled with social crime.

## CONCLUSIONS AND ASSESSMENTS

After examining the cases, certain trends are apparent in the implementation of peace accords. The reconstruction tasks that are severely affected by social crime are the same in each of the cases, where such provisions are included in the peace accords.

- Distribution of humanitarian relief.
- Demobilization.
- Reintegration.
- Creation of civil police.
- Creation of judiciary.

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- Return of refugees.
  - Protection of human rights.

These accord provisions are difficult to implement and are largely impacted by social crime. Considering the importance of each item, such conclusions denote the importance of addressing social crime in peacekeeping missions. If international actors' goals are to implement the various provisions according to the timeline outlined in the accords, then any interference by social crime should be addressed in some policy manner.

Another category that highlights the situation on the ground are the factors that exist in the social crime environment. These include:

- High unemployment, inflation, poverty, or unequal income distribution.
- Unemployed and armed former combatants.
- Absence of social control by the state, prompting the increase in local bands and rogue policing.
- Ready availability of weapons throughout the area.
- Use of street children and former child soldiers by organized crime syndicates.
- Corruption throughout numerous layers of society.
- Impunity.
- Intimidation tactics directed toward "legitimate" actors.

Accord implementation only addresses the topics that are outlined in the peace agreement, but if the above factors are not addressed in some manner, social crime will continue, thus fueling the state of violence in the implementation stage. With continued insecurity, both internal and external actors will be frustrated by halting progress. Implementation plans should examine the functions of violence (not just the causes) in society (Keen, 74). This lens allows actors to see how violence is used as political capital and the environment it creates for illicit pursuits that support the interests of both legitimate and nonlegitimate actors. Addressing social crime overall will allow actors to better establish policies that actually tackle the main issues that underlie social disorder.

### **CONDITIONAL COOPERATION**

Different conditions produce different types of cooperation. Areas where armed peace enforcement components exist will involve perhaps less coordination between civil and military groups than ones where enforcement is absent. How do we envision cooperation, however? Cooperation can be defined as actions between individuals or groups who realize

their self interest can be achieved either more effectively through working with another group or individual they could otherwise compete with (Spar, 6).

After the magnitude of implications this paper has outlined for social crime, what can civil and military groups possibly do to address this problem? There will be no quick fixes, but there are actions these actors can apply in the post-war state. Possible suggestions for increased cooperation between civil and military components that directly address social crime fall into two categories: direct and indirect. Direct actions are ones that strategically address the problem of social crime involving both actor types. Indirect actions are more general policies that increase the cooperation between civil and military actors in peace operations.

### DIRECT ACTIONS

- Realization that social crime is more than “common crime” or banditry.
- Admission of the necessity of some form of internal policing in peacekeeping missions and the need for civil actors’ involvement (especially law enforcement).
- Acceptance and respect of the civil and military actors’ roles in the implementation stage.
- Use of models like Australians Civil-Military Operations Teams (CMOT) in Baidoa, Somalia whose tasks included coordination with local leaders, NGOs, and UN political actors, support for humanitarian operations, the distribution of food stuffs, security for NGO compounds, and direct involvement in re-establishing the civil police and judiciary (Williams, 63).
- Closer and continued monitoring of social crime and the relevant actors.
- Constant and consistent diplomatic pressure on local actors for compliance of peace provisions, especially the ones directly threatened by social crime .
- Civil and military collaboration on studies and reports on social crime during implementation and its effects on reconstruction.
- Sharing of information on social crime and culprits by both sides.
- More widespread distribution of peacekeeping and civil actors throughout the country, especially in rural areas, where roving bands seize local control.
- Incentive-based policy for weapon recovery (targeted to street children and child soldiers).

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- Complete and verifiable removal or disposal of disarmed weapons, drugs, or other seized goods by internal/external actors .
  - International mechanism for peacekeeper abuses and collaboration in crime.
  - Enhanced inspection and equipment at points of entry and exit by both civil and military actors to control weapons and drugs.
  - Security for civil actors.

Some of these policy recommendations require either a cultural or tactical alteration. While the international community is relatively new to missions that involve multidimensional peacekeeping, it must incorporate innovative strategies that increase the cooperation between the essential reconstruction actors. Past experiences in peacekeeping missions such as in Bosnia, Tajikistan, Guatemala, and Mozambique are instructive in modeling future operations. Let us highlight what are the most crucial aspects from the above list.

Security for civil organizations and the media is crucial in allowing both an execution of their duties as well as the monitoring they provide on the ground. In order for the peace accords to be implemented, civil branches must be able to work in their respective areas. Without a relatively secure environment, implementation will be patchy and ineffective. Additionally, if the media are targets of violence, their crucial reporting presence of abuses on the ground may disappear. While no group appreciates criticism of its action, peacekeeping forces will have to accept both functions of journalism. They serve as an example of the transparency that should exist in societies moving towards peace and free elections.

Even though the international community may hesitate to take responsibility for tasks that involve social order, it should be a permanent component of all missions. While the four cases outlined here detail the increase in social crime, they are not the only examples. Somalia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Angola, Haiti, the Republic of Georgia are other areas where this has been a noted problem. It is understandable that this be a task that missions exclude from the mandate, but some form will be needed if implementation is to continue on its timetable and done so in a compliant manner.

As for the contribution of peacekeepers to social crime and black market activities, Williams states “specific international mechanisms need to be established to monitor, investigate, and report violations by peacekeeping personnel . . .” (74). Increased screening of the motives of volunteers, especially in the civilian police division (like the IPTF in Bosnia) may reduce the number of volunteers whose principle motive is economic — an interest well served in the informal markets of the transition state. Their participation in the black market as buyers is a concern for the effect it causes in creating an “artificial” economy, which can cause problems if more stable and formal mechanisms are not implemented. In so far as peacekeepers and other external components participate in social crime, be it in violence, arms running, or drug trafficking, such actions must be addressed in a consistent manner.

### INDIRECT ACTIONS

- Creation of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) structures or Civil-Military Operations Teams (CMOT), involving specialists in law enforcement, education, public transport, engineering, public health, and communication .
- Regular meetings of civil and military actors with contentious issues being decided by the Special Representative.
- Increased border patrol by peacekeepers and international civil police and training to local police officers, especially targeting arms and drugs.
- Enhanced joint training of civil and military actors.
- Steady donor support for NGOs.
- Increased dialogue between international agencies like the World Bank and IMF.
- A reexamination of whether the Military Staff Committee (MSC) should be strengthened and reorganized.

These indirect strategies would increase cooperation between civil and military actors, which could potentially raise their effectiveness in addressing social crime. They require institutional changes that will not be easy to secure, but there is already some progress. CIMICs and CMOTs are increasingly becoming a permanent component of peacekeeping missions, which allow for a better coordination and cooperation structure for civil and military actors on the ground.

A regular dialogue between the players — civil and military — may enhance cooperation and coordination of implementation activities. If the mandate is clear in the beginning, and the needs and resources spelled out specifically, infighting among these groups may be reduced. Involving other civil groups not part of the civil component of the mission is key in weaving together a firm implementation force that can effectively usher in the first strands of peace.

The MSC is worth discussing for a moment. It is a possible policy option that would increase military input to the Secretary General, doing away with the military's concern that peacekeeping plans made by the Security Council do not have sufficient strategic information (Williams, 69). There is much controversy over expanding the duties of this group. States certainly may object for various reasons, but in so far as this group's main purpose would be offering military advice to the highest UN policy makers, such an addition may increase the effectiveness of future peacekeeping missions.

Another area fraught with coordination problems is the IGO level. "Part of the problem appears to have been the rigid division of responsibilities between international agencies, with the World Bank and IMF handling economic reconstruction — which has made macro-economic reform a priority — and the UN supervising the peace process itself" (Keen, 67-8).

Increased dialogue and coordination between these groups may ensure a more successful implementation on the ground. These groups are so far removed from the conflict site that they need to dialogue with actors who serve the area and are aware of the political reality and needs. Those with the purse must speak to those who will spend it.

### **DIFFICULT TASKS IN A DIFFICULT SPACE**

With the complexities that are present with social crime in the implementation stage, what can the international community's objectives be realistically? In so far as the reduction of violence is the main one, measures that address the more violent aspects of social crime must be created. As economic development is a major necessity if the peace accords are to be successful, it is unlikely that any feasible plan would state that there must be an eradication of the black market.

There will always be black markets and organized crime, especially in the transition stage; such aspects are present in the most developed countries. Additionally, the black market serves the interests of society: it provides a space by which goods and services can be bought and traded for survival and profit. Is that not the definition of an economy? Certainly, economies in post-war transition will be just that — in transition. The creation of a formal economy will take many years (how long, we do not know), but in the meantime, the violent environment in the area must become more stable for long-term progress to occur. Even in this multidimensional stage, there are ways in which civil and military components can address social crime. However, before any suggestions are incorporated into reconstruction missions, commitment from both civil and military actors to cooperate must be present.

The post-accord environment is not for unilateral players. If international crime syndicates can realize that, should not the international community, composed of civil and military actors, do the same? Despite the different objectives, international players could benefit from studying the structure, penetration, efficiency, effectiveness, and premeditated connections that these syndicates cultivate. The external impression of conflict zones is that there is minimal control. However, both local and international crime syndicates divide the space according to function and interest for transport, export, and distribution. If civil and military actors are to enact their mission mandates, they must, at some level, compete with these crime groups. Through cooperation, civil and military actors have a chance of interlinking the ropes that hold the net of peace together. Any defection from such coordination will allow leakage. The main question is how much leakage and what harm it will do to the implementation of the peace accords. Social crime is an enormous problem in post-war transition and missions that do not address it within its own context will fall into the peril of ineffectiveness, which may lead us from transition to war again.

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