

# The Scroll and the Sword: Synergizing Civil-Military Power

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## ABSTRACT

Greater integration of all elements of national power is now indispensable to national and international security. This is driven by two strategic imperatives: one, the evolving non-state social-cultural strategic and operational environments of the 21<sup>st</sup> century; and two, the challenge to America's ability to continue to afford its longstanding predilection for ambitiously applied hard power as strategic resources become increasingly scarce. Failure to comprehend these imperatives, at many decision-making levels, can not only cost many lives. It can also cost immense amounts of political and economic capital, threatening to undermine long-term U.S. grand strategy. Recent policy initiatives reflect a nascent appreciation of the need to leverage softer, civil elements of national power, reposed in the interagency process and the private sector. However, a unifying concept to coalesce civil and military power has yet to find full articulation.

Many of the principles for this concept may be grounded, among other places, in the inherently strategic concepts of civil affairs/civil-military operations (CAO/CMO) as ways and strategic capabilities like civil affairs (CA) as a means – the only true operating concepts and capability the U.S. Government has to synergize civil-military power. At all levels and across the full range of operations, evolving CAO/CMO and CA are at the forefront of stability, transition to peace, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations. Meanwhile, demand for CA, itself in a state of dynamic change, has exhausted supply. Indeed, as the strategic and operational value of CAO/CMO and CA becomes more apparent, Joint and Army doctrines struggle to address environmental challenges and place CAO/CMO and CA

in appropriate context, while the CA force may already be broken. This study looks to identify that strategic context, a conceptual hierarchy, principles for synergizing civil and military elements of power, and specific recommendations with regard to civil-military ways and means.

## DISCLAIMER

Unless specifically referenced, the views expressed in this paper are strictly those of the author and do not represent any official opinion.

## INTRODUCTION

Greater integration of all elements of national power is now indispensable to national and international security. This is driven by two strategic imperatives: one, the evolving non-state social-cultural strategic and operational environments of the 21<sup>st</sup> century; and two, the challenge to America's ability to continue to afford its longstanding predilection for ambitiously applied hard power as strategic resources become increasingly scarce. Failure to comprehend these imperatives, at many decision-making levels, can not only cost many lives. It can also cost immense amounts of political and economic capital, threatening to undermine long-term U.S. grand strategy. Recent policy initiatives reflect a nascent appreciation of the need to leverage softer, civil elements of national power, reposed in the interagency process and the private sector. However, a unifying concept to coalesce civil and military power has yet to find full articulation. Many of the principles for this concept may be grounded, among other places, in the inherently strategic concepts of civil affairs/civil-military operations (CAO/CMO) as ways and strategic capabilities like civil affairs (CA) as a means – the only true operating concepts and capability the U.S. Government has to synergize civil-military power.

At all levels and across the full range of operations, evolving CAO/CMO and CA are at the forefront of stability, transition to peace, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations. Meanwhile, demand for CA, itself in a state of dynamic change, has exhausted supply. Indeed, as the strategic and operational value of CAO/CMO and CA becomes more apparent, Joint and Army doctrines struggle to address environmental challenges and place CAO/CMO and CA in appropriate context, while the CA force may already be broken. This study looks to identify that strategic context, a conceptual hierarchy, principles for synergizing civil and military elements of power, and specific recommendations with regard to civil-military ways and means.

Understanding civil-military power is not “thinking outside the box”. It's understanding the box in the first place. War and peace are part of the same policy continuum. All dimensions and elements of power count – at times some more than others, but in the end result, all. Long ago, Clausewitz described war as “...merely the continuation of policy by other means” (i.e., implying that war is not the only policy choice) and Liddell-Hart posited a century later that the “...object of war is to attain a better peace” (i.e., implying that war goes beyond war-fighting).<sup>1</sup> 21<sup>st</sup> century warfare, however, provides an opportunity for broader and more substantive understanding of these insights – a consciousness that transcends Sun

Tzu's dictum that "...to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill".<sup>2</sup> Applied national security strategy must now be at a previously unseen level of comprehensiveness, integration, and balance, from formulation through execution.

## STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES

America's need to better synchronize military and non-military (or civil) elements of power is evident in two strategic imperatives – the constraints of the changing strategic environment and the restraints of the increasing expensiveness of the prevailing American strategic culture. First, the strategic environment emerging in the 21<sup>st</sup> century calls for a more holistic, far-reaching and balanced applied grand strategy. National security issues since the end of the Cold War and especially 9/11 have been increasingly non-military, emanating mainly from the civil sector of society. Challenges such as ethnic and religious conflict, terrorism and insurgencies, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international organized crime, incidental and deliberate population migration, environmental instability, infectious diseases, and sharpening competition for dwindling natural resources are transforming hitherto orthodox notions of national security. Although nation-states retain the unique advantage of being able to coordinate and apply the full range of power elements, growing seams and actors between nation-states present increasing vulnerabilities and threats.

Within these non-state seams, however, are not only the greatest threats to national security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, but also the greatest opportunities, among them international governmental and non-governmental and private sector organizations, which have proliferated in number, variety, and capability. The United Nations and its agencies alone, for example, are far more capable at peace operations. UN peacekeeping missions are as robust a business as they were during their peak in the 1990s. A key recent development is the U.S.-inspired and supported Peace-Building Commission (PBC) as part of emerging UN reform. According to U.S. Ambassador to the UN John R. Bolton:

*Our common imperative is to create a cost-effective, efficient advisory institution, capable of ensuring the successful transition from peacekeeping operations into peace building, providing important advice but not duplicating work. The PBC can most effectively help prevent nations from sliding back into conflict by ensuring that the Security Council is aware of all the elements that are essential to achieving sustainable peace in a given nation, from immediate humanitarian assistance to transitional security to national efforts at institution building.*<sup>3</sup>

The growth of non-military (or civil) power alone stipulates more deliberate and skillful coordination of military and non-military power in more complex, multinational settings and in ways not yet entirely familiar to security policy elites. More operationally, the inflections of warfare in the 21<sup>st</sup> century are rapidly changing, beyond the predominance of the physical and information battlefields, to one of non-state social-cultural warfare:

*Victory will be defined more in terms of capturing the psycho-cultural rather than the geopolitical high ground. Understanding and empathy will be important weapons of war. Soldier conduct will be as important as skill at*

*arms. Culture awareness and the ability to build ties of trust will offer protection to our troops more effectively than body armor. Leaders will seek wisdom and quick but reflective thought rather than operational planning skills as essential intellectual tools for guaranteeing future victories.*<sup>4</sup>

New and re-emerging types of war such as stability and counterinsurgency operations involve a "...confluence of military and non-military operations... This requires an organization vested with the power to coordinate political, social, economic, and military elements".<sup>5</sup> "Asymmetric warfare" is seen as "...population centric; the population is the ultimate key to victory for both sides of the conflict".<sup>6</sup> "To be effective in this environment, combatant commanders require tools that are not only instruments of war, but implements for stability, security, and reconstruction in our global neighborhood."<sup>7</sup> And "...because insurgency is a holistic threat, counterinsurgency must be integrated and holistic".<sup>8</sup> Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, however, some transnational threats such as al-Qaeda are being understood as a "global insurgency" rather than a mere international terrorist network.<sup>9</sup> At the same time, due to a flattening, non-linear world, decision cycles have shrunk while interdependent second- and third-order effects gain new importance, pressuring leadership to anticipate change and shape events rather than be shaped by them. Thus, the margins of error are becoming too narrow, the consequences and stakes too high, and the opportunities too great to keep doing the business of national security as usual.

The second strategic imperative is related to the erosion of America's longstanding diplomatic, cultural, military, and economic advantages at least in relative terms, shrinking the strategic margin of error to a critical tipping point and restraining American strategic options and independence. Indeed, U.S. foreign policy in response to 9/11 has been ambitious, evoking thoughts of what historian Paul Kennedy called "imperial overstretch."<sup>10</sup> Moreover, America is entering a new era of relative strategic scarcity, where political, cultural, military and economic resources to shape and influence events more to its liking are less at its disposal. Even before 9/11 and its aftermath have more clearly shown, American (and Western) political, cultural, and economic values have not been as universally embraced as much as may have been thought. Unfortunately, the stalwart budget and efforts under Karen Hughes, Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, have done little to solve the issue of America's popular political image among publics especially in the Middle East.<sup>11</sup>

By a number of measures, America is a country of deepening public and private debt and declining competitiveness.<sup>12</sup> Beyond reducing America's throw-weight diplomatically, culturally and (of course) economically, this loss of relative commercial and financial power and independence will eventually translate into an end of clear U.S. military superiority. Asymmetric threats are already mitigating much of the longstanding U.S. advantage in hard power; but, as peer and near-peer competitors are better able to bankroll and technologically support force modernization in their own countries, and as information technologies and the lessons of low-tech, low-cost socio-cultural and information warfare in particular present equalizers to traditional, industrial-era technology-driven military power, it will become increasingly difficult for the U.S. to hold off challengers like China – to a good extent because the U.S. will owe these countries more and more for its debt coverage as well as find it hard to match their technical and manufacturing competence, of which some may translate into their own military power.

Traditional American bias towards coercive or “hard” power in general, albeit expedient and more measurable – and its ambitious, unilateral, pre-emptive employment of late – has also been not without issue and cost. Beyond missed opportunities for more effective integration of all elements of national power (especially informational), it presents often counterproductive costs and risks. International and domestic support for U.S. policies related to the War on Terrorism has been problematic, while America’s international standing and moral authority have been tenuous, encumbering newly energized diplomatic and information strategies. In addition, the U.S. continues to shoulder immense political and financial costs. War on Terrorism interventions have approached \$100-billion annually in mostly supplemental instruments for over five years, on top of programmed Defense outlays. In other words, America’s more ambitious application of its hard-power since 9/11 has already cost nearly a half-trillion dollars (not including hundreds of billions spent so far on homeland defense or an even the larger short and long term direct and indirect costs directly resulting from 9/11.) Given mounting fiscal pressures and competing domestic constraints, it is clear this largesse cannot go on much longer.

America’s preference for hard power is most reflected fiscally, most obviously between the budgets of the Defense and State Departments (the former about 30 times the latter). Even though foreign aid has expanded by 50% over the past two years, it is still only around \$20-billion.<sup>13</sup> Developmental funds under the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are about the same, while the Office of Transition Initiatives, which assists the critical transition between relief and reconstruction efforts, has operated on about \$5-million.<sup>14</sup> Unsurprisingly, soft power is diminutive in DoD – an organizational culture steeped in traditional American fascination with technology.<sup>15</sup> Under DoD’s \$7.6-billion FY05 Security Assistance Program, for example, less than \$90-million was devoted to International Military Education and Training (IMET), a key component of theater engagement strategies that generates large soft-power dividends due to relationships built among military leaders.<sup>16</sup>

Soft power (which is persuasive rather than coercive) is complementary to hard power. If appropriately accessed through the interagency process and from the private sector, where it largely finds itself, it can mitigate much of the costs and risks of war and help create opportunities for a more profitable peace. Hard power is more resource-intensive, zero-sum, and reactive. Soft power is more economical, renewable, and synergistic. It creates a more peaceful, stable and profitable international environment, has further-reaching effects, is less costly and risk-intensive, and introduces more feasible, acceptable, and sustainable strategic options.<sup>17</sup> As much as America’s hard-power approach to the War on Terror has alienated many Muslim populations, for example, military-led humanitarian efforts such as tsunami relief in Indonesia, earthquake relief in Pakistan, and ongoing development in Bangladesh have reversed the anti-Americanism there garnered more favorable public opinion towards the United States, as polls monitored by Terror Free Tomorrow have documented.<sup>18</sup> Perhaps most importantly, soft power can also be preventatively applied:

*Strengthening weak states against failure is far easier than reviving them after they have definitively failed or collapsed... Strengthening states prone to failure before they fail is prudent policy and contributes significantly to world order and to minimize combat casualties.... [T]his is far less expensive than reconstructing states after failure. Strengthening weak states also has the potential to eliminate the authority and power vacuums within which terror thrives.<sup>19</sup>*

## CLOSING THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAPS – RECENT INITIATIVES

The good news is that recent policy initiatives and programs to close civil-military, soft-hard imbalances at policy, interagency, and joint levels reflect recognition – at the “ends” and “ways” parts of the ends-ways-means paradigm of applied national security strategy – of the need to more adroitly bring together civil and military power. National security strategies, in their proliferation, are entailing a more holistic, balanced strategy involving greater use of civil and soft power. Of the eight “aims” of the *National Security Strategy*, for example, four are soft-power intensive, three are a combination of soft and hard power, and one is primarily related to hard-power.<sup>20</sup> Of the 27 recommendations of Congress’s *9/11 Commission Report*, one advocates the use of military force in direct action against terrorist organizations.<sup>21</sup> More is also being done to leverage the private sector.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation is exemplar of more savvy support to economic and business development,<sup>22</sup> along with the self-funding Overseas Private Investment Corporation and public-private initiatives such as “Open for Business” under the Department of Homeland Security. Since 9/11, initiatives to link the business and national security communities such as Business Executives for National Security (BENS) and the International Peace Operations Organization (IPOA) have taken on new, more powerful significance in “developing new tools to combat a category of new security threats that cannot be deterred or negotiated away”.<sup>23</sup>

There is also growing attention to improving the interagency process. Significant are the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* studies, which recommend the realization of an interagency concept of “unity of effort”:

*Complex U.S. contingency operations over the past decade, from Somalia to Iraq, have demonstrated the necessity for a unity of effort not only from the armed forces but also from across the U.S. government and an international coalition. In most cases, however, such unity of effort has proved elusive, sometimes with disastrous results. The U.S. national security apparatus requires significant new investments in this area. Otherwise, the United States’ ability to conduct successful political-military contingency operations will continue to be fundamentally impaired.*<sup>24</sup>

Other than Homeland Security, State and Defense are most involved in the interagency national security process. Under the “transformational diplomacy” concept promulgated in January 2006, the State Department is stirring to empower interagency cooperation:

*Vital to this vision is continued collaboration between civilians and the military. Diplomats must be able to work effectively at the critical intersections of diplomatic affairs, economic reconstruction, and military operations.*<sup>25</sup>

A month earlier, the White House issued National Security Presidential Directive 44, the long-awaited replacement of the Clinton Administration’s PDD-56. It tasks State, as the lead agency for interagency coordination and planning, to develop strategies and plans for reconstruction and stabilization as well as a civilian response capability through the Office of

the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).<sup>26</sup> An interesting implementing concept is the *Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation*, developed jointly between S/CRS and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), a model for strategic interagency planning coordination undergoing further revision and experimentation.<sup>27</sup> Given its small budget and limited personnel, however, it will take S/CRS some time to organize, be fully staffed and resourced, and gain institutional traction and muscle as a true means of coordinating civil-military power at the interagency level.

DoD, in contrast – as one could expect – has been much further along with regard to interagency cooperation. The Defense Secretary had already realized shortly after 9/11, that “...wars in the twenty-first century will increasingly require all elements of national power...”<sup>28</sup> Additionally, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff similarly instructed:

*We must harness the elements of national power to win the War on Terrorism... Through closer coordination within the Department of Defense and interagency we maximize the impact of our military power and build trust, synergy, and momentum. We will focus on a collaborative approach... building and enhancing interagency relationships. Look for ways that the military instrument – and the way it is applied – can complement and strengthen the actions of other elements of national power.*<sup>29</sup>

The Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006 recognizes the need for a formal strategic concept to synchronize civil and military power:

*The QDR recommends the creation of National Security Planning Guidance to direct the development of both military and non-military plans and institutional capabilities. The planning guidance would set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies. It would help Federal Departments and Agencies better align their strategy, budget and planning functions with national objectives.*<sup>30</sup>

DoD interagency coordination mechanisms are also more robust. This is framed in DoD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations” (SSTRO). Released a month before NSPD-44, it gives SSTRO priority comparable to combat operations and notes that “integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations”.<sup>31</sup> In addition:

*Whether conducting or supporting stability operations, the Department of Defense shall be prepared to work closely with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global and regional international organizations..., U.S. and foreign nongovernmental organizations..., and private sector individuals and for-profit companies.*<sup>32</sup>

Unfortunately, neither NSPD-44 nor DoDD 3000.05 “...explain how to conduct seamless transitions that seek to maintain the strategic/national objectives in total support of national policies” (although the Office of the Secretary of Defense is currently working on an implementation plan for DoDD 3000.05).<sup>33</sup> Nonetheless, DoDD 3000.05 notionally supports

the more established concept of “unified action”, which is “the synergistic application of all instruments of national power and multinational power and includes the action of non-military organizations as well as the military forces”.<sup>34</sup> Theater engagement strategies, which feature non-combat programs like IMET to build relationships and mitigate the need to resort to combat operations, are embedded in the *Joint Operation Planning* doctrine.<sup>35</sup> (However, there is no joint, interagency doctrine dedicated to theater engagement strategy.) Then there is the joint effects-based concept, which expands the planning and conduct of operations from a predominantly force-oriented, military-on-military approach to one that facilitates the application of all elements of power.<sup>36</sup>

The Army, which bears the brunt of missions in “post conflict” Phase IV (Stabilize) and Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) of the joint planning process, has also realized that:

*Both national and international security require integrating many non-military disciplines... such as economic and political health. To a greater degree than ever, diplomatic, informational, and economic factors now affect national security. At the strategic level, an adversary’s power is no longer reckoned in terms of its military capabilities. It is now assessed more comprehensively, in terms of its interconnected political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems.*<sup>37</sup>

Army operational doctrine (found in FM 3-0) describes the integrated operational environment as factors of “mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil considerations” (METT-TC). The “C” in METT-TC (added in 2001) stands for “civil considerations” that:

*...relate to civilian populations, culture, organizations, and leaders... in all operations directly or indirectly affecting civilian populations. At the operational level, civil considerations include the interaction between military operations and the other instruments of national power. Civil considerations at the tactical level generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on the current operation; however, they also consider larger, long term diplomatic, economic, and informational issues.*<sup>38</sup>

(Interestingly, while Army operational doctrine identifies seven “battle operating systems” with respect to METT-TC, none of them engages the “C” factor.)

While the good news on recent civil-military ends-ways developments is that change is afoot, for some years to come, Defense and the military will, by default more than desire, “do the heavy lifting” for civil-military interagency cooperation and coordination, in Washington and the field, and for the development of many non-DoD managerial capabilities, a need recognized by a growing number in the Defense establishment. DoD is the only executive agency with the prerequisite unity of purpose and command, policy and operational doctrine, standing planning and execution capabilities, professional staff, and fiscal and materiel resources and infrastructure to leverage and facilitate coordination of civil and military elements of national power at all levels – from the strategic to the tactical. This is reflected in DoD’s efforts to support S/CRS, with attempts to transfer a total of about \$200-million over the last two fiscal years and loan of staff to energize S/CRS development, set further back by the House and Senate’s July 2006 decision to zero out \$75-million funding for the S/CRS

Conflict Response Fund (CRF). With respect to the need for DoD to help transform the U.S. Government's ability to synergize civil-military power, a September 2005 Defense Science Board study on stability operations posited:

*We have great respect for the military services' approach to management... We believe this management discipline, now focused on combat operations, must be extended to peacetime activities, to stabilization and reconstruction operations, and to intelligence—not only in DoD, but across the government... In addition to strengthening capabilities within the Department of Defense, we urge the secretary to use his considerable influence to propel needed changes that span the government's agencies and departments... other than Defense.<sup>39</sup>*

DoD's enabling role in energizing the civil-military interagency process – helping to build capacity for transition of essentially non-DoD missions, in DoD's vested interest – is in fact a principle long familiar to CAO/CMO and for CA forces. The integration, synchronization, collaboration, or coordination of civil and military elements of power to fulfill national or international security objectives in unified action and effects-based approaches are, in essence, the application of CAO/CMO and CA, at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, regardless of the type of intervention, operation, or phase.

### **CIVIL AFFAIRS AND CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS – AN EVOLVING STRATEGIC CONCEPT**

CAO/CMO have been applied, albeit not in currently recognizable form, by the U.S. Army for almost its entire history, with the first use of “military government” during the Mexican War, through Reconstruction after the Civil War, the Philippine Insurrection and other small wars in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, the deployment of provisional Civil Affairs/Military Government units to occupied portions of the Rhineland after World War I, and of course the occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II. Since the 1950s, through the “hearts and minds” campaigns in Vietnam and during the peace operations of the 1990s, CAO/CMO have doctrinally matured, the latest joint definition being:

*The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and non-governmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.<sup>40</sup>*

Civil affairs operations, in turn, are currently defined in Army doctrine as:

*Those military operations planned, supported, executed, or transitioned by CA forces through with, or by the indigenous populations and institutions (IPIs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or other governmental organizations (OGAs) to modify behaviors, to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society, and to assist in establishing the capacity for deterring or defeating future civil threats in support of CMO and other U.S. objectives.<sup>41</sup>*

Although the Cold War focus of CAO/CMO was on “minimizing civilian interference in military operations”, since Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, senior commanders are better understanding their value to visualize and shape the civilian (or cultural) component of the integrated operational environment (the “C” in METT-TC). Joint, Army and Marine doctrine acknowledge that CAO/CMO permeate military operations at all levels across the full range of operations and are at the forefront of SSTRO and counterinsurgency operations. Indeed, as suggested earlier, it is at the forefront of 21<sup>st</sup> century warfare:

*The military of the future must be able to go to war with enough cultural knowledge to thrive in an alien environment... Soldiers must gain the ability to move comfortably among alien cultures, to establish trust and cement relationships that can be exploited in battle.<sup>42</sup>*




Figure 1. Civil Affairs Operations.

## CIVIL AFFAIRS AS STRATEGIC ENABLER

CA is premier among the military's capabilities to conduct CAO and facilitate CMO – and no longer exclusively in the Army. Beyond the USMC's new special operations forces, there are two Reserve Marine civil affairs groups (CAGs, tactical CA formations slightly larger than Army CA battalions), and the USMC has tasked its artillery battalions with CMO as a secondary mission. The Navy (in addition to setting up a corps of foreign area officers, or FAOs, to go out with the fleets) has created a Maritime Civil Affairs Group and is converting two Reserve mobile construction (Seabee) battalions to CA, albeit more to support a littoral theater engagement strategy.<sup>43</sup> In accordance with its expeditionary concept, the Air Force, in addition to growing its FAO program, has been training personnel in CAO/CMO and participating in CAO-type missions in support of theater engagement strategies worldwide. Both Air Force and Navy Reserve personnel have been receiving Civil Affairs Qualification Course training at Ft. Bragg, albeit to help the Army fill its depleted CA ranks to support continued deployments.<sup>44</sup> CA is thus becoming a *de facto* joint capability.

Although capabilities are growing among the services, the bulk of CA still comes from the Army – land power remaining most suited to integrate elements of national power and the most suitable form of military power in culturally intensive asymmetric environments:

*Perceptions and trust are built among people, and people live on the ground. Thus, future wars will be decided principally by ground forces, specifically the Army, Marine Corps, Special Forces and the various reserve formations that support them.*<sup>45</sup>

Only the Army has the gamut of strategic, operational, and tactical CA capability, nested in Reserve Component (RC) brigades and commands – not in the Active Component (AC). Because of its CAO mission, (Army) "...civil affairs are the only forces that were designed and structured to provide the various capabilities necessary to oversee, facilitate, and coordinate stability operations as well as military support to SSTRO".<sup>46</sup> Army CA has been doing this for generations (long before SSTRO was a concept), although its mission has evolved considerably since the Cold War.

Army CA, with direct historical roots in post-war Germany and Japan, are the designated AC/RC units organized, trained, and equipped to conduct CAO and support CMO across the full range of military operations. During combat, more than minimizing civilian interference, CA helps hasten an end to hostilities and reduce civilian casualties and damage. The military's prime instrument to coordinate with local, U.S., and international civilians, CA facilitates humanitarian relief, civil order, and the resumption of public services and normal daily life as fighting subsides. As emphasis shifts from relief to reconstruction, CA brokers the growth of governance and helps turn responsibilities over to civilian relief and reconstruction agencies and, ultimately, local public administrators, enabling fulfillment of the political-military end state. While CA generalists at the tactical and operational levels are in direct support of forces, CA functional specialists, especially in commands and brigades, are increasingly in general support of interagency stability and reconstruction operations, largely at operational and strategic levels through, for example, joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs). The evolution of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq and Ministry Support Teams in Iraq illustrate much of this evolution in

CA employment concepts. Then there is the growing role of CA in “Phase 0” shaping applications in nation assistance missions, designed not only to foster good will towards the U.S. but prevent states from failing and promote stability by facilitating development and building indigenous and regional military capacities and cooperation.

CA is no doubt a strategic enabler. Its potential as such has been gaining visibility, especially since 9/11. Robert Kaplan notes that the U.S. Pacific Command, within the context of its theater engagement strategy, conducts “civil affairs projects” to help secure basing rights and, conversely, deny them to potential adversaries such as China.<sup>47</sup> More specifically, in a piece on how the U.S. should pursue its post-9/11 global security interests, Kaplan lists as the first of 10 “rules” the need for more CA personnel.<sup>48</sup>

In addition, most actionable intelligence now of greatest value is “human intelligence” (HUMINT), which originates largely from open sources and comes through information and cultural/situational awareness obtained from personal contacts and relationships. CAO/CMO thus have significant value as (indirect) information sources for intelligence:

*The “high tech” Army remains engaged against non-traditional adversaries who cannot match its combat power. These adversaries, however, are able to engage the Army across the spectrum of the security and operational environments using unsophisticated, yet effective, human-based techniques, augmented with today’s technology. Cold War paradigms developed for operations conducted during peace and war do not adequately address the current and future complex environments in which the Army will be operating. Tactical and operational levels of war regularly take on strategic importance. Information is the key to winning this battle successfully, and to this end, HUMINT sources are critical.*<sup>49</sup>

In 21<sup>st</sup> century non-state social-cultural warfare, intelligence, information operations (IO), and CAO/CMO have effectively become an inherent mission for everyone in uniform, coined in the Army phrase “every soldier is a sensor” (as well as a “sender”):

*The individual soldier is the most capable, sophisticated collector of intelligence in today’s Army... Every day, in the towns, cities and countryside, soldiers talk to inhabitants and observe more relevant information than all the combined technical intelligence sensors can collect. Soldiers also differ from other collection systems in that they interact with the populace. Clearly, soldiers are exposed to information that would be of significant value if collected, processed and integrated into a Common Operational Picture; hence the concept of “every soldier is a sensor”.*<sup>50</sup>

On a more strategic level: “Timely and actionable intelligence, together with early warning, is the most critical enabler to protecting the United States at a safe distance.”<sup>51</sup> Beyond intelligence and early warning, CAO/CMO can help detect “opportunities for democratic transformation”<sup>52</sup> in theater engagement missions, as a by-product of its presence and area assessments in cooperation with country teams and interagency partners.

With respect to theater engagement and nation assistance activities, there is also the vastly underdeveloped role of CAO/CMO and CA (as well as interagency processes) in helping to

foster public-private cooperation and leveraging private sector companies looking not just to “get in on the ground floor” in development-related foreign direct investment opportunities, but in creating the ground floor to begin with. Beyond (and in coordination) with the Millennium Challenge Corporation and conventional State and Commerce Department commercial assistance activities, as well as with current NGOs like BENS and IPOA, there is a great potential for discreetly linking economic development led by USAID, for example, with the assistance of the military, with market development by Fortune 500 and other companies looking to expand business to underdeveloped countries, co-mitigating many risks, sharing information, and drawing synergistic benefits. Most groundwork could be done informally, albeit more deliberately and with some policy direction from Washington.

Last but not least, CAO/CMO and CA have considerable impact on IO and the “war of ideas”, not only due to its “key leader engagement” of indigenous public opinion makers and international civilian relief and reconstruction managers at tactical and operational centers of gravity, but through generation of good will abroad and “good news stories” at home on relief and reconstruction through its civil-military coordination and emerging civil information management (CIM) activities, thus feeding both strategic communications and IO efforts at the tactical, operational, strategic centers of gravity.<sup>53</sup> Moreover, the CIM capability of CA (per the new doctrine), as well as its longstanding civil-military operations center (CMOC) and CMO estimate best practices, can facilitate interagency coordination at all levels.

In all these respects, properly employed, CAO/CMO and CA can help engage strategic threats and opportunities, especially at the generative stage in theater engagement missions – rather than when the conflict or crisis breaks out, which is more risk-laden and expensive and when hard power becomes the Hobson’s choice.

CA has been the most available, expedient, and cost-effective means the military (and the U.S. Government) has had to execute U.S. political-military strategy and win the peace on the ground. America’s capability to conduct this increasingly vital mission is little more than 6,500 CA soldiers in the Army and Marines. (Over 90% are in the RC – itself in a dynamic state of transformation, mainly because RC soldiers are best suited for intense interaction with civilians and because of civilian knowledge and skills they have or can access, and which cannot be duplicated in the AC without great expense.)<sup>54</sup> Less than one half of one percent of the U.S. force structure is thus dedicated to leveraging civil and soft power, and the budget share is even smaller. In many ways, CA is the low-tech solution to the low-tech problem – perhaps why it has gathered so little attention in a strategic culture predisposed to hard power and vested in the military industrial complex.

As proof of its worth, since the early 1990s, demand for CA escalated and then, following 9/11, skyrocketed. According to the Army’s Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), up to 90% of all deployable Army and Marine CA personnel have gone at least once to Iraq and Afghanistan – among the busiest specialties in the military. This does not include hundreds more CA personnel sent since 9/11 to over 20 other countries, including growing numbers of theater engagement missions in support of U.S. interests worldwide. Wholly deployable RC CA units no longer exist – units have been cobbled together using “fillers” from the remnants of others, as well as fleshed out by as much as 50% with Air Force and Navy Reserve personnel in rotations starting in 2006.

Although the value-added of CAO/CMO and CA as the ways and means to synergize civil-military power is becoming more apparent, (Army) CA is in precarious shape. CA is

hard pressed to support both the burgeoning CMO mission and CAO support to interagency nation-building. One reason, in truth, is because CA's traditional comparative advantages in particularly language and cultural knowledge, as well as its nation-building functional specialist proficiency, have dwindled over time for a number of reasons, although recent initiatives may be reversing some of this. Moreover, because the civil-military aspects of international armed intervention have grown exponentially and demand for CA has ballooned, CA has been beleaguered in terms of policy, doctrine, force structure, resources, training and education, etc. Unless these issues are tackled with appropriate seriousness, authority, and energy, "CA runs the risk of being absorbed, outsourced, and/or becoming obsolete".<sup>55</sup>

The issues are being addressed, albeit incrementally and at force management level. Under-resourced and under-staffed, USACAPOC has dealt with doctrine and force design, as it lobbied for assistance from higher commands. Following three years of effort, the Army published a new CAO doctrine and re-designated the 96<sup>th</sup> CA Battalion the 95<sup>th</sup> CA Brigade (with four battalions) in August 2006. In FY07, CA became a branch in both the AC and RC Army – albeit only after basic branch qualification. AC CA staff positions have been authorized at unified and specified commands, as well as in Army units down to brigade combat team level – although many posts remain unfilled. The RC CA force is expanding, geographically realigning, and re-organizing. Pursuant to its new force design, CA units will feature greater, organic CMO and CIM capability, for example – but these changes remain under-resourced and may not be complete until FY12.

It may all be too little, too late, especially with the DoD decision to split responsibility for CA between special operations and the conventional Army, complicating CA transformation. Indeed, the full impacts of this decision on CA have yet to be realized throughout most decision-making and staff levels of both USACAPOC and USARC, as these two commands learn about each other's organizational cultures amidst force transformation and high operational tempo. While intense discussion at the DoD, SOCOM, and the Army ensued in 2004-06 over where CA should be, more important issues of a vision for CAO/CMO and CA, doctrine, force management and operational tempo, CA employment in theater, CA education and training, etc., received less attention.<sup>56</sup> As the Defense Science Board (which did not recommend moving CA out of SOCOM) noted in late 2005:

*Perhaps, more important than organizational reporting is proper sizing, recruitment, retention and motivation of the best people to actually perform Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs is largely a reserve activity, and we think that is good insofar as it provides a window on the private sector where the skills required by the stability operations mission can be found in abundance. However, the reserve recruitment process for Civil Affairs is the overall reserve recruitment process and may not tap into the private sector communities with the special skills needed by Civil Affairs. Further issues regarding Civil Affairs involve how they are fielded, i.e. coupled to maneuver units, and whether that leads to the best use of the special capabilities of Civil Affairs units. We also need to consider the rotation policy for Civil Affairs reservists and the mobilization policy, and tailor same to the special needs for Civil Affairs. Finally, in light of the likely size of future stability operations, we have to consider whether the overall size of that reserve capability is adequate: quantity has a quality all its own.<sup>57</sup>*

Despite its now obvious value-added, there is no single DoD executive agent for CAO/CMO and CA. Per a March 2006 Office of the Secretary of Defense directive, Army CA is currently divided between the Army Reserve Command for RC force management and U.S. Army Special Operations Command for AC force management and doctrine/schools, further complicating CA force transformation and integration and creating a period of adjustment and co-education on force management issues between USACAPOC and USARC – all under a period of high demand and operational tempo. “Good ideas” on what to do with CA are abounding. In an effort to capture these and place them into context, George Mason University’s Peace Operations Policy Program, in cooperation with the Reserve Officers and Civil Affairs Associations, has co-sponsored a series of roundtable discussions among subject matter experts, in and out of CA, with the intent of publishing a white paper following the final roundtable in mid-2007. The Civil Affairs Association drafted a series of papers with recommendations on the future of CA for consideration at the roundtables.<sup>58</sup>

Beyond USACAPOC’s efforts, the Army Reserve is looking at revitalizing CA functional specialty capabilities through better recruiting and retention policies, a warrant officer program for CA specialists, and Army-paid industry and public administration internships for them.<sup>59</sup> Another idea is for the State Department, as it stands up S/CRS Advanced Civilian Teams, an Active Response Corps, and a Standby Ready Reserve – as counterpart to CA functional specialists, to look to DoD, especially the Army Corps of Engineers, for its initial capability in deploying civilians and developing its own expeditionary culture.<sup>60</sup>

Now more than ever, these issues and “good ideas” must be in a comprehensive, strategic context for civil-military power that applies to civilian and military players.

## **FINDING A STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR CIVIL-MILITARY POWER**

Elements for a unifying national strategic context for synergizing civil and military power can be found: first, in a hierarchy of strategic concepts; and second, in identifying strategic civil-military principles – not only in order to understand how this synergy can take place horizontally across the elements of power represented in the interagency process, but perhaps most importantly, how it can be translated vertically from the strategic to the operational and tactical levels, for both civil and military components.

Fortunately, the elements of a strategic hierarchy of civil-military concepts or principles already exists, albeit not developed and linked holistically – starting with interagency “unity of effort”, the principles for which are being further developed.<sup>61</sup> (In truth, “unity of effort” may be too tall of an order, as understood by the military. More realistic, in most cases, may be “unity of purpose” – more agreement on basic goals and objectives than on common ways and means.) Cascading down the strategic scale, “unity of effort” (or purpose) could flow into the “unified action” systems framework articulated in the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO), the bridging document between national security and military strategies and joint doctrine.<sup>62</sup> Unified action aims to achieve unity of effort (or purpose) among all elements of power in order to engage better both the threats and opportunities of today’s complex strategic and operational environment, which increasingly emerge from the civil-military dimension and where many lines are blurred. Appendix D of the CCJO goes beyond traditional phasing in the joint planning process and specifies the same “phases” as “lines of effort”, stressing simultaneous activities rather than a linear approach. The first is Phase 0

(Shape), while the last two are Phases IV (Stabilize) and V (Enable Civil Authority). All of these look to leverage civil and soft power through CAO/CMO and IO.

This suggests understanding the civil-military relationship in international interventions with the military as the “enabler”. Enabling, however, is not co-opting. If DoD is to help build interagency capacity, even in its enlightened self-interest, it must do so with respect to the organizational cultures of smaller agencies often with narrower, less operational focus – a common denominator approach that applies the military principles of simplicity and unity (of command). Moreover, the military must discard the attitude that “synchronizing military power with other instruments of national power substantially improves the joint force’s strategic capabilities”<sup>63</sup>, as if civil and soft power were “force multipliers”. Especially in Phases 0, IV, and V, military power is the shaping action, while civil and soft power are decisive. Military-led Phases II and III (Seize Initiative and Dominate) are merely steps to fulfillment of the political end state (*a la* Clausewitz). With respect to unified action:

*Military operations are a part of that. International civilian policing and stability functions are part of it. Transitional governance is part of it. The rule of law is part of it. Economics is part of it. Development of a civil society is a component... The Department of Defense has control over only one small portion... And what we have come to recognize is the Department of Defense as had its so-called effects-based planning... what is the effect that you want to achieve? If the effect that you want is sustainable peace, you need that full spectrum of capabilities and where you’re going to get that, the majority of those capabilities, is from the civilian world.*<sup>64</sup>

These lines of effort may also be understood within a broader conceptual relationship between modes of policy and force in a continuous loop. Policy may for a moment call for a mode of force (in conflict), but policy prevails. Evoking Clausewitz as such can serve to “remind leaders that force is not an end in itself.”<sup>65</sup> Nested within this unifying civil-military continuum, the loop of lines of effort between policies of war and peace, are CAO/CMO and CA, whose strategic principles may include:

- CAO/CMO and CA are holistic, cumulative, integrative, and synergistic, both as ways and means. CAO/CMO and CA are best suited to manage the seams of power, and the gaps between organizations and processes. They leverage civil and (particularly informational, social-cultural, and economic) soft power at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels in order to create conditions for civil-military transition, minimize or mitigate the costs and risks of military and hard power, and meet growing non-traditional and asymmetric threats and exploit opportunities emerging largely from civilian sectors across the full range of operations. In doing so, they help overcome the frictions existing in these seams, gaps, and transitions, and accelerate decision cycles – a key strategic and operational advantage over asymmetric adversaries.
- CAO/CMO are inherently informational and social-cultural. Enabling, moderating, and balancing, they promote unity of effort or purpose while managing change, risk, and expectations – they draw together disparate players towards a medium of cooperation largely through the soft power of information as well as in strategic communications/ information operations.

Because CAO/CMO, a largely human enterprise, are also predominantly about relationship-building and engaging the local populace (and cultural awareness), they are thus at the center of 21<sup>st</sup> century non-state socio-cultural (or asymmetric) warfare. Finally, they are adaptive and thus conducive to creating a learning organization, as they are inherently a learning activity, constantly responsive to situation and environment.

- CAO/CMO and CA are inherently joint, interagency, and multinational. Always subordinate to policy, they are at the heart of unity of effort (or purpose), unified action, and effects-based approaches through their coordinating function and the creation of synergies at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Their growth in capabilities across the services is tacit recognition of this fact.
- By enabling more proactive use of civil and soft power, they employ the military principle of offense. By enabling more effective leveraging of non-military elements of power in order to mitigate costs and risks of hard power and conflict situations (especially when used preventatively), and thus expand non-lethal, non-kinetic options for commanders at all levels, they employ the principle of economy-of-force. By being the key non-lethal, non-kinetic contributor to force protection, they employ the principle of security.
- Applied CAO/CMO involve a strategic, enabling style of leadership. CAO/CMO and CA are predisposed for a strategic style of leadership and decision-making support due to the greater emphasis on political bargaining, collaboration, consensus and relationship-building, as well as access to civil and soft power. Another way to describe the strategic leadership style is “leading from behind” – creating conditions for the success of others so the full menu of power options may be brought to bear (and blood and treasure spared). Another approach is to see CAO/CMO as a “customer service” activity, with civilian partners as clients. Above all, this kind of leadership, in information and socio-cultural intensive strategic and operational environments, should emphasize managing expectations all-around.

In short, CAO/CMO and CA are inherently strategic in nature.<sup>66</sup>

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Based to a large extent on an understanding of these principles – and most importantly the insight that CAO/CMO and CA are inherently strategic, more specific recommendations with regard to the way ahead could include:

- OSD should lead an interagency effort to examine the idea of the creation of a new “Office of Strategic Services” (OSS), as proposed by Max Boot from the Council on Foreign Relations before the House Armed Services Committee on 29 June 2006. A new “OSS”, operating under an interagency unifying concept of “unity of effort” per executive directive, would be a joint civil-military agency under the combined oversight of the Secretary of Defense and

the Director of National Intelligence, and include CA and PSYOP among military capabilities and S/CRS and parts of USAID among civilian capabilities. “The new OSS could cultivate a corps of experts, civil and military, coming from both government and the private sector, who would be skilled in the difficult task of rebuilding stateless or war-torn societies in cooperation with other federal departments, international agencies, American allies, and non-governmental organizations.” In addition, the “OSS” could look to expand directed efforts at public-private ventures to leverage commercial power to assist with “preventative” economic and business development in fragile states, as suggested earlier. This would further the value of CA/CMO, especially in an interagency context. In the meantime, however, DoD should establish permanent CA strategic planning and liaison billets with the major interagency players of SSTRO such as S/CRS, USAID, and the proposed Multi-National Interagency Group (MNIG).<sup>67</sup>

- Notwithstanding that effort, OSD/JCS should designate JFCOM or another or new joint command structure as executive agent for CA and CMO, and marry its proponent responsibilities for both DoD/joint support of interagency unity of effort and CA/CMO. Place *both* AC and RC CA under this joint command structure for force management, doctrinal development, and education and training. Propose and obtain Congressional approval for appropriate Title 10 USC and program and budget authorities such as those in USSOCCOM.
- Within that joint structure, create a proponent center for joint-interagency CA and CMO doctrine, training and education that may also serve as (or support) a joint-interagency center of excellence – which could be a network of government and non-governmental centers of excellence collaborated by the National Defense (or “Security”) University, in conjunction with other senior service schools and staff colleges – that educates and trains civilian and military stabilization, relief, and reconstruction operators through both physical and virtual events, as well as provides a (likewise collaborative) venue and platform for real-time experimentation and development of civil-military, interagency operational concepts concurrent with operations in the field.<sup>68</sup> Remove or re-designate related CAO/CMO portions from SOCOM, such as in the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), the Army John. F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), CAO/CMO-related service schools, and USARC CA training centers and units, and place under the authority of this center. Create joint-interagency billets for this center directorate. Last, integrate CAO/CMO (and IO) training into professional development programs at all military education levels as joint function and a line of operation, as appropriate.
- The Joint Staff should designate CAO/CMO a joint function under Joint Publications JP 3-0 and JP 5-0 and integrate them as such with the concept of an effects-based approach. Because CAO/CMO cut across both vertical lines at strategic, operational and tactical levels and horizontal lines among civil and military players, they are already a *de facto* joint/interagency function. (Former CENTCOM Commander Gen. Tommy Franks listed CMO as one of seven major lines of operation in his guidance to planners for the invasion of Iraq.)<sup>69</sup> Institutionalize task-force interagency approaches to CAO/CMO such

as the PRT concept or the full-spectrum operations concept of the 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division in Baghdad that employ other military specialties, such as engineers, to perform tasks more traditionally coordinated by CA.<sup>70</sup> In fact, Army CA doctrine has streamlined CAO missions and CA functional specialties – 20 of the latter were present in the 1992 version of Army FM 41-10; 16 in the 2000 version; and only six in the current CAO doctrine. This is for two reasons: first, the greater capabilities found among civilian organizations to perform them (as they should); and second, greater involvement of non-CA military specialists as these missions move to the center of particularly SSTRO and counterinsurgency operations. The Secretary of Defense's decision to re-assign USACAPOC from SOCOM to the Army Reserve Command is, in a sense, tacit recognition of CAO/CMO as more than just a special operation.

- Insure CAO/CMO as a joint function is reflected in all other joint doctrines; in particular, re-write joint CMO doctrine to reflect a joint/interagency doctrine for CAO/CMO, and integration of strategic and operational CAO/CMO concepts into emerging joint/interagency coordination doctrinal concepts. In any case, CAO/CMO needs to mature into an interagency/multinational concept that has application in both military and non-military agencies and departments at strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
- Create joint command/staff structures for strategic and operational level CA formations (commands and brigades) and restructure appropriately, for example, to enable joint/interagency strategic and operational planning (e.g., as part of a JIACG) and smoother military-civil transition through parallel alignment of functional specialists and teams between CA and interagency humanitarian assistance and reconstruction and development specialists and teams, per an interagency memorandum of agreement. (Maintain Army and Marine tactical CA formations [including the 95<sup>th</sup> CA Brigade as assigned to USSOCOM in-theater], but capable of joint augmentation and employment.) More specifically, develop the S/CRS Civilian Reserve Force capability in parallel to Army CA functional specialty capabilities, using the PRT and Ministerial Advisory Team models as points of departure. S/CRS should also associate its CRF with CA commands and brigades across the country and have the CRF train with its associate CA partner units. Within the Army, associate CA functional specialties with DA civilian installation management expertise that can be generated to deploy early as in PRTs, etc., in order to front-load stability, governance and reconstruction capabilities until they can be transitioned to State-led capabilities.
- Program, authorize, budget, and fill permanent AC CA strategic and operational planning and operations staff at joint, unified, and regional combatant commands. In the Army, create permanent CA (G9/S9) staff even below the brigade combat team level, down to battalion size, in order to create a more robust CAO/CMO and CA integration capability at that critical level.
- Professionalize CA. This doesn't mean just a greater ratio of AC to RC CA personnel and forces. Moreover, it means more robust policy, program, and funding supporting of CA in terms of force development, training and education, and incentives for joining and remaining in CA such as:

designation of CA as a joint specialty and a full (accession) Army branch; re-designation of many NCO posts, especially in functional specialties, as warrant officer positions; recruiting and retention staff assigned specifically to USACAPOC units down to brigade level, with their own budget for higher reenlistment and re-deployment bonuses; creation of a senior CA officer course that focuses on strategic and operational planning and force integration as well as interagency cooperation and coordination; educational stipends for degree or certificate training, especially with respect to functional specialty professional development; industry, interagency, and public administration internships for younger CA personnel; increased language and cultural awareness training; increased access to benefits such as TriCare for RC personnel under multiple combat deployments; and so on. And accelerate CA transformation and insure it has priority in receiving new equipment. While some may balk at the costs of these largely human capital initiatives, the strategic value-added of CAO/CMO and CA more than obviates the expense – still small compared to war-fighting formations – of appropriately sourcing this capability. The whole of CA is still less expensive than a heavy brigade combat team or a fighter squadron. You get what you pay for.

Although the principles and recommendations listed above may not be comprehensive or exhaustive, they do reflect a point of departure in addressing the issues of CA and CMO and pointing to a DoD-led way to more effective synchronization of civil-military power. Indeed, CAO/CMO and CA are themselves underdeveloped. Their potential is nonetheless clear: By understanding the strategic value of CAO/CMO and CA, finding a strategic context for synergizing civil-military power may become less daunting.

### **CHANGING THE STRATEGIC CULTURE**

While national security policy, doctrine, and programs must continue to evolve to better synergize the full range of national elements of power, ultimately, the strategic culture of the United States and the organizational cultures of both civil and military components must continue to change. At the national policy and interagency levels, the bias towards the responsive use of hard power must find balance in more opportunistically leveraged soft power – not just in policies, but in ways and means. Until the greater balance in policy and strategy is reflected in coordinating doctrines and, most importantly, program authority and budgetary lines, the paradigm shift has not really happened:

*Within the U.S. Government, there will need to be a change in the culture of cabinet departments, other than DoD, which are largely focused on policy... The nature of the inter-agency process has to change to be more than coordination; to be an orchestration of all the instruments of U.S. power. Where there is separation of statutory authorities from capabilities and resources, we will need to reconcile those differences without undue acrimony.<sup>71</sup>*

It also begins with transforming interagency civil and military cultures into learning organizations, separately and together, through the education and training of leaders and in

policies for professional development and career management that reward experience in civil-military and interagency coordination.<sup>72</sup> An interdisciplinary, civil-military training and educational center of excellence program as recommended earlier, for example, would not only offer economy of scale to draw the participation of equally important but less capital-rich civilian interagency players and NGOs, it would help bridge the vertical gaps between policy and implementation simultaneously with the horizontal gaps of interdisciplinary and international cooperation and coordination, address the critical issue of a dearth of civil-military co-understanding of roles, capabilities and limitations (i.e., managing expectations) *before* – and not after – an international intervention, and grow future strategic civil-military leadership. In the military, change must come from the bottom-up as well as the top-down:

*Future professional development should incorporate knowledge areas such as police actions, foreign internal defense and interagency/joint/coalition operations. Skill sets or competencies must include cultural awareness, civil-military operations, intelligence, and information operations.*<sup>73</sup>

Because of its still-predominant role in international interventions, the military – more than any other organizational culture – must inculcate, from the ground up and the top down, a new consciousness of civil-military power, in order to prevail among the growing constraints and restraints of the 21<sup>st</sup> century strategic environment. War-winning must take precedence over war-fighting, opportunities over threats, capabilities over forces, and the military as an enabling and not just implementing source of national power. While the scroll is indeed ultimately mightier than the sword, both are mightiest in unison. This synergy, more than anything else, will help ensure that America and its partners will chart their own destinies more than become orphans of the inevitable storms of our times.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>2</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, (London: Oxford University Press), 1971), 77.
- <sup>3</sup> See UN General Assembly Document GA/10444, “Creation of of Peacebuilding Commission, Emergency Response Fund Highlights, As 60<sup>th</sup> General Assembly Takes First Steps Towards Major UN Reform”, Department of Public Information, 27 December 2005. Note the establishment of a Central Emergency Response Fund, set at \$3.79-billion for 2006-07, enables Security Council instruments to respond more rapidly and effectively to crises, at times preventatively, as well as better transition to peace-building. Ambassador Bolton’s comments are in U.S. Mission to the UN Press Release # 265 (05), “Explanation of Vote by Ambassador John R. Bolton, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on the Peacebuilding Commission, in the General Assembly”, 20 December 2005.
- <sup>4</sup> Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales (ret.), “Clausewitz and World War IV”, *Armed Forces Journal*, July 2006, 18.
- <sup>5</sup> Robert R. Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare”, *Parameters*, Spring 2004, 23. See also John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
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- <sup>7</sup> Adm. Mike Mullen, “What I Believe: Eight Tenets That Guide My Vision for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Navy”, Proceedings, January 2006, 1.
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- <sup>9</sup> Lt. Col. Michael F. Morris, “Al Qaeda as Insurgency”, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 39, 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter 2005, 41-50.
- <sup>10</sup> Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, (New York: Random House, 1987).
- <sup>11</sup> Ilana Ozernoy, “Eyes Wide Shut”, *The Atlantic*, November 2006, 30-33.
- <sup>12</sup> For data on current accounts, see Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) News Release BEA 06-08, “U.S. International Transactions: Fourth Quarter and Year 2005, Washington, D.C., 14 March 2006, 6, while personal savings rate data are derived from BEA News Release BEA 06-17, 28 April 2006, 2. For energy and commodity information, see the Short-Term Energy Outlook, U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration, Washington, D.C., 9 May 2006, available at [www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov). For all other information, see *Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing America for a Brighter Economic Future*, The National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st Century: An Agenda for American Science and Technology, [Pre-publication version], Executive Summary, Washington, D.C., National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., February 2006, ES-9 – ES-15.
- <sup>13</sup> The FY2007 discretionary budget authority of the Department of Defense is \$439.3-billion, 7% more than the previous year; the FY2007 discretionary budget authority of the Department of State is about \$14-billion, an 20% increase from FY2005 (this does not include almost \$20-billion in international assistance programs – a rise of more than 15% over the last two years). See U.S. Office of Management and Budget, *Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), available from: [www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/); Internet; accessed 2 November 2006.
- <sup>14</sup> General information is available at: [www.state.gov](http://www.state.gov); [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov); [www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/cross-cutting\\_programs/transition\\_initiatives/index.html](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/index.html); Internet, accessed 2 November 2006.
- <sup>15</sup> A strident discussion of American over-reliance on technology can be found in Ralph Peters’ “The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs”, *Weekly Standard*, 6 February 2006, 18.
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- <sup>18</sup> For more information, go to: [www.terrorfreetomorrow.org](http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org); Internet, accessed 26 October 2006.
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- <sup>21</sup> National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 22 July 2004), available at [www.9-11commission.gov](http://www.9-11commission.gov); Internet, accessed 12 December 2005. See especially Chs. 12 and 13.

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- <sup>22</sup> Congress provided nearly \$1-billion in initial funding for FY04 and \$1.5-billion for FY05. The FY07 budget is for \$3-billion and annual funding for the MCA is projected to increase to \$5-billion in FY08. Available at: [www.mca.gov](http://www.mca.gov); Internet, accessed 2 November 2006.
- <sup>23</sup> General information is available at: [www.opic.gov](http://www.opic.gov); Internet, accessed 12 December 2005. “Open for Business” centralizes information to assist the business community, with links to contracts, grants, small business opportunities, research and development and contacts. For more information, go to: <http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/>; Internet, accessed 12 October 2006. More information on Business Executives for National Security and the International Peace Operations Organization can found at [www.bens.org](http://www.bens.org) and [www.ipoa.org](http://www.ipoa.org); Internet, accessed 17 October 2006.
- <sup>24</sup> Clark A. Murdock, ed., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era* (Phase I Report), (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004), 9. See also the Phase II Report, July 2005. In addition, see Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 2001). Page vii, notes that “[u]nity of effort requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, with non-governmental organization (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and among nations in any alliance or coalition”.
- <sup>25</sup> Office of the Spokesman, Department of State Fact Sheet 2006/64, “Transformational Diplomacy”, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Spokesman, Department of State, 18 January 2006), available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/59339.htm>; Internet, accessed 8 February 2006.
- <sup>26</sup> The Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development *Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2004-2009, Aligning Diplomacy and Development*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and USAID, 2003), provides a strategic planning framework for a more integrated DoS-USAID response to commonly identified challenges related to the War on Terrorism; but, it does not explain how respective departmental capabilities are coordinated and is not a holistic interagency document. See also George W. Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization”, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 7 December 2005), NSPD-44 provides such impetus – within at least the context of reconstruction and stabilization activities. See also Office of the Spokesman, DoS Special Briefing 2005/1168, “President Issues Directive to Improve the United States’ Capacity to Manage Reconstruction and Stabilization Efforts”, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Spokesman, Department of State, 14 December 2005); available at: [www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/58067.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/58067.htm); Internet, accessed 15 December 2005.
- <sup>27</sup> Maj. Gen. John A. Gallinetti and Amb. Carlos Pascual, *Planning for Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Conflict Transformation*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Joint Forces Command J7 Pamphlet, Version 1.0, 1 December 2005).
- <sup>28</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military”, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2002, 29-30.
- <sup>29</sup> Gen. Peter Pace, “The 16<sup>th</sup> Chairman’s Guidance to the Joint Staff – Shaping the Future”, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 October 2005), 4. Italics added.
- <sup>30</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), 85.
- <sup>31</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations”, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, 28 November 2005), 3. A precedent document is Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*, Vols. I and II (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 1996), which discusses how to facilitate coordination and cooperation with U.S. government agencies, and intergovernmental, non-governmental, and geographical security organizations – but from a DoD/military perspective. More recent is Joint Forces Command J7 Pamphlet, *U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation*, (Suffolk, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, USJFCOM, 1 December 2005), prepared by both S/CRS and the Joint Warfighting Center. It is the first of a series of documents to improve civil-

military coordination at the interagency level in such operations, provide a planning framework, and identify metrics to measure USG performance.

- <sup>32</sup> DoD Directive 3000.05, 3.
- <sup>33</sup> Maj. Robert L. Farmer III, "White Paper on Future Civil Affairs Concept: Vision, Capabilities, Force Design, Force Structure", Version 9.0, (Ft. Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command), 6 March 2006, 2.
- <sup>34</sup> Gen. Richard B. Meyers, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, Version 2.0, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, August 2005), 1.
- <sup>35</sup> See Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, Revision Third Draft [3].10, (Washington, D.C. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 2005).
- <sup>36</sup> See Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 7, *Operational Implication of Effects-based Operations (EBO)*, (Suffolk, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, USJFCOM, 17 November 2004).
- <sup>37</sup> U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual FM-1, *The Army*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 2005), 2-2.
- <sup>38</sup> U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual FM 3-0, *Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, June 2001), 5-5.
- <sup>39</sup> Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, December 2004), iv and 171. In the same citation, the DSB identifies three areas where "the secretary's effort could have considerable impact: The secretary can accelerate the institutionalization of an effective pan-government strategic planning and integration process... The secretary should lend his support to the efforts of other departments and agencies as they undergo transformation, particularly in their approach to instituting management discipline for contingency planning and for maintaining contingency capabilities. Finally, the secretary should urge the establishment of an effective national strategic communication capability and lend DOD's resources and capabilities to this effort, as appropriate."
- <sup>40</sup> See Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication JP-3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 February 2001), especially GL-6. USSOCOM, which is the proponent office for this doctrine, is currently leading a joint working group for revision of the doctrine, to which the author is participant. Planned publication is February 2008.
- <sup>41</sup> Department of the Army, Field Manual FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, 15 September 2006), 1-2.
- <sup>42</sup> Scales, 19.
- <sup>43</sup> Andrew Scutro, "Navy Enhancing the Role of Foreign Area Officers", and Christopher Munsey, "Seabees Tasked to Take on New Civil Affairs Role", *Navy Times*, 1 August 2005, 20 and 22, respectively.
- <sup>44</sup> Maj. Vanessa Dornhoefer, USAF Air Mobility Command CMO instructor at McGuire AFB, NJ, email messages to author, 16 December 2005 and 1 March 2006. Contingency Response Groups (CRGs) are provided basic CMO training at the Air Mobility Operations School of the USAF Air Mobility Command Air Mobility Warfare Center at McGuire AFB, while the Advanced Air Mobility Operations Course (AAMOC) there incorporates training on the roles of both NGOs and CA/CMO. In addition, the USAF Special Operations School at Hurlburt AFB, FL features courses in CMO, and USAF JAGs, which are trained at Maxwell AFB, AL, have received pre-deployment CMO instruction, though it has not become part of the standing curriculum. In addition, according to USACAPOC, USAF (and Navy) Reserve

volunteers are receiving CA/CMO training at Ft. Bragg, NC prior to deployment with Army CA units in support of Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.

<sup>45</sup> Scales, 18.

<sup>46</sup> Farmer III, 3.

<sup>47</sup> See Robert D. Kaplan, "How We Would Fight China", *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 2005, available at: [www.theatlantic.com](http://www.theatlantic.com); Internet, accessed 14 October 2005.

<sup>48</sup> See Robert D. Kaplan, "Supremacy by Stealth", *The Atlantic Monthly*, July/August 2003, available at: [www.theatlantic.com](http://www.theatlantic.com); Internet, accessed 14 October 2005.

<sup>49</sup> Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, *Torchbearer National Security Report, Key Issues Relevant to Actionable Intelligence*, (Arlington, VA, June 2005, 7).

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid*, 5.

<sup>51</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, June 2005), 23

<sup>52</sup> See John D. Negroponte, *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, October 2005), especially 1-2 on use of intelligence in identifying "opportunities for democratic transformation".

<sup>53</sup> For a more detailed explanation of this idea, see Christopher Holshek, "Integrated Civil-Military and Information Operations: Finding Success in Synergy", *The Cornwallis Group IX: Analysis for Stabilization and Counter-Terrorist Operations*, (Cornwallis Park, Nova Scotia, Canada: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2005), 137-165.

<sup>54</sup> See remarks by Lt. Gen. James Helmly, Chief of Army Reserve, regarding CA and the challenges to the RC in Jen DiMascio, "Army Reserve May Take Over Civil Affairs", *InsideDefense.com*, 1 March 2006; available at: [www.insidedefense.com](http://www.insidedefense.com); Internet, accessed 5 March 2006.

<sup>55</sup> Farmer III, 24.

<sup>56</sup> For more on the CA in SOF issue and the future of CA, see Michael J. Baranick, Christopher Holshek, and Larry Wentz, "Civil Affairs at a Crossroads", in *Transforming the Reserve Component*, Defense & Technology Paper 10, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, February 2005, especially 31-47. Also see: Tom Breen, "Uncivil Affair: Army Resists Push to Move Nation-Builders Out of SOCOM", *Armed Forces Journal International*, March 2005, 20; Lt. Col. R. Christian Brewer, "U.S. Army Civil Affairs and the Fate of Reserve Special Forces in Support of Current and Future Operations", (Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College Strategic Research Paper, March 2004); and Sandra I. Erwin, "Civil Affairs: As Demand for Nation-Building Troops Soar, Leaders Ponder Reorganization", *National Defense*, May 2005, 20-21.

<sup>57</sup> Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DoD*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Department of Defense, September 2005), 46.

<sup>58</sup> For more information on the Civil Affairs Roundtable series, search the GMU-POPP website at <http://popp.gmu.edu/index.htm>; Internet, accessed 28 October 2006, as well as the Reserve Officer Association website at <http://www.roa.org>; Internet, accessed 28 October 2006. For more on the Civil Affairs Association, go to: <http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org>; Internet, accessed 28 October 2006.

<sup>59</sup> See DiMascio, "Army Reserve May Take Over Civil Affairs".

- <sup>60</sup> See Dr. James J. Hearn, “Departments of State and Defense – Partners in Post-Conflict Operations, Is This the Answer for Past Failures?” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Research Project, March 2006).
- <sup>61</sup> See Martin Lidy, “Emerging Interagency Doctrine for Interventions” [draft], (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 4 January 2006).
- <sup>62</sup> See Gen. Richard B. Meyers, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, Version 2.0, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, August 2005).
- <sup>63</sup> FM-1, 3-2. See especially Para. 3-9.
- <sup>64</sup> See DoS Special Briefing 2005/1168.
- <sup>65</sup> Karen Guttieri, “The Civil Dimension of Strategy”, in *Humanizing Our Global Order*, eds. Obiora Chinedu Okafor and Obijiofor Aginam, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 93.
- <sup>66</sup> For more background on the assumptions and premises of strategy upon which the analysis of CMO and CA as inherently strategic are drawn, see Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Letort Paper, U.S. Army War College, February 2006), esp. 66-68.
- <sup>67</sup> Max Boot, “Statement Before The House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities”, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 29 June 2006), available at [http://www.cfr.org/publication/11027/statement\\_before\\_the\\_house\\_armed\\_services\\_subcommittee\\_on\\_terrorism\\_unconventional\\_threats\\_and\\_capabilities.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11027/statement_before_the_house_armed_services_subcommittee_on_terrorism_unconventional_threats_and_capabilities.html); Internet, accessed 31 July 2006.
- <sup>68</sup> For a more detailed explanation of this idea, see Christopher J. Holshek, “Interdisciplinary Peace Operations Professional Development: Investing in Long-Term Peace Operations Success”, *The Cornwallis Group VII: Analysis for Compliance in Peace-Building*, eds. Alexander Woodcock and David Davis (Cornwallis Park, Nova Scotia: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2004, esp. 68-70).
- <sup>69</sup> Gen. Tommy Franks, with Malcolm McConnell, *American Soldier*, (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 336-340.
- <sup>70</sup> See: United States Institute of Peace Special Report 147, *Provisional Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations in International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, September 2005), available at: [www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org); Internet; accessed 12 December 2005; and Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick R. Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations”, *Military Review*, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, July-August 2005), 4-17, available at: [www.leavenworth.army.mil/MILREV](http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/MILREV); Internet, accessed 12 January 2006.
- <sup>71</sup> *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DoD*, 6.
- <sup>72</sup> See Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1994). For a detailed explanation of what a learning organization is, see especially Part II. See also Karen Guttieri, “Unlearning War”, in *Organizational Learning in the Global Context*, M. Leann Brown, eds. Michael Kenney, and Michael Zarkin, (London: Ashgate, 2006).
- <sup>73</sup> Col. David G. Paschal, “Irregular Warfare: Impact on Future Professional Military Education”, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Research Project, March 2006), 23.