

Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions

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ABSTRACT

Research has attempted to explain why some peacekeeping missions fail, while others succeed. By "success" is in this paper meant the absence of war during the deployment of the peacekeeping mission. The research is characterized by the case study approach aiming at learning lessons from past failures and successes, and has generated numerous reasonable generalizations. Implicit in the case study approach as well as in the term "lesson," is that there are general explanations that can account for peacekeeping missions' outcomes. Meanwhile, statistical tests have not been carried out in order to examine the generalizations' empirical validity on cases not included in case studies.

Using a dataset that includes all UN peacekeeping missions in intrastate conflicts up until December 1999 and is constructed with the peacekeeping operation calendar month as unit of analysis, this paper performs statistical tests of a number of propositions that refer to characteristics of peacekeeping missions. It is found that most of these characteristics have no statistically significant effect while variables that refer to causes of civil wars have strong effects.

INTRODUCTION

Under what conditions are peacekeeping missions successful? The considerable amount of research that has attempted to answer this question is characterized by the case study approach and has generated numerous reasonable generalizations or "lessons learned." Implicit in the case study approach as well as in the term "lesson", is that there are general explanations: If there are no generally applicable explanations because each peacekeeping mission is unique, then we can never learn lessons or generalize from past missions. While

general explanations invite the use of statistical methods, statistical tests have not been carried out in order to examine the validity of case study based generalizations. One way to contribute to this research area is then to assess whether and to what extent propositions on the success of peacekeeping mission are accurate using statistical tests. This paper does not have any theoretical or conceptual ambitions, only a simple empirical one: to statistically test a number of propositions, implied by the case study literature, on the conditions for successful peacekeeping missions.

Of the 110 armed conflicts during 1989-1999 (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2000), 103 were intrastate. These 103 cases took place in 67 countries, and 48 cases reached the level of “war.” (*Ibid.*). “War” refers to cases with an annual rate of at least 1000 battle related-deaths, while “conflict” refers to cases that have incurred at least 25 – but less than 1000 – battle deaths per year (*Ibid.*). Intrastate cases are apparently of the greatest humanitarian concern simply because of their numbers. In addition, intrastate conflicts lack well-specified war fronts that may shield the civilian population from becoming a direct war target. It is thus in intrastate conflicts that peacekeeping missions can have the largest impact on the quality of life. For this reason, this paper focuses upon intrastate peacekeeping. Using a data set that is constructed with the intrastate peacekeeping mission month as unit of analysis, this paper performs statistical tests of a number of propositions on conditions for successful UN peacekeeping missions. The data set includes all intrastate peacekeeping missions up until December 1999.

This paper is organized as follows. The second section contains a brief review of literature on the key concept of “success” and findings on whether and why peacekeeping missions are successful. The third section contains propositions that specify the conditions under which peacekeeping missions are successful, as well as control variables that are related to the causes of war literature. The propositions are merely a small sample of existing propositions and cover the mission, the mandate, and the field executive, and are not meant to be exhaustive or representative of the research area as a whole. The fourth section presents the data set, measurement principles and data sources for the variables found in the propositions of the third section, while the fifth section presents statistical findings obtained through Probit regression of a data set containing 1091 monthly observations. Finally, the sixth section contains conclusions as well as policy and research oriented implications

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

THE KEY CONCEPT OF “SUCCESS”

There is an academic discussion on how to judge the success of peacekeeping missions. For instance, Diehl (1994) suggests the criteria of reducing armed conflict, and contributing to conflict resolution (see also Druckman and Stern, 1997). Johansen (1994) argues that because peacekeeping missions often are not designed to address these issues, Diehl’s criteria are unsuitable. Another approach is to compare mission outcome with mandates, and/or whether missions hinder that conflict spreads to neighboring countries (Druckman and Stern, 1997. See also Bratt, 1996). The latter approach has been criticized on the basis that mandates are often vague, complex, and change during missions (*Ibid.*). Other suggested criteria include

whether the mission was efficiently planned and supplied, or that missions should be evaluated in the light of the constraints they operate under with regard to funding, material, personnel, and recalcitrance of the conflict parties, and whether a long- or short-term perspective should be applied. (*Ibid.*)

This paper uses “success” in the sense of war termination and war prevention, i.e., the absence of war, while the peacekeeping mission is deployed. The reason for this short-term perspective is that this is a primary – but certainly not the only – goal of peacekeeping missions. Other goals – such as addressing the underlying causes of the conflicts and war – are the object of political, civilian and humanitarian missions and initiatives, and can be more successfully pursued given that peace has been secured or war has been avoided. With this focus this paper positions itself in – and contributes to – an established statistical literature that deals with the onset, occurrence, and duration of intrastate wars. This literature in turn provides theoretical and empirical guidance for the statistical application.

ARE PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS SUCCESSFUL?

The scholarly literature holds that peacekeeping missions contribute to peace in two main ways (e.g., Diehl, 1987; Fortna, 2000). First, missions are believed to allow and “force” warring parties to separate their forces, and consequently help maintain cease-fires that in turn are assumed to make peace talks possible as well as more fruitful. Fortna (2000:7) denotes this function as “interposition.” Second, because warring parties are distrustful of each other, they will expect that the other party will not honor cease-fire agreements. This expectation will in turn undermine agreements as warring parties may pre-empt what is believed to be attacks from adversaries. Peacekeepers will under such circumstances serve their second function of “monitoring” (*Ibid.*) or external guarantors of the agreements. By monitoring compliance with agreements, mutual trust among warring parties is created. Because of an alleged international political cost that is assumed to follow upon violations of agreements monitored by UN peacekeepers, it has also been argued that peacekeepers may refrain insincere parties from restarting conflicts (*Ibid.*). In summary, peacekeeping missions are believed to contribute to peace by decreasing distrust among parties, and by increasing the cost of defection from agreements.

How successful have peacekeeping missions been? One piece of evidence is found in Diehl (1987: 48) who claims that “most missions have accomplished a minimization of armed conflict, but have been ineffective in helping to resolve the underlying sources of the dispute between the parties.” A less positive conclusion is provided by Bratt (1996) who examines the 39 peacekeeping missions between 1945 and 1996, and evaluates success in four ways: mandate performance, facilitation of conflict resolution, conflict containment, and limitation of casualties. Bratt claims that 19 missions were completely successful, and 3 moderately successful with regard to mandate performance. Eleven missions were completely successful and 3 moderately successful with regard to conflict containment (i.e., stopping the conflict from spreading to neighboring countries). 21 missions were completely successful and 4 moderately successful with regard to conflict resolution while 19 missions were completely successful and 4 moderately successful with regard to limitation of casualties.

Taking these figures at face value means that about 50% of all missions were failures regardless of success criterion.¹

Bratt answers the descriptive question of *whether* peacekeeping missions have been successful, but does not investigate whether there is a relationship between the presence of peacekeeping missions and peace in interstate as well as intrastate conflicts. Hence, can knowledge of whether a mission was present improve our ability to predict peace or war? Three statistical studies have addressed this second question.

Fortna (1998, 2000) attempts to statistically assess to what extent UN peacekeeping missions have been successful in ending interstate wars 1946-1992. The unit of analysis is the interstate war peace agreement, leading to a data set containing 47 observations.² Fortna's statistical studies show that *given that conflict parties have entered into a peace or cease-fire agreement*, peacekeeping missions as well as monitoring missions have no effect on the duration in calendar months of these agreements. Hence, having knowledge of whether a peacekeeping mission has been established would not assist us in predicting whether peace will follow an agreement. While not excluding the possibility that a different research design, statistical method, and different variable data may lead to a different result, this complete absence of an effect is surprising. This is so since it is often argued that comprehensive peace agreements make peacekeeping missions more likely to succeed (e.g., Bratt, 1997). It can be conjectured that peacekeeping missions are sent to cases where peace is most difficult to keep, and hence agreements are most likely to fail. Still, even if this conjecture is correct, then peacekeeping missions have apparently not been up to the task. Nevertheless, Fortna actually controls for variables that are believed to measure how likely peace agreements are to fail.

In contrast to Fortna who examines interstate wars, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) focus on civil wars. Their data set contains all civil wars since 1944 that had ended by 1997, or that were active as of December 1999, but had at least one "significant" settlement, truce or third-party peace mission since 1997, i.e., 124 observations.³ More to the point, the study examines whether the duration of peace after the end of the war is influenced by the presence of a peacekeeping mission as well as other variables. Similar to Fortna's findings, Doyle and Sambanis report that presence of UN missions has a barely statistically significant effect on the probability of a peaceful period of at least two years, and at least five years. Further analysis reveals that "traditional peacekeeping missions" ("[consent based] deployment of military units and civilian officials in order to facilitate the negotiated settlement of conflict") have negative effects, while enforcement missions and "multidimensional PKOs" ("[consent based] mission designed to implement a comprehensive negotiated agreement") that involve extensive civilian functions and components, have positive effects.

¹ Whether 50% should be regarded as good depends on whether we view the glass as half full or half empty. A success rate of 50% may be regarded as very good, considering the alternative for the cases in question. In addition, the cost of development aid in repairing the economic and political damage of a single civil war will outstrip the economic resources spent on a failed peacekeeping mission. This success rate may also be placed in some perspective by comparing it to the success rate of the business sector of the world when it comes to launching successful products. Perhaps the rate can also be compared to the success rate of venture capitalists.

² This unit of analysis means that conflict prevention missions are excluded.

³ Ibid. For this reason missions such as MINURCA and UNSMIIH are excluded.

These pioneering statistical studies indicate that *there is no general relationship between the presence of UN peacekeeping missions and (1) the durability of peace agreements in interstate wars, and (2) the duration of postwar peace in intrastate conflicts*. At best, any relationship applies to two mission types – multidimensional PKOs and enforcement missions – in intrastate cases. Though these statistical studies tell us that there is overall no *general* relationship, they do not preclude the possibility that – and raise the question of whether – a contingent relationship may exist. Hence, while the studies address the research question “is there a relationship between UN peacekeeping missions and peace?,” they raise the question “under what conditions are UN peacekeeping missions successful?” Statistical studies have not addressed this question.

WHY ARE PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS SUCCESSFUL?

A considerable amount of case study based “lessons learned” research has attempted to provide general explanations for why some peacekeeping missions fail, while others succeed.⁴ For instance, Diehl (1994) (see also Johansen, 1994) argues that peacekeeping is most likely to succeed when peacekeeping forces maintain neutrality, have the consent of the warring parties, only intervene in interstate conflicts⁵, are lightly armed, and use their weapons in self-defense only. Urquhart (1987: 258) argues that success is dependent on a viable and supportive political context, feasibility of the mandate, quality of the command, military discipline of the troops, and co-operation from the parties, among other factors. Malaquias (1996: 88) cites the importance of adequate resources, while Bratt (1997) argues for the importance of, e.g., a comprehensive settlement agreement, consent, impartiality, and the limited use of force. These generalizations are amenable to statistical tests and need to be statistically tested in order to determine their accuracy. However, not a single statistical test has been carried out so far.

The Brahimi report contains many widely held ideas on the sources of civil war that are claimed to “affect the difficulty of peace implementation” (p. 4-5): poverty, ethnicity, and democracy, just to mention a few of them. It is also common that Security Council resolutions make claims on the importance of poverty for civil war. For instance, S/RES/1123 (1997) on the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti is “Affirming the link between peace and development.” It can thus be argued in statistical applications that we cannot know whether a peacekeeping mission was successful, or whether there were no causes for war. To exemplify, there had not been any war in the Central African Republic when the UN decided to establish the MINURCA mission in 1996 to forestall war, and no war occurred during or after the mission. In this case it could be argued that it is not possible to determine whether the peace was due to the presence of MINURCA, or due to the absence of causes of war. Implicit in such an argument is that not all cases are equally war prone. This

⁴ See for instance Durch (1993), Diehl (1994), Malaquias (1996), Bratt (1997), *Report Of The Panel On United Nations Peace Operations: Comprehensive Review Of The Whole Question Of Peacekeeping Operations In All Their Aspects* (hereafter called “Brahimi report”), reports from the UN Lessons Learned Unit (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons>), and Fortna (1998, 2000).

⁵ If Diehl is correct, then two major implications follow: we should avoid sending peacekeeping missions to the conflicts and wars where they are most needed from a humanitarian perspective; because we should not send peacekeeping mission to intrastate cases, and because there are very few interstate wars, we could in practice phase out the UN peacekeeping operations department.

heterogeneity of war proneness is dealt with in this paper through the use of control variables on the sources of civil war that account for this heterogeneity. By controlling for the sources of civil war, the purpose is to generate less biased statistical estimates.

CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL PEACEKEEPING: 14 PROPOSITIONS

SOURCES OF CIVIL WAR

A cursory visual inspection of the civil war trend of the past 10 years suggests that democracies are less prone to experience civil war than other political systems. This impression is corroborated by statistical studies that have reported that type of political system has an important influence on the likelihood of civil war (cf. Heldt, 2000 for an overview). Instead of a linear relationship, in that the more democratic a country the lower the likelihood of civil war, the identified relationship is non-linear. Semi-democracies are most prone to experience civil war, autocracies are less prone, and democracies are least prone. The statistical studies in question argue that this finding is due to the difference in grievances, and the opportunities to vent grievances, that characterise different political systems: grievances for revolt in democracies are believed to be limited as democracy protects the rights and interests of citizens; grievances for revolt in autocracies are believed to be large, but so are also the personal risks for revolting; in semi-democracies grievances inducing revolt are believed to be large, but personal risks for revolting lower, compared to autocracies (*Ibid.*). While the interpretation of findings can be disputed because the findings build on aggregated data (*Ibid.*), the statistical relationship between regime type and civil war applies and is therefore taken into consideration. It can therefore be conjectured that *peacekeeping missions in democratic host states are more likely to be successful.*

A second set of statistical findings concerns the importance of ethnicity for civil war. Supported by anecdotes, it has become close to a conventional wisdom that multiethnic states are inherently more civil war prone than are ethnically homogenous states. Nevertheless, the non-anecdotal empirical evidence does not support such a simple proposition. There is an increasing amount of statistical evidence that societies consisting of two or a few more large ethnic groups, are more prone to civil wars than are ethnically homogenous societies as well as ethnically heterogeneous societies. (*Ibid.*) Just like semi-democracies, ethnically semi-homogenous states are also most civil war prone. Examples of such countries are Fiji, Rwanda, and Burundi. The explanation offered for this pattern is two-fold and focuses upon grievances and the co-ordination problem: whereas in ethnically homogenous societies there are no ethnically based causes for conflict, in multiethnic societies, such causes exist (Collier *et al.*, 1999); in ethnically fractionalised societies, it is more difficult to recruit members and maintain unity of rebel movements, than in ethnically polarised societies (*Ibid.*).

As the case with studies of the relationship between democracy and civil war, the interpretations of findings can be disputed (cf. Heldt, 2000), but the aggregate statistical relationship applies and is therefore taken into consideration. It can therefore be expected that *peacekeeping missions in host states with low or high levels of ethnic fragmentation are more likely to be successful.*

A third set of findings concerns the role of poverty. Past decades' patterns of civil war lends support to the commonly held view that poverty breeds conflict. In fact, the level of economic development with regard to GDP per capita has been shown to influence the war proneness of states, in that the larger the per capita income, the lower the likelihood of civil war (*Ibid.*). One offered explanation for this pattern is that poverty – i.e., grievances – breeds discontent (Henderson and Singer, 2000). Another explanation is that at low levels of economic development, individuals have little to lose but potentially much to gain from rebelling (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2000; Collier *et al.*, 1999). Once again, and as the case with the impact of democracy and ethnic homogeneity, interpretation of findings can be disputed (cf. Heldt 2000), but the aggregate statistical relationship applies and is therefore taken into consideration. On this basis the following proposition is generated: *the higher the GDP per capita in the host state, the more likely that a peacekeeping mission will be successful.*

A particularly strong relationship has been found between individual years. The state with regard to war and peace in a certain year is an almost perfect predictor of war and peace during the following year. Jackman (1999: 23-24) shows that this simple decision rule leads to a predictive accuracy of 96.5%. This implies that peacekeeping missions should be sent to countries that are at peace, either because a peace agreement has been applied, or because war has not yet broken out. Expressed differently, and as often is suggested by scholars, peacekeeping missions are most likely to succeed when there is a peace to keep. From this follows a testable proposition: *peacekeeping missions are more likely to become successful if the previous period of time was characterized by peace.*

Scholarly attention has recently focused on the issues over which wars are waged and armed force is used. An emerging and inductively based scholarly view holds that incompatible positions over the allocation of territory (i.e., the parties' demands concern either border adjustments or the distribution of territories) amount close to a necessary condition for interstate war (Heldt, 1993; Diehl, 1992; Goertz and Diehl, 1992; Vasquez, 1993, 1995; Kocs, 1995; Huth, 1996; Heldt, 1999; Vasquez and Henehan, 2001)⁶. These claims receive strong support from data on territorial disputes and interstate war between 1950 and 1990 (Heldt, 1999). This empirical pattern may not appear surprising when considering that the charters of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe state that threats to the territorial integrity of a country constitute a "just" cause of war (cf. Nordquist, 1998).

A similar importance of territory can be found for intrastate wars and armed conflicts short of war. In these cases rebels demand autonomy or independence (e.g. PKK versus the government of Turkey). Another issue in intrastate wars and armed conflicts is government, in that one party demands partial or total government control and/or change of the political system (e.g., NPA versus the government of the Philippines). It appears impossible to identify intrastate wars that did not involve one of these issues (cf. Wallenstein and Sollenberg, 2000).

⁶ It has meanwhile been disputed whether territory is a cause of war, or just a convenient excuse for wars which are initiated for other reasons (Kocs, 1995). It can also be argued that the relationship is a tautology, or due to conceptual crudeness. However, a discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.

What character do these issues have, that is, why are these issues important? Limiting the suggestions to intrastate armed conflicts, issues of government and territory are identical in the sense that they ultimately concern who is to make authoritative decisions, and according to which principles, over a number of people in a defined territory. This indicates that the two issues of government and territory can be described at an even more aggregated level – governance. An empirical example of the relatedness of these two issues is the intrastate armed conflict in Yemen during 1994. Initially, former South Yemen voiced dissatisfaction with the way in which governmental posts were allocated. After its grievances were not addressed, it decided to achieve political control through secession. This led to full-scale civil war in mid-1994.

One possible explanation for why the property of governance is important is that all non-anarchic gatherings of peoples are hierarchically organized. Given hierarchical organization, governance becomes the ultimate resource for regulating any intra-state incompatibility. With control of government and/or territory an important tool is at hand for regulating all incompatibilities, fulfilling all interests, goals, needs, etc., or for addressing other kinds of grievances. Government and territory are thus important “keys” and it might be difficult to imagine other issues with such potentially large implications in hierarchically organized societies that they are worth the costs and risks of war.

As of today there has been no statistical research on whether the issue of government is more civil war prone, and once civil war has broken out, leads to less easily resolved wars, than is the case with the issue of territory. There is meanwhile some indirect evidence, in that one study reports that ethnic civil wars – wars where rebel groups can be identified along ethnic lines – lead to wars of longer duration (Lindsay and Enterline, 1999). It is reasonable to assume that ethnic civil wars correspond with wars over territory to a great extent. There are meanwhile many conjectures on this subject matter. For instance, the Brahimi report (p. 4) conjectures that “political and economic objectives may be more fluid and open to compromise than objectives related to [...] ethnicity [...]” and therefore affect the success rate of peacekeeping missions. A similar claim can be found in Diehl (1994: 174). This conjecture implies that conflicts over territory are less amenable to successful peacekeeping than are conflicts over government. Hence: *peacekeeping missions are more likely to become successful in civil conflicts over government than over territory.*

FIELD EXECUTIVE

AFFINITY

The literature contains two competing perspectives on the role of ethnic/cultural affinity between peacekeepers and conflict parties. One perspective claims that peacekeeping forces are more likely to succeed if they are from the same region as the conflict. The basis for this proposition is the conjecture that affinity creates trust and legitimacy, while non-affinity creates distrust and non-legitimacy. (e.g., Diehl, 1994: 124). According to Duffey (2000: 150), “maintaining good relations with the local community, a prerequisite for successful missions, relies on peacekeepers’ understanding of the local population’s culture and respect for their cultural traditions.” This perspective implies not only that affinity rather than

neutrality is crucial for the success of the peacekeeping mission, but also that UN peacekeeping missions are inherently flawed because of their multiregional composition.

An opposite perspective implies that UN peacekeeping missions' multiregional composition makes them more instead of less likely to be successful. The reason for this is that conflict parties are alleged to be less likely to regard regional peacekeepers as neutral and trustworthy (Diehl, 1994: 128-29), as illustrated by the following quotation that refers to peacekeeping in Croatia:

That is why we like dealing with Americans — said K., president of the housing committee and Deputy Mayor of the town — you can always count on the same type of treatment from them, regardless of your nationality. The rules of the game apply equally to all participants; no exceptions are made. America's inability or lack of understanding of this situation is actually a benefit as far as I can see. This makes you blind to the differences and you end up treating all the constituents the same regardless of ethnicity and or nationality (Komarica, 2001: 9)

These perspectives on the importance of affinity and neutrality can be applied to the country composition as well as to the leadership of peacekeeping missions. The Brahimi report (p. 92) makes a case for the importance of mission leadership for success:

Effective, dynamic leadership can make the difference between a cohesive mission with high morale and effectiveness despite adverse circumstances, and one that struggles to maintain any of those attributes. That is, the tenor of an entire mission can be heavily influenced by the character and ability of those who lead it.

Given a focus on mission leadership, in conjunction with the affinity argument above, the following testable proposition is formulated: *peacekeeping missions are more likely to succeed if the highest field executive has ethnic or cultural affinity with the host country.*

DURATION

An argument can be made that the duration of the appointment of the highest field executive may be important for the success of a peacekeeping mission. For instance, one component of the affinity argument is conflict knowledge. Such knowledge is in turn a function of the duration of an appointment rather than merely a function of the ethnic or cultural origin of the executive. A similar point is implied in a UN Lessons Learned Unit report's (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/handbuk.htm>) claim "frequent changes in the top leadership of an mission, including component heads, detract from the objective of developing a coherent and integrated structure for the mission." and "quick turnover of staff in key positions is detrimental to efficiency and continuity." On this basis the following proposition is formulated: *the longer the duration of the highest field executive's appointment, the more likely that the peacekeeping mission will be successful.*

MISSION

TIMING

It is commonly held that war experiences make peaceful coexistence impossible. This line of argument has often been applied to Lebanon and the former Yugoslavia. An identical line of thought is expressed in Posen (as quoted in Roe, 2000: 189): “When groups make judgements of others’ intentions ‘[t]he main mechanism they will use is history: how did the other group behave last time...’” Several statistical studies report that the history of peace and war influences the onset and in particular the occurrence of civil war. However, the relationship is not as simplistic as the aforementioned proposition “war experiences make peaceful coexistence impossible.” It has instead been found that the longer that peace has been at hand, the less likely that civil war will be initiated (Cf. Heldt, 2000). Expressed differently, the shorter the time period from a civil war, the larger the likelihood that a civil war will erupt again. Similar relationships have been found in statistical studies of interstate relations (cf. Jackman, 1999).

These findings suggest that grievances and desire for revenge that are caused by war events actually disappear over time (Cf. Heldt, 2000), or that the modes and norms of conduct that are established during war slowly give way for a more civilized code of conduct, or even that some abstract form of “inertia” is at work. As apparently implied in Jackman (1999), we can also regard the length of peace as a measure of the amount of trust in a dispute dyad: peaceful relations create mutual trust, which in turn increases the likelihood of peace, and so on.

There is also statistical evidence that the hazard of civil war termination decreases over time (Collier *et al*, 1999; Lindsay and Enterline, 1999). Civil wars are most likely to end one way or another within one year, but when they continue beyond this point, they become drastically less likely to end. This finding has been explained by the willingness of warring parties to continue the war in order not to have wasted previous war efforts, and that war leads to polarization which makes solutions more difficult to achieve (Collier *et al*, 1999). The finding can also be interpreted in the same vein as the studies of the importance of previous war experiences for civil war occurrence: war creates mistrust, which in turn induces further war and so on (cf. Heldt, 2000; Jackman, 1999), or “cumulative inertia” (Allison, 1984: 35), in that the longer a certain state has existed (that is, the more “stable” it is), the more probable it is that it will continue to exist.

These findings point towards inertia, or learning with regard to the effect of peace and war on trust, and the importance of trust for peace and war. While the probability of civil war occurrence decreases as time goes by, so does the probability of war ending decreases over time. On the basis of these findings, the following proposition is formulated: *the later a peacekeeping mission is sent to a civil war, the less likely it will be successful.*

DURATION

As noted in the discussion on the importance of the duration of the highest field executive's appointment, a case can be made that duration is positively related to the probability that the peacekeeping mission will become successful. An analogous line of reasoning can be applied to the duration of peacekeeping missions: the longer the mission has been in place, the greater the knowledge of the conflict; the greater the knowledge of the conflict, the more likely becomes success. From this it follows that *the longer the duration of the peacekeeping mission, the more likely it will be successful.*

SIZE

Urquhart (1987: 258), as well as other scholars, claims that cooperation from the parties is crucial for the success of peacekeeping missions. The question is then how such cooperation can be achieved. One common line of argument is resource oriented: according to the Brahimi report (p. 9), “bigger forces, better equipped and more costly but able to be a credible deterrent” can improve the success rate of peacekeeping missions when conflict parties are non-cooperative. As another example, consider Skjelsbeck (1989: 259) who notes that “no military commander will be completely satisfied with the number of troops at his disposal,” or Malaquias (1996: 88) claim that “meager resources” contributed to the failure of UNAVEM II. The importance of resources can also be given another rationale: the larger the force, the more capable it will be to perform the two aforementioned basic functions of “interposition” and “monitoring” which are assumed to influence mission success. This line of reasoning generates the following testable proposition: *the larger the peacekeeping mission, the more likely it will be successful.*

COMPOSITION

Scholars have argued and provided case study evidence that language and cultural differences within a peacekeeping contingent may have negative consequences (cf. Elron *et al.*, 1999 for an overview of perspectives; see also, e.g., Ahlquist (1996, 1998) and Duffey (2000) for case study evidence). One alleged consequence of linguistic differences is intra-mission *misinterpretations* of communication (*Ibid.*). According to the Brahimi report (p. 18) in some missions the situation is more than merely problematic, in that “some units may have no personnel who can speak the mission language.” Cultural differences can have the additional effect of causing *disagreement* on what line of action that should be taken, rather than merely misinterpretations of what line of action that has been agreed upon (*Ibid.*). Another alleged consequence is that entities of different linguistic and cultural origin will refuse to co-operate with each other because of the in-group/out-group categorizations groups make on the basis of demographic similarity (Elron *et al.*, 1999: 75). Misinterpretations, disagreements, and refusal to co-operate are in turn believed to create co-ordination problems that diminish the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions.

It is tempting to propose that because each and every country has its own unique language and culture, the size of the co-ordination problems is a linear function of the amount of countries involved in peacekeeping missions (e.g., Elron *et al.*, 1999: 82). It then follows that

the more countries involved in a mission, the less likely it will be successful. It can also be argued that co-ordination problems caused by differences in culture and language are inherent in UN peacekeeping missions because of their multinational character. In one extreme case, troops from 49 countries were present at a single moment in time (United Nations, 1996). If these propositions are correct, then two propositions may follow: UN peacekeeping missions are inherently flawed; regional non-UN peacekeeping initiatives should be encouraged because they are culturally and linguistically more homogenous.

While there is ample evidence of the prevalence of cultural and language differences among troops in peacekeeping missions, it can be questioned how severe these differences are. A more interesting question is whether there exists any evidence that such differences have negatively influenced the mission success. Hence, do such differences matter? Elron *et al* (1999: 83) claim that “scattered evidence suggests that such [multinational] forces are able to function effectively and carry out their missions in a reasonable manner,” but there does not exist any statistical evidence. To investigate this, the following simple proposition will be tested: *the fewer countries involved in a peacekeeping mission, the more likely it will be successful.*

Implied in the above arguments is that the co-ordination problem decreases over time, in that the longer a certain country composition has been at hand, the less misinterpretations, disagreements and refusal to co-operate. Hence, the longer the duration of the country composition, the more effective the peacekeeping mission. From this follows yet another testable proposition: *the longer a peacekeeping mission has had a certain country composition, the more likely that the mission will be successful.*

MANDATE

SIZE

The importance of mandates is reiterated in many studies. One example is the Brahimi report's (p. 10) claim of the importance of “clear, credible and achievable mandates.” Urquhart (1987: 258) highlights the importance of “feasibility of the mandate” while Doyle *et al* (1997: 384-91) stress the need to avoid ambiguous mandates. One dimension of “achievable” or “feasible” mandate is the number of tasks, another dimension is the duration of a certain set of tasks.

It can be conjectured that mandates with many tasks may cause mandate overload. Mandate overload may in turn decrease the performance of the peacekeeping mission. A testable proposition is then *the less comprehensive the mandate, the more likely that the peacekeeping mission will be successful.*

DURATION

It is also reasonable to conjecture that the longer the peacekeeping mission has been mandated to perform a certain set of tasks, the better the mission learns to cope with these tasks. This task coping will in turn lead to a more efficient peacekeeping mission. It can therefore be proposed that *the longer a certain set of tasks has been mandated, the more likely that the peacekeeping mission will be successful.*

MEASUREMENT AND DATA

DATASET

The above propositions will be tested on a new data set with a temporal domain of 1960-1999, and a global spatial domain. While there are relatively few intrastate peacekeeping missions, the data set generates 1091 observations by using the intrastate peacekeeping mission calendar month as unit of analysis.⁷ Hence, all UN missions – and not just those sent to ongoing or ended wars – are included, and a single mission of five years generates 60 (monthly) observations. Considering that data on some aspects of peacekeeping missions are available on a monthly basis, and that many aspects change on a month-to-month basis, the usage of the month as the unit of analysis was regarded as reasonable. An analogy can be made to a doctor and a patient. Instead of observing the patient once in 5 years to assess whether the changing treatments are effective, the doctor observes the patient 60 times over the 5-years period to assess effects more accurately. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations' website (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ops.htm>) and UN (1996) are used to identify missions.

By “intrastate peacekeeping mission” is meant missions that were established for the purpose of interposition and monitoring (among other things) between warring parties (ONUSAL), or potentially warring parties (e.g., MINURCA) in intrastate conflict, or potential intrastate conflicts. For this reason UNYOM, UNOGIL, UNIFIL, and parts of UNFICYP, are excluded. Because UNFICYP addresses conflict or tension between two state actors from the war of 1974 and onwards, the dataset includes the period from 1964 to the onset of the war of 1974. While there existed intrastate conflict in Northern Yemen, UNYOM addressed the tension between Northern Yemen and Saudi Arabia. UNIFIL was established to address tension between Lebanon and Israel, it was not explicitly established to address the conflict between Israel and Palestinians. UNOGIL monitored the border between Lebanon and Syria, it did not intervene in the civil conflict of 1958. Finally, UNAVEM I is excluded because it did not interposition itself between warring parties. Its purpose was instead to monitor withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The following missions are included: DOMREP, MINUGUA, MINURCA, MINURSO, MIPONUH, MONUA, MONUC, ONUC, ONUCA, ONUMOZ, ONUSAL, UMAMIR, UNAMIC, UNAMSIL, UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, UNCRO, UNFICYP (until the war of 1974), UNMIBH, UNMIH, UNMIK, UNMOP, UNMOT, UNOMIG, UNOMIL, UNOMSIL, UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II, UNPREDEP, UNPROFOR, UNPSG, UNSF, UNSMIH, UNTAES, UNTAET, UNTAG, UNTAG, and UNTMIH. ONUCA was partly established to monitor an entire region, and

⁷ Only complete operation months are included. Thus, the first and last month of the mission are sometimes excluded because the peacekeeping mission was not deployed the entire month.

partly to monitor Nicaragua and Contras. Only the part of the mission that refers to Nicaragua is included in the data set.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

WAR This binary variable – WAR – has a score “0” denoting absence of war, while “1” denotes its presence in the host country. By “war” is meant intrastate conflicts that have incurred a total of at least 1000 battle related deaths during the course of the conflict. Wallensteen and Sollenberg (2000), data collected within the Uppsala Conflict Data Project, and Singer and Small (1994) are used as sources.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

1. *Democracy*: This binary variable – DEMOC – has a score of “0” denoting the absence of democracy, while “1” denotes its presence in the host country. Democracy is measured by two indicators: “competitiveness of executive recruitment” and “competitiveness of participation” (maximum scores are 3 and 5, respectively), as defined by Marshall and Jaggers (2000). To be coded as a democracy, the host country has to receive a score of at least 3 for both indicators. The data set POLITY IV as described in Marshall and Jaggers (2000) is used as source.
2. *Ethnic Fragmentation*: A continuous variable – ETHN – builds on a widely used measure of the probability that two individuals randomly drawn in a country do not belong to the same ethnic group. The variable varies between 0 and 1, where 0 denotes an extremely ethnically homogenous host country, while a score close to 1 denotes extreme fragmentation. Probabilities are obtained from Krain (1997). In the few cases where data was not found in Krain, probabilities were calculated on the basis of data on ethnic composition found in *CIA World Factbook 2000*.
3. *Economic Development*: A continuous variable – ECO – measures GDP per capita (thousands of USD) in 1990 prices in the host country the previous calendar year. *UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics On-Line* (<http://esa.un.org/unsd/mbsdemo/>) and Heston *et al.* (1995) are used as data sources.
4. *War History*: A binary variable – WARHIST – that has a score “0” denoting the absence of war the previous calendar month in the host country, while “1” denotes its presence. Data sources are the same as for WAR. This variable is in practice the lagged dependent variable, which means that autoregression is at hand.
5. *Issue*: A binary variable – ISSUE – indicates whether the civil conflict concerned government or territory. A score of “0” denotes “government”

while a score of “1” denotes “territory”. “Government” denotes a dispute over the type of political system or the composition of government, while “territory” denotes a dispute over autonomy or session (Cf. Sollenberg and Wallensteen, 2000). Sollenberg and Wallensteen (2000) are used as data source for all war related cases apart from the ONUC mission in the civil war in Congo. The ONUC mission was coded on the basis of information in UN (1996), Lefever (1965, 1967), Wainhouse (1973), and Durch (1993), while UNFICYP is coded on the basis of Stegenga (1968). In some cases (e.g., MINURCA) where war had not erupted, issue coding is made on the basis of UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ website (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ops.htm>) and UN (1996).

6. *Field Executive Affinity*: Affinity between the field executive (e.g., force commander) and the country hosting the peacekeeping mission can be measured in several ways. Ethnic identity is a vague concept as it may refer to more or less conspicuous traits such appearance, culture, history, language, religion, etc. An attempt is here made to use two conspicuous traits – civilization and genetic makeup – to measure group affinity.

In line with recent genetic research that has measured genetic variations between ethnic groups, Vanhanen (1999) distinguishes between three main population categories – Caucasoid, Negroid, and Mongoloid – and uses them (as well as other factors) as parts of an indicator of ethnic heterogeneity. This study adopts this measurements principle, in that one binary variable – EXGENAFF – measures genetic affinity and has a score “0” denoting non-affinity, while “1” denotes affinity. Genetic affinity is at hand when the majority of the population in the host country is from the same main genetic category as the majority of the country of origin for the field executive. This is admittedly a potentially fallible measure of affinity, because it is never certain that the field executive is drawn from the largest genetic group in multicultural countries. However, in practice this unlikely to have influenced the statistics because almost all countries in the data set were heavily dominated – or belonged solely – to one category. Overall it can therefore be expected that the field executive is from the majority genetic category.

CIA World Factbook 2000 and *Encyclopedia Britannica* were consulted for data on ethnic composition of countries, while Cavalli-Sforza (1991) were used to determine to which of the three main population categories – Caucasoid, Negroid, and Mongoloid – that ethnic groups belonged. Host country and country origin of field executive are identified through mission reports of the Secretary General, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ website (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ops.htm>), UN (1996), and information provided by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

One of the most debated theses of the 1990’s is Samuel Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?” Huntington (1993, 1996) argues that the main dividing lines between countries, and the largest source of future war, are differences in “civilization.” Huntington refers to “civilization” as an aggregate of several common elements such as language, religion, history, and

customs that are commonly used to identify ethnicity. Huntington further delineates the world into eight civilizations as follows: African, Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, Latin American, Sinic, Slavic-Orthodox, and Western. Building on information provided in Huntington (1996), Russett *et al* (2000) have categorized all countries of the world as belonging to one of the eight civilizations, but finds meanwhile that three states do not fit any of these eight categories, and are consequently placed in a “lone” category.

This paper uses this variable as an alternative measure of affinity between field executives and host countries. Civilization affinity – EXCIVAFF – is a binary variable where a score “0” denotes non-affinity, while “1” denotes affinity between the field executive and the host country with regard to belonging to the same civilization. Data sources for country origin of field executive and host country of peacekeeping mission are the same as for EXGENAFF, while Russett *et al.*'s (2000) categorization is used to determine the type of civilization of the field executive and the host country. Judging from UN (1996), mission reports of the Secretary General, and information provided by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, a couple of mission months involve a vacancy in the position as chief executive. Because there was no field executive, non-affinity could not arise. Those observations are therefore coded as involving affinity.

7. *Field Executive Duration*: This discrete variable – EXDURATION – measures the number of calendar months that the highest field executive (e.g., force commander) has held an appointment. Data sources for country origin of highest field executive and host country are identical with the ones for EXGENAFF. Some missions are regarded as a continuation of previous missions because they only changed in terms of mission name. Hence, when the highest field executive was the same as in the end of the preceding mission, this duration variable does not restart the count from 0. The following missions are regarded as linked in such a manner: UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III, and MONUA; UNAMIC and UNTAC; UNMIH, UNSMIH, UNTMIH, and MIPONUH; UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II; UNPROFOR, UNCRO, UNTAES, UNPSG, UNPREDEP, UNMIBH, and UNMOP.
8. *Mission Timing*: This discrete variable – MTIMING – measures the number of war calendar months passed when the peacekeeping mission is deployed in an ongoing war. Singer and Small (1994), Wallensteen and Sollenberg (2000), the UN (1996), the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations' website (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ops.htm>), and data collected within the Uppsala Conflict Data Project, are used as sources. Missions that are regarded as continuations of previous missions because they only changed in terms of mission name, are given the same value for MTIMING as the preceding mission.
9. *Mission Duration*: A discrete variable – MDURATION – measuring the number of calendar months that a peacekeeping mission has been deployed. UN (1996) and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations' website (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ops.htm>) are used as sources. As the

case with MTIMING, some missions are regarded as linked because they only changed in terms of mission name. As the case with the EXDURATION variable, this duration variable does then not restart the count from 0.

10. *Mission Size*: This continuous variable – MSIZE – measures the total manpower (civilian police, military observers, and troops) of the peacekeeping mission as of the last day of every month, divided by the country size in square kilometers. Country size data is taken from *CIA World Factbook 2000*, while numerous sources were consulted for monthly manpower size: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations' website (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ops.htm>), information provided by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN (1985, 1990, 1996), mission reports of the Secretary General, Lefever (1965, 1967), Stegenga (1968), Wainhouse (1973), Higgins (1980, 1981), Rikey (1984), Durch (1993), Sköld (1994), <http://www.globalpolicy.org/>, UN Yearbook, UN Chronicle, de Cuéllar (1997), data collected by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project, and various UN documents obtained at the United Nations archives (New York).⁸
11. *Country Number*: A discrete variable – CNUMBER – measures the number of countries participating in the peacekeeping mission as of the last day of every calendar month. UN (1996), mission reports of the Secretary General, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations' website (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ops.htm>), and information provided by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, are used as data sources.⁹
12. *Country Composition Duration*: This discrete variable – COMPDURATION – measures the number of calendar months that the peacekeeping mission has been composed of a certain set of countries. Data sources are the same as for CNUMBER. As the case with MTIMING, some mission are regarded as linked because they only changed in terms of mission name. This means that the country composition duration of, e.g., UNTMIH considers the country composition duration of UNSMIH. Hence, when country composition was the same as in the end of the first mission this duration variable does not restart the count from 0.¹⁰
13. *Mandate Size*: A discrete variable – MANDSIZE – measures the number of broad tasks the peacekeeping mission has been given by the United Nations. Coding was not performed on the basis of a predetermined and conceptually developed task categorization. Instead “judgmental coding” was made by counting the number of general tasks. Examples of such general tasks are

⁸ 15% of the 1091 observations are generated through linear interpolation that was made after case study of the interpolated months ascertained the manpower size was stable - or increased or decreased in an apparently stable manner - during the interpolated month(-s). Because of this only very small measurement errors — and hence a negligible influence on the statistical findings — can be expected from the interpolation.

⁹ 12 observations are building on data imputed from the preceding month. It was observed that the monthly country composition is characterised by inertia, and thus seldom change. Therefore, imputation appears to constitute a highly accurate method to generate missing data.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

“cease-fire monitoring,” “demining,” “disarmament,” “election monitoring,” “police training,” “withdrawal monitoring,” “assist in the return of refugees,” “civil administration monitoring,” and “demobilization monitoring.” UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, mission reports of the Secretary General, Wainhouse (1973), Higgins (1980) and UN (1996) were used as data sources.

14. *Mandate Duration* A discrete variable – MANDDURATION – that measures the duration in calendar months of a certain set of tasks. Data sources are the same as for MANDSIZE. As the case with MTIMING and a few other variables, some missions are regarded as linked because they only changed in terms of mission name. Therefore, in cases where the mandate does not change although the mission name changes, this duration variable does not restart the count from 0.

FINDINGS

Below follows a presentation of the statistical findings on the propositions that specify under what conditions peacekeeping missions are most likely to become successful. As evident from the summary statistics (Appendix, Table II), and as to be expected from previous research on the causes of civil war, the peacekeeping missions were sent to countries that were on average very poor, autocratic, and ethnically polarized. In addition, the conflicts were equally distributed between the issue of government and the issue of territory. Also, though not presented in Table II, there had been a state of civil war at an average of 22 months at the time of mission deployment, the monthly average manpower of peacekeeping missions was 3754, and about 28% of all observations involve an ongoing civil war (i.e., “non-success” as defined in this study). These last pieces of statistics can be compared to the case for all UN interstate peacekeeping missions: only 1.6% of all monthly observations involved an ongoing war; interstate peacekeeping missions never deployed in ongoing wars.¹¹ While intrastate missions are often deployed in ongoing wars, interstate missions are never deployed in ongoing wars. As will be evident from the result analysis below, this fact can to a large extent account for the huge difference in war proneness and hence “success” as defined in this study.

Turning to the statistical findings, there is evidence that some characteristics of the mission and the field executive are influential, but no evidence that the mandate is important. However, the variables with the largest substantive impact are related to the sources of civil war. When rerunning the statistics without controlling for the sources of civil war it was found that all but three of the peacekeeping mission related variables were statistically significant, and one variable even changed sign. Not controlling for sources of civil war will thus lead to severely biased statistical estimates. In addition, when investigating how much the peacekeeping mission related variables contribute to the overall precision of the model, it was found that the impact was negligible. The overall conclusion is then that variables related to peacekeeping mission are of insignificant importance and that almost all of the variation in

¹¹ The figures for interstate peacekeeping missions are taken from a dataset constructed by a research project headed by the author.

war (i.e., “success”) is accounted for by variables related to the sources of war. It is thus the source of conflict or context, rather than the nature of peacekeeping missions, that determines success. Unfortunately, the sources of conflict are not easily manipulated in a more favorable direction.

SOURCES OF CIVIL WAR

In line with previous research on the determinants of interstate and civil wars, the findings show that the state with regard to war and peace for a given month (WARHIST) strongly increases the probability that an identical state will be at hand in the subsequent month during a peacekeeping mission. The large coefficient of this variable (cf. Appendix, Table I, Model I) implies that peacekeepers will have a limited ability to change war into peace. Similarly, when peace is at hand a given month, there is a low probability that war will be at hand the following month. This suggests that war and peace take on a dynamics of their own, and this has two major implications.

First, intrastate peacekeeping missions will be much more successful if they are used for conflict prevention, or sent to conflicts where peace has already been established (as is the case with interstate peacekeeping missions). Once war is at hand, it is very difficult for peacekeepers to return the country to a state of peace; in contrast, once peace is at hand, it is much less likely that the country returns to a state of war. Expressed differently, the statistics are the first firm evidence in favor of the old idea that in order for peacekeeping to be successful it is crucial that there exists a peace to keep to begin with. Second, short-term goals of establishing peace – if successful, though admittedly this is not very likely given an on-going war – will have long-term and strong positive effects on the peacefulness of countries. Similarly, a failed peacekeeping mission that is unable to stop a country from sliding (back) into war can do little to compensate for its failure.

Contradicting statistical research and propositions on the sources of civil war, Table I, Model 1, shows that ethnically polarized societies (ETHN) are less instead of more civil war prone than ethnically homogenous and ethnically fragmented societies, that level of economic development (ECO) has a positive impact on war, and that there is no evidence that secessionist conflicts (ISSUE) are more difficult for peacekeepers to handle than are conflicts over government. The surprising finding that poverty has a reversed impact may not be that surprising after all: a reasonable ad hoc explanation is that given that a conflict situation has arisen (perhaps because of poverty), resource access may prolong the conflict. An equally reasonable ad hoc explanation can be provided for the finding that ethnically polarized societies are more civil war prone: polarisation implies fewer parties, and this makes settlements easier.

The peace promoting impact of democracy (DEMOC) is as expected and of the same large magnitude as the effect of previous war month (Table I, Model I). This finding stresses the importance of instating democracy. However, and as will be argued below, the goal of instating democracy is not only difficult, but may also increase the risk of civil war, as well as being difficult to reach once civil war has broken out. Using democracy as a panacea during peacekeeping missions is therefore not always a viable strategy. Democracy should instead be used as a conflict prevention tool.

To begin with, a climate of ongoing civil war is not conducive to successful political reforms. Second, and as pointed out by Hegre *et al.* (2001: 36), given a civil war, a country becomes less likely to be coded as democratic because the government regulates political participation in its struggle against the armed opposition. Thus, a country can almost by definition never be a full-fledged democracy while it is involved in a civil war. Turning to countries where civil war has not yet broken out, or has been halted, there is some evidence that regime type changes increase the likelihood of civil war (Hegre *et al.*, 2001).¹² This negative impact of a regime type change is only a short-term one, while democracy per se will lead to fewer civil wars in the long term. The rational long-term choice is then one of moving from autocracy towards full-fledged democracy when civil war has not yet broken out, or has been halted. It is meanwhile important to consider that if civil war breaks out because of regime type changes, above findings suggest that it will be difficult for peacekeepers to move the country back to a state of peace.

This set of findings on the importance of democracy for civil war, the effect of regime type changes on civil war, and the difficulty of moving to democracy when civil war is at hand leads to the following major implications. First, the type of political system must be regarded as a given in those cases where civil war has broken out. Second, while we may regard the type of political system as a variable that can be changed in cases where civil war has not erupted or has been halted, changes in political system may increase the risk of civil war. Meanwhile, the positive effect of democracy is much larger than the negative impact of a regime type change. It may therefore be rational to promote democracy in countries where peace is at hand but armed conflict is believed to be close at hand. On the other hand, it is not clear whether it is actually feasible to promote democracy under such adverse circumstances.

FIELD EXECUTIVE: DURATION AND ORIGIN

Appendix, Table I, Model I, shows that it is important that the force commander is not from the same ethnic group (EXGENAFF) as the majority of, and in particular not from the same civilization (EXCIVAFF), as the host country. This finding rejects the cultural similarity or affinity proposition and is instead supportive of the impartiality or neutrality proposition. Because the absence of civilizational affinity can by definition not be the case given regional peacekeeping mission, this finding suggests that regionally based peacekeeping missions, which are often assumed to be most effective because of their cultural and ethnic affinity to the conflict country, should be avoided instead of encouraged as alternatives to UN peacekeeping missions. It implies also that regional peacekeeping missions (for instance, a European rapid reaction force for use in European hotspots) that always have commanders from the region of the conflict may have to rely on force and power rather than trust of the conflict parties to secure mission success.

Table I shows also that the duration of the position as the highest executive position (EXDURATION) is not influential. One interpretation is that force commanders do not

¹² Note that this finding refers to countries in general, not just those hosting peacekeeping troops. In the dataset used for this paper, only four out of 1091 monthly observations involve a change in type of political system. It was therefore not meaningful to examine the impact of regime changes on the success of peacekeeping missions.

become so much more skilful over time that it matters for mission outcome. Another interpretation is that the skill of the commander is difficult to translate into the actions of the peacekeeping force because important daily decisions are made at lower levels in the mission hierarchy. If this interpretation is valid, then the force commander is less important than originally believed.

MISSION: TIMING, DURATION, SIZE, AND COMPOSITION

The findings above that the state with regard to war and peace a given month strongly increases the probability that an identical state will be at hand in the succeeding month during a peacekeeping mission, raises the question of whether it matters whether peacekeeping missions enter early or late once a war has broken out. Table I, Model I, shows that it is important to enter with peacekeepers as early as possible in ongoing wars (MTIMING). The longer the time period from the start of violent civil conflict until peacekeepers are deployed, the higher the likelihood that war rather than peace will be at hand for a given mission month. Peacekeeping missions become less successful the later they arrive in ongoing wars.

Building on these two findings, it may be tempting to argue that (1) cases where war has not yet broken out, but are meanwhile considered at risk, or where peace has been established, should be singled out for peacekeeping missions, and that (2) in cases where war has broken out, peacekeeping missions should be sent to recent civil wars only. Nevertheless, a strategic and prudent decision of sending peacekeeping mission to countries where war has not yet broken out, peace has been established, or where wars of recent origin, but not to other countries, may be seen as sending peacekeepers to those countries where they are least needed. A more reasonable approach is to send peacekeepers to wars where they are (most) needed but meanwhile design the missions so that they become successful even in less favorable environments.

Table I also shows that endurance pays (MDURATION). The longer the mission has been deployed, the higher the likelihood that peace rather than war will be at hand for a given mission month. A late mission deployment can thus be compensated for by longer mission duration. Several other variables did not have any effect: the size of the peacekeeping mission (MSIZE); the number of peacekeeping countries (CNUMBER); and the duration of country compositions (COMPDURATION).

MANDATE: SIZE AND DURATION

The complexity of the mission with regard to the number of mandated tasks (MANDSIZE), and the duration (MANDDURATION) of these tasks, do not influence the probability of success. Thus there is no evidence of mandate overload, that mandate tasks are executed in a better manner over time, or that mandates must be kept simple, as has been often suggested and feared. To the extent that missions are overloaded by mandates it does not influence mission success. The Security Council can thus continue to formulate ambitious mandates without fear of repercussions on mission efficiency.

THE SOURCES OF WAR OR PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS CHARACTERISTICS?

One way to compare the power of the sources of war variables to the peacekeeping mission characteristics variables, is to re-run the statistics with one set of variables at a time. Appendix, Table I, Model II, shows the findings for the sources of war variables when not including the peacekeeping mission characteristics variables. The effect of ethnic fragmentation is smaller; territorial civil conflicts are now less war prone than conflicts over government; the effect of level of economic development is smaller but still in the wrong direction; the peace inducing effect of democracy is weaker. More surprising is that the overall precision of the model is virtually unchanged, as is evident by the LL and the extremely large Pseudo R^2 statistics that indicate an almost perfect model fit. This shows the relative insignificance of the peacekeeping mission characteristics variables.

Appendix, Table I, Model III, shows the effect of the peacekeeping mission characteristics variables when not controlling for the sources of war variables. Seven instead of three propositions, out of a total of nine propositions, are now supported by the statistical findings. One (MSIZE) of the four rejected propositions has a statistically significant effect but in the wrong direction. While the proposition stated that the larger the size of the peacekeeping mission the larger the likelihood of success, an opposite relationship has been found. The absence of statistical control for sources of war variables has apparently introduced a severe bias for several variables. In addition, the precision of Model III is drastically lower than the case for Model I, as evident by the lower LL and Pseudo R^2 statistics. This finding supports the conclusion of the relative insignificance of the peacekeeping mission characteristics variables.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Under what conditions are peacekeeping missions successful? The findings of this paper indicate that it is the sources of war rather than peacekeeping missions characteristics that account for the success of peacekeeping missions. The typical successful mission is characterized by the following properties: it is sent to cases where peace has been established or when war has not yet broken out, or is deployed early after the outbreak of civil war; the host state is democratic, ethnically polarized, and very poor; the mission has been deployed for a considerable period of time; and the chief executive is not from the region of the conflict.

As this is the first statistical study of the conditions for successful peacekeeping, the results must be regarded as tentative and approached with caution by anyone interested in policy implications. For instance, while the sources of war variables came out very strong and almost yielded perfect predictions, this does not mean that characteristics of peacekeeping missions cannot be important for whether peace or war is at hand. All that can be inferred from this study is that most of the characteristics of peacekeeping missions that have been investigated in this paper are unimportant, but that does not preclude the possibility that other characteristics may be very important.

Moving from policy implications to implications for future research, the effects of the sources of war variables are substantial while propositions related to the character of the peacekeeping mission carry much less weight. This means that even if variables omitted from this statistical application were proven to be an important source of bias, there is substantial room for a weakening of the effect of these variables before they become statistically insignificant. In other words, the effects of the sources of war variables are unlikely to be crowded out in future statistical tests by variables that refer to characteristics of peacekeeping missions. One challenge for future research is to identify those characteristics. The case study literature provides an abundance of additional propositions that may be fruitful to incorporate in future statistical tests. However, a challenge for future statistical research is to present more fully developed theoretical and conceptual formulations. In short, this new research direction, as well as policy makers, may be best served if future statistical research concentrates not on additional case studies, but instead on theory building and explication of key concepts.

APPENDIX

Table I: Predicting War in Intrastate UN Peacekeeping Missions, 1960-1999.

	Model I	Model II	Model III
Constant	B 0.111	- 1.346	1.337
	SE 0.658	0.583	0.186
	P 0.433	0.003	0.000
DEMOC	- 4.337	-1.346	
	1.113	0.599	
	0.000	0.013	
ETHN	- 23.399	- 7.587	
	5.189	2.834	
	0.000	0.004	
ETHN*ETHN	24.998	9.051	
	5.407	2.728	
	0.000	0.000	
ECO	0.451	0.293	
	0.235	0.144	
	0.028	0.021	
WARHIST	4.415	4.639	
	0.486	0.302	
	0.000	0.000	
ISSUE	0.348	- 0.777	
	0.525	0.377	
	0.254	0.020	
EXGENAFF	0.748		- 0.061
	0.425		0.131
	0.039		0.321
EXCIVAFF	1.107		1.611
	0.334		0.137
	0.000		0.000

EXDURATION	- 0.036		- 0.011
	0.035		0.007
	0.151		0.068
MTIMING	0.015		0.004
	0.005		0.001
	0.003		0.001
MDURATION	- 0.019		- 0.019
	0.008		0.003
	0.014		0.000
MSIZE	- 0.587		0.894
	1.535		0.351
	0.351		0.006
CNUMBER	0.009		0.030
	0.021		0.006
	0.385		0.000
COMPDURATION	- 0.053		- 0.037
	0.053		0.011
	0.160		0.000
MANDSIZE	0.020		0.053
	0.045		0.009
	0.325		0.000
MANDDURATION	0.013		- 0.006
	0.018		0.004
	0.437		0.066
N	1091	1091	1091
Log Likelihood	- 37.934	-46.453	- 380.250
Pseudo R2	0.941	0.928	0.398

NOTE: Probit regression, Huber/White-correction of standard errors and one-tailed p-values are used. Stata version 6.0 for Apple Macintosh is used for all statistics.

Table II: Summary Statistics of Variables.

VARIABLE	MEAN	STD. DEV	MIN	MAX
WAR	0.281	0.450	0	1
DEMOC	0.181	0.385	0	1
ETHN	0.485	0.205	0.1	0.81
ETHN*ETHN	0.277	0.200	0.01	0.656
ECO	1.488	1.322	0.092	4.627
WARHIST	0.288	0.453	0	1
ISSUE	0.568	0.496	0	1
EXGENAFF	0.737	0.440	0	1
EXCIVAFF	0.213	0.409	0	1

EXDURATION	8.929	9.206	0	53
MTIMING	21.947	41.881	0	154
MDURATION	38.443	28.375	0	122
MSIZE	0.079	0.153	0	0.694
CNUMBER	20.538	11.032	0	49
COMPDURATION	6.645	13.229	0	82
MANDSIZE	6.957	5.694	1	26
MANDDURATION	21.125	26.170	0	122

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