Compliance Assessments in the Balkans:
Personal Perspectives

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George Rose is the Technical Manager for the Front Line department in the UK Centre for Defence Analysis transferring knowledge and experience of direct OA support to the military into the challenging tri-service environment. He is a visiting Fellow of Cranfield University in the UK in recognition of his work in information systems applications to solve military problems. Between 1994 and 1998 George worked with the HQ ARRC where he led a small military civilian team developing models and staff tools for NATO’s only rapidly deployable HQ. This has necessitated methodology development both for warfighting and for operations other than war (OOTW). George gave advice to senior commanders throughout the Bosnia planning carried out by the HQ and then in late 1995 deployed to Sarajevo for the year-long IFOR deployment before re-establishing the HQ in Germany in late 1996. During the time in HQ ARRC, George developed and fielded a HQ Information System Technology Demonstrator. The system was used in Bosnia, and is recognised as one of the most advanced systems deployed in any HQ. In the early 1990s George was promoted to Divisional Superintendent in the UK Defence Operational Analysis Establishment at West Byfleet, where he was responsible for studies of major UK procurement issues in the challenging post cold war environment. Such studies involved the EF 2000, attack helicopter, maritime air defence, and space based surveillance. George has a B.Sc. in Metallurgy and a Ph.D. from the University of Strathclyde in Scotland.

Mike Neighbour is currently Head Operational Analysis Branch, at NATO’s Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) HQ in Rheindahlen Germany. He is responsible for the provision of timely scientific and analytical advice to the Commander and the Chief of Staff across the range of ARRC activities. This advice usually manifests itself in a high intensity warfighting scenario although in 1998/9 it was applied to Peace Support Operations in Kosovo with the deployment of HQ ARRC commanding the Land forces in KFOR 1. (Mike was awarded the Operational Research Society’s Presidents Medal for the outstanding work undertaken in Kosovo). Mike joined the UK scientific civil service having studied Maths and Physics at degree level and then undertaken research on Geomagnetism at the Hong Kong University. Before assuming his current appointment he has worked within the UK Defence Evaluation Research Agency (DERA) in various fields. His last post
was as a Resource Manager in Higher Level Studies (HLS) he had the responsibility for the allocation of staff to studies and all aspects of staff management. Prior to this he worked as the Head of Maritime Balance of Investment within the Sea/Air Division of DOAC looking at the maritime force structure for 2010. Prior to this he worked as the Head of the Surveillance Section which included a study on the Military Utility of Space-based Surveillance and Target Acquisition systems.

ABSTRACT

One aspect of analysis support carried out by operational analysts for IFOR (Bosnia 1996) and KFOR (Kosovo 1999) has been the assessment of factional compliance. In the case of IFOR it was compliance with the military aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), whereas in Kosovo it was monitoring compliance with the Undertaking agreement to disarm, signed by the Kosovo Liberation Army. This paper will discuss the development of the methodologies and give examples of the utility of such analysis. The authors will give first hand practical experiences and lessons learned. It is the author's contention that such analyses will be prominent feature in future operational deployments. Indeed, within HQ ARRC standard operating procedures have been developed for compliance operations, and these could form the basis for a ‘Code of Best Practice.’

INTRODUCTION

HQ ARRC deployed as NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in late December of 1995. Their purpose was to oversee and implement the military aspects of the GFAP as signed by the representatives of Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. During the operation a small Operational Analysis (OA) team from HQ ARRC supported the IFOR commander. One task was to assess whether the former Warring Factions were complying with their responsibilities under GFAP.

In 1999, the HQ ARRC was again deployed to the Balkans, this time to Kosovo, to implement UN SCR 1244. Part of this involved, again, an assessment of compliance of a party (the UCK) to the agreed conditions in the Military Technical Agreement (MTA). The OA team built on the previous experiences and further evolved and enhanced the compliance methodology. Within the past year HQ ARRC has incorporated these Compliance experiences into a headquarters operating procedure, as there is a realisation that such a methodology is likely to feature in many potential future operations. This paper records the evolution of this assessment technique.

BACKGROUND

The HQ ARRC mission in Bosnia is simply stated:
‘On Order, Commander ARRC is to assume command of IFOR ground forces in B-H and complete the military tasks of the Peace Agreement as defined by the North Atlantic Council. He is to control and secure the withdrawal of the UN forces not transferred to the IFOR.’

This is further expanded in the overall campaign plan as:

I intend to employ the full spectrum of JMCs and liaison arrangements and military forces to establish the Security Framework within which Humanitarian Aid and Civil Action Projects can be carried out to allow peace to take root and to achieve the conditions that will allow a transition to peacekeeping operations and a reduction in IFOR force levels. IFOR force numbers will only be reduced when it is ‘judged that sufficient stability has been achieved.’

Thus the analysis challenge was to develop a methodology which would monitor changes in the security situation and aid judgement of ‘sufficient stability’ within Bosnia. For many years’ operational analysts had developed techniques focussed on combat using information and data which warfighting headquarters naturally collected. Thus metrics based on casualties, equipment losses, movement and logistics became the routine method of ‘monitoring’ the campaign.

In the type of operation which faced HQ ARRC in Bosnia (An Operation Other than War (OOTW) or Peace Support Operation (PSO), are two acronyms used as descriptors) the breadth of the tasks (some military and some non-military) necessitated the collection and analysis of a wider data set. While the headquarters was well set up to collect and report traditional types of information it was unclear who would collect and assess the ‘non-military’ information. This became a task on the operational analysts.

CAMPAIGN MONITORING

The role of the operational analysis in HQ ARRC was:

‘To give independent analytical and scientific advice to the Commander to aid his decision-making over the spectrum of ARRC activities.’

It was necessary to ensure that information was available to advise the commander on the strategic success of the campaign and to provide the commander with information that he would not normally have access to. Early development of a Compliance methodology had begun some months previously based on intelligence summaries of the situation in Bosnia. It used as its basis a simple four point scoring methodology from an UK study into OOTW. The proposed information source was the routine HQ reports and returns, a database and Geographic Information System.

On deployment of HQ ARRC in late 1995, an immediate concern was the compliance of the Former Warring Factions (FWF) with the provisions of the GFAP (The Dayton Agreement). The GFAP milestones gave very short time-scales for their accomplishment and an objective, responsive method for monitoring the FWF actions was urgently required.
The previously proposed Compliance methodology was adopted but a number of practical problems were encountered. A review of the routine headquarters reports and returns showed that most were of variable quality, repetitive of the same information, not on magnetic media, contained much subjective content and of infrequent production/availability. The sole exception to this was the HQ INTSUM (Intelligence Summary)—it was consistent contained verified data, was in a word processed format hence easy to put in a database, and it could easily incorporate Compliance statements. It also contained both operational and intelligence data. A relational database was constructed and data entered from the daily INTSUM—each individual fact/event was entered, relevant Compliance data extracted, scores assigned based on FWF GFAP tasks. A screen shot of the database entry form is shown in Figure 1.

**Figure 1:** The Compliance Scoring Form.

The method was routinely used to underpin the IFOR weekly Compliance assessment, which was distributed throughout the NATO chain of command. It was also used to explore detailed compliance issues before meetings between IFOR and the FWF. An example of the type of information that was produced is seen in Figure 2. Throughout the year-long IFOR deployment the database became the compiled and searchable record of the campaign and was often used to complement specific intelligence assessments and produce detailed statistics of aspects of the mission.

**SUMMARY FROM COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT IN BOSNIA**

This new technique of Compliance assessment showed the utility of simple scoring techniques. It also demonstrated that databases can give valuable, timely views of a range of
operational data. This methodology also demonstrated that operational analysis techniques had a significant role to play in the new types of operations facing NATO.

![ZOS Violations: D+90 to D+120](image)

**Figure 2:** Zone of Separation (ZOS) violations from D+90 to D+120.

### COMPLIANCE MOTORING IN KOSOVO

Sub paragraph a, of the KFOR mission states that KFOR is to monitor compliance of parties to the agreements with the UCK (the UCK are what was know in the western press as the Kosovo Liberation Army) undertaking. The undertaking to demilitarise was signed on the 21 June 1999 by General Ceku on behalf of the UCK. In order to measure and hence monitor compliance OA Branch examined the compliance document signed by General Ceku. The examination identified 148 specific paragraphs where a compliance requirement was stated. For each task identified an implied action to demonstrate compliance was recorded and the KFOR action required monitoring that compliance. Two such compliance tasks are illustrated below the 2nd column is a quote from the undertaking, the 3rd the action we were taking and the 4th the task which had to be undertaken.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser Ref</th>
<th>Compliance Requirement</th>
<th>Implied Compliance</th>
<th>KFOR Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>93. UCK/4</td>
<td>The UCK in Kosovo agree to commit themselves publicly to demilitarise in accordance with paragraphs 22 and 23</td>
<td>Sound-bites which undermine the undertaking are non-compliant</td>
<td>Monitor UCK media/press statements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94. UCK/4</td>
<td>The UCK in Kosovo agree to commit themselves publicly to facilitate the deployment and operation of KFOR.</td>
<td>Sound-bites which undermine the undertaking are non-compliant</td>
<td>Monitor UCK media/press statements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A total of 148 tasks are an unwieldy number to report on and consequently they were grouped into 11 categories listed below, the number in brackets indicates the number of tasks in each category.

- Cessation of Hostilities (13)
- Declarations & Communication of Location of forces (11)
- De-Militarisation (8)
- Adherence to procedures (17)
- Co-operation with KFOR (25)
- Co-operation with civil presence (9)
- Minefields, etc (8)
- MTA/Understanding (9)
- Response to enforcement (18)
- Authority and General Provisions (0)
- Timelines (29)

The list of categories and the tasks gave us an understanding of what we meant by compliance. In order to monitor that compliance, we drew on data from a number of different sources. The key to monitoring compliance was to use a representative sample of the activities of the UCK. It was deemed valid, therefore, to use a number of daily HQ KFOR event summary products and reports, which were used to populate the Incidents Database. Figure 3 shows a typical incident and Figure 4 that same incident entered into the database.

**Figure 3:** Typical compliance incident.

It should be noted that positive compliance as well as non-compliance were important and were entered into the database. Whether an event was rated as compliant or not on occasion was a matter of judgement. In order to eliminate bias due to interpretation the number of
different people inputting events into the database was limited. With event descriptions varying in quality, language and accuracy, coupled with the possibility of a single event being reported by multiple sources, the approach was taken of having a single judge for scoring.

Figure 4: Compliance database input form.

In order to discuss the progress towards demilitarisation agreed in the Undertaking, a Joint Implementation Committee (JIC) meeting was held each Monday. This meeting was between General Jackson and his staff and General Ceku and the UCK leadership. In order to prepare for the JIC meeting OA Branch prepared a weekly Compliance Report. Because of the high profile and potential importance of the report it was particularly important that the report was:

- Accurate.
- Provide the required detail.
- Staffed through other interested parties.
- On time.

In order to produce the report two members of the Branch were allocated to the task of Compliance Monitoring. One effectively entered the events into the database throughout the week and was responsible for the production of the detailed categorization report. This report provided a chronological listing of compliance events by category which fulfilled the need to
provide a rapid, accurate and detailed reference system for Commander KFOR (COMKFOR) to refer to particular events.

The other member of the team “scored” the events and on production of the categorization report, then wrote a summary of the compliance within each category, which highlighted themes, trends and significant acts.

The process was designed around the timing of the JIC meeting held each Monday. This effectively meant scoring all events up to midnight on the Friday, then producing the report for consultation with the Operations, Intelligence, Military Police, Media & JIC branches of the HQ in order to confirm that the OA Branch view coincided with that of the rest of the HQ. After any minor amendment the final version was incorporated in COMKFOR’s brief for the next JIC meeting.

The final part of the report provided a summary graphic of compliance with the Undertaking using a traffic light system. Each of the categories was given a colour, red, amber or green depending on whether the category was assessed as non-compliant, partially compliant or completely compliant. Figure 3 shows the text of a typical summary report at the top left, with a category summary in the box. It then illustrates how that might then be translated into the "traffic lights" summary graphic.

In the case in Figure 5, public declarations by the UCK leadership to the demilitarization of the UCK have been judged to be fully compliant with the terms of the Undertaking. So the coloured box relating to the category for declarations and communications has been coloured green and the presence of an arrow in the adjacent box would indicate whether this was an improvement or deterioration of the situation recorded for the previous week.

### OAB COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT OF UCK AS AT 032359B SEP 99 – K+74

1. **General**. There has been a significant decrease in the number of non-compliant issues that can be attributed directly to the UCK/PU. This is accounted for by improved compliance from the UCK/PU, but there are other factors to consider. The UNIP are now taking responsibility for investigating incidents at an earlier stage. This causes loss of OAB visibility on the final outcome of an investigation and the subsequent apportionment of blame. In addition the connection between organised crime and crime committed by UCK/PU members is becoming harder to define.

8. **Declarations & Communication of Undertaking**. The UCK leadership has publicly declared its compliance and does seem genuinely eager to co-operate with KFOR. The situation in the OZs is less clear.

13. **Summary Table**. The summary table is attached as Annex A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set</th>
<th>Compliance Category</th>
<th>Assessment Text</th>
<th>Graphic</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cessation of Hostilities</td>
<td>Minor non-compliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Location of Forces</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>De-Militarisation</td>
<td>Minor non-compliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Adherence to Procedure</td>
<td>Minor non-compliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Co-operation with KFOR</td>
<td>Minor non-compliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Co-operation with Civil Presence</td>
<td>Non-compliant</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Declarations and Communications</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Minefields obstacles and Checkpoints</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Response to enforcement</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Authority and General Provisions</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Timeliness</td>
<td>Minor non-compliance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Figure 5: Example compliance incident.**

Figure 6 shows that the UCK achieved compliance early on with cessation of hostilities and the use and carriage of illegal weapons, and became non-compliant in areas concerning co-operation with KFOR and the civil authorities before becoming broadly compliant on the 19 September.
In summary, the compliance report not only provided accurate timely and audible information to the Commander, but was used to brief senior visitors and provide external reports. Figure 6 was the summary graphic produced in the final report on the UCK demilitarization, and was also sent to the North Atlantic Council and the UN.

**SUMMARY FROM COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT IN KOSOVO**

It should be recognised that the KFOR(1999) experiences differ from those of IFOR(1996). In particular NATO understanding of a “peace support operation” was more mature. There was recognition that agreements had to be monitored. HQ ARRC culture was more amenable to analysis techniques and that an auditable process was needed to inform the Commander. Finally compliance monitoring was seen as a HQ wide activity.

**CURRENT COMPLIANCE ASSESSMENT IN HQ ARRC**

Since return from Kosovo in October 1999 HQ ARRC has continued to review its procedures and train to carry out those procedures. The current situation is that compliance monitoring has been absorbed into HQ ARRC concept of operations, standard procedures have been written and tested on exercise ARRCADE GUARD in 2001 and again with refinements in ARRCADE GUARD 2002.

While warfighting remains the priority within ARRC the need to ensure that the skills need for the more likely mission of Peace Support are maintained is re-enforced in a number of directives:

“Our HQ must be ready to operate at any point on the spectrum of conflict from PSO to combined joint warfighting, and to transition from one point to another.” (COMARRC’s Directive 2002)
“Keep PSO core skills alive so that we are intellectually prepared and ready for any short notice PSO.” (COSARRC's Interim Directive for 2002)

“Ensure the HQ maintains an acceptable level of PSO competence.” (DCOS Ops Directive for 2002)

To discharge these directives the HQ has a series of seminars and exercises and to ensure that we capture the good practices developed Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and Standard Operating Instructions (SOI) are written SOP P7100 and SOP I7100 refer to compliance (Figure 7).

Figure 7: Joint Commission Documents Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and Standard Operating Instructions (SOI).

SOP P7100 gives the following two definitions:

“Compliance operations involve all the actions by ARRC forces aimed to ensure the conformity and observance of any kind of agreement signed by specific Parties.”

“The CWG is a multi-disciplinary group (MDG) constituted within HQ ARRC for non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CRO) in order to provide assessment to the Commander on the compliance or non-compliance attitude of specific Parties/non-formally recognised personnel and organisations as part of Compliance Operations.”

The Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) is the process by which the HQ conducts its business with the various groups involved in the Peace Support Mission, the responsibilities of the JIC are:
- To influence parties involved in an agreement.
- To monitor compliance.
- To establish and maintain close contact with the parties.
- To co-ordinate with civilian elements and organisations.

The fundamental importance of compliance monitoring to the Joint Implementation Commission process is illustrated in Figure 8 of the Operational Cycle of the Commission.

The Operational Analysis Branch has permanent representation on the Compliance Working Group. The role of the CWG is to establish compliance categories; this would be done in a similar fashion to that in Kosovo. If there were no formal agreements the CWG would establish a code of conduct which would be used to establish monitoring categories. The CWG would be responsible for producing a compliance report, the frequency of which would be dependent on situation and finally the CWG would be responsible for identifying any issues, which should be brought to the Commanders attention.

TACSOP P7110 gives some examples, the code of conduct categories states:

**CODE OF CONDUCT CATEGORIES (Example)**

1. There could be a single Code of Conduct for all the non-formally recognised personnel and organisations involved in the crisis which are not signatories of any formal agreement, or a Code of Conduct specific for each one.
2. The categories are each comprised of a number of specific tasks (positive compliance) and/or non-permissive behaviour (negative compliance). The text of these tasks/prohibitions is taken from the text of the relevant agreements (Cease-fire agreement, Undertaking, UNSCR, etc) and/or Universal Charters.

3. The categories must be prioritised according with the Commander’s guidance. The priority of the categories can change during the different phases of the operation.

The TASCOP gives an example of codes of conduct categories, Figure 9.

Compliance Working Group:
CODE OF CONDUCT CATEGORIES AS AT \textit{(date)}

| 1. CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. |
| 2. DISARMAMENT. |
| 3. ETHNIC RIGHTS. |
| 4. CO-OPERATION WITH NATO. |
| 5. LAW AND ORDER. |
| 6. CO-OPERATION WITH CIVIL PRESENCE. |
| 7. POWS, REMAINS. |
| 8. NOTIFICATION OF WEAPONS |

Each generic category will have the tasks/constraints extracted from the relevant agreements and/or Universal Charters.

Figure 9: An example of codes of conduct categories.

COMPLIANCE: THE FUTURE

The techniques developed by OAB are now institutionalised as a military task with the UK and are slowly being adopted by NATO, but with a long way to go to have a NATO standard procedure. HQ ARRC TACSOP are being used a basis of a code of best practise (COBP), they are being used at NATO sub-regional command level as well as in the new emerging NATO Land Rapid Reaction Corps.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

In both Bosnia and Kosovo a key task of the military peace-keeping force was to monitor compliance with agreements. In both cases the analysis techniques evolved by the Operational Analysis Branch of HQ ARRC, played a key role.
The techniques developed on these operations have been refined by HQ ARRC and practised on exercises, resulting in a mature set of ARRC standard instructions. In addition to use by HQ ARRC the procedures have been adopted by other NATO HQs and used on exercise. The need to have a compliance monitoring procedure is now considered well established and the techniques set out in this paper are gaining acceptance within NATO.

REFERENCES


