

A NATO Collective Strategy Proposal and Practical Planning and Analysis Experiences from Operations in Afghanistan

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“The security challenges of today are too multi-faceted to be handled by one single institution, no matter how capable.”

NATO after Prague 2003

“We need to integrate any NATO military response into a wider overall framework that will include political, as well as perhaps financial and judicial measures.”

NATO SG, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 2 February 2005

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Bosnia Herzegovina security cooperation programme, the Supreme Allied Command in Europe (SACEUR) 2-4 Leadership Programme (NC3A, The Netherlands), the NATO operational planning course as a syndicate leader (NATO School, Germany) and the development of NATO collective strategy doctrine. He joined the MODUK Directorate of Navy Resources and Plans as the Amphibious and Joint Warfare desk officer in June 2005.

ABSTRACT

NATO's strategic concept describes how the assets of member Nations are to be co-ordinated and focused to achieve security goals using diplomatic and military instruments of power. It recognises that coherence of economic components of strategy between member nations is also key, as is the international community working in concert. NATO, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) continues to develop a collective strategy doctrine proposal and linkages to appropriate management and operational planning tools. The proposal is underpinned by academic research and NATO experience on operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. A collective strategy uses a framework to comprehend the interdependencies of the security, governance, economic, social and human societal domains and to chart the long term coordinated action agreed by the key stakeholders; local governance and the international community. The approach enables consultation, co-operation and co-ordination and seeks to create a self-sustaining secure environment.

The importance and relevance of this doctrine is illustrated by a case study of a mission with complex civil-military interactions. When NATO became responsible for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, there was no collective strategy or multi-year plan for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. NATO decision-makers, planners and analysts viewed the mission as a whole. The resulting Investment Management Framework (IMF) reflected the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) / International Agencies report "Securing Afghanistan's Future" and dialogue with key players in the government and international community. This work enabled the development of the NATO mission Operational Road Map (ORM) to the military end-state. In addition to supporting the development of the framework and road map, analysts also identified an associated set of measures to track progress in achieving desired effects, objectives and ultimately the end-states. The resulting management tool is being used to support regular assessments and reviews of NATO operations in Afghanistan.

UNDERSTANDING THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT—A WIDER OVERALL FRAMEWORK

NATO'S FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY TASKS¹

NATO's essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all of its members by political and military means in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and the United Nations charter. A portion of its fundamental security tasks are:

¹ "NATO Handbook" (Belgium: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), chapter 2.

- a. Security: to provide a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions ... in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the use of force.
- b. Crisis management: to stand ready, case by case and by consensus ... to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management including crisis response operations.

THE STRATEGY OF A DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY ALLIANCE

In the present political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliance's role in preserving peace and preventing war depends, even more than in the past, on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and on the successful management of crises affecting security. The political, economic, social and environmental elements of security and stability are thus taking on increasing importance.²

NATO's strategic concept describes how the assets of member Nations are to be coordinated and focused to achieve security goals using diplomatic and military instruments of power. It also recognises the desirability of coherent economic policies,³ but that its dependent for example on the international community setting goals⁴ where possible from within a wider overall framework or a collective strategy to fund reconstruction and development.

A COLLECTIVE STRATEGY

A collective strategy seeks to create a self-sustaining secure environment that requires adequate governance, a viable economy, security mechanisms and responsive social and human networks. The foci of the international community inclusive of NATO are spread across the societal domains, organisations focusing their particular expertise.

NATO as an illustration advising on military response options and their integration into a wider overall framework, a framework such that short term and emergency interventions, key structural and systematic reforms and national development programmes can be identified and prioritised, as shown in Figure 1.

SOCIETAL DOMAINS

To play a full role in framework discussions with representatives of the international community or with those of the internal security forces an understanding is required of the

² "NATO Handbook", page 156.

³ North Atlantic Treaty, Article 2.

⁴ MC 327/2, 'NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations', para 39.

societal domains, their interdependencies and the way in which they positively or negatively influence each other:⁵




Figure 1: A collective strategy framework.

- a. **Governance.** Governance is the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage the nation's affairs at all levels. It comprises all the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which the citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights and obligations and mediate their differences. Governance is not the sole domain of government but it transcends government to encompass the business sector and civil society.⁶ The Centre for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) describes 3 forms of governance: autocracy, democracy, anocracy. Anocracies are described by the CIDCM as a "Middling category rather than a distinct form of governance"⁷ they are relatively unstable.

⁵ "Securing Afghanistan's Future" page 2 "Without an adequate level of security, a society will fail to achieve key national goals for economic stability, political normalisation, national reconciliation, reconstruction and social development. However, reducing societal violence and attaining an adequate level of security may only be possible if there are improvements in the economic and political domains."

⁶ www.neda.gov.ph/mtpdp2001/glossary_of_terms.htm

⁷ "Peace and Conflict 2003. A Global *Biennial Survey* of Armed Conflict, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy." (USA: Centre for International Development and Conflict management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, 2003) page 19.

- b. Economy (Inclusive of Infrastructure). The economy is the system of production, distribution and consumption.⁸ Infrastructure is the physical structures that form the foundation for development.⁹ A societies skeleton e.g. bridges, roads, reservoirs, cables, pipes, rails, schools, healthcare.
- c. Social and human capital. Social capital is the fabric of networks, relationships, norms and institutions that bind a society together and enable it to function and grow dynamically. Human capital refers to the acquired knowledge, skills and capacities that allow individuals to operate within this fabric.¹⁰
- d. Security. Security is the provision of a basic level of safety to maintain or enable a return to normalcy in the political, economic and social spheres.¹¹ The elements of security are considered further below.

SECURITY

Post combat and post conflict security can become the main constraint to stabilisation. In its absence the initiation or resumption of large-scale conflict becomes more likely as shown in Figure 2.¹² Components of security are:

- a. National security institutions. Civil primacy and fiscal transparency are required to co-ordinate the activities of the ministries, institutions and donor states. They are responsible for intelligence, investigation and interdiction.
- b. Regional security framework. A framework to enable good security relations with neighbouring states and to encourage stability within the region is needed. Destabilising external support from sub-state actors, parties, tribes or warlords must be countered.
- c. Law. Law is the collection of rules imposed by authority that in principle are followed by every member and ruler of a society. The Judiciary is a branch of government with power to resolve legal conflicts, interpret and apply the law. The rule of law provides an enabling environment for development and economic investment and builds confidence in the political framework.
- d. Police. The police provide the core of an effective internal security structure. They are an agency that maintains order, prevents and detects crime and enforces the law. The police are required to conform to international standards and inspire trust and respect of the populace.

⁸ www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/webwn2.0

⁹ www.city.Ottawa.on.ca/city_services/planningzoning/region_op/annex_a.htm

¹⁰ "Securing Afghanistan's Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward" (Afghanistan: A Government / International Agency report, 2004) page 14.

¹¹ "Securing Afghanistan's Future" page 78.

¹² "Securing Afghanistan's Future" page 79.

- e. Penal System. The penal system consists of justice mechanisms, correction facilities, magistrates, defence counsellors and prison warders.
- f. Armed Forces. Armed forces can counter or neutralise significant armed groupings e.g. militia, insurgents, terrorists or opposing national armed forces. Of note operational activities post combat may include leading or supporting: disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DDR); de-mining; international criminal tribunals, counter organised crime and narcotic programmes. Their activities should support and be synchronised with police agencies.
- g. Human Rights. The population needs to develop confidence in the authority of the state by accountability mechanisms designed to redress human rights abuses. Seeks to combat culture of impunity within security agencies.




Figure 2. Effectiveness of internal security mechanisms.¹³

Security is a natural focus for a diplomatic and military Alliance such as NATO. However, NATO is not resourced to address all of the elements of the security domain and must therefore interface with local/ internal security mechanisms (e.g. police¹⁴ and judiciary) and the international community (e.g. United Nations or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe). The arrival of a NATO joint force will immediately affect the regional or societal balance of power and the way in which violence is used; an understanding of violent conflict is therefore required.

¹³ Idea generated from “Countering Terrorism, The UK Approach to the Military Contribution” (Shrivenham: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC(UK), 2003) page 15 and PHQ ARRC Joint Effects Board products.
¹⁴ MC 327/2, para 41.

THE APPLICATION OF A COLLECTIVE STRATEGY

INCORPORATING ASPECTS OF COLLECTIVE STRATEGY INTO OPERATIONAL DESIGN

A consideration of operational design concepts and tools (end-states, centres of gravity, objectives, decisive points) gives a better understanding of how a collective strategy can be used.

- a. End-States. End-states are the conditions that should exist for the mission to be successfully completed. Some generic examples that illustrate different End-states that could be identified in developing a collective strategy are:

(1) *Societal End-State*; a self-sustaining secure environment.

(2) *NATO End-States*:

(a) Strategic End-State: level at which society attains its own momentum to progress¹⁵ or the peace-building¹⁶ components attain an equilibrium that does not require external military assistance.

(b) Military End-State: internal security mechanisms regain control, levels of violence within societal norms, public support for security.

(3) *Basic level needs*: food, water and safety for an individual to survive.¹⁷

Table 1 gives examples of what these end-states might mean for an individual.

- b. NATO's objectives. NATO objectives within a collective strategy may be:

(1) *Security*: de-escalate societal violence, contain and diffuse armed conflict, disrupt negative external involvement, inhibit group action, increase human security, enable internal security mechanisms, create the conditions for civil agencies.

(2) *Governance*: communicate with leaders/representatives in order to understand local issues, advocate self-determination, discourage discrimination, encourage and support good governance.

(3) *Economic*: encourage coherence of economic action to improve infrastructure¹⁸ and develop societal capacity e.g. employment.

¹⁵ "Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq's Reconstruction: The Post Conflict Reconstruction Project" (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2004)" page 6, "Nation jumpstarting."

¹⁶ "Securing Afghanistan's Future" page 12.

¹⁷ Maslow's theory.

Component	What end-states might mean for an individual		
	Basic level/ needs	NATO	< > Societal
Security	I only feel safe in my home	I travel throughout my community, avoiding only areas that are known to be dangerous	I go about my daily activities with a manageable level of concern
Governance	I have no say in how my society is governed	I have a say in how I am governed	My society has a responsive and pluralistic system of governance
Economic	I only have just enough food and water to survive	I have enough resources to meet my basic needs	My resources exceed my needs
Social & Human	I'm not guaranteed access to health care in an emergency	I have sufficient access to primary education and basic health care	A wide range of social services is available to me

Table 1: What end-states might mean for an individual.¹⁹

(4) *Social and human*: encourage coherence of action to improve services e.g. health and education.

- c. Centre of Gravity (COG). The COG is “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends... the point at which all our energies should be directed”²⁰

“A Centre of Gravity put simply is something that a commander will fight to win or protect”²¹

- d. Decisive Points (DP). DPs are the series of events that are decisive within an operation. The ability to establish favourable conditions at a DP allows the commander to maintain momentum and gain the initiative; failure inevitably places the COG at risk.

A diagram that could represent a collective strategy operational design is shown in Figure 3.

¹⁸ NATO’s Security and Investment Programme (NSIP) may fund, to the minimum level possible, infrastructure repair if in support of planned military objectives. NATO does not normally manage funds for civil infrastructure or humanitarian projects, but it may look to member nations or IO/ NGOs.

¹⁹ Idea generated from “Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq’s Reconstruction: The Post Conflict Reconstruction Project” (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2004) page 4.

²⁰ Clausewitz.

²¹ Gen Helge Hansen GE A, NATO School Operational Planning Course, 2004.




Figure 3: Illustrative segment of a collective strategy operational design.²²

OPERATIONAL RISK AND DECISIVE POINTS

Commanders will be interested in the risk associated with each DP. Operational risk is gauged by the significance of an event versus the likelihood that it occurs; high, medium or low. Since the significance of not attaining a DP is equally significant, in broad terms high, then the commander needs to be appraised of when the most likely or unlikely periods of failure at a DP are. Operational analysis can be used to assist staff performing the operational risk assessment.

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC) AS PART OF A COLLECTIVE STRATEGY

CIMIC staff are responsible to commanders for liaison with civil organisations, for aspects of civil support to the joint force and support to the civil environment. Their actions are

²² Where: CJTF = Combined Joint Task Force, DP = Decisive Point, COG = Centre of Gravity, LLOC = Land Lines of Communication

bounded within guidelines. Within a collective strategy CIMIC staff need specialist knowledge to seamlessly interact with their military and civilian counterparts, to encourage coherency of action, consultation, co-operation and co-ordination.

COMPREHENDING CIVIL INFORMATION

An adversary to a collective strategy may be an insurgent or a terrorist. It may also be the lack of political stability, law and order or employment. Commanders need to detect, understand and influence²³ that which undermines the internal security mechanisms and prevents the attainment of the military end-state. There are various sources of civil information and numerous cultural nuances. CIMIC, intelligence, logistic, military police, political advisors, country advisors, military staff may have collected, collated and processed civil information individually, the commander needs to ensure there is a mechanism to combine this information for assessment and distribution. Operational analysis, measures of effectiveness, nomination of a lead agent or functional area expert are tools that should be considered and applied.

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE)

MOE seek to assist commanders understand the situation by analysis of indicators or data. Ideally the data is compiled from a variety of sources e.g. media, polls, original interviews official/ public works²⁴ and analysed by independent mechanisms or at least as objectively as possible:²⁵

Activity	Measure of effectiveness	Indicator/ data sources
Security	Changes in humanitarian security	Attacks on humanitarian workers
	Reduction in levels of lawlessness	Number of incidents
	Improving perception of security	Independent survey of public opinion
Governance	Involvement in governance	Number of local institutions established
Economic	Less unemployment	Employment statistics

Table 2: Examples of MOE for different foci in the collective strategy.

ENABLING ACTION

NATO military action may be a key enabler in addressing the lack of political stability, law and order or employment. Whether in lead or in support NATO planners and operators need

²³ Knowledge superiority “Countering Terrorism,” page 16.

²⁴ “Progress or Peril? Measuring Iraq's Reconstruction,” page 11.

²⁵ “Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian Military Relations in Afghanistan” (London: Save the Children, 2004), page 37.

a framework to comprehend the interdependencies of the security, governance, economic, social and human societal domains and to chart the long term co-ordinated action agreed by the key stakeholders; local governance and the international community be it to:

- a. Monitor, assess and develop a secure environment.
- b. Enable security sector reform.
- c. Enable reconstruction.
- d. Encourage dialogue.
- e. Strengthen civil administration.
- f. Share information with IO/NGO.
- g. Support the international community in improving civil structures.
- h. Assist governance in extending its authority.

Ultimately the collective strategy framework approach seeks to enable consultation, co-operation, co-ordination and coherency of action. Although the international community will use different language to describe what they assess as critical milestones or steps, discussions need not be inhibited by terminology as flexibility, work rounds and compromises can be used to generate a common understanding.

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCES

The need for a collective strategy is illustrated with experiences of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. The Joint Force Command (JFC) for the mission is in Brunssum, The Netherlands. This is an operational level command focussed on long term issues of operational planning, mounting and sustaining the mission. HQ ISAF located in Kabul is a joint HQ at the operational/tactical interface and is focussed on operations, information campaign, support to security sector reform, support to reconstruction and liaison at all levels in theatre. The experiences presented are those of an analyst working both in the JFC supporting the development of the plan and at the “coal-face” in HQ ISAF helping to refine and execute this plan.

PLANNING FOR THE ISAF MISSION

Direction and guidance from the Strategic Headquarters (SHAPE) was used by the JFC to develop the detailed Operational Plan for the NATO mission in Afghanistan. A multi-functional team led by planners at the JFC developed this plan. Analysts were members of this planning team. Planning was initially informed by reces, background studies and expertise of the members of the planning team. The team continued to plan and refine the Operational Design during the first NATO rotation at HQ ISAF and on the basis of this

experience they started to build a campaign plan. The second rotation of the HQ in Kabul presented a unique opportunity as the core of the forward HQ was also provided by the JFC. Planners and analysts took their knowledge, experience and the developing campaign plan forward into theatre. They worked with the wider HQ team, other members of the international community and the government to develop first the overarching framework for the mission to achieve an overall end-state. This was called the Investment Management Framework (IMF). On the basis of this understanding they also further developed and refined the campaign plan and added a complementary system of campaign assessment to map and measure ISAF mission progress through to the military end-state. The resulting operational decision support tool for JFC and HQ ISAF is called the JFC Operational Road Map (ORM).

Figure 4 shows how the IMF and ORM are related. The IMF reflects the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) / International Agencies report “Securing Afghanistan's Future” and dialogue with key players in the government and international community. As a framework it maps out the way to the political end-state for the mission as a whole. It also provides the framework within which the ISAF support plans fit.




Figure 4: Relationship of Investment Management Framework to the International Security Assistance Force mission

The Investment Management Framework proved both a useful tool for understanding the mission and an important mechanism for co-ordination and communication both internal and external to the ISAF HQ. But the maintenance of this overarching framework was beyond the scope of HQ ISAF. It has been shared with the GOA, the UN, NATO and the wider international community but they did not take on the lead and this tool has yet to find a home. GOA has used the IMF to develop structures for planning and managing of some projects. In this work, GOA also relied on the advice of military planners and analysts. The need for

mechanisms to plan in a co-ordinated, holistic fashion and to understand complex interactions in such a mission was an important experience that underpins the collective strategy work.

PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT TOOLS

The basic planning tools are: the campaign plan that encapsulates the operational design and an associated campaign assessment. The campaign plan includes the Lines of Operation (LOP), Decisive Points, Objectives, Key Initiatives/Tasks/Effects and End States. In addition, a fundamental building block for the planning was a detailed COG analysis. At HQ ISAF a Canadian-led planning team did a study of this issue that was an important input to the planning and tool work. The campaign assessment identifies Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) to track and assess progress on LOP. For the ISAF mission, analysts in the JFC and the NATO Consultation Command and Control Agency (NC3A) have developed a customised MS Access Database support tool, Tool for Road Map Update and MoE Progress (TRUMP), to support the management of the campaign plan and execution of the campaign assessment. It also automates some of the regular analysis steps. We would like to focus a little deeper on the structure of the campaign plan and the associated campaign assessment.

CAMPAIGN PLAN STRUCTURE

The structure of the IMF is shown in Figure 5. Planners worked with analysts and internal and external experts to identify LOP. These were broken down into the following elements:

Each LOP has:

- Desired end-state
- A number of Thrusts or sub-LOP

Each Thrust has:

- Start-State
- Desired end-state
- A number of Operational Tasks

Each Operational Task has:

- Start-State
- Desired end-state
- An Objective for Each Phase
- A number of Initiatives

In developing the IMF, each LOP was presented to the Key Leaders at regular weekly meetings in the HQ ISAF Battle Rhythm. These meetings often had lively debate but always ended in consensus on the content and the commander also took the opportunity to provide feedback on his meetings with key stakeholders and to provide further direction and guidance.




Figure 5: Investment Management Framework structure

Figure 5 also shows that the IMF is broken out into phases:

- Initiation/Development when plans are made and projects developed.
- Consolidation/Transition when GOA executes these plans with the assistance of the international community
- Sustainment when the international community hands over responsibility and the GOA execute the projects on its own

The campaign plan in the ORM has a similar structure, but rather than Operational Tasks and Supporting Initiatives, it breaks down LOP into Operational Effects and Sub-Effects. The change was due to emerging concepts in operational planning and evolving practices in the HQ because of rotation. The principles are the same – a systematic decomposition of the mission.

CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT STRUCTURE

The structure of the ORM campaign assessment is based on a simple hierarchy linked to the campaign plan. Analysts worked with planners and internal and external experts to identify a set of MOE to track progress in achieving desired effects, objectives and ultimately the end-states. The ORM focuses on the military mission. This mission is one of supporting the development of a safe and secure environment in Afghanistan. In order to assess progress, the HQ must track ISAF actions. It must also collaborate and co-ordinate with external agencies to assess whether the desired effects are being achieved.

DECISION SUPPORT CYCLE

The campaign plan is executed and campaign assessments made using the Decision Support Cycle illustrated in Figure 6. Functional area experts in HQ ISAF work with their counterparts to collect, review and summarise MOE on a monthly basis. These experts work with the analysts to make an assessment for each of the individual measures. The results are then combined to show progress for each effect, LOP and ultimately the mission as a whole. The TRUMP tool is used to support the data collection and assessments. It automates a structured and systematic way of reporting progress across the mission towards the end-state. This aggregation is co-ordinated by the analysts and reviewed by the planners and together they prepare a campaign assessment briefing. This briefing is used to summarise progress, identify obstacles and focus actions. The plan is reviewed where necessary corrective action and adjustment recommended. This is followed by a detailed review of the MOE and current data sources. Finally a review of the supporting tool, TRUMP, is made. The results of the campaign assessment are the subject of a bi-monthly report to the JFC. The regular campaign assessments also form a substantial input to bi-annual NATO mission reviews that provide a long-term view and a mechanism to adapt plans. The ORM is a useful decision support tool for both HQ. It also support overall situational awareness in the JFC and hand-over of knowledge in HQ ISAF rotations.




Figure 6: Operational Road Map Decision Support Cycle.

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

In supporting this work analysts have learned some things about the use of MOE to support a complex mission like the NATO mission in Afghanistan. First the identification of MOE must be a collaborative effort of experts, analysts, and planner. The experts have the detailed knowledge of their subject its specific context in the culture. The analysts provide a scientific rigour and a systematic view of the process. The planners are able to put this in the context of the timeframe of interest and the operation as a whole. The top-down view of the planners and analysts provides a focus for the more broad and detailed expertise of the experts.

Together they are able to better come up with a set of measures that are relevant for the mission at hand.

These MOE must be well-defined. As indicated by the name, they should be measurable but we have had to allow subjective measures to ensure that achievement of effects could be properly assessed. In order to ensure that both subjective and objective measures are consistently tracked and used, a fact sheet was prepared for each MOE with definition, clearly defined with thresholds (targets) internal and external sources of information, etc. The importance of thresholds for the measures was also a lesson we learned. In a supporting mission it is difficult to identify the level of ambition for how well our support should be provided or how much progress that support aims to achieve. Compound that with moving targets and there is a real challenge in assessing both ISAF and overall mission success. Tying the measurement system to the plan with its objectives and end-states helped identify the required targets and thresholds.

We have also found that there are lots of good ideas about potential measures, but they need to be practical and ultimately must be used and reviewed. At HQ ISAF, once the initial set of measures was set up they were used in the regular campaign assessments and their review is a regular step in the Decision Support Cycle. This review checks that the MOE are in fact appropriate and sufficient to show achievement against the required effect, objective or end-state. Some examples of categories of MOE used are: Security Sector Reform events, crime and security incidents, governance in particular indicators of free and fair elections, public perceptions, and mechanisms for co-ordination. A more detailed summary has been provided for inclusion in the Code of Best Practice for MOE.

SUPPORTING ANALYSIS

As has already been mentioned, analysts supported throughout this process. They are well integrated in the Operational Planning Process. They provide advice during the development of the operational design so that it is well-structured and elements such as decisive points, criteria for success and ultimately end-state are as measurable as possible. These well-defined goals also support the development and testing of Courses of Action (COA) for the mission. Another very important role for the analysts in the planning process is to support the comparison of different COA. This can be as simple as feasibility checks or as complex as wargaming and simulation. It may also include an operational risk assessment as was done for the ISAF mission.

Once the plan was developed its execution was also supported by the analysis team. They worked with planners and experts to track progress and ensure relevant and timely supporting analysis and feedback. The basic system is in place at HQ ISAF and in the JFC, but there is room for improvement and some areas requiring further investigation.

The current set of MOE is actually a mix of different types of measures. In particular they include, level of effort/force (What am I doing?), measure of performance (How well am I doing it?) measures of effectiveness (Am I achieving the desired effects?) and development indicators. The change from tasks to effect in the campaign plan has helped to identify associated measures of effectiveness and the associated thresholds that define the conditions for success. The supporting nature of the ISAF mission makes it difficult to use MOE alone

to identify how ISAF is supporting the achievement of this effect or where ISAF may need to change its level of effort. The different types of measures continue to be used, but they are being broken out and used for different assessments.

The MOE assessment is based on a scoring system that is a combination of a score against a threshold and an assessment of trend. This works for the majority of the MOE. There are some measures, however, where trend is not important, as they just have to be sustained. These have been grouped as enablers and are monitored like batteries that need to be kept charged. There are others where the thresholds and trend changes as the mission progresses. We also allow a weighing system to be applied, but the development of the weights is complex and requires more research. One of the potential uses of the weighting systems we have explored is the effect of interdependencies.

In developing the IMF the analysts worked with planners to identify interdependencies. This was done by performing a pair-wise comparison of the different Operational Tasks to assess whether the dependencies were Critical, Serious, Moderate or Minimal. This assessment allowed the staff to identify critical interdependencies and sequences. There is a need to take this work further. In particular, an influence model could be developed based on the assessment of the interdependencies and the COG analysis. It could be refined and further informed by the MOE tracking and campaign assessments.

Finally this work should not be done in isolation on such a mission but finding analysis counterparts in national organisations and agencies outside the military is not always easy. It is important to extend our analysis network to promote understanding and enable collaborative assessments. ISAF analysts worked with colleagues in other military organisations but they had no equivalent in organisations like UNAMA. The type of structured analysis we do was “foreign” to the fledgling government institutions. That being said, we have had good experiences in Afghanistan with willingness to work together and share what information is available. Sometimes the information desired is just not available or credible. We need to work together to identify and rectify this where possible.

SUMMARY

It may not be easy to develop a collective strategy, but our NATO experiences in Afghanistan show that it is possible and the rewards are far too important to ignore. When NATO became responsible for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, there was no multi-year plan for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The military with their structured approach to planning and integrated analysis support were able to analyse this operation with complex civil-military interactions and build a simple structured framework. This framework informed the development of the JFC ORM and the systematic assessment of progress to the military mission end-state. A collective strategy was used to support consultation, co-operation, co-ordination and coherency of action between the military and key stakeholders in the government and the international community. It encouraged a local lead and was successful in enabling it in some areas. This lead and the tool itself help provide continuity in an environment that is always changing with the rotation within military HQ and international organisations and constantly evolving projects. Enabling the local authorities to co-ordinate and manage is also an important step towards successful mission completion.