

# Developing Non-Security Metrics for the Coalition Provisional Authority<sup>1</sup>

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“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”

Sun Tzu

## INTRODUCTION

Sun Tzu’s admonition to achieve situational awareness is often focused in practice more on gathering information about the enemy than about friendly or supporting forces and

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<sup>1</sup> The material in this article is derived from work done by the author(s) as members of the Institute for Defense Analyses under a task conducted for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation. The author(s) were members of a team established to support the Coalition Provisional Authority. The observations and conclusions offered in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the Institute for Defense Analyses, the Department of Defense, the Coalition Provisional Authority, or the United States Government.

capabilities. Even when applied to acquiring knowledge about the friendly forces, most military commanders, by training and core competency, tailor their information, reporting and evaluative analysis toward measuring the available capabilities of combat and logistics systems as they relate directly to combat operations and requirements. In the summer of 2003, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) faced a requirement that had been avoided since the Vietnam War and previously, the aftermath of World War II. Specifically, the DoD needed reporting channels, information, and analysis that would measure the outcomes of efforts in the wake of major combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

DoD had been charged with running the largest stabilization and reconstruction operations, in an ambiguous security environment, since the Vietnam conflict. In the absence of a U.S. Mission, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), followed by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), took on the role of representing the U.S. Government (USG), the role of authority within Iraq for governing and the provision of services that the Iraqis were not able to provide themselves. The President had established the overall goal,<sup>2</sup> and DoD, as lead cabinet department, was responsible for planning, execution, and the integration of capabilities provided by other supporting USG departments and agencies, those of coalition partners, and the organizations comprising the “international community.” Initially, ORHA focused on the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the provision of limited services. When it became clear that a more comprehensive program was required, the CPA, a more robust organization with a wider mandate, replaced ORHA.<sup>3</sup> As a result of the recast mission, DoD formed a team in late summer to assist the CPA in developing metrics for non-security tasks that CPA was executing. Personnel from the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation led the team, which included ATT personnel and members of the Institute for Defense Analyses. The team’s primary point of contact was within the CPA Washington office.

The team received guidance from DoD that contained the following objectives:

- Develop metrics to measure progress in Iraqi reconstruction.
- Align metrics with CPA strategic plan and resources.
- Develop framework for collecting and reporting data.
- Focus on the practical – separate the short, medium, and long term.
- Focus on non-security metrics.

In addition, coordination with the CPA in Baghdad reinforced the team’s analysis that:

- Any recommended system should maximize technology and not increase workload for CPA staff in Baghdad beyond what they would need for their own management purposes. Read only files developed by CPA-Baghdad could be used by CPA-Washington to extract information and develop reports,

<sup>2</sup> National Security Presidential Directive 24, “Post War Iraq Reconstruction,” 20 January 2003.

<sup>3</sup> For the ambiguous genesis and foundation of the CPA, see L. Elaine Halchin “The Coalition Provisional Authority, (CPA): Origins, Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities.” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 29 April 2004, cited at <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32370.pdf>.

alleviating some of the reporting burden for CPA-Baghdad, and the system should be built to enhance CPA-Baghdad management capability as a first priority, rather than a reporting system driven by Washington requirements.

- Any proposals or recommendations by the team should have the concurrence of CPA Baghdad.
- The recommended metrics and system should build Iraqi capacity. The team initially envisioned developing a system that would be developed in cooperation with the Iraqi Governing Council and Ministries, and could be turned over to them.

The team assembled by OSD was not the first, or the sole effort underway in this area. Initial research focused on establishing the current status of metrics work in CPA and what other models might be applicable. The team examined historical material from the Philippines, World War II, Vietnam, and interventions in the 90's in the Balkans and the Caribbean. Beginning work in mid-summer 2003, the OSD team found that CPA had already taken some initiative in this area, establishing an Information Management Unit within the office of the Administrator with the role of single point of contact for assembling and analyzing information about the reconstruction effort from all available sources. To support that effort personnel were seconded from the Department of State Humanitarian Information Unit, (HIU) the interagency single point of contact for identifying, defining the scope of, and tracking emerging and continuing humanitarian crises. The Department of State also had initiated some limited polling of the Iraqi population in an effort to identify progress and areas of weakness. Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), the military headquarters working in conjunction with CPA, had Civil Affairs units in the field conducting reconstruction and stabilization activities in direct support of maneuver/combat units.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had begun to generate assessments and incorporate reporting in their field work. Later, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers became involved in metrics and measurements as a result of their designation as the lead agency for supervising reconstruction contracts associated with the passage of the Iraq Reconstruction Act (commonly known as the "Supplemental"). The team contacted all these agencies as they began the assistance effort. It became clear early in the process of conducting research that understanding the current state of the measurement and reporting system would be critical to preventing duplication and meeting the task guidance. It was pointed out to the team in early interviews that the metrics effort was hampered by a late start and few resources. In one session, USAID medical program officers indicated that the standard resource allocation in medical/health interventions was that between 12% and 20% of the intervention budget was devoted to measuring outcomes.<sup>4</sup>


## **PLANS AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORTS**

The effort to measure progress depended on three critical pieces of information. First, an end-state or set of criteria that would define success had to be identified. Second, the baseline data for the areas under consideration had to be obtained. Third, a plan, directing


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<sup>4</sup> Interview at USAID, August 2003.

resources to requirements and specifying the responsible agencies, timeframe, and execution parameters had to be developed. Conceptually, this is shown in Figure 1.



*Figure 1: Conceptual Challenge to Developing Metrics.*



*Figure 2: Idealized Reporting System.*

The concept is applicable to the overall problem and to the constituent parts. The operational challenge was to lay out the tasks that were required in the reconstruction and stabilization effort, find or develop the information and plan required for each task, and then devise a system that would aggregate and translate data into useable information. The useable information would take the form of indicators, measures, and metrics that decision-makers and staffs could use to satisfy the needs of several user communities, as shown in Figure 2. It

became clear early in the effort that the proposed metrics would have to work within a pragmatic reporting and analytical system that would be constrained by the quality and quantity of available data and the reporting system through which the data would travel.

The major plans developed for the reconstruction of Iraq in use by the government in 2003 and 2004 originated in three places. First, the CPA developed a plan that focused on four core areas: security, economics, essential services and governance. The first draft CPA plan was developed over the summer of 2003 and revised in October and December of 2003. The major revisions added a fifth core area, strategic communications, and added greater detail in establishing interim goals and timelines for many of the supporting programs and projects. The five core areas contained a total of approximately 46 objectives and 170 key tasks.

In the fall of 2003, the National Security Advisor was given additional responsibility for coordinating the reconstruction effort from Washington, while the CPA retained field implementation responsibilities. The National Security Council developed a “Strategic Plan for Transition” that contained 19 objectives and 98 goals for transition. Finally, when Congress appropriated supplemental funds for the reconstruction effort, they broke the funding down into projects and required the Executive Branch to regularly report on the progress of the reconstruction effort in 10 categories and 58 major projects. This reporting requirement became known by its legislative numbering shorthand as the “2207” report.

The proliferation of plans provided the CPA and the OSD metrics team with significant challenges and opportunities. The different plans contained similar, but not completely identical, task requirements and language, and different levels of specificity with respect to task description, responsible implementing entity, resources, timelines, reporting requirements, and funding. In order to ensure that no reporting and therefore metrics requirements were missed, the team began an early and iterative process to map the different plans’ requirements to each other. The task map was revised upon the receipt of each new plan or draft version. The ultimate goal of this mapping exercise was to develop indicators, measures and metrics that could be used to meet the requirements of the several plans without duplicating reporting and analytical efforts.

## **DESCRIPTION OF THE SITUATION IN THE FALL OF 2003<sup>5</sup>**

“How’m I doing?”

Ed Koch, Mayor of New York City, 1978 to 1989

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<sup>5</sup> The information in this section was derived from interviews conducted in the Washington area among government and private contractors, and military personnel involved with the reconstruction and CPA effort, and from research with documents provided by the CPA, DoD, DoS, and USAID. In addition, four members of the DoD team (including one of this article’s authors) conducted a site visit in November and December 2003, and two members returned to Iraq in February 2004. During these site visits, interviews and document reviews were conducted with members of the CPA ministerial senior advisors, their staff, Iraqis and the CPA staff. In addition, members of the team spent considerable time with the Iraqi Central Statistical Office and the Ministry of Planning, and the CPA Information Management Unit and the Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis.

The system that existed in the summer and fall of 2003 for gathering information, analysis and reporting was dynamic and fragmented. All of the plans developed for the post-conflict situation in Iraq operated on the basis of a current and still applicable principle of rendering assistance only in those areas where the affected nation, (Iraq) could not fend for itself. To that end, assessing the Iraqi ability to provide information and reporting became the first endeavor in developing a metrics system. Any gaps identified in the Iraqi system would have to be supplemented by systems provided by the military and the CPA.

On the Iraqi side, where it was assumed that some of the data might exist, and for whom the system would ultimately have to operate, there were several obstacles to overcome. First of all, Operation Iraqi Freedom and its chaotic aftermath removed any remaining infrastructure capacity. The infrastructure in Iraq had substantially deteriorated in the years since Saddam had come to power, and the Iran-Iraq War, Operation Desert Storm, and the UN sanctions and the way they were applied accelerated this process. In addition to the physical infrastructure, many institutional and organizational processes that were assumed to exist did not. While political systems for controlling the population under Saddam might have been centralized and sophisticated, the rest of the country's systems were more late-19<sup>th</sup> century vintage.

While as individuals, Iraqis justifiably lay claim to education and technical skills, the information and systems management skills necessary to a 20<sup>th</sup> century society did not exist. As examples, there were no national birth or death certificate system, no national telecommunications system, and no foundation for demographic analysis, (one of the priorities in the reconstruction effort was to establish a postal code system which is often used in demographic analysis), and no system of position location. Without such systems, decentralized hand written records at each hospital have to be examined to determine basic national health data, information often required hand delivery, there was no ability to track population status or trends based on location, and there was no way to accurately inventory real property and assets to determine the requirements for reconstruction. The Iraqi Ministry of Planning and the Central Statistical Office became the focus for exploiting and developing Iraqi capacity to generate and manage information for use by government policy makers.

Two examples of the assessment challenges follow. Without addresses (which do not exist in most Iraqi towns and cities) Civil Affairs staff often had to used digital cameras with a hand held Global Positioning System held in the field of view to establish location, time, date, and condition of public buildings. Assessing the number of schools requiring reconstruction presented challenges based on cultural differences. The Coalition military tended to count the number of schools represented by the buildings. These numbers rarely matched those provided by Iraqis, as the Iraqis consider a school to be composed of a faculty, headmaster, student body, and curriculum. Since they used a particular building to house many "schools," the numbers provided by Iraqis seemed to be inflated as every headmaster wanted his "school" renovated.

A second aspect constraining the Iraqi ability to provide data focused on the systems of civil administration and the ability of the Iraqi management systems to handle information development and reporting requirements. With the demise of Saddam's regime, the responsibilities of the local, district, governorate, and national administrative divisions became unsettled and the relationships between them were unspecified. Therefore the challenge to the CPA and the military was to identify the appropriate governing council (local, district, governorate), or ministry with the appropriate issues and responsibilities, and

empower them to begin collecting information. In the decentralized environment in Iraq in 2003, this was difficult. (As an example, what is the functional relationship of the local governing council to the Ministry of Transportation? Does/will the ministry build roads and the local authority fix the potholes, etc? Who establishes road work requirements – does the ministry have assessment teams or are requirements generated at the local level and compiled at the national level?). In many instances, local authorities were empowered by military commanders in an effort to get any sort of reconstruction moving. These decentralized projects had to be integrated into a national plan to prevent duplication. At the same time, as the national ministries became more capable, they attempted to insert their processes and exert authority over functions in local jurisdictions where the local Iraqis had become competent and protective of their own prerogatives.

In addition, the relationship between the national Iraqi Governing Council and the ministries was not fully defined. Therefore, individual ministers and their CPA senior advisors relied alternatively on CPA and Iraqi ministries for information support.

To compound the issue, there was wide variation in the technical competencies of Iraqi professionals. While many were well trained in their fields and dedicated to the task of rebuilding their country, training in systems management and an appreciation for the comprehensive situation in Iraq, even within their respective competencies, was often lacking.

On the Coalition side, the nature of the data generation and reporting system reflected the strengths of the organizations present in the country. The military, under the command of CJTF-7, had the most capability to penetrate into the Iraqi countryside and administrative apparatus, due to the numbers of personnel it could deploy, and to the security situation. CPA, on the other hand, suffered from a chronic lack of personnel (57% fill of all positions in late November, early December 2003), and a lack of a manning system that enabled sustained personnel fill at regional and local offices. By default, the military became the primary information resource available to the Coalition leadership. However, the military capability to gather and report information was not without its own set of constraints. To interact with the local, district and governorate governing councils, the military formed Civil Government Assistance Teams, (called by many different names), composed primarily of the Civil Affairs staff personnel and Civil Affairs units assigned in direct support to maneuver/combat units operating in a particular area. These Assistance Teams were the primary conduit of information to and from the various Iraqi administrative elements.

The Governance Assistance Teams established contact with local Iraqi authorities as their supported maneuver unit conducted security and stabilization operations within an operational area. These operational areas did not coincide with Iraqi administrative divisions. Additionally, the civil affairs units operated in order to support the security mission. Civil affairs teams in the field relied on maneuver units for communications support. When military maneuver units repositioned for tactical security reasons, often their supporting civil affairs units repositioned with them, breaking relationships with local Iraqis that had been painstakingly established. Considerable momentum was lost as replacement units and leadership re-established those working relationships with local leaders. Civil Affairs reports, in various formats, flowed through the supported maneuver units through the military chain of command upward to CJTF-7. At each level, they were analyzed according to established priorities and further refined for submission to the next higher level. At CJTF-7, the Civil Affairs Command staff, operating also as the CJTF-7 “C-9” or civil affairs staff,

refined the reports for submission to the CPA. The upshot of this system was a series of anecdotal reports filtered at every level through a system that justifiably placed a priority on items directly related to the security situation.

Finally, the CPA attempted to incorporate reports from other major actors involved in the reconstruction effort. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) managed projects in a wide range of activities. While the bulk of the agency's funding is devoted to long-term development, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has special competencies and funding for assisting fragile governance and administrative systems emerging from conflict situations. USAID had a number of projects and "implementing partners" (both non-profit and for-profit firms and individuals) working in Iraq and was continually incorporating refined reporting and metrics requirements into contracts.

The Project Management Office (PMO, now the Project Coordination Office, PCO), was set up under the executive agency of the U.S Army Corps of Engineers (USACOE) with the express purpose of administering the reconstruction contracts let using the \$18.6 billion supplemental funds. Within the CPA, two offices were established to manage and act on information reported from the various sources. The Office of Policy Planning (OPP) developed the strategic plan, recommended policy and monitored the progress in reconstruction. The Information Management Unit (IMU) was a small cell of subject matter experts and data management technicians from both government and commercial contractors focused on developing systems for tracking progress and analyzing trends within Iraq across the five core areas of security, essential services, economics, governance and strategic communication.

The system as it existed in late 2003-early 2004 is shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Data Collection and Reporting System.

## DYNAMICS

Over time, the focus for developing metrics, seeking information and applying analytical techniques changed. At the beginning of the effort, and in keeping with the strategic plan, the comprehensive effort focused on all three aspects of Figure 1, i.e. making accurate national assessments, moving the country toward individual project and overall national end-states and capabilities, and tracking the progress in individual projects and overall.

After the announcement of the date for transfer of sovereignty, while the original metrics effort continued, added emphasis was placed on assessing and empowering individual ministries in preparing them to manage the Iraqi systems (regardless of the status of those systems) by the end of June 2004.

With the influx of funding for reconstruction projects, and the added oversight of Congress and the NSC, (through the supplemental appropriations reporting requirements and the NSC strategic plan) project accountability and financial management also added an area of emphasis. Finally, the pending transfer of American responsibility from the DoD to the Department of State (DoS), added a fourth aspect to metrics and information management, as internal organizational requirements also had to be measured and evaluated.

## TASKS, MEASURES, INDICATORS, AND METRICS

“I’ll know Times Square is safe when I see a family with a baby stroller . . .”

Rudy Giuliani, Mayor of New York City, 1993 to 2001

In this environment, the team faced the challenge of cross-referencing dynamic plans to ensure that all requirements for measurement were being met, providing input to the development of appropriate measures and indicators that could support multiple requirements, and making recommendations about sources and reporting methods that could be supported in an austere and uncertain environment.

To accomplish the first task, the team expanded the information in the CPA strategic plan to incorporate recommended measures, indicators, and potential data sources. As an example, the CPA strategic plan organized one task as follows.

Core Foundation	Economy
Strategic Task	Build Financial Market Structures
Major Task/Program	Establish Commercial Banking System
Sub-Task/Project	Banker Training and Interbank Payment System

Each sub-task/project had the potential to be articulated as a contract or specific program funded from various sources. However, the plan lacked the detail necessary to measure progress within that task. The team added the following, incorporating an overall goal within the metric where applicable.

Metric	Effective Commercial Lending
Possible Indicators	# of operational commercial banks/branches % of bankers trained, by bank and within Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) # of commercial loans processed % of banks meeting capital requirements
Indicator Location/Reporting	Civil Affairs Reports
Responsibility	Central Bank of Iraq Central Statistical Office Ministry of Finance

The team replicated this process, based on research and interviews with subject matter experts and the CPA, for each of the 46 objectives and 170 key tasks. As a second step, but conducted concurrently as each was published, the team also cross-referenced NSC and “2207” tasks to the CPA strategic plan. This process naturally led to an extremely complex matrix of tasks, measures, indicators, data locations, etc., dependent upon modern systems for verifying sources and extracting and analyzing information. Figure 4 is an example page from one iteration of this effort highlighting linkages in one specific project area to resources and to indicators and metrics.




Figure 4: Example Task Map.

However, to comply with overall guidance and in recognition of the data environment, the team looked for pragmatic indicators that were available or could be rapidly developed. As an example, it would be desirable to have a Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Iraq. The CPI for the U.S., as for most western market economies, is composed of over 100 different items. In Iraq, the pragmatic, feasible equivalent looked at between 10 and 12 commodities such as cooking oil, propane, rice/staple grain, etc., simply due to a paucity of data, and lack of sources. A result of this iterative process led to the following recommendations in the spring of 2004 to the CPA as a set of metrics:

- Essential Services.

- Electricity Output and Consumption.
  - Electricity Availability in Hours/Day.
  - % Population with Access to Potable Water.
  - Mortality Rates (Infant, <5, Child, Maternal).
  - % Hospitals Operational/# Physicians per Hospital.
  - Immunizations.
  - Educational Enrollments.
  - % Schools Operational/In Need of Repair.
  - Crude Oil Production and Export/Days of Supply.
  - Port Capacity and Throughput.
- Economy.
  - Employment.
  - CPI of Standard Basket of Goods.
  - Average Wages.
  - % Arable Land under Cultivation.
  - Retail Price of Fuels.
  - Exchange Rate Level and Volatility.
  - Budget.
  - % of Public Sector Financial Mgt staffing complete.
  - Commercial Activity (# of Truck Border Crossings).
  - Value of Net Loans.
- Security.
  - % Criminal Courts operational and resourced.
  - # Prison beds and % meeting international standards.
  - Iraqis Killed/Wounded due to insurgency.
  - Murder Rate.
  - Major Property Crime Rate.
  - Total Crime Rate.
  - Attacks (Mortar, RPG, SAM, IED, Rkt).
  - ICDC Strength and Equipment.
  - % Iraqis perceive IPS as effective.
  - IPS Transitions at local and provincial level.
  - Anti-Corruption Controls in place.
  - % Judges vetted.
- Governance.
  - Provincial Council Reps in Place.
  - Town Hall Participation.
  - Election Participation.
- Strategic Communications.
  - Distribution of Messages.
  - Police Recruiting Campaign Inquiries.

## OBSERVATIONS ON CHALLENGES

As noted above, Iraqi physical infrastructure and the systems management capacities posed initial challenges for the CPA in their efforts to obtain information and to strengthen Iraqi systems. In many instances, Iraqi capacity had to be built from a very low or non-existent base. Overcoming cultural and social obstacles to the free flow of information and data analysis will take longer. The abuse of the Iraqi society by the Ba'ath regime resulted in modes of behavior that place a premium on trust derived from family, clan, tribe, and religious identification. This situation is reinforced by a set of cultural cleavages that result in a "zero-sum game" mentality.

The operating assumption in Iraqi society is that no individual or group can make progress unless some other individual or group is disadvantaged by the same process or outcome. The continuous abuse of information for political purposes by Saddam makes most of Iraqi society suspicious of efforts to derive, develop, and store information. There is always a suspicion that the information will be used for purposes other than those stated and conspiracy theories and rumors often constrain the willingness of individuals to share information. This hinders both the gathering of information from individual citizens, and the exchange of information between Iraqi government agencies. The concept of "positive sum game" outcomes derived from cooperation and compromise is still being discovered by the bulk of the Iraqi population and leadership. These sub-government alternative identifications and concepts about how the world works hinder the flow of information. Establishing a culture of information that supports accurate measurement of progress will take a long time, predicated on publicizing successes and demonstrating how free information flows benefit individuals, groups, and the Iraqi nation as a whole.

In addition to the challenges in working with a fledgling and fragile Iraqi bureaucracy that needed constant attention, CPA faced internal challenges in personnel fill and the distribution of substantive and management skills. As stated above, CPA in November and December of 2003 operated at approximately 57% strength. At its peak personnel fill, the CPA never got above 75%. In addition, although the expectation was that staff would serve six months in country, the true average tour length was three months. Low personnel fill rates, coupled with high turbulence, impeded momentum in every area of endeavor. Often there was no overlap or continuity between outgoing and incoming staff members, which meant that projects often lagged until the new staff member could get "up to speed" on the status and objectives of the projects for which he/she was responsible. In the area of metrics, relevant information was often misplaced, outdated, or produced in a different format, and had to be regenerated.

Not only was the personnel recruitment system unable to generate replacements at a sufficient rate, but it had difficulty supporting regional and local offices. Because no manning document for CPA existed, (CPA was basically one personnel pool), there was no standard for internal distribution of personnel within CPA between the headquarters in Baghdad and regional and local offices. Regional and local office leaders had to petition CPA in Baghdad for personnel, make arrangements directly with home offices in Washington, or go to Baghdad and recruit from incoming or CPA Baghdad staff to move to regional or local offices. This aspect of the personnel system meant that CPA was even more dependent on military sources of information, because CPA had trouble establishing and sustaining a local presence that could establish long-term relationships with Iraqi leaders.

CPA also had internal challenges achieving a balance in the ministerial advisory sections between people with substantive and overall management skills. As an example, the advisors to the Ministry of Health began developed a plan that began the direct provision of health care to the populace and addressed the need to rehabilitate the ministry with a building, modern communications and systems administration capabilities. This required not only health care professional practitioners such as doctors, nurses, etc., but also health care systems managers. This advisory section had the benefit of both, and so was ready to turn over responsibility for health care system management in February 2004. Another ministry advisory section did not take that approach and became so embroiled in the substance of providing services that it fell behind in rehabilitating the ministry it was advising. In November-December 2003, this ministry had 1200 Iraqis on the payroll, but less than 100 reporting to work every day because they had no building and no communications capability.

The Information Management Unit, established within CPA in the summer of 2003, struggled with the same personnel fill and turbulence issues as the rest of CPA, but demonstrated the utility of having a centralized collection and analysis point for information generated from all the sources. It provided a clearinghouse for information and also worked to standardize reporting systems, platforms, and formats. In addition, CJTF-7 had people working on the metrics issue, focused on security, in both the Civil Affairs (C-9) section and in the C-5 (strategic plans and policy) section. The IMU worked closely with these elements, USAID, the PCO, and the Office of Policy Planning to streamline requirements and furnish measurement information from the right source to the right user. The IMU and OPP also worked with USAID and PCO to incorporate as many reporting requirements as necessary into contracts, and have contractors doing the reconstruction and institution building report the indicators and metrics.

Finally, the Department of State Bureau for Intelligence and Research (INR) provided polling services for CPA. CPA established a goal of bi-weekly polling of Iraqi citizens, and although the goal was not met, DoS INR was able to conduct polls about every three weeks to one month. The polls contained both consistent themes (security, for instance) with topical themes and provided much needed information on Iraqi perceptions. The results of this polling effort were made available to CPA, CJTF-7 and to the USG in Washington.

## **CONCLUSIONS AND CONTINUING EFFORTS**

As the date for transfer of sovereignty (June 30, 2004) approached, the metrics effort was folded into the plan to transfer responsibility from CPA and DoD, to a U.S. Mission and DoS. At the same time, efforts continued in Washington to standardize, or at least rationalize, information management systems. Additionally, Congress proposed several initiatives to improve future government performance in this area, and the Administration took steps to build capacity within the Executive Branch to better conduct “reconstruction and stabilization” operations.

The U.S. Mission to Iraq is the most complex mission of its type since the end of the Vietnam war, since it incorporates all the usual functions of an embassy, plus it retains all the unique functions of CPA that fulfill continuing U.S. responsibilities in the country. Within the Mission, the Information Management Unit and Office of Policy Planning were merged into the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, which also became the office housing the

ministerial advisory teams. Figures 5 and 6 give a snapshot of the Mission and IRMO organizations as of the summer 2004.

It should be noted that the information management and analysis function is still split between the IRMO and PCO/PMO, and there are relatively few billets for personnel with information management and analysis functions.

The USG continued to wrestle with information management standardization. In Washington, a “Community Coordination Working Group” was established under the leadership of the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency to gather all the government sponsors and contractors working on information databases and achieve minimum standardization.




Figure 5: U.S. Mission to Iraq.

Most prominent among the Congressional initiatives, Senators Lugar and Biden, chair and ranking member, respectively, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, proposed the Civilian Management Reconstruction and Stabilization Act of 2004 (S.2127)<sup>6</sup>, which intends to establish a USG capability to train, equip, and deploy civilian counterparts to the military so that in future situations, the civilian leadership avoids many of the shortcomings of the CPA. The Executive Branch is not waiting for Congress to dictate the specifics of such a capability, and had established, within the Department of State, an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. With resources taken “out of hide” the DoS has received NSC support and participation by other agencies of government. They expect to receive Congressional authorization and funding in FY2006. The ultimate goal is to have the capacity to lead reconstruction and stabilization efforts in two or three situations for a period of several years, requiring expert personnel from many areas of government and the civilian

<sup>6</sup> Cited at <http://www.theorator.com/bills108/s2127.html>.

community.<sup>7</sup> One area emphasized in discussions with the Office has been the need for a metrics capacity supported by information management and analytical skills.




Figure 6: Iraq Reconstruction Management Office.

As a result of the efforts of the CPA and the effort to develop metrics one can draw a conclusion that this issue has to be addressed in consonance with other planning issues and that resources need to be devoted to metrics planning and implementation. In reconstruction and stabilization efforts, metrics take on as much importance as traditional information requirements supporting intelligence efforts. In fact, they become a primary effort, as the ability to measure progress informs the strategic communications effort, which is the key to managing expectations and keeping the population informed and secure. Without this effort, which must be institutionalized, future missions will face the same challenges, loss of momentum, and reduced performance.

<sup>7</sup> Interviews with Ambassador Carlos Pascual, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Fall 2004, and presentation by Ambassador Pascual at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 20, 2004, cited at <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/rm/37430pf.htm>.