

Evolving U.S. Government Interagency Transformational Diplomacy Doctrine

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Mr. Lidy retired from the U.S. Army after 20 years of service and continues to work on defense related projects as a civilian. He joined the Institute for Defense Analyses in October 1986 and serves as a Project Leader for tasks supporting the Unified Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has authored more than 75 reports and studies. Recent projects include providing analytical support to Joint Forces Command for its joint and combined interagency experimentation, providing support to the Combatant Command exercise programs, and engagement activities supporting the European Command's Black Sea Initiative and civil-military emergency planning in the Balkans. Mr. Lidy also deployed to Bosnia in November 1995 as a member of the team that assessed the Federation forces and recommended to the Secretary of Defense actions to equip and train them, and assisted the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq with metrics for operations not related to security. Military service includes assignments as a fixed and rotary wing aviator, staff officer, and commander of aviation units within infantry divisions and non-divisional aircraft maintenance and supply units in Europe and Vietnam, and he has more than 1,250 combat flight hours. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and received an M.S. in Operations Research from the Georgia Institute of Technology.

ABSTRACT

One of the major objectives of the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* is to transform the U.S. Government's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century. This paper identifies recent institutional reforms that have been implemented by various departments and agencies in response to this strategic objective. These reforms, however, are taking place within department and agency stovepipes without an interagency doctrine to integrate the processes and organizations or to link them to the other national security objectives.

The paper proposes how these reforms might be incorporated into an interagency doctrine that can improve existing capabilities that de-conflict and coordinate department and agency activities into a capability that provides government-wide coherence to planning and execution of what the Secretary of State has termed *transformational diplomacy*: "To work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system."

INTRODUCTION

The current National Security Strategy¹ of the United States identifies nine essential tasks. One of those tasks is to “Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century.” The focus of this paper is on how recent actions to meet that goal can be brought together to establish interagency doctrine for carrying out transformational diplomacy, including the special case of reconstructing and stabilizing an affected nation.

RECENT TRANSFORMATIONS

THE COORDINATOR FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

On 27 April 2004, the Principals Committee of National Security Council (NSC) authorized the Department of State (DoS) to establish an office to manage interagency civilian post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations. The position of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization² (S/CRS), reporting directly to the Secretary of State, was established on 1 July 2004.

The Coordinator is responsible for and authorized to oversee and coordinate civilian post-conflict response activities undertaken by the DoS and other civilian departments and agencies of the U.S. Government (USG) interagency community. The office serves as the focal point for monitoring, planning, staffing, and organizing USG civilian responses to post-conflict contingencies, and as the interface with the military forces in the Department of Defense (DoD). The office looks to future crises rather than ongoing activities, and is to provide clearly defined and prepared options for intervention contingencies; maintain a surge capacity for deployment across a range of situations; support the DoS regional bureaus; and coordinate the USG civilian response as required.

During his briefing at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, Ambassador Carlos Pascual indicated that the mission for his office was to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”³ This mission statement extends S/CRS responsibilities into the prevention of situations that may lead to conflict.

The S/CRS has established a standing Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) within the NSC framework and assembled a number of sub-PCCs to develop the concept of operations and organizational entities to implement the concept. The organizational arrangements and various entities are shown in Figure 1.

¹ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, March 2006.

² Action Memorandum: *Establishing a Coordination Function at State for Civilian Post-Conflict Operations*, 9 June 2004.

³ Briefing: *Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)*, 13 December 2004 with 21 November 2005 sub-PCC updates.




Figure 1: USG Reconstruction and Stabilization Organizations and Concept of Operations.

Prior to a declaring a contingency, the Standing PCC for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations (PCC-RSO) and its sub-PCCs, with representation from appropriate departments and agencies, develop the supporting mechanisms and organizational framework to conduct the operations. There are five sectoral and three cross-sector sub-PCCs (shaded in Figure 1).

S/CRS uses the following definitions⁴ for key terms:

- **Stabilization** – *The process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful longer-term development.*
- **Reconstruction** – *The process of rebuilding the political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory where it has been damaged or destroyed to create the foundation for longer-term development.*
- **Viable Peace** – *The point in a conflict transformation process at which the means and motivations for conflict are sufficiently diminished and local institutional capacity is sufficiently developed to allow international actors to pass the lead to local actors without the country falling back into conflict. Otherwise stated, the country should be beyond major conflict and beyond major security, political, and economic reliance on foreign interveners so that future transformation of the country to a free market democracy is largely and increasingly in the hand of benign, credible local authorities.*

⁴ Briefing: S/CRS at the Civil-Military Interface, 21 November 2005.

- Sustainable Development – *Continued economic and social progress that rests on four key principles: improved quality of life for both current and future generations; responsible stewardship of the natural resource base; broad-based participation in political and economic life; and effective institutions which are transparent, accountable, responsive, and capable of managing change without relying on continued external support. The ultimate measure of success of sustainable development programs is to reach a point where improvements in the quality of life and environment are such that external assistance is no longer necessary and can be replaced with new forms of diplomacy, cooperation, and commerce.*

When a country-specific crisis occurs, the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), a country-specific PCC formed for the crisis, is established on the recommendation of the Secretary of State. It is formed from the PCC-RSO and the Regional PCC in whose area the affected nation is located. The CRSG will deploy the Humanitarian, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Team (HRST) to the appropriate geographic Combatant Command (COCOM) and the staff of the command and the HRST will develop the country-specific reconstruction and stabilization plan, integrating the civilian and military resources to achieve the objectives mandated by the NSC Principals Committee.

When conditions permit, the CRSG will deploy an Advance Civilian Team-Headquarters (ACT-HQ) and a number of Advance Civilian Teams-Tactical (ACTs-Tac). The ACT-HQ will collocate with and support an existing U.S. embassy or serve that function until one can be established. The ACT-Tac will operate in conjunction with tactical military forces because of the need for security.

Although not yet part of the concept, it is likely that Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), like those currently deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq, will be deployed when security conditions permit and operate within the affected nation's administrative boundaries while tactical forces and the ACTs-Tac move to less secure tactical areas or redeploy.

The five sectoral sub-PCCs have developed separate *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task Lists* (PCRETLs). The lists identify the scope of the potential effort that may be required. This list will be tailored to the country-specific contingency because all tasks may not be required, or additional tasks may be found necessary based on the specific conditions in the affected nation.

CHANGES REFLECTED IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The National Security Strategy was updated in March 2006 and outlines two related transformations. The first is the Transformational Diplomacy initiative:

“To work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.”⁵

⁵ Op cit, page 33.

The second significant transformation provides the organizational capability to accomplish transformational diplomacy. The new position of Director for Foreign Assistance (DFA) at DoS was established in January 2006. The incumbent, who has already been confirmed by the U.S. Senate, also serves simultaneously as an equivalent Deputy Secretary of State and the Administrator for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The DFA will:

- Have authority over all DoS and USAID foreign assistance funding within an integrated interagency planning, coordination, and implementation mechanism.
- Develop a coordinated USG foreign assistance strategy, including five-year, country-specific assistance strategies and annual country-specific assistance operational plans.
- Create and direct consolidated policy, planning, budget, and implementation mechanisms, and staff functions required to provide umbrella leadership to foreign assistance.
- Provide guidance to foreign assistance delivered through other agencies and entities of the USG, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator.
- Direct the required transformation of the USG approach to foreign assistance in order to achieve the President's Transformational Development Goals.⁶

PUBLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 44

In December 2005, the President issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) – *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*. This directive assigns responsibilities for management of interagency reconstruction and stabilization efforts, and establishes as U.S. policy the role of the interagency community when “assisting the stabilization and reconstruction of countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies.” It further specifies that the U.S. should work with other nations and organizations to anticipate state failures, avoid them whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary.

The directive assigns the Secretary of State responsibility and authority to coordinate and lead integrated USG efforts involving all U.S. departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare and plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization activities. The DFA and S/CRS have major responsibilities for coordinating and complying with the actions mandated in NSPD-44.

Other executive departments and agencies with programs and personnel that may be able to assist in addressing the relevant challenges will:

⁶ Fact Sheet: *New Director for U.S. Foreign Assistance*, 19 January 2006.

- Coordinate with S/CRS their budgets for reconstruction and stabilization activities.
- Identify, develop, and provide S/CRS with relevant information on capabilities and assets.
- Identify and develop internal capabilities for planning and for resource and program management that can be mobilized in response to crises.
- Identify within each agency current and former civilian employees skilled in crisis response, including employees employed by contract, and establish under each agency's authorities mechanisms to reassign or reemploy skilled personnel and mobilize associated resources rapidly in response to crises.
- Assist in identifying situations of concern, developing action and contingency plans, responding to crises that occur, assessing lessons learned, and undertaking other efforts and initiatives to ensure a coordinated U.S. response and effective international reconstruction and stabilization efforts.
- Designate appropriate senior USG officials and government experts as points of contact to participate in relevant task forces, planning processes, gaming exercises, training, after-action reviews, and other essential tasks.
- Make available personnel on a non-reimbursable basis, as appropriate and feasible, to work as part of the S/CRS Office and develop additional personnel exchanges, as appropriate, across departments and agencies to increase interoperability for reconstruction and stabilization operations.

The directive also requires coordination between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to integrate reconstruction and stabilization plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate. The Secretaries are required to develop a general framework for fully coordinating reconstruction and stabilization activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate.

To maintain clear accountability and responsibility for any given contingency response or reconstruction and stabilization mission, lead and supporting responsibilities for departments and agencies will be designated under mechanisms outlined in NSPD-1, *Organization of the National Security Council System*, issued in February 2001, and may be re-designated as transitions are required.

NSPD-44 does not affect the authority of:

- The Secretary of Defense or the command relationships established for the Armed Forces of the U.S.
- The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
- The President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance.

The directive officially establishes the functional PCC for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations and supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 56, 20 May 1997, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*.

Given the definition of Transformational Diplomacy, one of the key measures signaling the need for intervention is the degree to which the affected nation can self-govern in accordance with accepted international norms. Although repressive and rogue states have the capacity to self-govern, they typically cause instability within the affected nation and in the region. Typically, they require forceful intervention to change behavior and capacity.

Figure 2 illustrates the life cycle of an intervention within the construct of Transformational Diplomacy. It starts from the point when the affected nation's decline in governance capacity is noted by the international community and continues until the desired end state of peer status⁷ is achieved.




Figure 2: Life Cycle of an International Intervention.

Coalition intervention can follow two paths. In Scenario 1, the affected nation responds to peaceful coalition intervention measures.⁸ This form of intervention employs internationally coordinated foreign aid (civilian-led) and theater security cooperation (military-led) programs designed to strengthen the institutions of government and society in the affected nation.

In Scenario 2, the coalition's attempt to resolve the decaying situation peacefully has not been successful, and its members collectively seek authorization through a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) to use force, if necessary, to change the affected nation's behavior. In both cases, the international coalition seeks to reach an acceptable level of improvement within the affected nation before turning over longer-term development to a

⁷ *Peer Status* – A state recognized by other sovereign states as an equal, and one that governs in accordance with accepted international standards. (Source: Stipulated).

⁸ *Peaceful Intervention Measures* – International intervention in an affected nation with the consent of the nation, to conduct developmental and security cooperation programs that increase capacity to self-govern in accordance with accepted international standards.

United Nations-led organization such as the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission⁹ (UNPBC), United Nations Trusteeship Council¹⁰ (UNTC), or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Figure 2 also identifies a number of possible triggers¹¹ that could be used to monitor the status before and during an intervention. The triggers are pre-established metrics that take account of the dynamic environment and measure the status of self-governing capacity within the affected nation. When a trigger is reached, the coalition will need to take decisive action to transform the operational environment. Table 1 summarizes the types of metrics each of the triggers in the figure might represent, the preeminent coalition authority following the decision, and the decision the coalition authorities would likely make.

Trigger	Metric	Preeminence	Coalition Decision
1	Affected nation no longer functions as a peer	<i>Coalition Civilian</i>	Willing nations form coalition and collaborate and coordinate the design of specific peaceful intervention programs
2	Affected nation continues decline	<i>Coalition Civilian</i>	Coalition of willing decides to intervene
3	Affected nation does not respond to intervention actions	<i>Transition from Coalition Civilian to Military</i>	Coalition requests use of force, if required
4	Affected nation accepts or rejects Coalition attempts at peaceful resolution	<i>Military</i>	Conflict, peace enforcement, or peacekeeping based on affected nation response
5	Conflict ended or peace operation in effect	<i>Military</i>	Stability and reconstruction operations begin
6	Sufficient stability	<i>Transition from Coalition Military to Civilian</i>	Stability and domestic security sector capacity adequate to enable Coalition civilian lead
7	Stability and reconstruction sufficient	<i>Transition from Coalition Civilian to UN lead</i>	Transition from coalition civilian to UNPBC, UNTC, or UNDP lead

Table 1: Possible Triggers for Intervention Decisions.

⁹ The *Peacebuilding Commission* was established on 20 December 2005, and is intended to pick up the international effort in such countries when peacekeeping missions are completing their tasks of bringing fighting to an end and monitoring cease-fires. The new commission will have 31 members. Seven, including the 5 veto-holding permanent members, will come from the 15-member Security Council; 7 from the 54-nation Economic and Social Council; 5 from the 10 top contributors to the United Nations; 5 from the 10 nations that supply the most troops for peacekeeping missions; and 7 chosen to assure geographical balance by regional groupings. Representatives of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other institutional donors will be expected to attend meetings.

¹⁰ The *UN Trusteeship Council* was originally established to administer trust territories and facilitate their decolonization and independence. The organization has become dormant with its last session held in May 1993. East Timor and Kosovo have been handled by an *ad hoc* process under leadership of Special Representatives of the Secretary General and UN Missions. The council could be one of the options for overseeing the transformation of an affected nation to peer status.

¹¹ *Trigger* – A pre-established metric that measures the current status and when achieved, prompts the intervening coalition to take corrective action. (Source: Stipulated)

PUBLICATION OF DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.05

Based on the Defense Science Board recommendations¹² to institutionalize stability operations within the DoD, the anticipated publication of NSPD-44, and the changes in the National Security Strategy described earlier, the DoD published its directive, DoDD 3000.05 *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, in November 2005. The directive is intended to provide guidance to the department on stability operations as it develops joint operating concepts, mission sets, and applies lessons that have been identified in similar operations. The directive also establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission and are given priority comparable to combat operations. The policy will be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

DoDD 3000.05 defines two key terms.

- Stability Operations — *Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish and maintain order in States and regions.*
- Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) — *DoD activities that support USG plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction, and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interest.*

The DoD definition of stability operations extends from peacetime to conflict, but is limited in scope to establishing and maintaining order. The S/CRS definition of stabilization implies an extension from peacetime through post-conflict periods until the conditions for longer-term development are met, and envisions a process to manage the range of tensions that could lead to violence and breakdown in law and order. These distinctions are important for establishing the roles of the civilian and military partners in reconstruction and stabilization operations.

EVOLUTION OF TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY DOCTRINE

These recent directives and transformations of the national security institutions are intended to improve the USG capabilities to carry out the President's transformational diplomacy and reconstruction and stabilization policies. Because there are 15 Executive Departments and over 100 agencies, boards, and commissions with more than 4.8 million military and civilian employees, the response to these directives will require close collaboration and coordination among the affected organizations, and a unifying doctrine.

¹² *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within the DoD*, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, September 2005.

The definition of doctrine includes “*a body of principles in a branch of knowledge; a statement of fundamental government policy.*” The DoD refines this general definition, as it applies to the military forces, and defines doctrine as “*fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.*”¹³ In both definitions, the underlying foundation of doctrine is a set of agreed principles that establish the cornerstone for linking and guiding the organizations and processes as they carry out the doctrine.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERVENTION

Throughout history, people have sought to understand why successful commanders win their battles. Successful military leaders don’t have a formula. Instead, they follow certain principles. They learn from experience that if they select and apply the correct principles, their chances of success are high. On the other hand, if they ignore the principles, or even a single vital principle, their chances of failure are high. These principles are now known as the *Principles of War*,¹⁴ and have become the intellectual core of the art of war and strategy.

As a complement to the *Principles of War*, the DoD has also defined six basic principles to follow when employing its resources while conducting the full range of Military Operations Other Than War¹⁵ (MOOTW).

The Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in May 2005 unveiled nine principles of development and reconstruction,¹⁶ which were inspired by military doctrine and patterned on the *Principles of War*. Like the *Principles of War*, the *Nine Principles of Development and Reconstruction* have evolved out of the study of history. The principles attempt to distill fundamental lessons learned and bring greater clarity to the operative principles that inform the mission of USAID. With a similar focus, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has recently developed a set of principles for good international engagement in fragile states.¹⁷

Because the conditions and environments within troubled nations vary, each intervention has been different than the others. Recent experience has shown that in today’s complex political-military environment, military forces, aid workers, and diplomats frequently find themselves intervening in an affected nation along with other coalition members. Each coalition partner – whether military or civilian – contributes to a part of the multidimensional solution for the complex contingency intervention.

¹³ Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

¹⁴ Joint Pub 3-0 *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 10 September 2001.

¹⁵ Joint Pub 3-07 identifies the following operations as MOOTW: arms control, combating terrorism, support to counter-drug operations, enforcement of sanctions, maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, nation assistance, support to counterinsurgency, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations (including peacekeeping, peace enforcement, preventative diplomacy, peace making, and peace building), protection of shipping, recovery operations, show of force, strikes and raids, and support to insurgency.

¹⁶ “USAID FrontLines,” May 2005.

¹⁷ *Piloting the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States*, 11 August 2005.

Many lessons have been identified from recent international civil-military interventions, but despite substantial investment of resources, few operations have been completely successful. By analyzing successes and failures, a proposed set of principles for interagency intervention operations has been derived and is listed in Table 2.

Principle	Description
Collaborate and Coordinate	Identify the coalition members and cooperate with all partners, including the affected nation authorities, and harmonize plans and actions to achieve synergy and agreed objectives.
Communicate	Employ all elements of information activities – public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and information operations – in an integrated and coordinated manner to inform or influence key audiences in the affected nation, the region, and partner nations on the policies, objectives, and status of the operation.
Share Information	Convey among coalition partners knowledge of, or information about, the current situation and future activities in a timely and understandable form.
Build Local Capacity	Involve affected nation personnel in reconstruction and stabilization activities and mentor their progress to self-sustaining capacity.
Unity of Effort	Bring into a common action the efforts of all coalition partners.
Simplicity	Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans consistent with the objectives and priorities of the affected nation.
Security	Security involves a range of actors – the military and the police; the judicial and penal systems; the ministries of foreign affairs, trade, and commerce; and civil society organizations – and is achieved when transparency, the rule of law, accountability and informed debate, and reinforcing legislative capacity for adequate oversight of security systems have been achieved.
Protect Human Rights	Do no harm and ensure the affected population has the fundamental right to individual dignity and specific freedoms of life, liberty, security, subsistence, and other guarantees to which all humans are guaranteed.
Minimum Necessary Force	Apply the measured and proportionate application of violence or coercion, sufficient only to achieve a specific objective and confined in effect to the legitimate target intended.

Table 2: Proposed Principles of Interagency Intervention Operations.

WHEN ARE INTERVENTIONS NECESSARY?

The reason for conducting interventions is because the troubled state has a problem that is affecting its neighbors or causing extreme anguish and turbulence within its borders. There are no internationally agreed criteria established for determining when peer nations should conduct intervention in a troubled nation.¹⁸ Furthermore, while a modern nation can be troubled and become unstable for a number of reasons, there is no agreement on the potential causes that might require intervention. However, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has developed definitions¹⁹ for various conditions that have recently caused instability in troubled nations, and that have prompted interventions by the international community. These definitions are listed in Table 3.

¹⁸ The USG attempted to establish criteria for making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support, and the criteria are documented in PDD-25 *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, May 1994.

¹⁹ *Reintegration in the Transition from War to Peace*, 19 September 1997.

Class	Definition
Failed State	A state lacking centralized authority and in a situation of general anarchy, such that there is no authority to provide effective national protection.
Weak State	A state that has a semblance of authority but is unable to exercise effective power over all of its territory. Authority may be limited geographically, or in terms of the ability to carry out state functions (e.g., provision of services, or maintenance of law and order).
Conflicted or Contested State	A state that is not necessarily weak, but in which there is a conflict between groups for control of the state or specific geographic areas within the state. The state may be willing to extend national protection only to persons from particular groups or regions.
Repressive State	A state, which exercises authority, but does not extend protection to all of its citizens. Repressive states command strong central authority, and are able to crush potential rebellions and outbreaks of violent conflict.
Rogue State	A repressive state that seeks to exert influence over other states or regions by threatening to or actually developing, testing, and fielding weapons of mass destruction and threatening their use. (Source: Stipulated)
Troubled State	A general category for a state, which for internal reasons has attracted the attention of the international community as a possible location for intervention, including states against which international sanctions are being enforced (Source: Stipulated)

Table 3: Classification of Troubled States.

The ability to discern when a state is troubled, who should take appropriate action to mitigate the situation, and what strategy should be undertaken to achieve the desired outcome are key questions that intervention doctrine should address. One method that might help focus thinking is to ask two questions. The first question (Q1): “is there a legitimate state?” The second question (Q2): “are state institutions effective?” Answers are either yes or no, and the matrix shown in Figure 3 points to who decides.




Figure 3: Governing Response Matrix.

In a situation where the response to both Q1 and Q2 is yes, the affected nation is responsible for discerning and taking action to deal with its internal problems. The state institutions may need international assistance if the domestic illicit power structures²⁰ (IPS) challenging its authority have a strong foothold and international links providing support.

²⁰ *Illicit Power Structure* – An organized group of individuals operating within an affected nation or across its recognized boundaries, which is not sanctioned by law or is unlawful. (Source: Stipulated)

If the responses are Q1-no and Q2-yes, the affected nation is likely to be a rogue or repressive state with strong institutions that are able to suppress the IPS, as well as those individuals and organizations that challenge the legitimacy of its authority. The issue in this situation is what are the specific metrics that are likely to trigger an international coalition intervention to mitigate the problem?

If the responses are Q1-yes and Q2-no, the international coalition should be able to assume responsibility for addressing the problems, but using mostly peaceful means (foreign aid and security cooperation initiatives) to strengthen the capacities of the affected nation's institutions.

Finally, if the responses to both questions are no, the international coalition will need to take action to fill the governance vacuum that otherwise will present the IPS with the opportunity to seize control and transform the affected nation into a rogue or repressive state. Actions to fill the vacuum are likely to require forceful intervention²¹ accompanied by stability and reconstruction operations carried out by the coalition until state institutions can take control.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT STRATEGY?

The summary of responsibilities and possible strategies for each case are listed in Table 4.

Case	Responsibility	Strategy
1	Affected nation	With the consent of the affected nation, the coalition provides assistance to strengthen governance capacity
2	Coalition must act to change the rogue or repressive state	Intervention using indirect (e.g., sanctions, blockades) or direct (e.g., forcible entry, take-down) actions; Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO) likely
3	Coalition must strengthen affected nation's institutions	With the consent of the affected nation, the coalition provides assistance, but may have to take over some state functions
4	Coalition must take over and restore affected nation capacity to self-govern	Coalition intervention may be peaceful if factions agree to coalition receivership, or it may be forcible if chaos exist; SRO likely

Table 4: Identification of Responsibilities and Possible Strategies for Intervention.

A more refined approach, based on the core functions of a peer nation, should provide answers to: (a) whether, and when, a coalition intervention is appropriate, and (b) the types of intervention that will be needed. Such an approach might be able to establish international norms for the core functions of a modern state and the quantitative criteria that measure the shift from acceptable international norms to unacceptable standards that require coalition intervention. The Overseas Development Institute has recently proposed ten core functions of the state²² summarized in Table 5. If agreement on these functions can be reached and developed into quantitative metrics, it should provide an important step in determining when coalition intervention is needed and the appropriate response to the return the state to peer status.

²¹ *Forceful Intervention Measures* – An intervention authorized by the UN Security Council that uses military force, or the threat of force, to change the governing environment in an affected nation. (Source: Stipulated)

²² Working Paper 253 Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State Building, September 2005.

Legitimate monopoly on the means of violence
Administrative control
Management of public finances
Investment in human capital
Delineation of citizenship rights and duties
Provision of infrastructure services
Formation of the market
Management of the state's assets, including the environment, natural resources, and cultural arts
International relations, including entering into international contracts and public borrowing
Rule of law

Table 5: Ten Functions of the State.

WHO ARE THE POTENTIAL COALITION PARTNERS?

Once the USG has established its interagency doctrine for interventions, including the processes and organizations that enable implementation, the doctrine still needs to establish a transparent and predictable process to effect collaboration and coordination with other coalition partners. The partners are likely to represent both military and civilian organizations, and just as important, they are likely to include governmental and non-governmental organizations. Figure 4 places the affected nation in the center of the bull's eye and overlays it with the various coalition partners in their appropriate quadrant.




Figure 4: Potential Coalition Partners.

At the top are governmental organizations including the potential donor nations and the Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) established by the sovereign governments. IGOs include the United Nations Organization and System, as well as other international or regional organizations such as the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The donor nations provide the military resources and civilian development and humanitarian resources. The IGOs are organized and resourced to carry out their mandates assigned by the nations that formed them. The International Humanitarian Organizations (IHOs) are both civilian and non-governmental, but unlike other Non-

Governmental Organizations (NGOs), they are formed and operate as sovereign entities under International Humanitarian Law.²³ The Non-Governmental group includes both the NGO humanitarian and development organizations and the business community, including Private Military Corporations (PMCs), which play an increasingly important role during intervention operations.

The authority, mandates, and responsibilities of the many partners also vary. Authority forms the legal basis for all organizations operating in the environment, and along with the mandate has an impact on what, how, where, and why an organization does something. Organizations are also responsible or accountable to some authority for the actions they take. Governments are responsible to their legislatures and public. The IGOs and IHOs are responsible to their member states or donors, respectively. NGOs are responsible to their boards of directors and their donors, whether donors are private citizens, governmental agencies, or IGOs.

During intervention planning, the *principal coalition members*²⁴ – the member nations and the appropriate IGOs and IHOs – will play key roles in deciding if and when an intervention is needed, developing options for conducting the operation, and reaching consensus on specific actions for conducting the intervention. The coalition member nations will also plan, organize, and fund the necessary resources – both civilian and military – and manage their contribution to the intervention. The *coalition implementing partners*²⁵ may include national civilian or military assets, those of the United Nation System²⁶ or other relevant global or regional IGOs, the IHOs, as well as NGOs and other contractors from the business community. The principal coalition members will need to collaborate and coordinate with the implementing partners; for non-governmental entities, this usually will occur after the key political-military decisions have been made and required resources have been identified and funded.

INTEGRATED INTERAGENCY INTERVENTION PLANNING

Another aspect of this doctrine is how the possible strategy for intervention will be developed and implemented by the coalition principals. When addressing a complex problem such as a coalition intervention, it is necessary to break the operation into subgroups or phases of activities that are distinguishably different so that the actions and resources of the various

²³ *International Humanitarian Law* – Initially a term used to refer to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, but now is a generic term to refer to the entire law of armed conflict. Deals with such matters as use of weapons and other means of warfare, the treatment of war victims by the enemy, and generally the direct impact of war on human life and liberty, protection of noncombatants and those presumed incapable of bearing arms and committing acts of hostility. (Source: Black's Law Dictionary at <http://search.zimply.com/black's-law-dictionary.html>).

²⁴ *Principal Coalition Members* – The nations that have joined the coalition and the relevant Inter-Governmental Organizations and International Humanitarian Organizations that plan, organize, fund, and manage an intervention. (Source: Stipulated).

²⁵ *Coalition Implementing Partners* – The civilian and military elements of coalition member nations, the field elements of relevant Inter-Governmental Organizations and International Humanitarian Organizations, and Non-Governmental Organizations and for profit contractors funded and managed by the principal coalition members to carry out intervention tasks. (Source: Stipulated).

²⁶ *United Nations System* – Includes the entities that comprise the United Nations Organization and the programs and funds, specialized agencies, and other related organizations, which have been brought into relationships with one another under the aegis of the UN Charter.

coalition partners can be planned and synchronized. Based on developed cultures and experiences, each USG department and agency, and multinational and multilateral partner is likely to have a different perspective on phasing. Because phasing is an artificial construct to facilitate planning, during execution the phases and application of resources often overlap or occur simultaneously. Some examples of different USG department and agency phasing perspectives follow.

The DoD currently has approved a planning process for its military forces that uses six phases²⁷ (0 through V) for its intervention operations, and doctrinal publications are being revised to reflect these phases.

The U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Generic Political-Military Plan²⁸ (GPMP) is currently used during ongoing experiments to coordinate the USG interagency community during complex contingencies involving the full range of national power, not just military forces. The GPMP template identifies seven phases (I through VII) for complex contingencies.

At the National Security Workshop sponsored by JFCOM²⁹ held on 1 November 2005, the Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance described USAID's transition strategy for reconstruction in three stages.³⁰

Given the disparate agency responsibilities and phases, the challenge is to integrate the military and civilian phasing to represent an interagency sequencing that facilitates agency planning, and at the same time retains the overall interagency perspective for the operation.

The challenge is even greater because there are at least two scenarios described earlier that these operations must take into account as the USG and its coalition partners eliminate the conditions that caused the nation to become a troubled state, and return it to a self-governing status in a state of viable peace.

Table 6 summarizes possible phasing for planning USG interagency interventions. The department and agency phases have been mapped into the proposed interagency phases for both scenarios shown earlier in Figure 2.

²⁷ Working draft revision to Joint Pub 3-0, May 2005.

²⁸ *Generic Political-Military Plan for Multilateral Complex Contingency Operations*, 18 July 2002.

²⁹ The objectives of the National Security Workshops are to shape and prioritize the concept development and experimentation activities that support transformation of the Joint Force. It is being conducted in several parts. The common theme developed during Part 1 focused on the need for a coherent, integrated USG planning capability. Part 2, held on 1 November 2005, addressed these planning issues by using a notional framework for USG planning to facilitate the discussion. The collective efforts of this workshop series will contribute to the continuing effort to develop a framework for rapid coherent planning and coordination of interagency and multinational actions. Additionally, the workshops will inform the political-military development process for the 2015-2020 timeframe to support the FY07 and FY08 experimentation program.

³⁰ Briefing: "Planning Experience – Interagency Integration Prospects," November 1, 2005.

Interagency	DoD	GPMP	USAID Stages	Affected Nation
A: Engagement	Shape thru Theater Security Cooperation	N/A	Development	Peer Status National Government Runs Nation
B: Identification and Assessment	Continue to Shape	Assessment and Preparation	Continue focused Development	Troubled State
C Attempt to change Affected nation; prepare for intervention	Deter	<i>Case 1</i>		
		Continue to Shape and Develop capabilities	Continue focused Development	Responds to deterrence measures and avoids conflict
		<i>Case 2</i>		
D: Forcible entry	<i>Case 1</i>			
	Transition to Phase F	Transition to Phase F	Transition to Phase F	Transition to Phase F
	<i>Case 2</i>			
E: Combat to defeat military and change government	<i>Case 1</i>			
	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
	<i>Case 2</i>			
F: Post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations	<i>Case 1</i>			
	Build and Sustain National Capacity	Build and Sustain National Capacity	Build and Sustain National Capacity	Build and Sustain National Capacity
	<i>Case 2</i>			
G: Build national capacity to govern and self-sustain	<i>Cases 1 & 2</i>			<i>Case 1</i>
	Enable Civil Authority	Post-Conflict Peace-Building, Transition, and Military Force Restructuring	Stage II Build and Sustain Systems	Transition to Phase H
				<i>Case 2</i> Coalition Civil Authorities Run the Government
H: Transition to Affected nation governance with international mentors	<i>Cases 1 and 2</i>			<i>Case 1</i>
	Enable Civil Authority	Durable Peace	Stage III Consolidate National Capacity	National Government Runs Nation
				<i>Case 2</i> National Government Assumes Control, Coalition Civil-Military Authorities Mentor
A: Return to Engagement	Shape thru Theater Security Cooperation	Self-Sustaining Peace	Development	Peer status National Government Runs

Interagency	DoD	GPMP	USAID Stages	Affected Nation
				Nation

Table 6: Proposed USG Phases of Interagency Intervention Planning.

HIERARCHY OF TRANSPARENT PLANS

To facilitate integration of planning and execution, the doctrine for USG intervention should establish a tier of interagency documents, including the guidance from senior leadership at the strategic echelon, which can be used to formulate department- and agency-specific plans to support the interagency objectives. One example of such a tier of interagency documents, their authors and approval authorities, and key content of the documents are summarized in Table 7.

Product	Author	Content
Strategic Objectives of the Intervention (SOI)	Drafted by the CRSG based on guidance from the NSC Principals; approved by the NSC Principles	One paragraph statement of the Strategic Objectives for the planned intervention
National Political-Military Plan (NPMP)	Drafted by the CRSG and approved by the NSC Deputies Committee	Five to seven page plan outlining the major tasks to achieve the Strategic Objectives, key assumptions, the estimated timeline, and the collaboration and coordination architecture ³¹ for the operation
Civil-Military Campaign Plan (CMCP)	Drafted jointly by the HRST and RCC staff; approved by the CRSG	The coordinated actions, phasing, the command and control/collaboration and coordination architectures, including coalition partners and the affected nation government
CMCP Annex A Civilian Operations	Drafted by the HRST and coordinated with the RCC staff; approved by the CRSG	The civilian tasks, resources, organizational arrangements, metrics, and reporting requirements
CMCP Annex B Military Operations	Drafted by the RCC staff and coordinated with the HRST; approved by the CRSG	The military tasks, resources, organizational arrangements, metrics, and reporting requirements

Table 7: Proposed Interagency Documentation to Support Interventions.

The annexes to the interagency CMCP should be organized to reflect the focus of the Reconstruction and Stabilization PCC working groups so that the tasks, metrics, and information collection processes reflect the strategic interagency guidance from the NPMP. Both annexes should support development of department and agency plans and include the following interagency sectoral and crosscutting appendixes:

- Appendix 1 – Response Strategy and Resource Management.
- Appendix 2 – Conflict Prevention and Mitigation.
- Appendix 3 – Transitional Security and Rule of Law.

³¹ *Collaboration and Coordination Architecture (C2A)* – The plan for linking together disparate autonomous civilian, military, governmental, and non-governmental organizations to facilitate information sharing, planning, and direction of organizations and activities to achieve harmonious and effective results to achieve a common goal. (Source: Stipulated)

- Appendix 4 – Governance and Participation.
- Appendix 5 – Humanitarian Response and Social Well-being.
- Appendix 6 – Economic and Infrastructure Reconstruction.
- Appendix 7 – Monitoring, Analysis, and Intelligence.
- Appendix 8 – Strategic Communications/.

The tasks in the CMCP and its annexes will need to include the appropriate tasks from the *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task List* as well as those from the DoD's *Universal Joint Task List*³² (UJTL). This collaboration and coordination between civilian and military partners is especially critical for security system reform.³³

THE WAY AHEAD

The recent transformations and recommended principles and processes should be combined into draft interagency doctrine for transformational diplomacy and evaluated during the Joint Forces Command-sponsored interagency experiment, Unified Action 2007. The results of that experimentation can then be used to modify the draft doctrine in time for Multinational Experiment 5, scheduled for 2008, so that the doctrine can be evaluated in the multinational and multilateral environment. Once the experimentation results have been adapted, the USG and its coalition partners should have transparent processes and common understanding of how the organizations and processes fit together and lead to unity of effort.

³² CJCSM 3500.04D *Universal Joint Task List* (UJTL), Joint Staff, 1 August 2005.

³³ *Security system reform* – The transformation of the “security system” – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework. While some donors use the term Security Sector Reform, this has led to confusion by some donors as to whether this pertains only to armed forces or the whole system of actors working on security related issues, thus the adoption of Security System Reform. According to this definition the security system includes:

- Core security actors: armed forces; police; gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defense forces, national guards, militias).
- Security management and oversight bodies: the Executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defense, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit and planning units); and civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions)
- Justice and law enforcement institutions: judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems.
- Non-statutory security forces, with whom donors rarely engage: liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private bodyguard units; private security companies; political party militias.

Security reform includes promoting transparency, the rule of law, accountability and informed debate, and reinforcing legislative capacity for adequate oversight of security systems. Security reform involves a range of actors from the military and the police, to judicial and penal systems, ministries of foreign affairs, trade, commerce and civil society organizations. Transitional justice is also an integral part of the security system. (Source: DAC/OECD, *DAC Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (2001)* and DAC/OECD, *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice, (May 2004)* <http://www.oecd.org/ldataoecd/26/44/31870339.pdf>)

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