Evolution of Canadian Forces Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

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INTRODUCTION

Canadian Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is evolving and endeavouring to define itself. The success of CIMIC cells attached to military operations over the past few years has necessitated the defining of policy and procedures for this burgeoning area within the military. With success, comes an increasing scrutiny of how the business of CIMIC is being conducted and whether it’s being conducted at the same professional level across the military. This paper is being written with the hope that those in the trenches will continue to influence the direction of this evolution.

Because CIMIC is in an early stage of evolution it is important to understand how it has developed and to define a start state upon which improvements, conclusions and recommendations can be made.

I challenge those who read this paper to either agree or disagree with my recommendations. The resulting debate will create a better CIMIC organization. I would ask civilians to help build the necessary relationships with the military so that we can better work together to achieve our common goals. I would ask the military members to use their influence to positively affect the direction of CIMIC.

EVOLUTION OF CANADIAN CIMIC

The Canadian Military has been conducting CIMIC operations since the Second World War. In the past it mostly consisted of humanitarian assistance (HA) in the form of physical goods; taking care of the immediate needs of the civilian population such as drinking water, food, shelter and clothing. In addition to HA, small projects such as playgrounds, which could be completed during a single tour or rotation, were undertaken. Funding for those projects came from a variety of sources and quite often out of the pockets of the soldiers. CIMIC was considered a secondary duty, usually a volunteer or someone with previous experience. This type of approach has been relatively successful in the early stages of an operation. However, increasingly complex deployments and environments require a more sophisticated approach.
Overtime, it was recognized that CIMIC could play an important role as a force multiplier. CF members were given CIMIC as a primary duty and some even received training. In August 2000, The Chief of the Land Staff issued an Action Directive that CIMIC become a reserve capability since it was recognized that reservists might have an inherent ability to interact with civilians. While CIMIC is not new, the overall approach is new.

In the Land Force Western Area as well as the other Land Force Area’s, a number of reservists with a wide variety of educational backgrounds, careers and personal experience were interviewed with the intention of bringing together a team that was greater than the sum of its parts.

CIMIC candidates embarked on a training regime to increase knowledge and abilities to deal with specific situations past rotations had identified as ‘Lessons Learned’. Candidates conducted training and completed courses on topics such as:

- Negotiation.
- Mediation.
- Cultural Awareness.
- Sales.
- First Aid Instructor.
- Project Management.
- Building Analysis.
- Language Training.
- Media Training.
- Tactical Command and Control Communications System (TCCCS).
- A tactical CIMIC course at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC).

Also a number of exercises were conducted in order to confirm skills developed during the courses and training:

- An exercise confirming written and assessment skills.
- An exercise confirming navigation, negotiation and cultural awareness skills.
- An exercise, just prior to deployment, confirming everything from the initiation of area assessments to the project management processes and approval as well as interaction with local agencies.

The above training provided the groundwork for success.
WHAT IS MODERN CIMIC?

While it is important to understand how the modern CIMIC operator is preparing for their job, it is equally important to understand who is filling that role. As part of discovering modern CIMIC, another good question to be asked is, ‘What are the qualities of a good CIMIC operator?’ Traits such as loyalty, honest, ethical, courageous, diligent, fair, responsible, selfless, mature, dedicated, personable, understanding, flexible, resourceful, fit, knowledgeable (of military and civilian policy / procedures) and decisive - all leap to mind.

Combining the two aspects of training and specific qualities with an array of personal experience creates the foundation for a CIMIC operator to thrive. Thus the modern CIMIC operator is trained to interact on a wide spectrum of initiatives and use their experience to further Canada’s goals. We have defined the type of training and who makes a successful CIMIC operator, thus an outline of what that person does must follow. However, it is incredibly difficult to define exactly what CIMIC is and does because it varies from operation to operation, environment were in and a person’s style of handling situations. A sufficiently vague textbook definition of CIMIC follows in the next section.

DEFINITION

“Civil-Military Cooperation is a military function that supports the commander's mission by establishing and maintaining coordination and cooperation between the military force and civilian actors in the commander's area of operation.”

CIMIC is a command function and responsibility. Unity of command for a military force is critical to achieve unity of purpose and of effort among all stakeholders and partners. There are an increasing number of non-military personnel, international organizations, non-government organizations and United Nations agencies involved in operations, which fuel the problem of integrating and coordinating civil and military activities and efforts. In order to ensure an organization maintains its relevance; it must periodically ask the question, ‘What is the purpose of CIMIC?’ or ‘Why do we have / need CIMIC?’

The answer is - whenever a military deploys somewhere, whether it is for a peace support operation, humanitarian assistance or for war fighting, there is always a civil dimension to consider. These may be refugees, the local population, and local officials, even workers from international organisations. CIMIC is a primary link between the military and these organisations. CIMIC works to coordinate and elicit cooperation from, and with, the civil dimension to help ensure the success of the mission.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

To delve further into clarifying modern CIMIC after we have determined the organizations relevance, we need to ask a further question ‘What are the tasks of a CIMIC operator?’ The assigned tasks will depend on the stage of an operation and the direction detailed in the CIMIC Annex of the operation order issued by the commander. CIMIC operators will liaise
and coordinate with civil authorities, civil agencies, allied and national or host nation military forces, with international organizations and non-government organizations. As well as participate in operational planning and identify worthy projects that meet local needs as well as fit within co-funder and military guidelines. In addition, CIMIC must be prepared to deal with issues regarding humanitarian assistance, civil infrastructure, civil administration, economic issues, commercial affairs, and cultural affairs.

Providing advice to the Task Force (TF) Commander in meeting legal and moral obligations to the local population can become an important activity. Provide program planning and technical advice as well as assistance to civil authorities in fields of expertise commensurate with operational requirements. Further activities may include coordinating requirements for, and assistance in acquiring local resources and facilities. One of the primary activities is to research, prepare and update area assessments and possibly economic assessments.

It is important to note that anyone of these issues may end up becoming time intensive or of significant importance to a commander and may assign the task to someone other than a CIMIC operator.

**CIMIC ORGANIZATION—THE BUILDING BLOCKS**

With the many of the CIMIC tasks and activities defined it would also be prudent to delve into the size of an organization in order to optimize the force multiplier effect. One of the key qualities of a CIMIC operator is flexibility; therefore, the organization itself should have a level of flexibility built into it. At a recent Army Reserve Regeneration Working Group the following CIMIC organization was recommended by the Directorate of CIMIC, as the building block for future deployments. This organization was proposed in order to maintain flexibility in the organization but also to provide a level of consistency for planning purposes.

The basic building block of a CIMIC organization is the CIMIC team. As outlined in Figure 1, it would consist of three-trained CIMIC operators and two CIMIC familiarized drivers. It is important that the drivers become part of the CIMIC work up training and matched to their CIMIC operators because they fill multiple roles of security, driving, observation, and coordination of some of the CIMIC tasks.

The CIMIC headquarters (HQ) cell collates and funnels timely and accurate information to the commanders staff for area awareness and decision making purposes. The Major acts as the adviser to the Commander on CIMIC issues as well as the Senior Liaison Officer attending meetings between the military and civilian actors.

The CIMIC operations officer runs the tactical CIMIC operation and is integrated into the operational planning process with the rest of the planning staff (OPS, INT, PSYOPS, PA). Coordinating CIMIC activities and summarizing the daily CIMIC situation reports are also time-consuming tasks for the operations officer.

The project cell becomes incredibly important to the mix if the task force is provided with funding for community improvements projects. The project process from initiation to
completion is time consuming and paper intensive to ensure all legal and financial criteria are achieved; thus, the requirement for a dedicated cell.

**Figure 1:** CIMIC ORBAT per Task Force.

The CIMIC organisation is displayed at a strength of 21 members which would take into consideration the size of the area of responsibility (AOR), population of the AOR and the number of sub units with the Task Force. The strength increases to 24 if there is a projects section requirement. Typically, each tactical CIMIC team will be OPCON to a sub-unit for administrative and logistical requirements.

WHERE DOES CIMIC FIT INTO THE OVERALL OPERATION?

INFORMATION OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS

CIMIC in its modern form has become a keystone of information operations. It has been said that he who has the knowledge has the power. A Task Force commander gathers his knowledge / power by gaining information about the environment s/he is operating in. Guidance is issued for the collection of information in the form of an ISTAR Matrix through the primary information requirements (PIRs) and information requirements (IRs). CIMIC operates within a broad spectrum gathering information across the width and depth of the ISTAR matrix.
Much of the valuable information that is gathered by military members is through establishing relationships based on trust, respect and reciprocity. CIMIC plays a significant role in the information gathering process as much of the key information gathered, is generated from CIMIC operators who create those valuable relationships with people. After ISTAR Matrix information is processed, it then becomes intelligence, which can be used in the decision making process by command.

![Maintain a Safe and Secure Environment Diagram](image)

**Figure 2**: Maintaining a safe and secure environment.

Figure 2 shows how CIMIC may influence in the physical and moral domain. CIMIC is a powerful ‘tool’ for the commander in projecting his influence into the local environment. CIMIC may be used in a pre-emptive manner to influence or change behaviour in the moral or physical domain. One avenue of approach may be to send in the CIMIC operators to pass the commanding officers message / information to leaders of the local community. Messages being passed may be in the form of promised reward or punishment aimed at influencing behaviour. Quite often, the effects of the messages are based on established relationships, especially in the case of punishment. If the CIMIC operator had established a relationship, where information is trusted and passed proactively then the person receiving the message is more likely to react in a manner that is desired by the commander.

**RELATIONSHIP WITH INFORMATION OPERATIONS**

The information operations atmosphere works most effectively and can improve the probability of mission success through a synergy created between CIMIC, PSYOPS, INT, PA and OPS cells. It is essential that information be exchanged between these branches in an
efficient manner in order to provide command with an accurate and timely picture of the constantly changing environment they are operating in.

The force multiplier effect created through this synergy reduces the dependence on military force to achieve mission objectives, while minimizing interference (in hostile environments) and increasing cooperation (in neutral to supportive environments) by the local population with military operations.

All of the information above defines the start state. In order to put forward relevant and achievable recommendations we must use the valuable experience we have gained to date in the CIMIC evolution.

**WHAT IS WORKING AND WHAT IS NOT?**

**EXAMPLE BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA (BIH)**

CIMIC was among the busiest elements within the battle group (BG). The amount of time spent on typical CIMIC tasks is broken down approximately as:

- 40% Liaison and information gathering.
- 30% Community Improvement Projects (CIP) and Humanitarian Assistance Projects (HAP).
- 20% Humanitarian Assistance (HA).
- 10% Miscellaneous activities that seem to come by the way of CIMIC.

CIMIC provided the commanding officer the capability to greatly influence the operational environment across a broad spectrum, at the community level through passage of information or by completing community improvement projects (CIP), as well at the family or individual level through humanitarian assistance projects (HAP) and humanitarian assistance (HA) activities.

By establishing close relationships with key players the CIMIC operators were able to gather key pieces of the information puzzle that provides the battle group (BG) with a picture of the environment it was operating in.

This information was used to assess where the battle group (BG) could make the greatest positive impact given their resources. One area the Canadian battle group (BG) gained a level of influence was through the allocated funds ($200,000 in Canadian / 260,000 KM) from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

It is important to note that it was an extensive process undertaking these projects. The CIMIC operators went out to the local communities and asked them what their priorities were for infrastructure. Without this, we were liable to repeat mistakes made in the past for example where schools were completely rebuilt and then no children ever attended them.
The projects were filtered against the criteria laid out by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and then prioritized for the commanding officers approval. The community improvement project (CIP) funds were then allocated as far down the prioritized list of projects as possible. The projects were put out to tender with a minimum of three project bids from independent contractors that had not yet been black listed for poor performance. The contractor with the most detailed bid, best reputation and most accurate pricing was allocated the projects. The CIMIC operator interacted with the contractor on a weekly basis as the projects took shape. This ensured that the details of the contract were being met. The CIMIC operators completed a detailed paperwork process to ensure that the CIDA guidelines were maintained.

Upon completion of the project the CIMIC operator initiated a project opening / dedication. At this point, there was a significant amount of coordination between the information operations, intelligence, public affairs officer (PAFFO) and CIMIC at the staff level. This was necessary in order to ensure the commanding officer was fully informed. The PAFFO briefed the commanding officer as to the media talking points, the information operations produced a targeting and tasking matrix from the information supplied by the CIMIC operators project / dedication paperwork and the intelligence cell ensured that there would be no ‘Grip and Grins’ with the local criminals. The result was a ceremony with a purpose. The purpose being ‘to further the battle group commanding officers mission and goals.’

The remaining portion of the CIDA funds or approximately 15,000 KM, were allocated toward humanitarian assistance projects (HAP). These projects allowed the officers commanding the sub-units as well as the individual soldier the opportunity to gain influence with families or individuals that could use help. HAP funds were used to provide approximately 30 projects to each sub-unit at a maximum cost of 500 KM per project. Any soldier could submit a CIMIC aid request, through the chain of command, to have access to HAP funds. HAP funds were used to purchase small items such as firewood, plastic sheeting for low expense winterization, candles, fencing, stoves, gravel, windup radios, and a toilet. The items were priced out and then purchased by CIMIC members and given to the soldier for distribution.

CIMIC operators, as well as the soldiers, also had the ability to influence the hearts and minds of the population through the distribution of HA in the form of Teddy Bears and stuffed toys, linen and blankets, school supplies, winter mitts and toques, adult and children's clothing, winter coats, shoes and other small items directed at the well being of the individual or family. We found that the CIMIC drivers played an important role in matching up the requests for HA with the current inventory and ensuring its timely distribution for delivery. It was important that the person or soldier who filled out the aid request be the one to actually deliver the items so that the member felt like they actually helped someone.

All of the HA was gathered through an organized donation program from the generosity of the Canadian public. Later in the tour, an additional 48 triwalls of HA were flown from Canada and the distribution strategy was adjusted. To reduce dependence on SFOR and the Canadian battle group (CA BG), the majority of the remaining HA was distributed to local non-government organizations (NGOs). Requests for HA to the CIMIC platoon were then referred to the local NGOs.
The CIMIC teams and the headquarters cell achieved significant levels of success during rotations 11 and 12 with recognition for their accomplishments. While the CIMIC cell received some initial reluctance on the part of the BG commanding officers, being imposed as an organization from outside, the CIMIC operators quickly proved their value and swayed the commanding officers opinion as to the force multiplier effect.

EXAMPLE HAITI

The most interesting aspect of the recent deployment to Haiti (Op HALO, then Op HAMLET) was the stand-up and deployment of the mission. The entire process, from the passing of the UN Security Council Resolution to the Canadian Forces (CF) actively participating in the operation, took less than one month.

This quick timeline, while quite appropriate for the situation, created some challenges for CIMIC. For example, the operational planning process for the mission was abbreviated (almost non-existent). Despite the fact that several of Canada’s national objectives for the mission seemed to directly involve CIMIC, our actual involvement in the planning process was minor. Other planning priorities such as logistic support, rules of engagement, length of the mission, accommodations, transport, area of operation, and virtually every other detail of a large-scale (by Canadian standards) operation overshadowed any CIMIC planning.

Most military commanders would likely state that a safe and secure environment will always be the military’s number one priority on a peace support operation. Even though CIMIC involvement in this mission appeared to be critical, there was some question at the outset as to when, where, and whether at all CIMIC personnel would be useful. The Task Force (TF) Commander decided to retain CIMIC at the NCE.

Apparently, it was communicated to the TF Commander during the strategic reconnaissance that the American forces on the ground planned to have no CIMIC capability. I am uncertain as to whether there was any discussion of the relationship between CIMIC and Civil Affairs (the branch of the US Military that handles CIMIC) or if something as simple as a difference in terminology might have contributed to a significant miscommunication. The reality was that, once we arrived on the ground, it became apparent that the US Forces had brought a sizeable Civil Affairs element with them, consisting of two six-man Civil Affairs team and a headquarters element, initially commanded by a Major, and later by a Lieutenant Colonel. These teams operated out of the US National Command, giving them the latitude to operate throughout Haiti.

The presence of such a large US Civil Affairs component made it redundant for the Canadians to keep our CIMIC element at the NCE. Rather than improved latitude, we ended up having to coordinate all CIMIC activities through at least two other headquarters.

Complicating this further was the fact that the Canadian CIMIC teams were housed with the National Support Element (NSE) due to a shortage of space at the NCE’s location. This created yet another level of liaison that was required before any CIMIC activity could take place. Therefore, CIMIC personnel had to liaise with as many as four separate headquarters prior to conducting any activity. This was a considerable strain on resources that led to great
frustration, and caused friction at one time or another between CIMIC and each of the other organizations.

Early in the mission, CIMIC established a priority of building a rapport with major non-government organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) (including the United Nations) on the ground in Haiti. However, this was complicated by the fact that many UN agencies had removed their personnel due to security considerations. Once the area was secure the UN agencies transitioned through a number of personnel changes, which complicated the exchange of information. A lack of a two-way flow of information from the UN made it exceedingly difficult to accomplish the UN’s objectives.

The bulk of Canadian CIMIC activity throughout the operation consisted of small projects, which focussed on education, water, and sanitation. For the most part, they seemed to be band-aid style projects designed to assist schools and orphanages. The nature of these projects was due to two factors:

- CIMIC was given access to $50,000 in project money by the Canadian Embassy. Embassy staff informed CIMIC personnel that this money should be used in ‘small, community-based projects’; and
- The mission was only supposed to have a 90-day mandate, which made the process of hiring contractors to undertake the work cumbersome and risky.

These two factors led to a situation in which Task Force personnel ended up doing much of the work for the projects. This became the greatest demand on CIMIC personnel’s time. Unfortunately, it is debatable whether these projects accomplished much, either in the sense of support to the civil environment or support to the force.

CIMIC personnel did manage to conduct some liaison, identifying and dealing with some UN personnel, some NGOs, and whatever local government personnel could be identified and located. There were varying degrees of success in conducting liaison, as there was a sense among those who had been in Haiti for some time that the military was not there to stay. This feeling is probably quite justified, as the Multi-national Interim Force (US, Chile, France, and Canada) was in the country under such a limited mandate (90 days, with no certainty of what would come after) that it impeded attempts at relationship building with local or international actors.

Approximately three months into the deployment, the United Nations (with Brazil being the major contributor) assumed command of the mission as. Canadian forces remained in Haiti for a further three months, moving from Port au Prince to Gonaives. With the move to Gonaives, the CIMIC team ended up under direct control (OPCON) to the infantry company (H Coy, 2 RCR, which replaced I Coy in June) on the ground. This change in arrangements appeared to be much more efficient. This allowed the CIMIC team to react quickly to the tactical situation on the ground, and to deal directly with the tactical headquarters. Increased support was made available to the CIMIC team.

While it was considered a success for CIMIC to be included in this mission, there is little else in Op HALO that should be considered successful from a CIMIC point of view. Perhaps the most significant achievement was for seven CIMIC qualified Reservists from across the county to be identified and DAG’d for operation in less than a week.
EXAMPLE AFGHANISTAN

Our mission during Op ATHENA Rotation 2 was to support the commander’s intent by enhancing the force protection of the Task Force and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Thus creating an environment where the locals will tell ISAF / Canadian troops of any opposing military force activity in their area of operation (AOO). This was done through the building and continuation of trusting relationships with the local populace.

Methods of establishing these relationships were as follows:

- Regular meetings with Mayors, Police Chiefs, Governors, Wakils (village representative), villagers, school teachers, directors and students.
- Conducting small quick high impact projects that benefit the community such as road repairs, road construction and supplying schools with desks.
- Donation of school supplies and medical supplies to the applicable institutions.
- Distribution of the ISAF News to the local villages and communities. (This was the first regular publication for many of the residents of Kabul, it was pro ISAF and a useful PYSOPS tool).

The area of operation consisted within the boundaries of the Kabul province. The German, Canadian, United Kingdom, Belgian, Hungarian, France and Italian forces each had a CIMIC detachment. These all varied in size between three to eight operators. Another CIMIC resource was a Finish CIMIC unit; they were an ISAF resource vice a Kabul Multi-national Brigade (KMNB) resource. It should be mentioned that CA CIMIC was not a declared resource for KMNB to use. We were strictly a CA resource and were utilized for CA reasons. This being said we assisted KMNB where we could and took over two police districts as our “unofficial” AOO.

Kabul CIMIC teams worked well at the tactical level; coordination of effort between teams was conducted to ensure this. Strategic coordination was very poor; as a result there were was very little direction and communication between ISAF HQ and KMNB HQ on the CIMIC net.

Our CA CIMIC team consisted of six members; three operators and three drivers. The size was too small, we required one more operator as a minimum.

Over the seven months in Kabul, CA CIMIC was able to effectively support the Commander’s intent by enhancing the force protection of Police District’s 6 & 7. Thirty-five projects were started and completed with $17 K from CIDA, 6 legacy projects passed on from rotation 1 were completed (all wells) as well as the continuation of the liaison relationship building with the local Afghan people and authorities.

CIMIC delivered the publication called The ISAF news published every two weeks. It contained stories telling the locals about what ISAF was doing as well as what was happening in and around the country. In this publication there was a section dedicated to
CIMIC projects in the AO. The publication is printed in both English and Dari for the readers. CA CIMIC was involved in a toy gun safety campaign to prevent the kids from pointing toy weapons at ISAF soldiers. This was done with the assistance of ISAF Info Ops and the results were positive when we left.

CIMIC continues to prove its value at the tactical level. All future operations should continue to include a CIMIC component.

CA CIMIC needs to come together; currently there is a gap / wall between the tactical teams and the strategic level. It is felt that advice given from the bottom up to strategic levels is not listened too. Further action is required to eliminate this division between both groups.

CIMIC is a very effective tool in the commander’s toolbox; it provides needed flexibility and visibility into the civil environment in which the TF operates.

Many people have expressed that CIMIC should not be doing any project work as this crosses the line between NGO’s and the military. We felt that in Kabul projects were essential tools in the CIMIC teams toolbox. It allowed us the flexibility to do something quickly with a high impact for the local community, therefore enhancing the force protection of the Task Force.

To simply go to meetings and try to build friendships without being able to help solve the issues can create frustration and distrust on the part of the locals and is a poor way to build a relationship. Small gestures such as the donation of school desks to the local schools or the construction of a community well are inexpensive to implement and the results are very beneficial to the community and to the military force regarding force protection.

In September 2004 the CIMIC operators were advised, Opposing Military Forces (OMF) had specifically targeted them. The threat was confirmed by the intelligence (G2) and included specifics about how the detachment was operating and locations it had visited. This coincided with the period leading up to the Afghan Presidential elections and an increase in attacks on ISAF targets was anticipated.

The CIMIC detachment was assigned a security force comprising of a half section of infantry from B Company, 1 PPCLI for each of its taskings. The section was responsible for close protection of the operators and any other security matters. This arrangement worked very well and made each patrol a less desirable target for opposing military forces. The one negative was that the security element was taken from the Force Protection Company, already heavily tasked and, it could be argued, undermanned. Having additional CIMIC personnel could solve the problem of additional security. When required, CIMIC patrols may be combined to present a defensible target rather than a two-vehicle patrol with only four personnel.

The threat further increased just prior to the Afghan Presidential Election. It was anticipated that the level for CIMIC operations would remain prohibitively high for approximately two weeks. It was decided to cease CIMIC operations for the two-week period while attempting to continue CIMIC work by keeping in contact with key personnel by phone.
The average Afghan citizen was worried about violence during the election and this feeling was exacerbated by the fact that some ISAF assets, specifically CIMIC, disappeared for two weeks. It could be argued that ceasing CIMIC operations during a critical point such as the elections was counter to what the Task Force should have done, and that CIMIC operations should have, in fact, stepped up their presence in the community. To demonstrate to the local population that the environment was secure and stable, CIMIC cannot be viewed as hiding from a possible threat.

CIMIC detachments should be properly trained and have sufficient personnel to deal with an increased threat, thereby precluding the necessity to cease operations at any point.\textsuperscript{iv}

\section*{WHAT IMPROVEMENTS CAN BE MADE?}

With our start state defined and examples from three different operations, I feel safe in making a number of recommendations based on the experience LFWA CIMIC has gained over a number of years.

\section*{CIMIC TEAM COMPOSITION}

The first recommendation from this paper is to adopt the above-discussed CIMIC team model as a standard building block for deployment. The size of the CIMIC cell can increase relative to the size of the military deployment, area of responsibility, population of AOR and number of sub-units in the Task Force.

One of the main arguments for adopting this model is to account for the loss of CIMIC operators during leave periods. A little over a month's worth of time during a six month deployment is spent on leave, which means (depending on the size of the CIMIC cell) anywhere from a third to half of your organization is on leave. The first and last months of a rotation are usually restricted from taking leave thus compounding the problem. All three-example deployments state this as a significant issue. The above CIMIC team model will minimize the effect of leave considerations, as there will always be a knowledgeable CIMIC operator to cover while the other is on leave.

An additional reason is the flexibility. In a higher threat environment such as Afghanistan this organization can work as a two-vehicle team (even with leave considerations), if necessary, with security support. In a lower threat environment each operator may be assigned a specific area thus increasing the span of coverage.

\section*{TACTICAL CIMIC TEAM ATTACHED TO A SUB-UNIT WITH AN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY}

The second recommendation is that the tactical CIMIC teams must be attached directly to a sub-unit for logistical and support requirements during work up training and deployment. CIMIC operators work most effectively when they are assigned an area of responsibility (i.e.
the same area as the sub-unit). The CIMIC operator will then interact with whatever level of non-government organizations, agencies and local authorities that are in their area and then report relevant information up the chain of command in a timely manner.

It is important for the sub-units to know this requirement during their planning process. An additional reason is to avoid the multiple levels of command coordination as experienced in Afghanistan.

INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION — STARTING TOP-DOWN

There has recently been significant hue and cry by civilian agencies operating along side military organizations. They have accused the military of conducting CIMIC operations in order to manipulate the local population (i.e. Afghanistan and Iraq). The civilian organizations profess to be providing aid in an altruistic manner and not mixing human requirements with the mission. While there may be a grain of truth in this accusation, if one delves deeper into the reasons why the civilian organizations and military are where they are - they seem to have significant common goals.

If CIMIC is conducted properly, as trained for by CIMIC operators there should be little conflict between what the military and the civilian organizations are doing. In fact quite often the two separate entities work together quite effectively at the tactical level and don’t trip on each other’s toes. The only time this argument has some truth is when organizations don’t take the time to coordinate the distribution of limited resources. It could be argued that the causes of these conflicts are more as a result of poor training and or personality conflicts between the organizations.

CIMIC, when conducted in an impartial, neutral and independent manner in the eyes of the national authorities and the local population, is a force multiplier not only for the military but also for civilian organizations working towards common goals.

A third recommendation is that any international organization (IO) and non-government organizations (NGO’s) that often work in conjunction with the military be involved in relationship building by participating in military exercises and attending CIMIC courses side by side with military members. The Pearson Peacekeeping center has added significant value to its tactical CIMIC courses by not only inviting IOs and NGOs to participate but foreign military personnel as well. Another recent example of these organizations beginning to build this working relationship was the Peace Operations Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee where they were discussing the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and the Militarization of Humanitarian Assistance.

Further to this recommendation the organizations should be involved as early as possible in the planning process leading up to an operation in order to coordinate issues such as HA distribution, economy of effort, and mutual support.

Implementation of the third recommendation once these relationships are built will take time but the investment will significantly improve the force multiplier effect and the
mission’s possibility of success. It is a win-win situation for the military and civilian organizations operating in conjunction with each other.

ESTABLISHING A POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (HA)

A fourth recommendation that I would make is that the CF / Army develop a standard policy and procedures for Humanitarian Assistance (HA). This could be an agreement with an aid agency to provide HA alongside the military. This would have mutual benefits of getting us out of distributing food, shelter and necessity items as well as providing security to the civilian organization operating in the area. It would also significantly reduce the haphazard nature of collection and distribution of HA that the Canadian military has undertaken to date.

ESTABLISHING A POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROJECTS (HAP)

A fifth recommendation would be to establish a policy and procedures for humanitarian assistance projects (HAP). A specific amount of funds should be set-aside for HAP for each rotation on operation. Adopting an approach such as this has many benefits for the military. As described in the Bosnia example funds were set aside to purchase items from the local economy to help locals in need. This is done at the individual and patrol level. The request is staffed up the chain of command by the patrol; funds are regulated, approved, the item purchased and dispersed by the CIMIC cell to the patrol for delivery. This allows the patrols to influence their environment and it also allows the military to get further away from the physical storage and logistical requirements of HA.

HA is a large headache on all rotations as these items are expensive to transport and are bulky. While Canadians can be relied upon for their generosity it becomes difficult to transport the items from Canada to the area of operation. By using the HAP funds approach it has the added advantage of supporting the local economy, which is essential in many of the areas we operate in. Locals are much more motivated to improve their own situation if given an economic chance rather than wanting to receive handouts from the military.

ESTABLISHING A POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS (CIP)

The sixth recommendation continues with the Task Force commander’s ability to influence the environment they are operating in by establishing a policy and procedures for community improvement projects. A standard agreement could be made with the Canadian International Development Agency or the Canadian Embassy to provide each Task Force Commander with funds to be used ‘or not’ on community improvement projects. As in the Bosnia and Afghanistan example these projects need to be recommended by the community and their involvement must remain throughout the process to ensure a beneficial effect as desired by the commander. These projects increase the level of neutral to positive opinions
regarding military presence in its area of operation. It is an essential tool for the commander to influence the environment and they must be given the discretion to spend these funds in an appropriate manor with the further ability to return the funds if it is felt not needed.

A dedicated CIMIC projects section within the Task Force Commander’s headquarters would implement the project process and administration as described above in the TF CIMIC ORBAT recommendation.

A STANDARD GUIDELINE FOR CIMIC
PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

The seventh recommendation is important for clarifying and understanding the different roles each element will play prior to deployment, as CIMIC is an outside component attached to the Task Force.

Each operation and environment we deploy into has many differences; therefore it becomes difficult to standardize training across the board. There are; however, a number of commonalities. Each Task Force will need to be trained to level 3 in the event there is any war fighting. CIMIC needs to be included in this at the sub-unit level they will be deployed with. This allows CIMIC to build the relationship with the sub-unit and learn / review the necessary skills to extract themselves from a firefight as we can see in the Afghanistan example CIMIC was specifically targeted. A pre-deployment exercise needs to be conducted prior to deployment where all elements of the Task Force are operating in their own capacity in order to flush out some of the problems / mis-understandings prior to deployment.

PREDICTABILITY WITH RESPECT TO SIZE OF A CIMIC ORBAT,
LENGTH OF TRAINING AND ROTATION TIME COMMITMENT

This eighth recommendation is very important due to the fact that CIMIC is now a reserve capability. If we are to get the right / most capable operators for the job we need predictability regarding the expected size of the CIMIC ORBAT, and the length of time commitment. The best CIMIC operators are coming from a variety of backgrounds and tend to be successful in their civilian careers as well. In fact you will find many are taking a reduction in salary to participate on an overseas deployment. They are motivated by what CIMIC does / represents and the experience they will gain. Uncertainties in contracts and poor administration have lead to wide frustration and even some CIMIC operators deciding not to go on the above-discussed rotations. This level of consistence is required to gain permission and plan for a leave of absence from our civilian occupations.

CONCLUSION

This paper has covered the evolution of CIMIC to date, defined our start state and made a number of recommendations based on current operational experience.
I reiterate my challenge to those who read this paper to either agree or disagree with my recommendations. The resulting debate will create a better CIMIC organization. I would ask the civilians to help build the necessary relationships with the military so that we can work together to achieve our common goals. I would ask the military members to use their influence to positively affect the direction of CIMIC.

Because Canadian CIMIC is in an early stage of evolution it is hoped that those in the trenches will continue to influence the direction of this evolution.

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