Partnership: Information Operations and Civil-Military Cooperation in Peacekeeping

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ABSTRACT

For peace operations to be successful, there must be a well functioning partnership between civil affairs and information operations and between civilian authorities and military forces at all levels, tactical, operational and strategic. Essential to this continued partnership is the thorough integration of information resources, policies and planning, both civilian and military. When these information resources are well integrated into the civil-military partnership on the local level, in a situation analogous to ‘community policing” in America’s urban landscape, “community peacekeeping” and the resulting positive public perceptions of “the peace” and the peacekeepers will aid force protection. Community peacekeeping will
bring about the achievement of an acceptable end-state to the peace operation. The paper cites examples from Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan to illustrate how, with proper integration, civil affairs and information operations work in synergy. Using civil affairs and information operations effectively in peacekeeping strengthens the civil-military relationship and helps to bring about a self-sustaining peace.

The village of Haji Basher, about 16 kilometers (10 miles) southeast of the airport, recently had its first contact with a 19-man PSYOPS unit, which included an MP (military police) squad for security, a local guide and an interpreter. “Ask him if it would be all right if we talk with him about how things are going here in the village, what they may need?” Staff Sgt. “J”, a team leader with the 90th Psychological Operations Battalion, said to Akbar, an interpreter from local Anti-Taliban Forces, after introducing himself to an elder named Abdullah Gan. … The civil affairs officer on the sergeant's mission, for example, is along to assess and prioritize the needs of the village - - potable water, irrigation, hygiene, health, nutrition and education. … According to unit commander Capt. “B”, who like others in the unit did not want his surname used as a matter of security, the villagers' refrain is inevitably the same in southern Afghanistan, where years of drought has produced an unending expanse of cracked earth and an inches-thick carpet of dust. “Every village asks for wells,” he said. "That means irrigation, farming, food and work. It means self-sufficiency.” … Earlier at Da Kalay, home village of the PSYOPS' guide, Sadiq… As speakers from a HUMVEE played native music to attract a crowd — a sure-fire magnet since the Taliban had banned music -- the Americans slowly slipped shoes — probably the first ever for the children -- onto unshodden(sic) feet, bending down and tying laces if necessary. Donated clothing from an international organization was also passed around after the troops, who had divested themselves of body armor and helmets so as not to intimidate the people, had sat down to the ritual of sharing tea. Hands were shook. Children beamed. Adults looked grateful. “It’s one of those mushy, Kodak moments," one of the soldiers said after helping a little boy put on a pair of shoes. … “It's really satisfying to be able to help people," said Sgt. "J", who used to work in weapons repair at Fort Bragg, N.C., before joining PSYOPS. “We just wish we could give them what they really want -- water.”


As the above vignette illustrates, for peace operations to be successful, there must be a well functioning partnership between civil affairs and information operations and between civilian authorities and military forces at all levels, tactical, operational and strategic. Essential to this continued partnership is the thorough integration of information resources, policies and planning, both civilian and military. When these information resources are well integrated into the civil-military partnership on the local level, in a situation analogous to ‘community policing” in America’s urban landscape, “community peacekeeping” and the resulting positive public perceptions of “the peace” and the peacekeepers will aid force protection. Community peacekeeping will bring about the achievement of an acceptable end-state to the peace operation, that is, a self-sustaining peace.
Public perceptions of the peacekeepers and their Mission are constantly evolving. Certainly, the perceptions of U.S. and other peacekeepers in Kosovo by both the ethnic Serb residents and by the Kosovars changed dramatically in the months following their initial entry. These perceptions are continuing to evolve. In part, this evolution is based upon the complex interplay of indigenous actors and circumstances on the ground. Yet perceptions can be affected powerfully by the action of the peacekeeping forces, especially in civil-military and information operations. This can be seen most clearly today in Afghanistan. Public perceptions in any peace operation can shape significantly the environment to the advantage or to the disadvantage of the peacekeeping force. The peacekeeping force that ignores this basic reality is at peril.

The broad international peacekeeping community recognizes the importance of civil-military operations and especially the role of information operations to peace operations. Even earlier skeptics now at least pay lip service to the concepts of CMO and IO. The recognition of the essential roles of civil-military operations, especially military Civil Affairs (CA) functions and Information Operations, based upon the practical experience of peacekeeping forces in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor have become widely accepted within the peacekeeping community. This recognition could not have come at a better time. Multilateral peacekeeping, however, including that of the United Nations, still has much to achieve in order to bring civil-military and information operations to an acceptable level. Nevertheless, recognition that there is a problem is the first step to a solution. The Brahimi Report makes clear that “an effective public information and communications capacity in mission areas is an operational necessity for virtually all United Nations peace operations.”

The United Nations, has some problems not applicable to other multilateral organizations; among them, the rules of engagement (ROE) under Chapters Six and Seven (the sections of the United Nations Charter applicable to peacekeeping operations), the veto power and influence over the agenda of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and the vast disparities in overall skill level and professional military culture among the members of the United Nations who actually provide the peacekeepers. Quite a different and unique situation may be found at the strongest and most coherent of the multinational regional organizations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has a common point of reference, at least a public facade of unity or common cause, a clear understanding of mission, and a close degree of cultural affinity and skill levels among its military members. Even here, however, a host of potential problems can arise to confront a peace support mission as we have seen in Bosnia and later in Kosovo.

The situation in Afghanistan has its own character and consequently its own problems. Because Afghanistan was not a major focus of the United States prior to September 11 and, under White House direction, a rapid response was required, the slow moving U.S. interagency process was unable to develop a consensus. The various institutions, civilian and military attempted to write their playbooks even as events unfolded and policy was developed concurrently with operational planning. A ninety-seven page Political/Military plan was produced by the U.S. State Department but it never received interagency clearance and thus was never “official” and thus was not recognized as the Pol/Mil plan. Without a recognized plan no clearly articulated end state, interim objectives or measures of effectiveness were put forward.
An early decision by senior U.S. leaders to concentrate U.S. efforts on defeating terrorism through military force while eliminating any U.S. role in “nation building” or peacekeeping, stunted development of a more coherent approach to a long-term solution in Afghanistan. We see the results of this flawed early decision for a small U.S. “footprint.” Because the U.S. did not commit sufficient military force, Afghanistan today continues to suffer from a weak security sector, lack of stability outside the capital, limited international capacity, little central control, and lack of overall coordination.

The international community fared no better. Indeed, the same lack of focus and requirement for speedy action prevented the international community from developing a consensus. The U.N.’s engagement in Afghanistan thus can be characterized as an operation in search of a strategy. Like the U.S., the U.N.’s engagement through UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) and the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) was also a “light footprint.” The relationships between the U.S. and the U.N. and the NGOs were strained from the beginning as the U.S. was perceived as a combatant and thus kept at arms length by the international community.

Indeed, in the view of many humanitarian and development NGO professionals, the civil-military relationship in Afghanistan is far more complicated than earlier efforts because the U.S.-led coalition force while conducting offensive military operations also had a significant civil-military component (the Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force or CJCMOTF). The Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force was constituted in its original form in mid-October of 2001. It is responsible for planning, coordinating and in many cases executing Coalition humanitarian operations in Afghanistan. For its part, U.S. military forces conducting humanitarian support programs while conducting military operations, adopted the practice of not wearing military uniforms and sometimes carried concealed weapons. These practices in the early war fighting stage with U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducting operations, especially civil affairs operations, while wearing civilian attire soured U.S. military-NGO relations for many crucial months.

In March 2002, the Agency Coordination Body for Afghanistan Relief (ACBAR) convened an NGO meeting to express concern over this practice of using civilian clothing as well as the mixed message of using military forces for simultaneous humanitarian and military mandates for the U.S.-led coalition. The NGOs were concerned that there would be confusion among the people of Afghanistan as to whether a particular group of “civilians” were NGO humanitarian operators, coalition soldiers or others, including personnel from U.S. intelligence and law enforcement. This background has had a profound detrimental impact on the long term ability of Civil Affairs and Information Operations components to be as effective as they could be.

BOOTS ON THE GROUND

From the earliest days of the George W. Bush administration, United States policy regarding peacekeeping operations sought to find a new path following the “thorough review” that was promised during the presidential campaign by the candidate and his future NSC advisor. That review initially found that United States’ “boots on the ground” peace support operations should be limited. In the reality of peacekeeping in the Balkans, in the post-September 11 War on Terrorism, and especially in the post-liberation of Afghanistan from
the *Taliban* and *Al-Qaeda*, the U.S. gradually came to realize that the U.S. military’s role is much broader and complex than simply winning the military battle. Whether “nation building” is the term used or not, it became evident that the presence of the U.S. military in a peacekeeping role still will be necessary and prudent for the foreseeable future, especially in those areas to which the U.S. has already made a commitment. During his first visit with American troops at Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo, President Bush unequivocally stated that the work of the U.S. forces is “important for the peace that NATO is committed to building in the Balkans. America and allied forces came into Bosnia and Kosovo; they came in together, and we will leave together. Our goal is to hasten the day when peace is self-sustaining; when local democratically-elected authorities can assume full responsibility; and when NATO forces can go home.”

In Afghanistan, the United States began to overcome its initial rejection of nation building and peacekeeping actions even if it continued to avoid the terminology whenever possible.

The classic “blue helmet” UN mission, causes real concern among some in the U.S. military, carries high risks and low rewards, and finds few friends either on Capitol Hill or on Main Street, USA. Thus, the Bush administration’s review focused on the United Nations and other international and regional organizations (e.g. NATO, OSCE, ASEAN, OAU) as the principal actors in peace operations in the future, with the U.S. providing some but certainly not the majority of the troops or with the United States military functioning in a more limited capacity by carrying out the vital logistical and transport functions to support non-US troops on the ground. Afghanistan caused the U.S. to re-evaluate and re-think these early assumptions.

**THE RELATIONSHIP OF CIVIL-MILITARY AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS TO SUCCESS**

United States military doctrine holds that the purpose of civil-military operations is to harmonize military and civilian activities toward a common set of goals that may include some or all of the following:

- alleviation of human suffering;
- reconstruction of physical infrastructure;
- restoration of societal infrastructure;
- enhancement of the acceptance and credibility of the peace operation;
- encouragement of dispute resolution; and
- promotion of societal stability.

Without civil-military cooperation it is unlikely that any complex contingency situation would achieve the kind of end-state scenario that might enable international forces to
“declare victory,” (i.e. mission completed) and depart from a country. If the problem is not a military problem then it is unlikely that the solution will be purely a military solution. Civil military operations can be relatively simple or quite complex in nature, financially costly or essentially cost-free, involving few or many actors, on a time scale measured either in days or in generations. Whatever the dimensions however, information operations must play a central part.

Information operations play an essential role in supporting the behavior modification that is at the core of most civil-military cooperative efforts. Humanitarian efforts, for example, can be made more effective through information operations to bring knowledge about opportunities for food, health care and shelter to those in need. In turn, information operations can be more effective in changing attitudes when tied to humanitarian need fulfillment. Information operations can enhance the perceived reward/punishment in modifying the behavior of the general population or among those in opposition to the peace operations. Information operations, whether focused on military or civilian public affairs, psychological operations, public diplomacy or some combination targeted to one or several audiences can have a powerful effect on behavior modification.

Through costly trial and error, the experiences in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo have made it clear to the U.S. military that civil-military operations and information operations must work hand in hand to achieve the goals of the mission. It is axiomatic that without well integrated military and civilian organizations and operations, the desired degree of necessary societal stability cannot be achieved. Without well designed and coordinated information operations, the “comfort level” of the peacekeeping forces will be precarious at best and disastrous at worst.

In Afghanistan, civil affairs units were exclusively in a war fighting mode and CA was in support of the battle to destroy the Taliban government and the Al-Qaeda forces using the country as a base of operations. Initially, CA and IO missions were focused exclusively on the short term combatant mission. After the rapid eviction of the Taliban Government and its replacement with authorities opposed to Al-Qaeda, CA and IO looked to new missions to support. In the U.S. view, long term stability of Afghanistan required a stable central government and both IO and CA could contribute to this effort.

The term Information Operations can be more confusing than illuminating. In part that is because it has been defined so many ways. In the context of peace operations, however, information operations refers to the use by the peacekeeping force of multi-media and personal contacts designed to influence attitudes and behavior on the part of the indigenous population. In the definition used here, cyber war, disruption of computer networks, offensive information and psychological operations, etc., have no place. Information operations in peacekeeping are primarily designed to ensure the legitimacy of the overall peace operations by helping to shape the local political-military environment in order to achieve the mission. Well designed and executed information operations can also influence attitudes and beliefs which are necessary as pre-conditions for members of the local population to work together to reconstruct, rebuild and reconstitute their own society. Although laudable, that is not its main function. Experience has also shown us that in the absence of a coordinated civil-military and information policy on the part of the peacekeepers, the information vacuum will be filled by those whose intentions are hostile to the interests of the peace operation.
An important guarantor of long-term peace and long-term stability is the sheer physical presence of the peacekeeping force with comprehensive civil-military operations backed up by and enhanced by a solid international public information campaign.\textsuperscript{11} Paradoxically, a robust and active civil-military program supported by an equally robust and well-coordinated military information and civilian public diplomacy campaign also may be among the best guarantors of force protection deemed so essential to domestic political support for peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{12} The American officer corps and its political leadership are more cautious and risk-averse regarding casualties than is the general public\textsuperscript{13}, according to a review of U.S. polling data. It is not beyond the realm of the possible that political and/or military leaders would use public opinion to justify their own agendas even if the true feelings of the society are at variance with that which is purported to be the public’s opinion.\textsuperscript{14} History may well judge the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia following the tragic loss of 18 U.S. Army Rangers as a telling example of this misuse of alleged “public opinion” to justify actions.

When military information operations take place in the absence of civilian public diplomacy or without a close coordination between the military and civilian practitioners, there is a very real danger of counter-productive operations and “working at cross purposes.” Clearly, the goals of the peace operation and the efficiency of information operations and/or public diplomacy are hampered by the inevitable friction and distrust engendered in the absence of civilian and military coordination on these operations. A tragic course of events in Somalia and its unhappy outcome and the abject failures in the early years in Bosnia gave rise to U.S. presidential decision directives calling on the American interagency community to better conceptualize, plan and coordinate the U.S. response to peacekeeping requirements.\textsuperscript{15}

Just as in Somalia, the experience of poorly coordinated military information operations with civilian public diplomacy early on in Bosnia,\textsuperscript{16} proved to be the primary impetus for the creation of a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on International Public Information on the eve of U.S. and NATO operations in Kosovo. The purpose of this Clinton Administration directive was to ensure that both civilian and military public information activities are coordinated in the Washington interagency process before being carried out in a coordinated way on the ground.

The Bush Administration was wise in retaining elements of this coordination mechanism initially but lost precious time in refining these instructions on coordination of international public information in its first months in office. Following the tragedy of September 11 and the ensuing soul-searching, the urgency to find a more effective means to coordinate international information in the U.S. government led the Pentagon to create a controversial but short-lived Office of Strategic Influence\textsuperscript{17} and the White House to establish an Office of Global Communication\textsuperscript{18} to join the ranks of the already existing International Public Information Secretariat at the Department of State. The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Madison Avenue Advertising Executive Charlotte Beers, has struggled since her appointment in fall 2001 to find funding, authority and operational ability to wage the information phase of the new war on terrorism.\textsuperscript{19}
COMMUNITY POLICING: A MODEL FOR COMMUNITY PEACEKEEPING

This integrated civil-military and information operations concept owes much to “community policing” as practiced by many U.S. urban police departments. Community policing is a proven success in “connecting” the public and the police in a mutually supportive way. Community policing is a collaborative effort between the police and the community that identifies problems of crime and disorder and involves all elements of the community in the search for solutions to these problems. It is founded on close, mutually beneficial ties between police and community members. Police departments with a strong community policing commitment are also those in the forefront of public awareness campaigns, i.e. information operations, at the grassroots level.  

Interaction between peacekeepers and public thorough civil military operations provides an excellent venue for information gathering regarding both real and potential threats to peacekeeping personnel. Consistent and sustained interaction provides direct insight into what the local population is thinking. Direct interaction dispels rumor and misinformation, counters disinformation, sets the record straight and put the facts before the public. Most importantly it gives the commander in the field the most powerful information operations tool in his inventory— the individual service men and women with their own unique and diverse experiences in constant and continued dialogue with the local population. To paraphrase the late broadcast journalist and director of the U.S. Information Agency Edward R. Murrow, these soldiers constitute the most important part of the communication chain—the last three feet. 

Just as in community policing, the interaction between the general public and community leaders and the same individuals maintaining public order and conducting civil-military actions and information operations at the grass roots level on a day-to-day basis is the key to success. These guardians of public order (police or peacekeeping forces) will begin to recognize individuals as individuals and they in turn will become real people (not just uniforms) to the members of the public. In a peace operation, until and unless this point of mutual recognition and mutual respect is reached, there will be a gulf between the peacekeepers and the public that no amount of sophisticated public information campaigns or relief assistance packages can bridge. Just as in basic police work, person-to-person relationships are the key to success for on-the-ground peacekeeping. 

For some U. S. commanders in the field and some policy makers in Washington, this proximity of peacekeepers to the indigenous population is seen too often as a threat to force protection. That force protection is important is obvious. Whenever troops are placed in close proximity to potentially hostile populations there will be some risk. But holding up force protection as not only the top priority but perhaps the only priority means that the peacekeepers will be seen largely by the local population as hostile and threatening. It will mean that public attitudes toward the peacekeepers will continually harden and make achievement of a self-sustaining peace that would permit the peacekeepers to withdraw much more difficult. Force protection must be flexible to take into consideration the threat level, the evolving public opinion and the needs of the mission. Public opinion is amenable to the tools and techniques of public information. Thus, while community peacekeeping may result in more risk in the short run for the safety of the peacekeepers, it will also result in a long term gain in public confidence, appreciation, and thus, security for the peacekeeping force.
Other nations have used a similar concept in combining civil affairs, psyops and security or intelligence operators in order to gain the benefit from the synergy of CA and IO while keeping force protection levels high. Canadian forces, as part of the coalition in Afghanistan, used CA and IO with G-2 elements very effectively. Unable to find an audience for the “one size fits all” cookie cutter approach to Information Operations initially favored by the U.S. forces, the Canadians used very localized “market research” to find the message that each local population would find most credible. They built their IO from the ground up and this methodology was later accepted by ISAF which also combined CA and IO with a security/reconnaissance force in Kabul.

As we shall see, the CJCMOTF’s latest plans to remove the causes of instability within Afghanistan and to establish a stable and secure environment to encourage emergence of a competent central government, through PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) bear a striking resemblance to these Canadian and ISAF initiatives. The U.S. would acknowledge that PRTs are modeled on earlier community-based U.S. teams employed in Kosovo and they may well owe much of their conceptual framework to theories of community policing.

LESSONS LEARNED IN TUZLA

Most military forces attempt to integrate “lessons learned” or “experiences” into their operations on a routine basis. Incoming military commanders are urged to pay attention to AARs (After Action Reviews) and the perceived mistakes of the past are pointed out in order to be corrected by each successive command. The U.S. Army is no exception to the AAR process and in fact inculcates the approach into every aspect of its tactical, operational and strategic thinking. This was certainly the case in recognition of the importance of information operations and the integration of these operations with the overall mission in Bosnia.

One example of this building on experience illustrates an effective use of information operations.21 By 1999 in Multinational Division North (MND-N), “Task Force Eagle”, located in the Bosnian city of Tuzla, information operations had become a top priority with Stabilization Force Six, i.e. SFOR 6 (the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division) and later SFOR 7, (the Texas National Guard’s 49th Armored Division). The SFOR 6 commander who had previous peacekeeping operations experience in Somalia and Haiti strongly emphasized the central importance of information operations at the outset of the 10th Mountain Division’s training exercises prior to their deployment to Bosnia. He charged his chief of staff directly with supervision of information operations and the full integration of these operations into all activities of the division staff at Eagle Base, Tuzla. The chief of staff, in turn, placed a lieutenant colonel in charge of a branch to develop information operations concepts, themes and programs and to ensure that these were closely coordinated with the public affairs and psychological operations (psyops) activities in the command.

The U. S. Department of State political advisor (POLAD) to the commander met weekly with the chief of staff and the information operations chief to update plans and operations and refine a weekly schedule across the entire division. Their plans included themes and messages for local radio and TV talk show appearances by the command group, TV, radio and print advertising, press conferences and media interviews, all-purpose talking points for
the commander and members of his senior staff. All of these plans were coordinated with SFOR headquarters information operations in Sarajevo and with public affairs representatives of key international organizations in both Tuzla and Sarajevo. The aim was to ensure that all parties involved in Dayton Accords implementation were delivering a consistent message.

Information operations were used on a daily basis to help to shape the local political-military environment in order to achieve effective Dayton implementation. This policy continued when the 49th Armored Division arrived in March 1999. As with the 10th Mountain Division, the new chief of staff exercised direct oversight of all aspects of information operations. Each of these divisions allocated more than $750,000 to these efforts, including paid radio, TV and print advertising. Both divisions actively pursued the information campaign at the divisional and the battalion level but information operations were used effectively too at the company and even at the platoon level. With frequent appearances on a wide range of local radio and TV programs, from teenage music shows to call-in public affairs programming, some SFOR officers became local celebrities while delivering the message. Both divisions used information operations to support specific campaigns ranging from weapons turn-in programs, to rumor control, to explanations for SFOR actions and to convey SFOR’s commitment to full implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. The information campaign had a substantial payoff in sustaining and improving popular support for the peacekeeping forces and for the aims of the peacekeeping operation, according to military and non-military observers.

LESSONS RE-LEARNED IN KOSOVO

The U.S. peacekeepers learned many of the Bosnian lessons well and applied them to a new and different situation in the next installment of peacekeeping operations in the Balkans — Kosovo. While U.S. military information operations were better linked to U.S. public diplomacy efforts in Kosovo as compared to the lack of any linkage between the military and civilian campaigns in Bosnia, they still lacked essential coordination elements. These unified U.S. efforts were simply not linked to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)’s own public information efforts nor coordinated with the efforts of either the NATO Kosovo Security Force (KFOR) Headquarters nor the efforts of the surrounding Multinational Brigades. 22

Even on those rare occasions when messages supporting civil military action plans within the larger information campaign are undertaken, success cannot be guaranteed. In late 2000, for example, a Kosovar Albanian was persuaded to sell a surplus cow to a needy ethnic Serb farmer. The “good news” that the two were working together was overshadowed by the “bad news” that the two were working together! The Kosovar Albanian became a pariah in the local Kosovar community and the Serb suffered the same fate among his ethnic Serbian compatriots. The civil-military goal of economic cooperation between the two communities was reached. The information campaign supported the goal when it disseminated this “good news” but because the cultural context was not sufficiently well understood, the message became a “bad news” message in both communities.

In a multi-national peacekeeping operation 23, coordination of both information operations and civil-military operations must go well beyond a single country’s peace operations to address these issues for the entire international community’s operations. Failure to
coordinate can result in fragmentation or a “balkanization” of the region’s information messages. The same population could receive different and contradictory messages depending on where they might be on a given day. If an ethnic Serb is shopping in the town of Kosovska Mitrovica (in northern Kosovo) he might hear a quite different “message” from that which he will later hear at his home in Strpce (in southern Kosovo). Will he then believe and act on the first, the second or neither?

At a Kosovo After Action Review Conference hosted by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute and attended by several dozen military officers and civilians with long-term and intensive experiences in Kosovo, it became clear that, while many lessons were learned from the peace operations experiences in Bosnia and elsewhere, there were many lessons which needed to be re-learned. Indeed, some lessons were experienced for the first time in Kosovo. Some of the most important of these lessons concerned the use, the misuse or lack of use of coordinated information operations in the context of civil-military relations in Kosovo.

While much of the material presented at the conference at the U. S. Army War College in February 2001 is beyond the scope of this paper, several of the key findings and recurring themes throughout the three day session are relevant here.

Participants in the conference were determined to improve the Army’s ability to work more effectively and efficiently with civilians and civilian organizations. They recommended that even at the pre-deployment phase, the Army should include permanent military liaison positions with key civilian organizations and establish civilian liaisons to the regional combatant commander. Of note too is the conference recommendation to assign a “humanitarian assistance advisor”, presumably a USAID representative to the regional commander.

Another item of general consensus among the participants was the failure of Army doctrine, organization, training and professional military education to properly prepare leaders and staffs for the current environment which embraces multi-service, multinational, interagency and civil organization contributions to peace support. Military leaders below the general officer level often are simply not prepared to handle political-military and civilian-military aspects of peace operations because this subject is not taught sufficiently in professional military education programs. Indeed, for most U.S. military officers, even those who attend the National Defense University, the Army War College or another of the premier senior service schools, political-military education comes too little and too late in the officer’s career. In peace support operations, a platoon leader may face difficult civil-military issues under the scrutiny of worldwide TV coverage of his actions. Unity of effort in peace operations requires that military forces fit into a framework that includes a wide range of civilian actors. Structures and processes must be established to share information, promote cooperation and direct coordination among military organizations, civilian government agencies, international organizations, NGOs and contractors. It was deemed essential that the civil-military operations center (CMOC) be established “outside the wire”, that is, in a location that does not restrict access to the center for any of the above organizations.

Of direct relevance to the interrelationship of civil-military and information operations was the overwhelming agreement among the participants that education and training in information operations is inadequate and that military leaders must have a better understanding and appreciation of the importance of information operations training to
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Successful peace support. Participants stressed that information operations in peace operations differ from information operations in war. The two imperatives of peace operations are transparency and impartiality and they must be made the cornerstone of information operations in a peacekeeping environment. Current U.S. Army doctrine, practices and procedures for using information as part of synchronized information operations to support a peace operation are too slow and uncoordinated. When an inherently faulty system is forced to work with international military and civilian organizations with their own sets of problems, it is a prescription for failure.

CMO AND IO IN AFGHANISTAN: MORE LESSONS

In Afghanistan, after the initial blunders concerning uniforms and concealed weapons which sowed distrust among the NGOs and may well have confused some Afghans as to whether U.S. civil affairs units were merely NGO humanitarians with guns, more thought and care was given to the civil-military relationship and the role that IO can play in reinforcing gains and limiting losses.

The first indications of a shift in U.S. policy regarding the concepts of “nation-building” and “peacekeeping” by U.S. forces in Afghanistan could be seen in the summer of 2002. In mid-August, an unnamed U.S. official in Kabul was quoted as saying that several years would be required to “complete the job.” While no timetable for withdrawal was announced, military officials did note that U.S. Special Forces troops would remain at least into 2004 to train the Afghan army and work on reconstruction projects. Soon thereafter, U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld showed off the “remarkable contributions” made by Army civil affairs teams and coalition partners in rebuilding Afghanistan. He said that reconstruction projects “create conditions so that the country does not again become a terrorist training camp.” In an abrupt departure from earlier statements by administration officials, Rumsfeld said that America and its allies “have to help the Afghan people build the infrastructure that will allow them to achieve true self-government and self-reliance.” At the press conference, co-hosted by the Defense Secretary and the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace, USMC, the speakers mainly addressed the projects completed or underway by Army civil affairs teams through the CJCMOTF illustrated by before and after photos of rebuilt schools, bridges, hospitals and irrigation projects.

The policy shift from a purely military combat operation to stability operations was confirmed a week later by U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in an interview with the London Daily Telegraph. According to Wolfowitz, “…(U.S.) focus is shifting to training the Afghan national army, supporting ISAF, supporting reconstruction efforts—those kinds of things that contribute to long-term stability.” At the time, the U.S. official signaled that the U.S. would even drop its opposition to an expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul. A commentary in The Economist spoke for many of America’s coalition partners: “…Afghanistan provides a case study of the difficulties of providing a stable alternative to an undesirable regime—and how much the Americans are willing to contribute to the messy business of reconstruction.” Throughout the summer and autumn of 2002, the U.S. media reported from Washington and Kabul/Bagram on the U.S. military’s civil affairs and psyops teams continuing and accelerated work in “winning hearts and minds” through reconstruction and development efforts at the community level.
By November 2002, the option of an expanded ISAF was no longer feasible due to the reluctance of coalition partners to commit additional troops. The U.S. began to reveal the details of a new plan which called for the restructuring of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{31}

The new plan was both an expanded commitment on the part of the U.S. military to the rebuilding of Afghanistan and an admission that security concerns continued to impede reconstruction efforts by civilian organizations. It was a major shift in policy from an avoidance of nation-building and peacekeeping to an acceptance that by whatever name it was called, the U.S. would be in the stability and security business in Afghanistan for some time. The decision to deploy U.S. forces, including civil affairs specialists, to regional centers formalized a change in policy that began in the summer of 2002. Not everyone was pleased by the shift. A representative of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (an umbrella organization of 77 NGOs) called the effort “misguided” and claimed that military-coordinated aid efforts could taint the projects of the United Nations and other aid agencies, and armed soldiers working in conjunction with aid workers could put agencies in danger.\textsuperscript{32}

With an eye on Iraq, the U.S. military was looking beyond combat to its role in a post-conflict situation. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations (formerly Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs) noted “…the military aspects of a problem, and the humanitarian aspects of a problem, are wrapped together like a pretzel, and it’s awfully difficult to unravel.”\textsuperscript{33}

The Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) was assigned to find a way to ensure long term stability so that the central government could eventually emerge in control of its territory and borders. The challenge is a formidable one to be sure. The interim government of Afghanistan, the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan or ITGA, has been slow to work toward a common agenda. The country’s infrastructure is in ruins. There is a low literacy rate, widespread unemployment/underemployment, continued interference in Afghan affairs from Iran and Pakistan, the continued threat of terrorism inside the country and on its borders, and perhaps most perplexing of all, continued independent actions by the so-called war lords, local leaders acting independently of — sometimes against — the authority of the central government.

In order to address these issues, the CJCMOTF began to establish, in December 2002 in Gardez, the first of eight Provincial Reconstruction Teams.\textsuperscript{34} PRTs in Bamyan and Kunduz follow Gardez before a pause in order to assess the work of the first three teams and to develop lessons learned. While the first three PRTs will be U.S. staffed and equipped, the PRT concept calls for coalition staffed and equipped PRTs following the assessment. All PRTs will have several roles including: enhancing the security environment; enhancing the reconstruction effort; monitoring and assessing military, political and civil reform efforts. In order to perform these tasks, the PRTs must engage pro-ITGA community leaders, interact with government authorities, international organizations and NGOs while maintaining a small non-combat operational footprint. The PRT is capable of calling upon the resources of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF-180) for resource intensive operations, including combat operations should they be necessary. Each PRT is to consist of three sections: headquarters, security and civil. The civil section will be key to the success of the PRT for it includes the provincial CMOC/CIMIC with information sharing capability with the other major actors in
each province including the ITGA representatives, representatives of the U.S. Department of State, USAID and other USG agencies, international and non-governmental organizations, UNAMA and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs. The Civil Section is tasked with establishing a Civil-Military Operations Center in order to coordinate reconstruction projects with IOs, NGOs and the central Afghan authorities. The PRT supports the regional administration, UNAMA and the ITGA. It assists the ITGA in establishing regional coordination offices, conducts village assessments, processes requests for assistance from local communities, assists the ITGA to conduct parallel activities with the Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority.

In addition, the civil section is charged with the responsibility to conduct weekly assessments of local acceptance of the rule of law, local acceptance of the authority of the central government, the level and flow of intra-regional commerce, the effectiveness of the local ITGA representatives and the participation and activities of international and non-governmental organizations in the province. Information Operations are an important component of the civil section. The PRT Psyops Team enlists support of key communicators and the cooperation of the local population, promotes a favorable image of the central government and the rebuilding and reorganization of the ITGA, and reduces support for terrorists and those opposed to the ITGA.35

**RELEVANCE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**

Whether forces are actually sent in a peacekeeping role, unilaterally, multilaterally, as part of a coalition, as part of a United Nations peace support mission, the situation on the ground could be one of “peace” to be “kept” or “made” or even a peace enforcement mission. Every situation is different and each contingency has its own time-line. In any end-state scenario there must be the supposition that the situation will be more stable, more peaceful and more internationally acceptable than at the time of entry by the peacekeeping forces. It is as true for the United Nations as it is for any multinational coalition or any unilateral mission that failure may be defined as withdrawal under circumstances worse that those at the point of entry. In order that the end-state level of a perceived improvement comes about, it is necessary for all international military forces to engage in extensive civil operations supported by information operations/public diplomacy.

Whether these civil operations are essentially infrastructure rehabilitation or improvements (roads, sanitation, communications etc.), humanitarian relief (food, medicine, shelter etc.) or more complex civil society operations (including rule of law, electoral reform, independent media, etc.), they will be perceived as positive or negative in the eyes of the indigenous population. Indeed, members of the local society must be made aware of these civil-military operations and how their society benefits directly from these operations.

Combined with the public affairs and public diplomacy activities of civilian agencies, international organizations, NGOs and other actors, military information operations can become a powerful public information campaign. The campaign should combine short term press relations and public affairs with mid-term education and training programs and long term exchanges of persons programs that lay foundations for initial public awareness and eventual favorable public attitudes toward the peacekeeping force and the civil-military operations it undertakes. The Brahimi Report got it right: “Effective communication helps to
dispel rumor, to counter disinformation and to secure the cooperation of the local populations. It can provide leverage in dealing with leaders of rival groups, enhance security of United Nations personnel and serve as a force multiplier.”

Of real importance to international peace operations, a “template” of sorts already exists within the United States Government for the internal coordination of both military (military public affairs, information operations, Psyops) and civilian (civilian public affairs, public diplomacy) operations through an interagency group on International Public Information (IPI) chaired by the Department of State. Presidential Decision Directive 68 of the Clinton administration established a core group chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. In the words of the PDD, the IPI group would “improve our [USG] ability to coordinate independent public diplomacy, public affairs, and overt international Military Information efforts.” In February 2001, the Bush Administration with the issuance of National Security Presidential Directive One (NSPD-1) established 17 Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs) to “serve as the day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy.”

In the post 9-11 period, international public information in the Bush administration was the subject of intense review and reformulation. Initially, IPI was given a role functioning as a sub-group of the Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) chaired by the National Security Council on Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations. Now it functions as its own PCC for Strategic Communications under leadership of the Department of State and the National Security Council and it works closely with the White House Office of Global Communication and the Pentagon. The new PCC met for the first time on November 15, 2002 and has held additional meetings in early 2003. In addition to the co-chairs, various bureaus of the Department of State at the Assistant Secretary level have attended as have the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and representatives of the White House Press Office, the Office of Global Communication, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Department Bureau of Stability Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The PCC quickly established sub-committees in order to do deliberate planning. Most importantly, planning is currently underway on a General Strategy for Global Communication in conformity with the National Security Strategy of the United States. Other issues addressed by the PCC sub-committees have included U.S. strategy on foreign information programs on Iraq; U.S. strategy for foreign information programs on the reconstruction of Afghanistan; international education issues and the balance in visa issuance between secure borders and open doors. In the latter sub-committee, the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the new Department of Homeland Security were principal actors.

In the view of the U.S. as stated in the original 1999 presidential decision directive, international public information has three components, all of which are overt and all of which stress truthful information in order to ensure credibility with foreign audiences. It must be understood that while the messages in these three distinct channels may differ in emphasis, they must not conflict with one another. The Clinton Administration core group’s tasks were to inventory communication assets, integrate IPI into interagency planning and develop a global strategy. Unfortunately, this task list remained largely uncompleted. Nevertheless, the IPI template could be expanded upon with modifications as necessary to encompass regional or multi-regional, multilateral or UN public information operations within peacekeeping operations. It is no less important for the international peacekeeping community to coordinate its military and civilian public information activities within a
Peacekeeping Operation as the example of Kosovo showed and the on-going efforts in Afghanistan prove beyond any doubt.

Whether conducted through an elaborate structure for coordination as in the U.S. interagency model or in a more traditional and less structured mode, information operations both civil and military, must have cohesion and their channels of communications open to work effectively. Civil-military affairs and information operations must work toward a common end in order to change attitudes and ultimately the behavior of the principal local actors as well as the general population within the area of the peace operation. The goal of all civil-military actions and the goal of all information operations are essentially behavior modification in order to shape the military and the socio-political landscape so that the peace support mission will achieve a situation where peace can be sustained. This is equally desirable from the perspective of the strategic interagency or international arena, through the operational CJCMOTF level to the tactical team on the ground in Gardez. With the creation of a climate favorable to the maintenance of lasting peace, the peace support forces can turn over the area to local authorities and withdraw, thus completing their Mission.

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ENDNOTES


2 Ibid. paragraph 146, p. 25.

3 See the Charter of the United Nations, Chapter Six “Pacific Settlements of Disputes,” and Chapter Seven “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression.”

4 In the autumn of 2002, a team under sponsorship of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (USAPKI) visited Afghanistan and conducted interviews there, at support facilities abroad and in the United States to study Civil-Military Operations in Afghanistan as presently constituted in order to determine what the U.S. and its coalition partners had done effectively and where improvement must be made. It was, in essence, an After Action Review which posed a number of questions and proposed a series of recommendations for future CMOs. It is not the purpose of this paper to duplicate that upcoming exhaustive study. The USAPKI CMO Report is still in progress and will be released later this year. The author was fortunate to have had direct access to the background materials and the raw data of the USAPKI study insofar as it relates to CMO and IO cooperation, draws on this material for the discussions on Afghanistan and gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance this body of work has provided.


8 “Remarks by the President to the American Troops in Kosovo,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Rome, Italy), July 24, 2001.

9 This refers principally to true peacekeeping operations rather than disaster relief and the like. Even disaster relief and humanitarian missions, however, require that U.S. and international forces engage in civil-military and associated information operations in order to conduct their mission effectively and with support and cooperation from the local population. See Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., August 13,1998 (unpublished manuscript).

International Public Information, a relatively new term of art, encompasses traditional civilian Public Diplomacy, public affairs and press relations, international educational and other exchanges, professional media training, international broadcasting as well as traditional overt military information operations, press relations, public affairs, IMET/E-IMET and psychological operations (Psyops).

See “American Public Rates Threats the U.S. Should Counter With Military Force” Opinion Analysis, U. S. Department of State, November 1, 2000. U. S. public support for peacekeeping missions usually is greater when seen as multilateral rather than unilateral. See also Avant, Deborah and Lebovic, James, “U.S. Military Attitudes Toward Post-Cold War Missions” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 27, No. 1, Fall 2000, pp. 37-56. While younger military officers support traditional military missions more than peacekeeping, they are more likely to support peacekeeping operations if these operations are seen to be career enhancing. Mid-level career officers see Congress and the American public as more suspicious of these new missions than is the military.

Force protection may be a more important issue to commanders in the field than to Americans at home. As yet there is no conclusive study which indicates this, however. In his The Evolution of U.S. Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton: A Fairweather Friend, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2000, author Michael G. MacKinnon points to poll results collected shortly after the tragic deaths of 18 U.S. Rangers at the hands of the Somali warlord Aideed noting that there was no overwhelming outcry by the public to pull out of Somalia.

See Kull, Stephen and Ramsay, Clay, U.S. Public Attitudes on Involvement in Somalia, Program on International Policy Attitudes, College Park, MD, 26 October 1993. As noted in Pascale Combelles Siegel’s Perception Management: IO’s Stepchild?, op. cit., Kull’s polling indicated that more than half of Americans supported staying in Somalia if the Somalis wanted outside intervention.


See Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations by Pascale Combelles Siegel, National Defense University, Institute for Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C. 1998. In her excellent study of information operations (IOs) in Bosnia, Ms. Siegel’s extensive interviews of NATO IO personnel appear to indicate that the military’s IOs were undertaken largely in isolation from the extensive USG and other NATO civilian public diplomacy activities underway in Bosnia and the region at the time.


Community Policing has been described as a philosophy of “personalized policing where the same officer patrols and works in the same area on a permanent basis, from a decentralized place, working in a proactive partnership with citizens to identify and solve problems” (see Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective by Dr. Robert C. Trojanowicz et al. Anderson Publishing Co., Chicago, Ill., 2nd edition, 1998.) Additional information may be obtained from The Community Policing Consortium, a partnership of five of the leading police organizations in the United States, at http://www.communitypolicing.org/

The following description of information operations in Tuzla is based upon the author’s interview of former MND(N) POLAD Dr. John D. Finney and a note to the author by Dr. Finney dated January 23 and January 25, 2001 respectively. For additional details on information operations in MND(N) see also “IO in a Peace Enforcement Environment,” Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter 99-2, Ft. Leavenworth, Ks., 1999. For a current look at SFOR information operations linked to civil-military affairs see the SFOR website at http://www.nato.int/sfor/cimic/cimic.htm and the Task Force Eagle, SFOR IX website at http://www.tfeagle.army.mil.


This lack of coordination between UNMIK and KFOR was not limited to information operations. A staff member of the United Nations Special Representative to the Secretary General for Kosovo (UNSRSG) provided insight into the operations at UNMIK’s headquarters. His presentation to the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute’s Kosovo After Action Review Conference explained some of the serious coordination problems between the two organizations. In the officer’s view, UNMIK was a highly compartmentalized entity, especially as regards communication between the various component organizations that controlled the spheres of operation in Kosovo: UNHCR (Humanitarian Assistance), UN (Civil Administration), OSCE (Democratization), EU (Reconstruction). As a result, UNMIK often appeared to KFOR to be uncoordinated, under-funded and unsynchronized. UNMIK’s perception of KFOR was no better. Even though the problems of lack of communication, personality conflicts and multiple agendas haunted both UNMIK and KFOR, it is likely that future United Nations missions will continue to be conducted on the UNMIK model rather than the East Timor (UNTAET) model of the military component clearly subordinate to the civilian leadership in a single organizational structure.


Military forces are often the only elements in a peacekeeping situation with the immediate logistical wherewithal to build roads, lay runways, clear mines, dig wells, reestablish communication nets and so forth during the emergency phase of the crisis response. NGOs often rely on military forces to assist them in providing an initial logistical safety net and basic infrastructure necessary so that humanitarian aid can begin to get through to those most in need. USAID works closely with peacekeeping forces to coordinate and assist in these efforts. Once the basic infrastructure is in place and humanitarian aid is underway, the next logical steps are establishment of basic education systems and facilities, establishment of public order, the police, both criminal and civil law courts and correctional facilities, the establishment or return of political parties and an electoral process, the establishment of an adequately trained responsible and independent media.


34 The description of the structure and organization of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the proposed tasks assigned to this new concept is based upon briefings and the author’s conversations with LTC Michael Stout USA, Deputy CJCMOTF commander and Ambassador Victor Jackovich, POLAD to the commander of CJTF-180 in January-February 2003. As the PRT concept is still a work in progress, it was understood that deployment of the PRTs will be modified as appropriate by ITGA priorities, availability of coalition contributions and other factors.

35 Not everyone agrees that a strong central government is the only vehicle to take Afghanistan into the future. Some argue that the U.S. and the international community should abandon a narrow state-centered approach and diversify into community-based approaches. It appears that the PRTs are a compromise designed to pursue national development from the grassroots rather than reliance on interaction with the ITGA in Kabul alone. See Sedra, Mark, “Afghanistan: It is Time for a Change in the Nation-Building Strategy,” November 15, 2002, Foreign Policy in Focus, Global Affairs Commentary, Inter-Hemispheric Resource Center. An excellent summary of the issues facing reconstruction and civil development in Afghanistan, with recommendations for future action from a U.N.-centric, non-U.S. perspective, may be found in the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID)-financed report Afghanistan’s political and constitutional development authored by Chris Johnson, William Maley, Alexander Their and Ali Wardak, Overseas Development Institute, London, January 2003.

36 Brahimi Report op.cit. p 25


38 Unpublished memorandum from Dr. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, dated April 24, 2001


40 Information on the current state of the PCC on Strategic Communication is based mainly upon the author’s discussions with Joe B. Johnson, Principal Deputy Coordinator, Office of International Information Programs (IIP), U.S. Department of State and with William V. Parker, Director of the Office of Strategic Communication, IIP, February 2003.