

More Than You Ever Wanted to Know About Keynotes

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INTRODUCTION

This discussion is about the keynote addresses for the first nine Cornwallis meetings. Perhaps the most important part of the first keynote (modesty should prevent me from speaking about that first address but I've never been a modest person) was the provision of a definition of 'keynote.' At that first meeting—before we even gave ourselves the name Cornwallis Group—I said that a keynote address or speech is an address, as at a political convention, that presents the essential issues of interest to the assembly. Another definition is that of the fundamental fact or idea, as keynote of a policy. I went on to say that I intended the keynote address to be the clarion call of the workshop.

It is clear that, unless a keynote paper is distributed to participants well before a symposium, the keynote can have little influence on the papers presented at that symposium. The keynote may, if heeded, influence discussions and perhaps have influence on subsequent symposia when a series, such as the Cornwallis meetings, is planned. An immediate suggestion falls to us, then, as we think of the consequences and usefulness of keynote addresses: they should be used to plan subsequent symposia and should be distributed to all at the time of the call for papers is issued for the subsequent symposia. Can this be a recommendation of Cornwallis X? [Since this paper is being published following Cornwallis X, I can truthfully say that no such recommendation came out of Cornwallis X. On the other hand, the announcement for Cornwallis XI, if there is to be a Cornwallis XI, may incorporate recent keynote addresses as clarion calls to the future participants: Who knows?]

What follows, then, is my review of the keynote addresses for the nine meetings of the Cornwallis Group. I make no apologies for any biases that may be displayed. For some of the symposia there were two keynote talks, one designated a military talk and the other a civilian talk; often the military address was presented by a retired senior officer. At the end of the review I provide some observations and suggestions, not conclusions and recommendations.

THE FIRST SYMPOSIUM (CORNWALLIS I?), 1996

The first meeting, held at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Cornwallis Park, Nova Scotia, chosen at the outset because of the favorable balance of trade arrangements (low costs), was not designated a Cornwallis meeting until well after the workshop-symposium. It is thus unclear that the first meeting can be considered Cornwallis I, although, since we write our own rules, we can call it what we wish. The title of the meeting was “Analytic Approaches to the Study of Future Conflict.”

To further set the stage it is useful to recall the announcement of that first workshop and the original intent of the meeting. The first call, prepared in essence by our permanent, to date, chair, Professor Dave Davis, and blessed by the organizing committee, read, in part: “A workshop is planned to highlight and share analysis techniques and methods, including simulation techniques, useful for the study of and training for present and future operations in which military forces might be used...The Workshop will provide a forum for detailed presentation of theory and potential applications of new techniques and methods...” You immediately note the absence of the phrases ‘peace operations’ or ‘peacekeeping.’ That absence did not stop Professor Davis, in his remarks introducing the proceedings of that first meeting, from saying, about my keynote address: “Gene Visco from the United States Department of the Army presented the Key Note [sic] address on the Future of Analysis. Gene’s paper reminded us that science has contributed to war for centuries, and that it was time that science contributed to peace with the same level of effort.”

I said no such thing. The penultimate section of my paper was the meat of my preaching; it was titled “Unexpected Environments, Non-Traditional Forces, and New Missions and Concepts of Operation” (the last section was a Summary). In that penultimate portion I said, in part: “This rather abrupt change from the unitary scenario to the multiple scenarios leaves military operations research somewhat in the lurch...We have become accustomed to stability of assumptions about the nature of future conflict, the general description and capability of presumed enemy forces, and even the geography over which we might be expected to fight. Our models and associated analytical processes were geared to that stability. We are now being called upon to address a much more confusing set of problems: unexpected environments, non-traditional forces, new missions and concept of operation. Our data bases are limited or non-existent.”

“Most of our models are inappropriate for the new arena. And, once again, we are being called upon, particularly by the combatant commands’ Commanders in Chief, for rapid responses to fast-breaking problems affecting force design and sizing and even tactics. The present conflict description consists primarily of small friendly forces, often widely deployed; it involves the threat of force (both lethal and non-lethal) with weapons, although almost always at hand, often not used or with serious restrictions affecting use. Death and injuries to friendly personnel are high likely but possibly only few in number spread over extensive periods of time, perhaps reflective of US Army experiences on the American frontier during the 1850 [sic; should have been 1860] to 1895 period in our history. Can we analysts rise to the occasion of this complex world?”

“Not the least of the difficulties with the multiple scenario world are descriptions and definitions...There are on-going attempts to develop taxonomies, to reduce communication difficulties and enhance understanding. The attempts are commendable and should continue

until there is widespread agreement and acceptance. Until that time comes, it is contingent upon all of us to take care with our language and define, as precisely as we can, the topics we discuss and write about. We should eschew simplistic phrases, grasped because they sound good, are terse and are amenable to popular acronym development. Any descriptive terms should pass a clarity test: is it reasonably unambiguous and exclusive? If it is not both, it should be rejected and not promulgated, even casually.”

The “Summary” section continued: “The one word that summarizes the multiple scenarios world is uncertainty. For those of us interested and involved in military analytic problems, that word is a far cry from the description of the first 45 years following World War II. It is a disturbing word. But, it is also an exciting world. If our practice had come into its own in the period between The Great War and World War II we might be far more familiar with uncertainty. For that period, at least until the late 1930s, was also a period of multiple scenarios. They were well-addressed, considering the tools of the time, by the ‘Color’ and later the ‘Rainbow’ Plans of the Joint Planning Staff (US Army and Navy). Perhaps we can look to that period for our inspiration. Our efforts at this workshop, and others that will follow, focused on raising new analysis banners, can benefit, at least morally, from that earlier period, because it truly was a successful period for those small (analysis) planning staffs. Their work led directly to the development of the major war plans for fighting and defeating the Axis Powers of World War II. Our invocation, then, should be: Let us be as successful!”

CORNWALLIS II, 1997

Cornwallis II (perhaps more precisely named Cornwallis I for reasons already mentioned) had as its title and theme: “Analysis For and Of the Resolution of Conflict.” Prof. Davis continued to provide the clarity of what we were all about in his remarks accompanying the proceedings of that meeting. He said, in part, “The original intents of the group [what became known as the Cornwallis Group] were to: 1. Study analytic techniques that were useful in the analysis of non-warfighting military operations; and 2. To spend sufficient time on each of these techniques to truly understand their nature.” I question the introduction of the ‘non-warfighting’ qualification, since, as noted, that qualification does not appear in the announcement of the formation of the symposia, at the outset. However, let us not nitpick away at our chair’s position.

Although not so designated in the proceedings proper, Professor Davis referred to Peter Anderson’s paper (the first item in the proceedings and the talk that opened Cornwallis II) as the keynote address. Anderson’s paper is titled “Military Operations Research and Canadian Forces Peacekeeping Operations.” At the time, P. R. Anderson was Director General, Operations Research, at the National Defence Headquarters, in Ottawa. In the Chairman’s Opening Remarks (Proceedings), Professor Davis quoted Peter: “We are much better at suppressing conflict than resolving it...” and concluded that the work at the second Cornwallis supports that observation. Peter’s address served the defined objective of a keynote presentation by providing a direction or a goal for the symposium, at least in part.

The paper, as stated in the Introduction to it, “...describes the extent of Canadian Forces involvement in Peacekeeping types of operation since the nineteen fifties. The paper then provide [sic] some examples of the operational research done in support of these operations

over the years. Finally, the paper discusses some of the analytical concerns and difficulties in applying combat analysis model [sic] and techniques to operations that are essentially deterrent in nature, where it is not intended that the combat capability of the peacekeeping forces actually be employed.”

The body of the paper does a good job of covering the recent history of Canadian forces in peace support operations and the supporting operations analysis by the Canadian group. It is in Anderson’s concluding remarks (“Summary and Issues for Analysts”) that we find the keynote contributions. In part: “...During the latter half of the Cold War, military operational research developed detailed and comprehensive models to analyze in depth combat issues in well understood strategic and tactical scenarios, taking full advantage of the incredible increases in computing power. [At this point, there is reference to Figure 14. The reference seems to me to be incorrect, as Figure 14, titled ‘Operational Research issues’, is more relevant to following parts of the summary. More on Figure 14 information later.] The last few years have changed the problems, and made it clear that some of our big models are not as flexible or as responsive as we now need. In a very fundamental sense, we have gone back to the original nature of operational research where the early practitioners really did apply the scientific method to the examination of operational problems. We need to relearn the art of observation and the use of sparse, not entirely satisfactory, but nevertheless, real data to model actual operations...peace support operations are not hypothetical and as analysts we need perhaps to get back to the basics. Peace support operations need to be better understood by the analyst, and the basic elements identified.”

[Here I note is a more useful introduction of Figure 14, which lists five issues, as follows:

- Is there really a military operations analysis problem?
- Understanding the basic elements of PSO
- Soft MOEs (e.g., Presence, Deterrence, Normality indicators, MIST)
- Implications of ROEs
- Many sided, Many objectives, Many value sets, Many time scales.]

Continuing with Peter’s summary: “...Peacekeeping is not as dangerous nor such a stress...as combat, but is just as complex. Rules of engagement often mean that full capabilities cannot be used, and measures of success are not easily defined nor easily quantified. The operations are seldom the two sided duels that combat models can handle, but involve increasingly many direct and indirect participants each with a different agenda, different time scales and cultural values.” The summary goes on to suggest the possibility that model hierarchies used for combat analysis may be useful in analyzing peace support operations. Peter then says: “This would get us a step or two along the road to addressing the theme of this year’s Cornwallis symposium. But it would not address the fundamental issues, which may be beyond the reach of the analyst. In looking at the UN operations over the years, I was struck in part by the success in damping down combat and the effectiveness in stepping between parties who are tired of fighting, but I was also struck by the lack of true resolution of conflict. Our real concerns perhaps should not be with the peace support operation itself in a military sense, but also with the much broader political, diplomatic and social aspects of real and lasting conflict resolution.”

Much of Peter’s key directions to us mirror the fine (modestly stated) first keynote address. His final points of direction are more indicative of the subsequent emphases of following Cornwallis symposia, as we see in later remarks of this paper.

CORNWALLIS III, 1998

The third Cornwallis meeting (I will not continue the re-numbering of the symposia against the tidal flow but will accept the revisionism that results in the meeting of 1996, prior to the establishment of the Cornwallis Group, being designated Cornwallis I) resulted in an identified keynote address. The speaker was Vincent P. Roske, Jr., at that time Deputy Director, J8, The Joint Staff, The Pentagon, Washington, DC. The address by Vince was titled “Quick Response Analysis for the Future Joint Environment.”

In his introduction to the proceedings, Chairman Davis specified that the theme of the symposium was “Analysis for Peace Operations” and that the construct of the meeting included sessions on Peace Making, Peace Building, and Peace Support, with appropriate definitions following the lead of the UN. Prof. Davis went on to say: “Cornwallis III represented a breaking out for most of us. The first two workshops were interesting and productive, yet the real cutting edge had not been found. During CIII, we began to define what that edge might look like. It appears to be some melding of the various disciplines called Operations Research and Conflict Resolution along with the older views of the world held in Anthropology and Sociology. For the first time in the sequence we were finally able to bring some of the other disciplines to the floor and to begin to deal with the similarities and differences.” With respect to the Roske address, Dave said: “...Mr. Roske lead with a clear discussion of the changing role of analysis within the United states Joint Staff. The need to prepare the staff and the various commanders to deal with situations that are as much political and they are military—as much humanitarian as they are military—and as much confused as they are military—these were the themes that were presented and helped to key the remainder of the workshop.”

The text of the Roske paper, prepared for the proceedings, differs somewhat from that presented at the symposium. Roske was assisted in preparing the paper for publication by ‘Ted’ Woodcock, co-chair of the symposium and senior editor of the proceedings. I believe the support to Vince was to insure that the paper would be prepared in a timely fashion for publication in the proceedings. The published paper is extensive, consisting of the following major sections and subsections (listed in parentheses): Future Military Force Structuring and Emerging Conflict Provide New Modeling Challenges (The Challenge: The United States’ National Military Strategy Demands Dynamic Analysis; Meeting the Challenge; The Defense Analysis Community Has Become Dangerously Model Centric); Making Studies More Relevant (What’s the Question? And What’s the Real Question?; What Do the Final Slides Look Like?; What Do I Already Know?; How Do I Get the Remaining Information I Need?; Collaboration Can Help Make Analysis Relevant); Planning and Analysis Tools Should be Built for Real Customers with Real Needs; Analysis and Planning Capabilities Must Support Future Operations; Integrated Collaborative Analysis and The Nimble Dancer Wargame; The Anchor Desk Experiment Concept (Initial Operational Definition; A Change in Operational Focus Can Be Caused by Changes in Societal Conditions); A Dynamic Commitment Force Allocation Game Supported the Quadrennial Defense Review; and Summary. The paper must be read in its entirety to see the relationships among the analytic tools and methods cited by Roske and the needs of joint analysis in the US military context.

The Summary provides the direction of the keynote: “The challenges placed upon the Military Operations analysis community today are vastly more complex and dynamic than [sic; the word is ‘than’] those during the Cold War. Operations Other Than War, OOTW,

dominate national security planning. ‘Engagement’ has become the center piece of the Military Strategy. Technology and asymmetries impact on timelines that are vastly shorter than they were just 5 or 10 years ago. Decision-makers need insights in this complex and rapidly changing environment, and they need them on short notice. The issues today are so complex, vast in scope, and dynamic that it is impossible to establish and maintain in one staff the expertise needed for responsive analyses support.”

“The role of the analyst has become one of gathering stakeholders, decision makers and the appropriate expertise into analysis formats than [sic; the word is ‘that’] can rapidly frame and assess these issues. Analysis has become a ‘cultural’ activity conducted in a continuum of interactions between the dynamic OOTW security environments, finding and applying expertise appropriate to address the issues of the moment, and the short lead times available for preparing the quantitative basis supporting the issue assessment. In this environment, the analyst is no longer the subject area expert he may once have been. He must be a master of methodology. The analyst is becoming a conductor; organizing and guiding decision makers, subject experts, and stakeholders, along a disciplined path to insight.”

CORNWALLIS IV, 1999

Cornwallis IV, “Analysis of Civil-Military Interactions,” ushered in a continuing topic of interest to the Cornwallis Group and flavored future meetings. It also ushered in a symposium characteristic intermittently followed in subsequent meetings: the use of two keynote addresses, one civilian and one military. The civilian keynote presentation was by Alex Morrison, then President of the Pearson Centre, and was titled “Civil-Military Interactions”; the paper as published in the proceedings, is co-authored by Christine Vroom, from the office of the Director of the Pearson Centre.

Alex posed four questions at the outset of his talk and then proceeded to provide some answers:

- Is the international community developing a new international security, conflict resolution, peacekeeping paradigm? If that is so, what are some of the events that are causing a change?
- Will the United Nations be replaced by one or more other international, but not universal, organizations in the field of peace, security and stability?
- If there is a new paradigm, what will be its shaped and methods of operation?
- What are some of the realities we must bear in mind when considering these questions?

In the summing up section of the paper, Alex says: “...we have posed a number of questions that need to be answered if we are to ensure an orderly modification of the current international security, conflict resolution, peacekeeping paradigm or an orderly transition to a completely new paradigm” thereby implying that he had not fully answered his four initial questions. He goes on to propose “an arrangement by means of which these questions and others of importance to the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, and we hope, to the Cornwallis Group, might be answered: We feel that there is a natural affinity between the Cornwallis Group and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. We would like to propose a formal cooperative arrangement between the two organizations. The PPC, from time to time, has a requirement

for answers to questions of a theoretical and conceptual nature in order to evaluate and assess our current programmes and ensure we offer material of cutting edge material. We do hope that the members of the Cornwallis Group will see fit to respond positively.” How did the Cornwallis Group respond?

As noted earlier, Cornwallis IV introduced an idea that has become, more or less, a tradition for subsequent symposia: two keynote addresses, one from a civilian perspective and the other from a military perspective. The military address was presented by Joseph W. Kinzer, Lieutenant General, US Army, retired. [The paper, as published in the proceedings was co-authored by Ted Woodcock, previously noted as editor and co-chair of the Cornwallis Group.] Joe’s focus was on the UN mission in Haiti, subtitled “In the Service of Peace.” Joe had the dual responsibilities of Force Commander, United Nations Forces and Commander, US Forces in Haiti from January 1995 to March 1996, so he knows from whence he speaks on the subject of Haiti.

General Kinzer emphasized the importance of understanding the culture and history of the community in which the peace operation is conducted, a point repeated and re-emphasized by many since Cornwallis IV and at many other recent fora. Further and somewhat at variance with others, particularly political leaders, Joe did not highlight force protection as the most important objective of the commander in a peace support operation. He did indicate that force protection was a high priority objective, but pointed out that military forces are created with an eye towards being in “harm’s way”, that is, there is risk involved in every military operation and troops and commanders are fully aware of the risks they take in carrying out their missions. They cannot do their jobs properly if they are consumed with the task of protecting themselves. Another piece of advice coming from Gen. Kinzer related to shaping the military force for the peace support mission; force capabilities are defined by the military dimensions of supportability, acceptability and feasibility.

CORNWALLIS V, 2000

Cornwallis V, designated “Analysis for Crisis Response and Societal Reconstruction” continued the trend of dealing with peace support and related topics, now including post-conflict matters and increased emphasis on relationships among the various participants, to wit: military, non-governmental organizations (NGO), civilian government agencies (US and ‘host’ country), and private volunteer organizations (PVO) [parenthetically, the distinction between NGO and PVO is unclear to this writer, although one can presume that NGO includes profit firms acting on contract in the ‘host’ country, carrying out functions assigned at earlier times to military and perhaps civilian government agencies].

Alex Morrison, President of the Pearson Centre, the first home for the Cornwallis Group, was invited to prepare a foreword for the proceedings of Cornwallis V, as he had also done for the first Cornwallis proceedings. His remarks were positive indeed. Among other things, he said: “The Cornwallis Group has achieved success. It could stop now. With four meetings and published proceedings—it has made a noteworthy contribution. But, I do not think that would be characteristic of this dynamic Group. They are doers. Over the five years, the Group has maintained its independence. Sponsored by no organization, no government or agency, no university or any other such organization, the Cornwallis Group has been free to develop its own agenda.”

“At the five year mark, we can look back and we can look ahead. As I look back to the first Cornwallis Group meeting of 1996, *Analytic Approaches to the Study of Future Conflict*, I recall that I was requested to write the forward [sic] to those proceedings. I wrote of how history and the news of the day were ‘full of the difficulties inherent in implementing current operations.’ I told of how peacekeeping was complex and how it requires the ‘orchestrated interplay of many operations and organizations.’ Some things have not changed. The same is true today.”

“For the future, may there be many more Cornwallis Group meetings! It is imperative that we—all as members of the New Peacekeeping Partnership—continue to work together, that we continue to explore new avenues or [the word probably should have been ‘of’] research and understanding. The Cornwallis Group, as an international group of scientists, mathematicians, military personnel, humanitarians and diplomats, is to be congratulated for its efforts and we are honored to have them convene annually at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre...”

Heady words indeed, of keynote quality and substance.

The keynote address at Cornwallis V was delivered by Major General John Drewienkiewicz, CB CMG, Royal College of Defence Studies, United Kingdom. A unifying issue at Cornwallis V was Kosovo and General DZ (as he designated himself) discussed the Kosovo mission from the UN perspective. I note, in passing, as with the keynote paper presented in the proceedings of Cornwallis III, senior editor and co-chairman of the meeting Ted Woodcock assisted the General in preparing the paper for publication. The keynote paper was titled “Getting Missions Started.”

The major parts of the paper were designated as: Introduction; Background to the Establishment of the Kosovo Verification Mission; Processes for Setting Up Missions Have Evolved; The Mandate Defines the Key Features of a Mission; Training Can Determine Mission Success; Operational Strategies and the Command and Control of Missions; and Conclusions. One chart, in the penultimate section of the paper, has lasting value to the readers. Figure 24 is titled “Lessons learned can provide guidance for future operations.” The ‘lessons learned’ [we now realize that the phrase ‘lessons learned’ is inappropriate; what passes for lessons learned are ‘observations made’; lessons are not learned until behavior changes or behaviors are confirmed] are:

- Easier to expand rather than re-structure a structure
- Staff planning capacity is a limited resourced
- Headquarters can be formed and trained in 90 days if efforts are sequenced gradually
- Modules are better than individuals
- Don’t re-equip as the force is being deployed
- Infiltration is preferable to a ‘Big Bang’
- In an alliance, everything takes longer

The General’s conclusions read, in part: “...It is important to note that if a commander...has not decided where to accept less than perfect solutions, events will overtake an organization and it will be forced to accept compromises in areas that have not been considered. It is important to distinguish between short-term and long-term decisions. The need to act quickly can limit future actions and will force compromises to be made. And

the essential components of the mandate of a mission, the necessary mix of military and civilian participants, and their levels of specialization should be established as soon as possible.”

This keynote was more in the notion of a blueprint or guidance for peace support operations than it was as a clarion call for the symposia.

[Cornwallis V was also the beginning to an attempt to respond to the keynote of Alex Morrison at Cornwallis IV. A draft research program was proposed and evaluated.]

CORNWALLIS VI, 2001

The title and hence the theme for Cornwallis VI was “Analysis for Assessment, Evaluation and Crisis Management.” In his introduction to the proceedings, Dave Davis did a masterful job of tersely summing up the previous Cornwallis meetings, as a review—the question beginning to be raised in discussions was whether there was a continuing need for the Cornwallis Group or had it done what it intended to do at the outset.

Dave said, in a significant paragraph: “The first workshop concentrated on new techniques for new types of conflict. Attending were military analysts, military operators, and one representative of a Non-Governmental Organization, World Vision International. Although the attendees were representative of six different nations, the overwhelming majority were from military backgrounds. The topics were, however, more broad and delved into what we now call Peace Operations. Cornwallis [II] was another step in our evolution. The theme for the second workshop was *Analysis for and of the Resolution of Conflict*. Here we added some conflict resolution professionals and more Non-Governmental Organizations, however, the majority remained military analysts. Cornwallis III, *Analysis for Peace Operations*, and Cornwallis IV, *Analysis of Civil-Military Interactions*, marked further evolutions of the Group. During Cornwallis IV, a research agenda was developed and is still being used today in several places. From the Civil-military Interaction workshop of 1999 we moved to *Cornwallis V: Analysis for Crisis Response and Societal Reconstruction*. The Group reached a level of analytic focus that was unique. Still with a majority of military analysts, an increasing number of analysts and operators from the civilian professions have been attending and presenting major papers.”

Dave went on, in his review of Cornwallis VI: “The Key Note presentation for this conference was given by Lieutenant General Manfred Eisele, retired from the German Army. General Eisele had been most recently to his retirement, an Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. His presentation, titled: *Peace Operations and Humanitarian Interventions in a Time of Change* was the central theme for the remainder of the workshop. His presence and interventions during the workshop were greatly appreciated and brought a wealth of information to the discourse...” After an introduction, the major sections of General Eisele’s presentation were: Rwanda; Somalia; Former Yugoslavia; Robust Peacekeeping; Lessons Learned?; Civilian Police; Modesty as Principle of Peacekeeping; International Law; and Fourth Generation Peace Operations.

A particularly relevant point was made toward the end of the paper: “For the Security Council it will be an extremely difficult challenge to balance Article 2’s principle of territorial integrity and state sovereignty against the increasing importance of the universal validity of human rights” [a point that I have raised on many occasions]. Further: “It must be feared that the Westphalian Order of 1648 with its predominance of government authority and the eternal character of territorial integrity over the basic rights of citizens will prevail once more. Neither China, who is afraid that any weakening of that principle might question the Chinese treatment of Tibet, nor the Russian Federation, whose dealings with quite a number of small peoples in the Caucasus striving for autonomy, if not independence from Moscow, is equally questionable, will support the universal rule of a Western understanding of human rights. International humanitarian intervention may therefore see an uncertain future.”

CORNWALLIS VII, 2002

The title for Cornwallis VII was “Analysis for Compliance and Peace Building”. It is useful to recall that Cornwallis VII was the first Cornwallis Group symposium following the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001. To a considerable extent, the world had changed from Cornwallis VI to Cornwallis VII.

The introductory remarks and greetings were provided by Sandra Dunsmore, the new President of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. Among her opening comments were: “...Peace operations today are multidisciplinary, complex and increasingly dangerous endeavors. The clear lines that existed during the era of classical peacekeeping have become quite blurred. Today when we refer to Peace Building, we recognize that peace is much more than the absence of war. Our sense of **what** we are attempting to do has changed. We recognize that peace is something that must be constructed, and, like any construction job, it requires blueprints, skilled professionals and craftspeople, resources and coordination.”

“...I came to understand the importance of reflecting on the question of **who**. There are clearly two categories of who—the international community on the one hand, and local, national, and in some cases, regional actors on the other. If ‘peace’ is to be sustainable, it cannot be imposed from the outside. The protagonists of the design, planning and implementation process need to be those most directly affected by the outcome. The role of the international community becomes one of creating the enabling conditions. The toll in human suffering in regions torn by conflict is enormous. The existence of a peace instrument provides a window of opportunity. If adequate support is not provided in a timely fashion, that window can close.”

This Cornwallis meeting re-introduced the dual keynotes. The first was by Dame Margaret J. Anstee from the UK; Dame Margaret spent 41 years in the UN, reaching the position of Under Secretary General. Her paper was comprised of: Introduction; Inter-State vs. Intra-State Conflict; Basic Ingredients to Ensure Compliance (The Terms of Peace Accords or Cease-Fire; The Authority and Strength of the International Force or Presence; Powers of Persuasion and Communication); Inducements to Promote Compliance and Sustainable Peace; Penalties for Breach of Compliance; Regional Aspects; and Conclusions.

The concluding remarks summarize the essence of the presentation: “Compliance can only be assured through complementary civilian and military action and close cooperation between the two. Peace accords and cease-fire agreements must be carefully negotiated, for they constitute the essential groundwork for the whole peace process and an objective international organization, such as the UN or OSCE, should participate in their formulation, particularly if they are to be called upon to monitor or supervise their implementation. To encourage compliance there must be carrots as well as sticks. This is why peacebuilding is so important and the prospect of a tangible peace dividend in the form of greater security, democratic institutions, and systems of justice and, above all, better conditions of living, can act as a powerful enticement for national reconciliation.”

“The great spoiler in these peace processes is invariably political expediency, whether on the part of the main antagonists or, more generally, on that of the international community, including the UN Security Council. And when there is an unlimited lust for power on the part of any of the main protagonists in the conflict then the scales are heavily weighted against any peace support operation, however carefully planned and implemented. In summary, compliance and peace building are two sides of the same coin and must be pursued jointly.”

The second keynote was by Ambassador Robert W. (Bill) Farrand; Bill had 36 years of service with the US Foreign Service (serving at embassies in Kuala Lumpur, Moscow, Prague, and Port Moresby; Deputy Commandant for International Affairs, Industrial College of the Armed Forces; and a last assignment before joining the faculty at the George Mason University was Supervisor of the Bosnian city of Brcko). Bill’s paper was “Brcko, Crucible of Peace in the Balkans.”

From that keynote paper: “I am indebted to Professor Dave Davis for favoring me with an invitation to speak to you today about my experiences as practitioner and implementer of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia. For more than three years, from 1997 to 2000, I served in Bosnia and Herzegovina as supervisor of the strategic city of Brcko and, simultaneously, as Deputy High Representative for Bosnia’s northern sector. In truth, however, the first role far outweighed the latter as I struggled day-to-day with realities on the ground.”

The paper was a detailed history of Farrand’s work in Bosnia, with focus on Brcko. His final paragraphs are most significant. Speaking of the development of laws, after an extended period of lawlessness: “As consumers and investors, can you imagine a world without contracts? A world where there’s nowhere to turn—except to the gun—to resolve commercial conflicts? How, in such a world, could you as, say, supervisor of Brcko, hope to lure entrepreneurs, domestic or foreign, to come and risk their capital by investing in or starting up enterprises in your new District. And unless you are able, at some point, to attract such private capital you will be forever dependent upon foreign assistance to rebuild the community. But that is the road to nowhere...So you will need a transport [sic; should the word be transparent?] system of law to sustain the private investment that will be essential to the creation of wealth and sustainable employment.”

“The Presiding Arbitrator, Roberts Owen, wrote into the Final Award’s operating Annex [issued in August 1999] a requirement that the Supervisor establish a multiethnic commission to harmonize the laws of the two entities for application in the new District. The BLRC [Brcko Law Revision Commission] was headed by a respected international jurist and staffed by qualified legal and juridical representatives from Bosnia, two from each ethnic faction—

Serb, Croat, Bosniac—as well as a staff of western lawyers skilled in drafting legislation. The US Government funded the BLRC at a tab of \$500,000 per year, an enormous bargain for what it delivered.”

“The executive director of the BLRC has now issued his final report. The BLRC drafted over forty laws, numerous by-laws and regulations, and oversaw the stem-to-stern reform of Bosnia’s judiciary. Such an advance in the Rule of Law has taken place nowhere else in Bosnia. One American investor from Chicago has taken a chance on Brcko by opening a cement block factory there. That’s a start.”

“The BLRC model might well be studied for possible application in other post-conflict peace operations, including in Afghanistan. I regret to report, however, that the BLRC itself was dismantled last October on budgetary grounds.”

CORNWALLIS VIII, 2003

“Analysis for Governance and Stability” was the title and the theme for Cornwallis VIII, unexpectedly the last (thus far) Cornwallis meeting to be held at the Pearson Centre. Two keynotes were planned but one keynoter, Ambassador Tim Carney was deployed to Iraq, as the war began just before the opening of Cornwallis VIII. The other keynote speaker was Major General Lindström. Breaking the formal requirement for a keynote address to set the stage for symposium, this keynote was delivered not at the outset of the meeting. Major General Anders Lindström is Commander of the Swedish Home Guard and served most recently as the senior Swedish Military Representative at US Central Command Headquarters.

The paper, presented in the proceedings, is co-authored by editor Ted Woodcock, assisting General Lindström. The paper is titled “Governance and Stability” and includes a review of the general’s experience at Central Command. The sections of the paper consist of: Deployment to CENTCOM Headquarters; Influences Appearing to Affect United States Policy; Operation Enduring Freedom (Activities in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom; Selected Activities During Operation Enduring Freedom); Using the Strategic Management System (STRATMAS) to Support Planning and Deployment; and Discussion. Woodcock incorporated the 18 slides that the general used in his presentation into the published paper.

Among other observations, General Lindström said: “These experiences have also demonstrated the critical need to develop comprehensive long-term strategies to address both the relatively short-term military needs of a situation as well as the longer-term needs of the wider society. Dominating military forces are clearly needed to support military operations, but less robust military forces, and even civilian police can be far more appropriate in low-threat situations involving some form of complex humanitarian emergency. Balancing the troops to the tasks at hand requires detailed planning that could be supported by an enhanced version of the Strategic Management System (STRATMAS).”

“In order to succeed, complex operations must involve extensive collaboration and cooperation between participants before, during, and after deployment. Establishment of a clear, unambiguous, chain of command with a single overall commander is also of critical importance. Rules of engagement that promote commander initiative in new and emerging

conflict situations are also necessary. New methods for modeling military and civilian activities within an overall societal framework and the collection and display of operationally-important data can provide military leaders and their operational planning staffs with significant advantages. Such advantages include the ability to assess the impact of proposed courses of action against different types and combinations of adversarial forces and actions, for example.”

CORNWALLIS IX, 2004

This symposium broke the mold of holding sessions at the Pearson Centre; Cornwallis IX was held in Stadt Schlailing, Austria, in an unsuccessful attempt to increase participation of European analysts; all we succeeded in doing was losing the Canadian participation. Two keynotes were presented, a military and civilian speaker. Through the kind offices of editor Ted Woodcock, I was able to access the two presentations prior to publication of the proceedings of Cornwallis IX. The military keynote was delivered by Colonel Karl Ernst Graf Strachwitz with the intriguing title “Does the Defense of Europe Start on the Foothills of the Hindukush?” The civilian keynote was by Dayton Maxwell, a strong representative of the NGO community and heavy contributor to Cornwallis Group activities. Dayton’s presentation, also in the form of a question, was “Are We Reaching the Threshold to Overcome the Obstacles for Effective CIV-MIL Cooperation Toward Mission Achievement? “

Graf Strachwitz is an officer in the German general staff, who had just completed a tour of duty as the Military Assistant to the NATO Commander of the ISAF forces in Kabul, Afghanistan. He entered the German army in 1974 as a conscript, went to Officer Candidate School and moved up the ranks.

From the abstract of the keynote address I quote the following, which partially summarizes the presentation:

“Achieving security and stability in Afghanistan will largely depend on the following:

- Being trustworthy to our commitment. In order to remain trustworthy in this dynamic environment the international community must follow-up with actions to the spoken words. Special support is required when considering the upcoming elections that were stipulated in the Petersberg (Bonn, Germany) Accords. Time is running out.
- The expansion of ISAFs area of responsibility must be accelerated. The Planning of this expansion of the area of responsibility should coincide with the expectations of the Afghan population. These expectations are: The efforts of US led coalition forces must be effective in countering the terrorist threat. The mission of the international community is to rebuild the country but at the same time giving their neighboring countries an Afghanistan with stable and reliable structures. The presence of ISAF is steadily gaining in importance especially when considering the complex political and geographic situation as the central government is expanding its influence to other regions within this country.

- Flexibility of strategy. The participating nations supporting the ISAF mission must supply the required forces and materiel (even though the budgets may be very tight) in order to achieve the goals set forth in the Petersberg (Bonn, Germany) Accords. Recent developments have clearly shown that the war on the drug trafficking has taken the top priority. The reason for this priority change has been the rapid improvements within the remaining security sector which includes the following:
 - > Build-up of the Afghan National Army.
 - > Build-up police forces.
 - > Disarmament and reintegration of former combatants.
 - > Establishment of legal- and governmental structures.

“The worries of the members of the United Nations is justifiable if the drug trafficking issue would not be addressed because it would enhance the build-up of further criminal structures and those elements which will use the profits from drug trafficking to finance terrorist activities. The implementation of a unilateral strategy for the stabilization of Afghanistan is in many respects a race with time, which the United Nation and NATO must win.”

Graf Strachwitz concluded his remarks with: “ISAF under NATO command has had a significant impact, even though the biggest challenges still lie ahead.”

“It was determined: ISAF is not considered as an occupational force, moreover a unanimous consensus exist for ISAF to rapidly expand its operational area within Afghanistan. The PRT–Concept seems to be the most appropriate vehicle, besides offering reconstruction, humanitarian aid and promoting the influence of the central government power in achieving this goal. The demobilization of militias must be closely coordinated with the accelerated build–up of the new Afghan army, but also the operations of O.E.F. and ISAF must be considered as complimentary operations. These are reasons enough to call for the development of a master reconstruction plan for the continuing development of Afghanistan. The international Anti–Drug–Conference and the Conference of the supporting countries are prove [sic; proof?] that despite the strong focus on IRAQ the international community has not lost site [sic; sight?] of Afghanistan.”

“The framework for an increased engagement is better than ever. It is important to strongly support the present dynamic political climate in Afghanistan, and this seems to be supported by the NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer, who clearly stated, that his main effort will lie in operations in Afghanistan. In a meeting of political leaders of NATO countries, which is to be held in Istanbul, will show a road map of their long term commitment for the political design process.”

“Ultimately, the NATO engagement in Afghanistan will be a measure of the commitment and perseverance to act upon on the agreed transformations within the alliance as stated in the NATO summit meeting in Prague. By accepting the ISAF operation, NATO's credibility and relevancy are at stake.”

The civilian keynoter, Mr. Maxwell is currently (2001-2004) a Senior Advisor in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). He is part of a USAID initiative to promote Conflict Management and Mitigation. His presentation provided the following: “The

common denominator to all that we do in response to crises is the bottom line in the title above – MISSION ACHIEVEMENT. Our various experiences have demonstrated that each of us can accomplish our tasks – humanitarian assistance, establishing security, forming a new government, restoring essential services – and we frequently perform these tasks with highly effective civil-military cooperation. But our experiences are also demonstrating that we're not achieving our MISSION, that the whole isn't greater than the sum of its parts. Why not? Somalia and Haiti are not resolved. Troops are still deployed in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. What are the obstacles and how do we overcome them? We've been hopeful before, and were disappointed. Do the current institutional efforts now being undertaken offer a more realistic hope that we're at the threshold of overcoming the obstacles?"

"Any attempt to dis-aggregate the issues risks falling into the conventional trap of focusing on the parts to the detriment of the whole. Yet it is necessary to perform some kind of deductive thinking which examines the parts. Here's one list of obstacles:

- The tension between political imperatives and realistic time frames to accomplish mission objectives.
- Falling short of achieving effective security capacity-building.
- Prioritization of use of limited resources heavily oriented toward the short-term.
- Inadequate civilian counterpart for the military's deliberate planning and expeditionary capability.
- Need for high degree of information control during preparations for crisis responses leading to limited interagency coordination.
- Integrated strategic planning for post-conflict actions not done alongside conflict planning.

"Is there a "threshold" to cross? In a recent conversation with a researcher at the Center for Naval Analysis I was told that 'the trouble with the military is that it has to measure everything'. The fact that there is no measurable 'threshold' to cross may be symptomatic of the civil-military cooperation issue. Diplomats are very reluctant to get tied down with plans that reduce their negotiation flexibility. Most diplomats saw the Dayton Accords as anathema to their style of operation, for example (while accepting its value as an important step forward at the time)."

"Yet events are transpiring (would "conspiring" be the more appropriate word?) to overcome some of the obstacles listed above. Here's what is happening in the United States on the obstacles listed above." Dayton went on to describe through a series of points progress or issues under the following headings: Tension on Timeframes; Establishing Stable Security; Civilian Planning and Expeditionary Capacities; Balancing Short-Term and Long-Term Priorities; Effective Interagency Coordination; Effective Civ-Mil Planning; and Summary – the Whole and the Parts.

"Note that this whole presentation is in the interrogative mode. One ingredient is not mentioned above, however. That is the need for effective teamwork. It is possible that all the elements mentioned in the previous paragraph can happen and the whole is still not greater than the sum of its parts. Team building efforts are often needed in industry, the government, the military and in NGOs. Doctrine can be written, standard operation procedures revised and refined, and mechanisms for coordination established, but if team-building for each new

crisis response is not done then the counterproductive turf issues can jeopardize the efforts. In Baghdad I often explained to visitors that the post-conflict operations for Iraq tended to be personality driven rather than effective teamwork based on good planning.”

“Are we on the threshold? Are we all working for faith-based organizations?”

SUMMARY, OBSERVATIONS, SUGGESTIONS

What are we to make of all this material. First, some mundane features. Our keynoters for the first nine Cornwallis symposia are described as one woman and 11 men; four were active civilian government employees, three were active serving military officers, three were retired civilians, two were retired military officers; and five were from the US, two each were from Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany, and one was from Sweden. Those are the demographics.

My interpretation of the talks, that is to say the emphases in the addresses, can be described as follows:

- Direct experience with specific peace operations (Haiti, Kosovo, Brcko, Afghanistan).
- Overall agency experiences and needs (operations research in Canada and in the US Joint Staff, and planning at US CENTCOM).
- New questions and proposals for action.
- Review of peace support operations with a focus on compliance.
- Humanitarian intervention.
- Military and civilian interactions, particularly in planning.
- Lessons to be drawn from the history of military analysis.

In summary, eight of the keynote addresses dealt directly with peace support operations and four with military agencies and analysis.

What other observations can I make? The first is that, following from the definitions stated in the first paragraphs of this paper, most of our keynote addresses were not keynotes. That suggests another observation: ‘Keynote’ itself may not be the most appropriate designation for invited addresses at Cornwallis symposia.

An observation stemming from the demographics for the first nine Cornwallis meetings is that the US has dominated (that may be too strong a word) by having too many of the keynote speakers from that country. In addition, the demographics also point to a far too heavy proportion of the keynote speakers being men.

Perhaps the most important observation I can make is that Cornwallis programs, with very few exceptions do not pick up input from previous keynote (however defined) addresses.

The suggestions follow directly from the observations. First, change the designation of the invited addresses to, perhaps, invited address! Alternatively, define for invited speakers the terms of a keynote address and ask for presentations that challenge and provide direction

to the subsequent meeting. This is a daunting task, I feel, and maybe only truly useful if Cornwallis takes on more of the character of workshops rather than symposia; that would be a radical change from the original intent but something that may be worth considering.

Another suggestion is to stress invitations to non-US speakers. There is a slight temporal trend observed; that is, non-US invited speakers appear in later rather than earlier meetings. Along with that suggestion is the obvious one of increasing the participation of women as invited speakers.

The final suggestion, related perhaps to the change of designation of the invited talks, is to make a more formal effort to use the products of the invited talks in planning and conducting subsequent Cornwallis sessions.