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A Proposal for Cooperation between Defense and non-Defense Agencies in Support of Smaller Scale Contingencies, in the Context of Longer-Term Planning

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Andrew Nicholls served six years in the Royal Australian Navy before Majoring in Psychology at the University of New South Wales. After two years working in Non-Government Organizations in child welfare and advocacy for persons with disabilities and their carers Andrew joined the Australian Department of Defence. Mr. Nicholls received a Defense scholarship to undertake a Masters of Defence Studies and has been involved in research and software development in support of capability development and analysis of longer-term planning issues. Andrew is currently the project manager, within Program Analysis and Evaluation, for Smaller Scale Contingencies analysis where he is on exchange from the Australian Department of Defence.

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the benefits that might be gained from greater cooperation between Defense long-term planners and non-Defense organizations involved in humanitarian relief operations. It also outlines a mechanism through which such cooperation might take place. In presenting these elements the paper firstly outlines the environment within which the U.S. military has been engaged in, particularly the increasing challenges of more complex and frequent operations following the end of the Cold War. It then presents a specific proposal for cooperation between Defense and non-Defense agencies. The paper concludes by outlining some of the analysis and thinking that is currently underway within Defense on how the potential impacts of Smaller Scale Contingencies are being analyzed.

LONG-TERM PLANNING: NGO AND DEFENSE BENEFITS

CONTEXT

Following the Soviet Union's collapse there was recognition that the United States might more frequently be called upon to undertake military operations short of major theater war[1].

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[1] Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Les Aspin, October 1993, page 8.

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History has largely confirmed this assessment. Between 1975 and 1990 there were some 15 significant military operations[2] that involved US forces. In contrast, from the end of the Persian Gulf war in February 1991 till early 1999 there have been 34 similar military operations involving U.S. military personnel[3]. This later number increases to around 50 when humanitarian type operations are added. This increase in frequency of deployment has also been matched by an increase in the diversity of employment. Table 1 summarizes the U.S. recent experiences in SSC operations.

Type of Operation	Number of Operations
Crisis Response/Show of Force	3
Limited Strike	3
Noncombatant Evacuation	9
No-Fly Zone	4
Maritime Sanctions Enforcement	4
Migrant Operations	6
Peace Operations	10
Humanitarian Assistance	9
Support to Other US Agencies	1

Table 1: Major[4] Overseas SSC Operations (March 1991 – February 1999).

While this change in the actual employment of U.S. Military force was anticipated there was a strongly held belief that a force structured for major war would be sufficient for the anticipated increase in other operations. That is Defense's longer-term strategic understanding and subsequent programmatic choices were premised on the ability of a force structured for major theater war being adequate and sufficient for what the United States now calls Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSC). The Bottom-Up Review (BUR) noted that:

> *Fortunately, the military capabilities needed for these operations are largely those maintained for other purposes — major regional conflicts and overseas presence.*[5]

Consequently decisions made in the Bottom Up Review and similar reviews, that have shaped and transformed the United States Defense force in dramatic ways, have not considered SSCs as a force driver. The impact that such reviews have brought to Defense programs, and subsequent capabilities, have not been insignificant. Broad numerical comparisons can be can be illustrative of the quantum changes now taking place. Table 2 provides a summary of the types of changes that have occurred to selected major force elements during the 1990s.

Element	Early 1990s	Late 1990s

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[2] Excluding classified operations, disaster relief and operations within the U.S. and includes only operations in the order of 500 deployed personnel and those that might be regarded as Named. Derived from: Instances of Use of United States Forces Abroad, 1789 – 1993.

[3] Report to Congress on U.S. Military Involvement in Major Smaller-Scale Contingencies since the Persian Gulf War, March 1999.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Report on the Bottom-Up Review, *ibid.*, page 9.

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Active Personnel	2 Million	<1.4 Million
Reserve Personnel	1.9 Million	< 0.9 Million
Active Army Divisions	18	10
Air Force Fighter Wings	36	19
Ships	547	314

Table 2: Changes to U.S. military during 1990s[6].

Recent stresses have resulted in a number of changes attributable to the demands of SSC operations. Services have initiated several operational and organizational changes to mitigate the demands of high PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO. These include the Navy's reduction in Inter-Deployment Training Cycle requirements, the Army's decision to rotate CONUS-based forces to Bosnia, and the Air Force's Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) initiative. This, of course, does not imply that the relationship between SSC involvement and PERSTEMPO/OPTEMPO is a simple one.

These changes mirrored a growing recognition that more analysis needed to be undertaken on the impacts of SSCs in the context of longer-term planning. Most recently this was articulated in the 1999 Defense Annual Report. It reiterates the point that the U.S. Department of Defense (US DoD) remains committed to being capable of meeting the diverse range of missions assigned to it by the U.S. government into the future. In recognition of the need to understand SSCs it notes:

> *SSC operations will require that the U.S. government, including DoD and other agencies, continuously and deliberately reassess both the challenges encountered in such operations and the capabilities required to meet these challenges.*[7]

A PROPOSAL FOR COOPERATION IN THE CONTEXT
OF LONGER-TERM PLANNING

In meeting these challenges it would seem self-evident that there are great benefits to be had from Defense and non-Defense organizations sitting down together and discussing their mutual interests in SSC operations. In ongoing operations the benefits of closer coordination have been clearly recognized and both regional commanders and other agencies are reaping the rewards.

There is no reason not to expect that these same benefits can be had at the longer-term strategic levels. I have already outlined the significant changes that have occurred to the major Defense elements in the context of longer-term planning. The ability to engage in discussions with appropriate organizations within the U.S. DoD would offer a unique opportunity for NGOs and IOs to present their concerns, interests and thoughts to Defense at

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[6] Report to Congress on U.S. Military Involvement in Major Smaller-Scale Contingencies since the Persian Gulf War, March 1999.
[7] Ibid., page 18.

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a time when fundamental changes in the capacity of the U.S. to undertake future SSC operations are being considered.

Similar benefits would be open to Defense. To whatever extent SSC operations may shape strategy and associated programmatic choices, Defense must be capable of providing reasoned and considered advice on such issues. In this regard there is great benefit to Defense from engaging in discussions with other organizations that participate in these operations. The ability to undertake dialogue with a range of agencies on their perceptions and understanding of longer-term trends, requirements and capabilities would particularly benefit this analysis.

In summary, there is value to both Defense and non-Defense agencies in the mutual recognition of their domain expertise and capabilities. In this regard there appears to be significant benefits to be had from sitting down together and working through some of the issues that affect agencies in the longer-term context. This would certainly be a new approach in the context of longer-term planning and would therefore require a great deal of confidence building on both sides. A large part of this process would involve the establishment of on going dialogue, and the development of shared understandings of interests, perspectives and differences.

To facilitate the development of such understanding, a forum could be developed over the next year for exchanging views on the roles of major assistance-providing participants in SSC. Such a forum could provide the various actors including the DoD, IOs, and NGOs with a mutual understanding of their functional capabilities as well as provide a conduit to inform each other of longer term planning issues relevant to humanitarian operations. The outcome of such a group might be the production of a paper that would enable the insights of the group to be presented to the broader defense community.

In order to allow Defense to negotiate its way through this process it would be strongly desirable to engage knowledgeable facilitators from outside of Defense — a party with broad credibility. This would assist both the development of a professional end product and smoothing the process of communications between the differing organizational types.

DEFENSE ANALYSIS

CONTEXT

In order to understand how such discussions might be incorporated into Defense it is helpful to outline some of the work that is currently taking place in the longer-term analysis of SSCs. The primary focus of this work — lead by PA&E in cooperation with the Joint Staff and Defense Policy — is analytical support to decisions affecting the shape and capabilities of future U.S. forces. These include, but are not limited to:

- How adequate is the projected DoD program for achieving U.S. objectives for SSC operations?

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- What are the relative importance of certain types of DoD capabilities to support SSC's?

- What SSC capabilities should be provided by US DoD?

- What SSC capabilities could be provided more effectively/efficiently by others?

- How fast can DoD respond to SSC requirements?

- What are the implications from rapidly disengaging from SSC operations?

Before these areas could be properly investigated it was important to deal with two significant 'assumptions' about SSC's. Firstly, due to the vast nature of MTW, SSC's were assumed by some to be a lesser-included case and therefore did not warrant analysis. Secondly, the very complexity, and uniqueness of SSC operations was regarded by some as 'defying analysis'. In brief, these objections were dismissed on the following grounds:

Lesser included case:

- SSCs have a potentially wider set of objectives.

- Many SSCs potentially stress different types of units than MTW.

- SSCs can last for extended periods of time (decades in some instances).

- Since the U.S. military is often in a supporting role in SSC's operational concepts can be very different form MTW.

- U.S. military is often used in non-traditional roles in SSC operations.

- Impact of SSC's is not simply a function of a single operation, but part of a complex problem set of multiple operations and global demands.

Complexity:

- Uniqueness is reduced if a reasonable categorization process can be achieved.

- Properly developed scenario sets — well accepted in MTW analysis — allowed for clear and shared assumptions.

- The very complexity of SSCs is an important reason why analysis is important.

There are also a number of challenges to SSC analysis, and the ability to undertake this work. These include:

- *Historical data to support the necessary analysis is difficult to obtain.* US force participation is often difficult to obtain at the level of detail necessary for

the scale of operations under analysis. Gathering validated data on contributions from NGO's, IO's and host nations is often problematic.

- *It is also not always clear what Defense's role actually was in an operation when compared to its endorsed tasks.* For a variety of reasons military forces from all countries often exceed the limits of their prescribed tasks, or their endorsed tasks are quite opaque. A simple linking of actual forces to endorsed tasks may not necessarily provide analytical insight to the purposes for which forces were employed. There is also little data on the historical basis for matching forces to tasks and the adequacies of those forces in meeting such tasks in actual operations.

- *The scale of these operations falls well below MTW around which Defense's, tools, data and assumptions have been built.* Consequently there are few analytical tools available to assist comprehensive SSC analysis. Furthermore, due to the relative scales the required details for SSC's are normally assumed away in MTW analysis.

Despite the reservation over the achievability of analysis and other challenges facing SSC analysis, and as previously noted, there is a growing interest in developing analytical techniques and insight into SSCs. Defense has well-developed capabilities for 'Blue on Red' analysis and, therefore, the focus of this current work is the sub-set of SSC that are primarily humanitarian in nature. To complete this analysis, PA&E, the Joint Staff and Policy are undertaking an incremental approach to build an understanding of SSC and their potential programmatic effects. There are three parts to PA&E's approach and they build on each other's insights and techniques.

- Understanding the affects of a single SSC.

- Understanding the affects of multiple SSC.

- Understanding the affects of multiple SSC over time.

Turning first to the individual SSC, we believe for analytic purposes, an SSC can be decomposed into several analytic phases.

- *Phase one:* Identification of requirements.

- *Phase two:* Identification of capabilities to meet those requirements;

- *Phase three:* Movement of these capabilities to the crisis region.

- *Phase four:* Movement of these capabilities within the region to their operating location;

- *Phase five:* Conduct of the operation; and,

- *Phase six:* Withdrawal of these capabilities from the crisis area.

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A survey of existing tools convinced us that (a). no single tool currently existed that would allow analysis of all phases of an SSC operation, (b). existing tools, properly matched to the requirements of each phase, could be utilized in a system of systems approach. The approach has allowed us to tackle five of these six phases. Further work is being undertaken to determine how we might analyze the conduct of operation for our long-term planning purposes.

In our analysis, SSC phases begin with a crisis somewhere in the world, which might involve U.S. humanitarian or other interests. The first phase of crisis analysis is to identify the overall demands of the crisis. To the extent possible, our aim is to identify total demand. This is to avoid making prior assumptions about the 'share' of work between various agencies. By doing this it is hoped that we will avoid embedding such assumptions within the problem set assumption that are critical areas for analysis and debate.

In phase two these demands are divided into those that can be met by capabilities already within the region and those that will need to be provided by outside sources. For purposes of our analysis, it is this latter demand which requires attention since this is the requirement that is likely to call upon the resources of the U.S. DoD. This second phase of analysis involves assessing international capabilities to meet that portion of the demand that cannot be satisfied by local capabilities. These capabilities will predominantly include non-military ones such as those resident within non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and domestic agencies such as the USAID. Our own experience is that the Joint Electronic Battle Book (JEB) tool originally developed by the Atlantic Command provides a useful tool. JEB's structure allows non-military assets as well as military assets to be assigned to various requirements such as water purification, food preparation, power generation etc.

The third and fourth phase involves the use of movement tools to transport these capabilities to the area of operation and then move them within that area to the point at which they are needed. These steps can provide a comprehensive analysis of the transportation requirements necessary to move capabilities identified in step two to the crisis area. This analysis can be simply reversed to provide a rough assessment of withdrawal — to achieve phase six. However, there is typically a transition period where military capabilities are drawn down more or less gradually and replaced by civilian assets which indicates the need for a more nuanced approach to withdrawal phase analysis than is required for the arrival phase.

While we have developed a process that will allow us to estimate the overall requirements of an SSC and whether there are sufficient resources to meet those demands, our capacity to actually model the details of a humanitarian operations—phase five—is limited at the present time. Further investigative work is currently underway to determine whether some simple timed phased modeling of the operation can be undertaken. We are also monitoring development of tools in other countries.

This approach to SSC analysis provides a considerable amount of material for measures of effectiveness, and evaluation, including factors relating to transportation, force size, time phasing, and so forth. It can also generate a great deal of information on the output of the contributing organizations such as numbers of meals produced, medical beds provided, gallons of water purified etc. If problems related to phase five (Conduct of Operations) can be resolved we will be able to develop greater insights into the conduct of an operation and

the impacts of success, failure or delay effect on particular elements (e.g. the effects of a slow security response on humanitarian relief) on the overall success and resource requirements of a humanitarian operation.

Such analysis of a single SSC forms a crucial building block for the analysis of multiple SSC operations occurring simultaneously. The problems of a single SSC operation is exacerbated when the U.S. DoD (and others) are required to simultaneously support a number of such operations. The solution to the analysis of this problem, we believe, needs to start from a combination of different SSC types — an SSC "stack" — so that the 'real world' cumulative affects of SSC can be captured. Such a stack needs only to be consistent, not identical, with historical and forecast trends to provide the appropriate vehicle to assess potential SSC affects. For purposes of analytic development, we believe it best to proceed by first analyzing a slice (such as a month or a quarter) in such a stack and then moving on to analyze a two (or longer) year period. The latter analysis would involve the additional complexity of accounting for troop and asset rotations, but provide insight into issues such as OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO. It is hoped that this analysis will provide sufficient insights to adequately answer some if not all of the SSC related programmatic issues confronting the DOD.

In conclusion, there are great benefits to be had from cooperation between Defense and other agencies in longer-term planning. Such exchanges will improve understandings between participants on overall capabilities, requirements, philosophies etc. In the shorter-term these insights could be shared within the Defense community through an appropriate forum and the circulation of proceeding throughout Defense and the wider community. Part of the direct benefits would also inform the analysis outlined within the second section of this paper. The longer-term benefits of such a cooperative venture should be aiding the ongoing improvements in capacity to respond to humanitarian disasters into the future.

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