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# Snapshot of Emerging U.S. Government Civilian Capabilities to Support Foreign Reconstruction and Stabilization Contingencies: Working Draft of the Executive Summary from IDA Document D-3269<sup>1</sup>

A. Martin Lidy, Project Leader  
David J. Baratto  
Daniel R. Langberg  
William J. Shelby

Presented at Cornwallis XII by Daniel R. Langberg

Institute for Defense Analyses  
Alexandria, Virginia, U.S.A.  
e-mail: dlangber@ida.org

*Daniel R. Langberg is an Adjunct Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses where he has worked on issues of national security, foreign engagements, and interagency affairs since 2005. Daniel is currently acting as Assistant to the Executive Director and Project Historian for the Project on National Security Reform, a non-partisan initiative sponsored by the Center for the Study of the Presidency. Prior to coming to IDA, Daniel worked for the Hudson Institute, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the United States Institute of Peace. Daniel received his Masters Degree in Peace Operations Policy from the School of Public Policy at George Mason University and was awarded the Woodrow Wilson Award for exhibiting exceptional ability, involvement, and promise in the field.*

## ABSTRACT

A number of recent directives and transformation initiatives are intended to improve the U.S. Government (USG) capabilities to carry out the President's transformational diplomacy and reconstruction and stabilization policies outlined in the current National Security Strategy. Because there are 15 Executive Departments and over 100 agencies, boards, and commissions with more than 4.8 million military and civilian employees, the response to these directives as well as any subsequent process and organizational changes will require close collaboration and coordination among the affected organizations, and considerable time to implement.

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<sup>1</sup> This draft executive summary is derived from the draft IDA document D-3269: *A Snapshot of Emerging U.S. Government Civilian Capabilities to Support Foreign Reconstruction and Stabilization Contingencies*, August 2006, and was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in response to tasking by the Director of Joint Experimentation (J-9), U.S. Joint Forces Command in partial fulfillment of the task "Joint Interagency Experimentation Support." Content current as of May 2006.

To ensure that all USG partners in this transformation process have a common understanding of the initial baseline and emerging changes that are being planned, Joint Forces Command tasked the Institute for Defense Analyses to provide a rough capabilities snapshot of where the civilian agencies stand in May 2006. This snapshot describes the civilian capabilities that have actually been employed during recent contingencies as well as those that might be employed under the transformational diplomacy concept in the future.

The research provided the study team with an opportunity to examine the capabilities of most of the USG. From this vantage point, it was possible to identify a number of findings and specific recommendations that could improve the reconstruction and stabilization capabilities of the USG and several observations that could facilitate future transformation efforts. The compiled information serves as the baseline for the JFCOM experimentation program to be conducted over the next two years and supports implementation of Department of Defense Directive 3000.05.

## INTRODUCTION

### OBJECTIVE OF THIS REPORT

A number of recent directives and transformation initiatives are intended to improve U.S. Government (USG) capabilities to carry out the President's transformational diplomacy and reconstruction and stabilization policies outlined in the current National Security Strategy.<sup>2</sup> Because there are 15 Executive Departments and more than 100 agencies, boards, and commissions with more than 4.8 million military and civilian employees, the response to these directives and process and organizational changes will require close collaboration and coordination among the affected organizations, and considerable time to implement.

To ensure that all USG partners in this transformation process have a common understanding of the initial baseline and emerging changes that are being planned, the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) tasked the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to provide a rough snapshot of where civilian agency capabilities stood in May 2006. This snapshot is intended to provide a common picture for the Department of Defense (DoD) and its partners, describing civilian capabilities that have actually been employed during recent contingencies as well as those that might be employed under the transformational diplomacy concept in the future.

The compiled information will serve as the baseline for a JFCOM experimentation program to be conducted over the next 2 years. The program includes two major events: Unified Action, involving the USG interagency community in a whole of government experiment, and Multinational Experiment 5 involving selected multinational and multilateral partners. This document will be used to support Unified Action workshops scheduled for

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<sup>2</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006.

2006 and the DoD will also use the same information during its implementation of Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05.<sup>3</sup>

Three specific tasks were assigned to the IDA study team:

1. Conduct a brief survey of USG resources and programs that can be used for stability, security, and reconstruction of institutions and infrastructure. Specifically,
  - What is the purpose, scope, duration, and size of the department or agency program (e.g., personnel, equipment, supplies, funding) identified by country, or retained on standby for contingency use?
  - What restrictions are placed on the funding or program (e.g., protection of human rights, congressional notification period, employment of capabilities only in the continental United States or only in foreign nations)?
  - How are programs implemented (e.g., through multilateral or bilateral funding), using what resources?
    - Employing department or agency personnel, equipment, and supplies.
    - Employing implementing partners.
      - » Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) such as UN operating agencies (e.g., the World Food Programme (WFP), the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)), or regional organizations such as the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
      - » International Humanitarian Organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).
      - » Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as CARE, OXFAM, and MSF.
      - » For-profit contractors.
2. Evaluate the flexibility of the USG department or agency if planned resources and programs to meet a contingency must be changed because of the evolving

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<sup>3</sup> DoDD 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, 28 November 2005.

conditions. Or, if after resources are deployed, the situation on the ground changes from that planned.

- What contingency funding is immediately available to start a contingency operation? Are these funds annual appropriations or funds that can be carried forward from year to year?
  - How long on average does it take to shift money?
    - *Within* a program or funding line?
    - *Across* programs or funding lines?
  - What is the department or agency experience with obtaining supplemental funding from Congress or from other funds available to the department or agency? What is the average timeline for (a) obtaining supplemental funding and (b) transferring funds within the department or agency?
  - Once funding or programs are shifted (or a supplemental is passed), how long does it take to make an impact on the ground?
3. Explain in general terms the processes used by other USG departments and agencies to shift resources to respond to crises, and how these processes differ.

## BACKGROUND

The current USG National Security Strategy identifies nine essential tasks. One of those tasks is to “Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st Century.” Several recent changes to the national security institutions have been undertaken to meet the emerging challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. The focus of this document is on those actions related to reconstruction and stabilization, and the potential for further transformation among the many departments and agencies within the federal government.

## CHANGES REFLECTED IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The National Security Strategy was updated in March 2006 and outlines several related transformations. The first is the Transformational Diplomacy initiative:

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*“To work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.”<sup>4</sup>*

The second significant transformation provides the organizational capability to accomplish transformational diplomacy. The new position of Director for Foreign Assistance (DFA) at the Department of State (DoS) was established in January 2006. The incumbent, who already has been confirmed by the U.S. Senate, also serves simultaneously as an equivalent Deputy Secretary of State and the Administrator for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The DFA will:

- Have authority over all DoS and USAID foreign assistance funding within an integrated interagency planning, coordination, and implementation mechanism.
- Develop a coordinated USG foreign assistance strategy, including 5-year, country-specific assistance strategies and annual country-specific assistance operational plans.
- Create and direct consolidated policy, planning, budget and implementation mechanisms, and staff functions required to provide umbrella leadership to foreign assistance.
- Provide guidance to foreign assistance delivered through other agencies and entities of the USG, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator.
- Direct the required transformation of the USG approach to foreign assistance to achieve the President’s Transformational Development Goals.<sup>5</sup>

Other diplomatic transformations to support the revised strategy announced by the Secretary of State include the following:

- Global Repositioning: Hundreds of diplomatic personnel will be moved to critical emerging areas over the next few years.
- Regional Focus: Many of today’s challenges are transnational and regional in nature, and regional collaborations and regional forward deployment of diplomats will facilitate a more effective approach to these issues.
- Localization: A more proactive approach will shift from reporting on outcomes to shaping them using modern technology to engage foreign publics more directly through the media and Internet, and establishing American Presence Posts and Virtual Presence Posts.
- New Skills and Training: Training transformation will promote long distance learning, establish experience in two regions and fluency in two languages as

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<sup>4</sup> See: [www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm](http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm)

<sup>5</sup> Fact Sheet: New Director for U.S. Foreign Assistance, 19 January 2006.

criteria for promotion to senior ranks, and emphasize languages of the more challenging regions.

- Empowerment: Empower Diplomats to Work Jointly with other Federal Agencies – Diplomats must be able to work effectively at critical intersections of diplomatic affairs, economic reconstruction, and military operations; the ability to work effectively with the military is particularly important.
- Expand the number of Political Advisors to military forces: Expand stabilization capabilities of the Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization.

#### THE COORDINATOR FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

In the spring of 2004, the National Security Council (NSC) authorized the Department of State (DoS) to establish an office to manage interagency civilian post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations. The position of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization<sup>6</sup> (S/CRS), reporting directly to the Secretary of State, was established on 1 July 2004.

In the spring of 2007 the S/CRS was aligned under the leadership and direction of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance<sup>7</sup>, designating the Coordinator as a Deputy Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance. The operational expertise and planning mandate of S/CRS was aligned with the funding authorities and foreign assistance country planning and budget processes of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, enabling more effective and efficient leadership for reconstruction and stabilization activities while minimizing duplicative roles or processes. At the same time, in accordance with the 2005 Appropriations act, the Coordinator for S/CRS will also continue to maintain a reporting relationship to the Secretary.

The coordinator is responsible for and authorized to oversee and coordinate civilian post-conflict response activities undertaken by the DoS and other civilian departments and agencies of the USG interagency community. The office serves as the focal point for monitoring, planning, staffing, and organizing USG civilian responses to post-conflict contingencies, and as the interface with the military forces in the DoD. The office looks to future crises involving failing, failed, and post-conflict states and complex emergencies rather than ongoing activities, and is to provide clearly defined and prepared options for intervention contingencies, maintain a surge capacity for deployment across a range of situations, and support the DoS regional bureaus and coordinate the USG civilian response as required.


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<sup>6</sup> Action Memorandum: Establishing a Coordination Function at State for Civilian Post-Conflict Operations, 9 June 2004.

<sup>7</sup> Memorandum: Aligning the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) with the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F), 19 March 2007.

The S/CRS office has subsequently established a standing Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) within the NSC framework and assembled a number of sub-PCCs to develop the concept of operations and organizational entities to implement the concept. The organizational arrangements and various entities are shown in Figure 1.

The emerging process under development involves the formation of a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (a country-specific PCC) prior to a declared contingency. The Standing PCC for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations (PCC-RSO) and its sub-PCCs, with representation from appropriate departments and agencies, develop the supporting mechanisms and organizational framework to conduct these operations. There are now four (formerly five) sectoral and three cross-sector sub-PCCs (cross-sector sub-PCCs are shaded in Figure 1).



*Figure 1: USG Reconstruction and Stabilization Organizations and Concept of Operations.*

S/CRS uses the following definitions<sup>8</sup> for key terms:

- **Stabilization** *The process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful longer-term development.*

<sup>8</sup>

“US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation (Version 1.0),” 1 December 2005, and briefing: S/CRS at the Civil-Military Interface, 21 November 2005.

- **Reconstruction:** *The process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for longer-term development.*
- **Conflict Transformation:** *The process of diminishing the motivations and means for destructive forms of conflict while developing local institutions so they can take the lead role in national governance, economic development, and enforcing the rule of law. Success in this process permits an evolution from internationally imposed stability to a peace that is sustainable by local actors, with the international community providing continued support at a greatly reduced cost.*
- **Locally Led Nascent Peace:** *The stage in a conflict transformation process at which the motivations and means for destructive forms of conflict are sufficiently diminished and local institutional capacity is sufficiently developed to allow international actors to pass the lead to local actors, usually with continued international assistance, without the country falling back into conflict.*
- **Sustainable Development:** *Continued economic and social progress that rests on four key principles: improved quality of life for both current and future generations; responsible stewardship of the natural resource base; broad-based participation in political and economic life; and effective institutions which are transparent, accountable, responsive, and capable of managing change without relying on continued external support. The ultimate measure of success of sustainable development programs is to reach a point where improvements in the quality of life and environment are such that external assistance is no longer necessary and can be replaced with new forms of diplomacy, cooperation, and commerce.*

The Interagency Management System<sup>9</sup> for Reconstruction and Stabilization is designed to assist Washington policymakers, Chiefs of Mission (COMs), and military commanders plan and manage these complex operations by ensuring coordination among all USG stakeholders at the strategic, operational, and tactical/field levels. The lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo demonstrate that the U.S. must employ an approach in these types of engagements that draws upon the full range of diplomatic, development, defense, intelligence, and economic resources available to the USG.

The Interagency Management System (IMS) is designed for highly complex crises and operations, which are national or security priorities, involve widespread instability, may require military operations, and where multiple U.S. agencies will be engaged in the policy and programmatic response. The IMS is not intended to respond to the political and humanitarian crises that are regularly and effectively handled through the current Washington and Embassy systems.

The system is designed to provide policymakers in Washington, COMs, and military commanders with flexible tools to ensure unity of effort as laid out through whole-of-

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<sup>9</sup> “Draft Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization,” 22 January 2007.

government strategic and implementation planning for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations. The system is intended to facilitate and support:

- Integrated planning processes for unified USG strategic and implementation plans, including funding requests.
- Joint interagency field deployments.
- A joint civilian operations capability including shared communications and information management.

This system is a response mechanism. It does not preclude interagency scenario-based, prevention or contingency planning, which may occur independently. The system will draw upon such plans when they exist.

When a significant crisis occurs or begins to emerge, the Secretary of State may decide to establish an Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Management System based on a decision by the Principals' or Deputies' Committees and implemented at the direction of the NSC.

The Interagency Management System consists of the following:

- CRSG (Country Reconstruction & Stabilization Group): A Washington-based decision-making body (Policy Coordinating Committee—PCC) with a planning and operations staff.
- IPC (Integration Planning Cell): A civilian planning cell integrated with relevant Geographic Combatant Command(s) (GCC) or with equivalent multinational headquarters.
- ACT<sup>10</sup> (Advance Civilian Team): One or more interagency field management and coordination teams to support COMs in the field.<sup>11</sup>

These structures are flexible in size and composition to meet the particular requirements of the situation and integrate personnel from all relevant agencies. Recruitment of personnel may require additional flexible hiring authorities, training, and resources not presently available. International or coalition partners may also be represented on these teams. Each team is designed to support and augment, not replace, existing structures in Washington, at the GCC, or at the tactical level in the field.

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<sup>10</sup> The ACT headquarters (ACT-HQ) will augment an existing country team in an affected nation. If there is no existing American Embassy, the ACT will serve as the embassy and the chief of the ACT as the COM. Field ACTs (FACTs) will also be deployed. They may be attached to tactical forces if deployed to provide immediate civilian support the forces and/or assigned to the provinces and municipalities within the affected nation to work with the provincial and municipal governing authorities.

<sup>11</sup> On 22 February 2007, the Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense concluded a Memorandum of Agreement on the operational requirements, authorities, and responsibilities shared between the U.S. Mission-Iraq and the Multi-National Forces Iraq for Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

S/CRS has developed and distributed five sectoral task lists as the *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task List* (PCRETL). The task lists identify the scope of the potential effort that might be required. The task lists will be tailored according to the country-specific contingency because all tasks might not be required, or additional tasks might be found necessary based on the particular conditions in the affected nation.

#### PUBLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 44

In December 2005, the President issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) – *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*. This directive assigns responsibilities for managing interagency reconstruction and stabilization efforts to the Secretary of State.

This directive establishes as U.S. policy the role of the interagency community in assisting the stabilization and reconstruction of countries or regions, especially those at risk of, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies. It further specifies that the U.S. should work with other nations and organizations to anticipate state failures, avoid them whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary.

The directive assigns the Secretary of State responsibility and authority to coordinate and lead integrated USG efforts involving all U.S. departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare and plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization activities. The DFA and S/CRS have major responsibilities for coordinating and complying with the actions mandated in NSPD-44.

Other executive departments and agencies with programs and personnel that might be able to assist in addressing the relevant challenges will:

- Coordinate with S/CRS their budgets for reconstruction and stabilization activities.
- Identify, develop, and provide S/CRS with relevant information on capabilities and assets.
- Identify and develop internal capabilities for planning and for resource and program management that can be mobilized in response to crises.
- Identify within each agency current and former civilian employees skilled in crisis response, including employees employed by contract, and establish under each agency's authorities mechanisms to reassign or reemploy skilled personnel and mobilize associated resources rapidly in response to crises.
- Assist in identifying situations of concern, developing action and contingency plans, responding to crises that occur, assessing lessons learned, and undertaking other efforts and initiatives to ensure a coordinated U.S. response and effective international reconstruction and stabilization efforts.

- Designate appropriate senior USG officials and government experts as points of contact to participate in relevant task forces, planning processes, gaming exercises, training, after action reviews, and other essential tasks.
- Make available personnel on a non-reimbursable basis, as appropriate and feasible, to work as part of the S/CRS Office and develop additional personnel exchanges, as appropriate, across departments and agencies to increase interoperability for reconstruction and stabilization operations.

The directive also requires coordination between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to integrate reconstruction and stabilization plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate. The Secretaries are required to develop a general framework for fully coordinating reconstruction and stabilization activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate. To maintain clear accountability and responsibility for any given contingency response or reconstruction and stabilization mission, lead and supporting responsibilities for departments and agencies will be designated under mechanisms outlined in NSPD-1, *Organization of the National Security Council System*, and might be re-designated as transitions are required.

NSPD-44 does not affect the authority of:

- The Secretary of Defense or the command relationships established for the Armed Forces of the United States.
- The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
- The President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance.

The directive officially establishes the functional PCC for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations and supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 56, 20 May 1997, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*.

Given the definition of Transformational Diplomacy, one of the key measures signaling the need for intervention is the degree to which the affected nation can self-govern following accepted international norms. Although repressive and rogue states have the capacity to self-govern, they typically cause instability within the affected nation and in the region. Usually, they require forceful intervention to change behavior and reestablish internally and internationally acceptable governance capacity.

Figure 2 illustrates a possible life cycle of an intervention within the construct of Transformational Diplomacy. It starts from the point when the affected nation's decline in governance capacity is noted by the international community and continues until the desired end state of peer status<sup>12</sup> is achieved through transformational diplomacy.

<sup>12</sup> Peer Status – A state recognized by other sovereign state as an equal, and one that governs following accepted international standards. (Source: Stipulated)




Figure 2: Life Cycle of an International Intervention.

Coalition intervention can follow two scenarios. In Scenario 1, the affected nation responds to peaceful coalition intervention measures.<sup>13</sup> This form of intervention employs internationally coordinated foreign aid (civilian-led) and theater security cooperation (military-led) programs designed to strengthen the institutions of government and society in the affected nation.

In Scenario 2, the coalition's attempt to resolve the decaying situation peacefully is not successful, and its members collectively seek authorization through a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) to use force, if necessary, to change the affected nation behavior. In both cases, the international coalition seeks to reach an acceptable level of improvement within the affected nation before turning over the continuing longer-term development to a United Nations-led organization such as the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission<sup>14</sup> (UNPBC), United Nations Trusteeship Council<sup>15</sup> (UNTC), or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

<sup>13</sup> Peaceful Intervention Measures – International intervention in an affected nation with the consent of the nation, to conduct developmental and security cooperation programs that increase capacity to self-govern following accepted international standards.

<sup>14</sup> The Peacebuilding Commission was established on 20 December 2005, and is intended to pick up the international effort in such countries when peacekeeping missions are completing their tasks of bringing fighting to an end and monitoring cease-fires. The new commission will have 31 members. Seven, including the 5 veto-holding permanent members, will come from the 15-member Security Council; 7 from the 54-nation Economic and Social Council; 5 from the 10 top contributors to the United Nations; 5 from the 10 nations that supply the most troops for peacekeeping missions; and 7 chosen to ensure geographical balance by regional groupings. Representatives of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other institutional donors will be expected to attend meetings.

<sup>15</sup> The UN Trusteeship Council was originally established to administer trust territories and facilitate their decolonization and independence. The organization has become dormant with its last session held in May 1993. East Timor and Kosovo have been handled by an ad hoc process under leadership of Special Representatives of the Secretary General and UN Missions. The council could be one of the options for overseeing the transformation of an affected nation to peer status.

Figure 2 also identifies a number of possible triggers<sup>16</sup> (indicated by T1 through T7) that could be used to monitor the status before and during an intervention. The triggers are pre-established metrics that take account of the dynamic environment and measure the status of self-governing capacity within the affected nation. When a trigger is reached, the coalition will need to take decisive action to transform the operational environment. Table 1 summarizes the types of metrics each of the triggers in the figure might represent, the decision the coalition authorities would likely make, and the preeminent coalition authority following the decision.

<b>Trigger</b>	<b>Metric</b>	<b>Preeminent Authority</b>	<b>Coalition Decision</b>
1	Affected nation no longer functions as a peer	<i>Coalition Civilian</i>	Willing nations form coalition, assess problems, set goals, and collaborate and coordinate the design of specific peaceful intervention programs
2	Affected nation continues decline	<i>Coalition Civilian</i>	Coalition of willing nations decides to intervene
3	Affected nation does not respond to intervention actions	<i>Transition from Coalition Civilian to Military</i>	Coalition reviews progress toward goals and requests use of force, if required
4	Affected nation accepts or rejects Coalition attempts at peaceful resolution	<i>Military</i>	Conflict, peace enforcement, or peacekeeping based on affected nation response
5	Conflict ended or peace operation in effect	<i>Military</i>	Stability and reconstruction operations begin
6	Sufficient stability	<i>Transition from Coalition Military to Civilian</i>	Stability and domestic security sector capacity adequate to enable Coalition civilian lead
7	Stability and reconstruction sufficient	<i>Transition from Coalition Civilian to UN lead</i>	Transition from coalition civilian to UNPBC, UNTC, or UNDP lead

Table 1: Possible Triggers for Intervention Decisions.

#### PUBLICATION OF DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.05

Based on the Defense Science Board recommendations<sup>17</sup> to institutionalize stability operations within the DoD, the anticipated publication of NSPD-44, and the changes in the National Security Strategy described earlier, the DoD published its directive, DoDD 3000.05 *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, in November 2005. The directive is intended to provide guidance to the department on stability operations as it develops joint operating concepts and mission sets and applies

<sup>16</sup> Trigger – A pre-established metric that measures the current status and when achieved, prompts the intervening coalition to take corrective action. (Source: Stipulated)

<sup>17</sup> Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within the DoD, September 2005.

lessons that have been identified in similar operations. The directive also establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. It specifies, “*Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission and shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.*” They will be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

The 3000.05 directive defines two key terms:

- **Stability Operations:** *Military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish and maintain order in States and regions.*
- **Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR):** *DoD activities that support USG plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction, and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interest.*

The DoD definition of stability operations extends from peacetime to conflict, but is limited in scope to establishing and maintaining order. The S/CRS definition of stabilization implies an extension from peacetime through post-conflict periods until the conditions for longer-term development are met, and envisions a process to manage the range of tensions that could lead to violence and breakdown in law and order. Moreover, S/CRS uses separate definitions for sustainable development and locally led nascent peace, while DoD seeks sustainable peace. These distinctions are important for establishing the roles and responsibilities of the civilian and military partners in reconstruction and stabilization operations.

## SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

With 14 civilian departments and more than 100 agencies, boards, and commissions to cover during approximately 3 months of research, the IDA study team focused on those departments and agencies already participating in the standing PCC-RSO, and other organizations that might serve a role in transformational diplomacy and reconstruction and stabilization contingencies. Although incomplete and subject to modifications as departments and agencies transform, this coverage does provide a baseline and includes both Executive and Legislative Branch organizations.

Most of the information was collected from official government Web pages, supplemented by information collected during visits with selected organizations. This information was supplemented by interviews with knowledgeable interlocutors within several bureaus and offices within DoS, the Department of Justice (DoJ), the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), USAID, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

The study group also collected information on other USG activities that provide a basis for interagency cooperation. For example, the National Response Plan (NRP), although domestic in focus, does assign responsibilities and authorities to various lead and supporting agencies shown in Table 2. The responsibilities support 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), and the NRP establishes the processes for financial management, international coordination, logistics management, private sector coordination, and public affairs. Because the heads of the departments and agencies signed the NRP, it is recognized as a major activity supported by the department and agency.

Other examples of interagency collaboration and cooperation include the Counterdrug Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs) under the direction of senior U.S. Coast Guard officers, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG), and on a smaller scale, the Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) from USAID. The NWCG membership includes organizations from both Federal and state governments: the Forest Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), four subordinate operating elements of the Department of the Interior (DoI), and State forestry agencies through the National Association of State Foresters.

<b>Departments</b>	<b>Agencies</b>
Department of Agriculture	Central Intelligence Agency
Department of Commerce	Agency for International Development
Department of Defense	Environmental Protection Agency
Department of Education	Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Energy	Federal Communications Commission
Department of Health and Human Services	General Services Administration
Department of Homeland Security	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Department of Housing and Urban Development	National Transportation Safety Board
Department of the Interior	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Department of Justice	Office of Personnel Management
Department of Labor	Small Business Administration
Department of State	Tennessee Valley Authority
Department of Transportation	U.S. Postal Service
	<i>American Red Cross<sup>a</sup></i>
Department of the Treasury	<i>Corporation for National Community Service<sup>b</sup></i>
Department of Veterans Affairs	<i>National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster<sup>c</sup></i>

Source: The National Response Plan, December 2004.

<sup>a</sup> The American Red Cross is a Non-Governmental Organization, but is funded by the USG for its role in the NRP.

<sup>b</sup> The Corporation for National and Community Service is a Public-Private Partnership.

<sup>c</sup> The National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster is an umbrella Non-Governmental Organization.

*Table 2: USG Federal Signatories of the National Response Plan.*

The research identified these three examples of well-planned interagency collaboration, agreed processes, and organizational responsibilities and arrangements. They are described in more detail in the department discussions as models that could provide insights into how the USG might achieve unity of effort for RSO. The experience gained and lessons identified by those involved in these interagency arrangements should be applied when appropriate to the implementation of the transformational diplomacy concept, and the emerging capabilities for interagency planning, the operational concepts, and organizational arrangements for responding to reconstruction and stabilization contingencies.

While providing visibility into civilian department and agency funding for foreign operations was an objective of the task, the study team was only able to identify a number of major programs and the funding for them. Time and available personnel resources did not allow the study team to conduct the comprehensive research that is needed to document all of the foreign accounts in the civilian departments and agencies, the legislative restrictions imposed on the use of those funds, and the administrative processes used to manage them. Such an effort will require additional time and resources to address completely all of the funding issues identified in the initial tasking.

## ORGANIZATION OF DOCUMENT

This document is a descriptive database of how the USG was organized when the snapshot was taken in May 2006. The first 14 chapters describe the missions of the 14 civilian Cabinet Departments and their organizations, funding, and the study team's evaluation of the potential for mentoring or responding to reconstruction and stabilization operations. Chapters 15 through 19 cover the same topics for USAID, the USG Intelligence Community, the Environmental Protection Agency, OMB and the Office of Personnel Management, and the General Services Administration. Chapter 20 contains information on other independent USG agencies, administrations, commissions, offices, and organizations from both the Executive and Legislative Branches of the USG. At the end of each chapter, the potential mentoring activities for transformational diplomacy or response capabilities for reconstruction and stabilization operations are summarized for that department or agency.

The final version of the document also contains four appendixes.

- Appendices A and B include a list of abbreviations and acronyms used by the various organizations and the bibliography, including the Web sites used during the research.
- Appendix C serves as a summary of the potential task contributions that the civilian departments and agencies might be able to contribute to reconstruction and stabilization operations based on their core competencies. The appendix contains the sectoral task list developed by the PCC-RSO arranged in hierarchical order and numbered for ease of reference. The tasks are those that the intervening organizations will plan and conduct to reconstruct the affected nation's institutions and infrastructure and establish stability. They have also been identified as national-level (ACT-HQ) tasks, those that would be carried out at provincial and municipal levels (PRT), or

tasks carried out by the Field ACT (FACT) during or immediately following conflict or chaos or state collapse. When a domestic core competency of a USG department or agency was related to one of these tasks, or an agency had recent *ad hoc* experience with the task, the organization was identified in either the ACT-HQ or FACT column for the respective task. In many cases several agencies had similar competencies, and the sub-PCCs will need to determine which agency will lead and which will support the task planning and execution.

- Appendix D identifies regional responsibilities of key departments and agencies by country and ocean area region.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The research by the study team provided the opportunity to examine the capabilities of most of the USG. From this vantage point, it was possible to make several observations that could facilitate future transformation efforts. The research also identified a number of findings and specific recommendations that could improve the reconstruction and stabilization capabilities of the USG.

## RESEARCH OBSERVATIONS

### PRINCIPLES FOR TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY INTERVENTION

Common agreed principles have served as the foundation upon which current joint military doctrine has evolved. The *Principles of War* and the *Principles for Military Operations Other Than War*<sup>18</sup> are well documented and guide the development of supporting military doctrine. USAID has recently developed its *Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development*, and the Donor Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has recently published its *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States*.

The USG currently lacks a unifying set of principles that can bring the military and civilian partners together and provide a common agreed foundation upon which to develop USG interagency doctrine for future interventions within the framework of transformational diplomacy. A set of such principles is proposed by the study team in Table 3.

<sup>18</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and Joint Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, respectively. Doctrine is defined as “a body of principles in a branch of knowledge; a statement of fundamental government policy.” DoD refines this general definition, as it applies to the military forces, and defines doctrine in Joint Publication 1-02 as “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”

## EXECUTIVE ORDER VERSUS LEGISLATION

Funding new government initiatives is always difficult. To this point in time, the implementation of the changes supporting transformational diplomacy and reconstruction and stabilization has been carried out by executive order, with limited new funding for these requirements. Experience with transformations caused by executive orders suggests that they are not always permanent and that a change in administration often results in canceling the previous administration's executive order, sometimes with, and sometimes without publication of a superceding executive order. Moreover, the cost of the new requirement is frequently taken out of existing funding, unless Congress is persuaded that the new requirement is necessary.

<i>Principle</i>	<i>Description</i>
<b>Collaborate and Coordinate</b>	Identify the coalition members and cooperate with all partners, including the affected nation authorities, and harmonize plans and actions to achieve synergy and agreed objectives.
<b>Communicate</b>	Employ all elements of information activities – public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and information operations – in an integrated and coordinated manner to inform or influence key audiences in the affected nation, the region, and partner nations on the policies, objectives, and status of the operation.
<b>Share Information</b>	Convey among coalition partners knowledge of, or information about, the current situation and future activities in a timely and understandable form.
<b>Build Local Capacity</b>	Involve affected nation personnel in reconstruction and stabilization activities and mentor their progress to self-sustaining capacity.
<b>Unity of Effort</b>	Bring into a common action the efforts of all coalition partners.
<b>Simplicity</b>	Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans consistent with the objectives and priorities of the affected nation.
<b>Security</b>	Security involves a range of actors – the military and the police; the judicial and penal systems; the ministries of foreign affairs, trade, and commerce; and civil society organizations – and is achieved when transparency, the rule of law, accountability and informed debate, and reinforcing legislative capacity for adequate oversight of security systems have been achieved.
<b>Protect Human Rights</b>	Do no harm and ensure the affected population has the fundamental right to individual dignity and specific freedoms of life, liberty, security, subsistence, and other guarantees to which all humans are guaranteed.
<b>Minimum Necessary Force</b>	Apply the measured and proportionate application of violence or coercion, sufficient only to achieve a specific objective and confined in effect to the legitimate target intended.

*Table 3: Proposed Interagency Principles for Interventions.*

Transformations implemented through legislation usually result in a more permanent change as the new requirements are acknowledged by Congress. Because Congress directs the action through legislation, the change usually results in new funding to provide the desired capability. The transformations for reconstruction and stabilization improvements should also be incorporated into legislative mandates so that progress already achieved will not be discarded with a change in administration, and so that these new requirements will receive funding support from Congress. It should be noted that Congress has started to address this issue and S.3322, “Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2006,”

passed the Senate in May 2006 and is awaiting action by the House International Relations Committee.

### CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS

The terminology for military command and control has evolved over time to provide common understanding of the authorities and responsibilities of commanders over the troops placed under their command. Terms like combatant command authority, operational control, tactical control, and administrative control are defined and used to plan and conduct joint and combined military operations. Within and between civilian departments and agencies, a similar standard reference does not exist. For example, terms such as principal officer in charge, direction, supervision, cooperate, and manage are often used, but without further definition. Within the civilian community, misunderstanding of these terms rarely resulted in life and death decisions, and the lack of precision could be tolerated.

During reconstruction and stabilization operations, the civilian terms need similar rigorous definition to convey the legal basis for the authorities and responsibilities they confer when civilian personnel, including both government employees and contractors, and military forces work together within a contested environment. As the contingency progresses, either civilian or military authorities can lead the operation, and unity of effort can be achieved through unity of command. These terms need clarification within the USG and agreement with our multinational and multilateral partners so that joint, combined, and interagency operations can be planned and conducted effectively and efficiently, and within the legal authorities that the terms establish.

### CIVILIAN FLEXIBILITY

The military and civilian departments and agencies of the USG can be compared with two different organizational models. The military is comparable to a fire station. The number of personnel is sized to the anticipated threat, and trained and equipped to do the job when called upon. They conduct operations and return to the fire station when the job is done and retrain and prepare for the next emergency.

The civilian agencies are more like a police station where the number of personnel is based on the average level of service required. The staff is trained and employed fully on a daily basis. If a problem occurs, available resources are drawn from quiet areas to assist with the troubled area. There is no flexibility built into the civilian organizational structure to provide a reserve or an emergency response capability as envisioned for S/CRS, or to allow personnel to be trained for the mentoring or response tasks in an overseas environment when called upon. The civilian community needs a personnel float of at least 5 percent, similar to that advocated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies,<sup>19</sup> to enable civilian staffs to be trained and prepared to deploy for contingencies on short notice along with their military partners.

<sup>19</sup> Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era Phase 2 Report, July 2005.

## DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY REPRESENTATION ON THE PCC FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

Many of the departments and agencies with domestic responsibilities assigned by the National Response Plan have established offices for emergency response or preparedness to carry out planning and execution tasks assigned by the plan. These staffs have knowledge of their agency's capabilities, routinely develop contingency plans, and manage the deployment and employment of resources when requested. These experts should participate actively in the PCC for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and especially on the sub-PCC for Response Strategy and Resource Management.

### AVAILABILITY OF USG CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES

This study has identified the potential capabilities and core competencies of the departments and agencies as they appeared at the time of the snapshot. The study team could not evaluate (1) the availability of these capabilities for use in transformational diplomacy operations or reconstruction and stabilization contingencies in an affected nation, or (2) the amount of capability that will be needed from any department or agency. These are issues that the DFA, the PCC for RSO, and the senior officials from the departments and agencies will need to resolve.

### INTERAGENCY EXPERIMENTATION MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

Although the PCC for RSO and its sub-PCC structure exist, their focus is on developing the processes, concepts of operation, and organizational structures needed for RSO. These are complex issues with many interacting lines of action that require experimentation to identify appropriate and workable solutions. There currently is no formal and agreed management mechanism to facilitate experimentation with these transformational issues. Joint Forces Command and S/CRS are currently conducting a series of workshops and experiments to address many of the important topics, but broader civilian agency participation is not ensured. Moreover, no one agency has authority to assign responsibilities, schedule interagency events, or commit an agency's resources to solve interagency community problems.

The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, as part of NSPD-44 implementation, could establish a Joint Interagency Experimentation Steering Group (JIESG) to assist the PCC for RSO in this important effort. The management for such a group of interagency partners could be co-chaired by civilian and military representatives from DoS and DoD, and be empowered by their agency superiors in a charter for the group to assign and accept responsibilities and commit agency resources to address interagency issues.

Once established, other departments and agencies should be formally invited to join the JIESG, and their agency superiors should agree to the charter and empower their representatives to accept responsibilities for tasks and provide resources to help with

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interagency solutions. Several working groups focused on specific lines of action can be established and chaired by a lead agency and supported by others.

The JIESG could then establish a work plan and schedule to support interagency experimentation in coordination with the PCC for RSO. Other agencies with more limited responsibilities and resources could participate at lower tier of involvement<sup>20</sup> as observers. It could also be helpful if selected House and Senate committee staff members were invited to participate as observers to gain familiarity with the issues and understanding of the approach.

## GOVERNMENT INTEROPERABILITY

The 435 Members of the House of Representative and 100 Senators serve as the board of directors overseeing the Executive Branch of the Federal Government with its 15 Executive Departments, over 100 agencies, boards, and commissions, and more than 4.8 million military and civilian employees. This is a large and difficult task made more complex by the need for continuous transformation to meet the challenges and needs of more than 290 million shareholders.

Recent transformations necessitated by the catastrophic events on 9/11 were developed by *ad hoc* committees resulting in the consolidation of several parts of the USG into the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the integration of the disparate intelligence community under the Director for National Intelligence (DNI). Because of the complexity and limited focus of these efforts to streamline the bureaucracy, changes often led to unintended consequences, and oversight mechanisms within the Congress do not always parallel the transformation.

Funding arrangements provide Congress with the ultimate control over the Executive Branch, but the rules are often complex and counterproductive to achieving unity of effort across the agency stovepipes created within the bureaucracy. The oversight and funding mechanisms make it difficult for the departments and agencies to work effectively and efficiently when a collaborative response is needed.<sup>21</sup>. Streamlining oversight and funding mechanisms could contribute to greater interoperability among the departments and agencies leading to unity of effort.

## EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY CIVIL AFFAIRS PERSONNEL AND UNITS

The military Civil Affairs (CA) personnel and units have been used to link the civilian (both coalition intervention organizations and affected nation authorities and their population) and military communities together during reconstruction and stabilization operations. Most of the CA resources have been attached to the tactical forces, and in less secure environments, CA teams were often the only elements available to carry out reconstruction tasks.

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<sup>20</sup> See: Project Horizon – A Proposal for Interagency Scenario-Based Strategic Planning, 17 February 2005.

<sup>21</sup> The 9/11 Commission made a similar recommendation about strengthening Congressional oversight of intelligence and homeland security. See: The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 419-422.

The Military Departments and the civilian departments and agencies need to work together actively to determine where CA personnel should also be assigned to civilian-led organizations to achieve the greatest payoff for both communities, and to identify the functional and cultural skills that the CA personnel need to bring to the organization.

## TERMINOLOGY

The work of the USG is assigned to various departments and agencies. Because of the focus on and nature of tasks carried out by these organizations, they develop an “agency culture” and terminology necessary to conduct their operations. Before meaningful collaboration and coordination to transform these institutions can be effected, the interagency community needs to understand where agency terminology is the same, where it is different, and the significance of the differences. The Joint Staff maintains Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, as the authoritative source for terminology used within and by the DoD. The interagency community should have its own glossary of terms,<sup>22</sup> showing where differences exist so that meaningful communications can be carried out among various departments and agencies, and with the multinational and multilateral partners. A similar *Dictionary of USG Interagency and Associated Terms* would facilitate communications among departments and agencies and with their multinational and multilateral partners.

## MULTINATIONAL AND MULTILATERAL PARTNER CAPABILITIES

The National Security Strategy calls for partnering with other nations to promote freedom, democracy, and human rights, and working within existing international institutions to help implement our policies. Several nations have developed or are in the process of developing RSO capabilities. A number of multilateral organizations have been established to carry out RSO-related tasks. A similar snapshot of the current and projected capabilities and capacities of both multinational and multilateral partners would inform the USG interagency community and provide useful planning information that can facilitate collaboration and coordination within the broader international community.

## FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section summarizes the findings and recommendations related to RSO capabilities that were derived from the research to compile this snapshot.

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<sup>22</sup> The Institute for Defense Analyses has produced a draft version 1.0 of such a dictionary. It is available at [www.ndu.itea.org](http://www.ndu.itea.org).

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**Finding<sup>23</sup> XI-1:** *The funding mechanisms established for civilian departments and agencies are neither responsive nor adequate to enable them to be capable partners to USG military forces during reconstruction and stabilization contingencies.*

**Discussion:** Most departments and agencies of the USG have a domestic focus, and only a few have funds for overseas operations. Based on the Stafford Act of 1974, Congress has expressed its willingness (1) to fund emergency response capabilities within the many departments and agencies assigned domestic responsibilities in the NRP, and (2) to set aside contingency funds administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to pay for these capabilities during a disaster. These two mechanisms ensure the capabilities for a rapid and effective response to help their constituents.

Congress is less willing, however, to provide the Executive Branch, other than DoD, with similar contingency funds for overseas operations, apart from humanitarian assistance funding for USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. It tightly controls funding for overseas development programs, foreign assistance, and reconstruction and stabilization contingencies carried out by civilian departments and agencies. For example, the "1207 program funds" in this year's budget authorizes DoD to transfer \$100 million from its own reserves to DoS for reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance, primarily to put civilian professionals alongside warfighters in stability operations.

This DoD action was necessary because currently the major funding within the civilian departments and agencies for conducting overseas operations is found in the USAID budget. However, approximately 85 percent of USAID funding is earmarked by Congress, leaving only small amounts available to respond to emerging near-term changes within countries caused by political instability or peaceful transformation toward democracy as occurred in several Eastern European nations recently. Because of this rigid control of funds, USAID must rely on supplemental authorizations to address emerging requirements. For more than a decade, USAID supplemental funding has ranged from \$300 to \$500 million per year, in addition to supplemental funding for Afghanistan or Iraq. The delays in obtaining supplemental funds and their expiration under existing procedures often means that opportunities for rapid and decisive civilian action are lost and the costs for transformation diplomacy or reconstruction and stabilization become even greater.

Since the office was created, S/CRS has not been adequately funded by the Congress to enable the organization to develop the processes and organizations to conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations. This limitation has kept S/CRS from taking on the strong interagency leadership role that was envisioned when the office was initially established in 2004. If the USG is to develop a responsive reconstruction and stabilization capacity, a contingency funding mechanism will need to be established to support the interagency community so that its response can be timely and effective. The mechanisms established and operated by FEMA might provide a basis for future funding of the civilian interagency community's support of reconstruction and stabilization operations.

**Recommendation XI-1:** The PCC for Reconstruction and Stabilization should examine the funding mechanisms established by FEMA, with Congressional authorization, for funding

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<sup>23</sup> Findings and recommendations are numbered by the Chapter (Roman numeral), or Appendix (letter) in which the issues are discussed.

Federal agency support during domestic disaster operations, and determine if similar funding mechanisms could be adapted to fund reconstruction and stabilization contingencies.

**Finding VI-1:** *No plan exists with which to establish the processes and responsibilities for harnessing the USG interagency capabilities for major foreign interventions, that might be similar to the National Response Plan for domestic emergencies.*

**Discussion:** During the interviews with the various department and agency representatives to collect the information needed for this document, we were told by several interlocutors that such a plan, based on the tasking of NSPD-44, would provide the departments and agencies with the necessary direction and specificity to enable them to modify their internal organizations and commit resources to accomplish the responsibilities assigned by the plan. Because this would be a new task, additional funding and resources would be required to build on existing core competencies to establish the capacity to carry out the plan.

**Recommendation VI-1:** The DFA and S/CRS, in conjunction with the appropriate interagency partners in the PCC-RSO, should develop an agreed interagency framework for declared foreign interventions, under both consensual and forceful measures. The framework should be documented in a plan, similar to the National Response Plan, that outlines assigned organizational responsibilities, planning processes, command and control authorities for civilian and military organizations to work together and with their multinational and multilateral partners, and the funding arrangements to bring national level unity of effort during foreign transformational diplomacy and reconstruction and stabilization operations.

**Finding VI-2:** *The evolving organizational arrangements and concepts for reconstruction and stabilization operations do not address the challenges of operational and tactical level command and control of the disparate interagency community elements assigned to carry out the essential tasks.*

**Discussion:** The Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) model for counterdrug operations described in Chapter VI has evolved over several years into a viable and successful concept to achieve unity of effort from the interagency community and its multinational partners. The JIATFs have not learned all the hard lessons, but the model they have derived should be examined and tailored to the unique circumstances when applied to other missions in other areas of the world that require interagency collaboration at the operational and tactical levels. Moreover, critical documents, similar to the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP) and JIATF Standing Operating Procedures might be needed, along with standing organizations containing a minimum core of trained personnel, to achieve a comparable level of capability when deployed by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

**Recommendation VI-2:** S/CRS and its PCC-RSO partners should examine the challenges and opportunities of applying the JIATF model to its operational and tactical level organizations such as the ACT-HQ, the FACT (formerly the ACT-Tac), and the PRT, and then incorporate these arrangements in the concepts of operation for these organizations.

**Finding XV-1:** *USAID, a major civilian partner for the DoD during reconstruction and stabilization operations, is not adequately staffed to provide the civilian support needed to conduct effective reconstruction and stabilization operations.*

**Discussion:** Organizations with overseas responsibilities, such as USAID, have undergone severe reductions in personnel. Following its establishment in the early 1960s, more than 17,000 full-time personnel staffed USAID. Today the agency is staffed with fewer than 2,100 full-time government employees, about 12 percent of its earlier size, including personnel on interdepartmental transfer from other departments and agencies. At the same time, its overseas requirements have increased in number, size, and complexity, and frequently need a more rapid response as contingencies occur. For example, USAID maintains 90 overseas field missions; provides staff to ongoing contingencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan; and provides the immediate USG response to major foreign disasters.

Contractors handle much of today's additional workload. They can perform tasks that deliver goods and services, but should not carry out inherent government functions such as establishing policy, negotiating on behalf of the USG with foreign partners, or managing other contractors for the USG. USAID's full-time staff should be sized to the requirements of transformational diplomacy and, more specifically, for the immediate needs of reconstruction and stabilization tasks. A combination of staff increases, contracting, and leveraging the core competencies of other departments and agencies will help to meet the anticipated requirements. By comparison with the DoD structure, doubling USAID's current staff would only grow it to approximately the size of one U.S. Army brigade, not the full division it once was, but could substantially enhance its responsiveness for future contingencies. Doubling the agency's size should be viewed as illustrative, because the study team's limited research did not suggest whether such an increase was justified or not.

The USG will need to determine how large a civilian fire station it needs and wants to build, and how it will be staffed so that military forces are not the only response option. Personnel performing functions will need both technical and cultural skills. Although some of the technical competencies can be drawn from other departments and agencies, or provided by contractors, there is still a requirement for a core of USG employees with combined technical and cultural skills to plan and manage operations in high-risk overseas areas with their military partners on behalf of the USG and with authority to speak for the USG. Such an increase in USG civilian capabilities should reduce requirements for DoD to perform these civilian suited functions.

**Recommendation XV-1A:** The PCC for Reconstruction and Stabilization, in coordination with the USAID staff and the DFA, should determine the full-time manning requirements for USAID to perform its civilian partner role during transformational diplomacy and reconstruction and stabilization operations.

**Recommendation XV-1B:** The PCC for Reconstruction and Stabilization, in coordination with the Administrator for USAID, should recommend to the Secretary of State the size of the required increase in USAID full-time staff, and propose to the Secretary of Defense that he support this increase in the President's Budget and when testifying to Congress.

**Finding XV-2:** *Although the USG and several allied nations have recognized the value of and deployed Provincial Reconstruction Teams in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the mission, organizational templates, supporting modules, and concepts of operations for these important organizations have not been agreed and documented to guide those operating in the field or planning future operations.*

**Discussion:** The use of the civilian-military PRT to conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations outside of the affected nation's capital has proven to be an effective tool in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Several allied nations are now leading PRTs in both contingencies,<sup>24</sup> but the concept first fielded by the USG in Afghanistan in January 2003 still has no defined organizational structure and supporting modules or an agreed concept of operations. S/CRS has proposed a Field Advanced Civil Team (formerly the ACT-Tactical) to serve with the tactical military forces as (1) the immediate provider of emergency humanitarian assistance and civil governance after conflict or during stability operations, and (2) as the PRT operating within the administrative jurisdiction of the affected nation, even though the tactical military forces might move to other tactical areas of operation within the affected nation.

Each PRT is unique and faces different environmental and threat conditions, but there is a need to identify how these differences impact on the organization and its concept of operation. Wide ranges in population density and geographic area will need to be accommodated by scaling factors for the organization. There have been several evaluations<sup>25</sup> of PRTs, but none has provided a complete assessment of all USG-led and allied-led PRTs or resulted in an agreed definition of the PRT.

There is an urgent need to establish an agreed organizational template, supporting modules, and concept of operations for the PRT that both military and civilian partners accept. These results will inform the PCC for Reconstruction and Stabilization of the staffing requirements and size of the civilian reserve that will be needed. They will also inform the National Defense University (NDU) team currently conducting pre-PRT training. USAID and the Stability Operations office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense are currently collaborating on these requirements, and S/CRS should also participate in the development effort.

The technical and cultural skills of civilian personnel that are needed for the PRT will not always be available at the Federal level. The S/CRS, USAID, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense group developing the PRT operational concepts and organizational templates should explore sourcing options that draw skilled civilian administrators, police, and military elements from State and local governments, perhaps forming PRTs using the JIATF model, within the framework of the National Guard. These JIATFs could be used for both large-scale domestic disasters or for foreign reconstruction and stabilization operations.

**Recommendation XV-2A:** S/CRS, USAID, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense should develop for the USG-led PRTs an agreed concept of operation and organizational templates, supporting modules, and scaling factors for fielding these organizations under various situations.

**Recommendation XV-2B:** S/CRS, USAID, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense should explore sourcing civilian PRT-level support from State and local governments to provide

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<sup>24</sup> Coalition forces currently operate 11 PRTs in Afghanistan, 8 PRTs are operated under NATO control, and 5 PRTs are in the process of transitioning from U.S. or coalition operation to NATO control. In Iraq, the United States currently has four PRTs operating under its control and the United Kingdom operates one.

<sup>25</sup> See: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan – An Interagency Assessment, 26 April 2006; Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Tactical Units with Strategic Impact, April 2006; and The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan – Lessons Identified, October 2005.

State, county, and municipal-level expertise for reconstruction and stabilization operations. The sourcing should explore options that integrate civilians with military personnel and units from the National Guard to form JIATFs to perform the PRT missions in either domestic or foreign scenarios.

**Recommendation XV-2C:** S/CRS, USAID, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense should inform the NDU staff conducting pre-deployment training for individuals assigned to PRTs of the agreed operational concepts and organizational configurations.

***Finding I-1:*** *The personnel system developed by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) provides excellent interagency interoperability and could be a useful model for the PCC-RSO to adopt for its civil reserve.*

**Discussion:** The NWCG is focused on providing highly qualified firefighting personnel from the interagency community. There are about 75,000 firefighters currently in the system. Through pre-established arrangements, the personnel system for accessing and deploying individuals and teams works through regional centers. For emergencies and in anticipation of the wildfire season, regional leaders and staff prepare requirements, which are then levied through the Resource Ordering and Status System (ROSS). ROSS then matches qualified and certified personnel with equipment from outside the region and forms deployable packages that meet the requirements. The NWCG agencies have at their disposal about 700 aircraft (mostly tankers) that are both government-owned and contracted. Agencies use commercial contract aircraft to move the teams and equipment to the site of the emergency. The teams rely on pre-packaged logistics modules for the first few days and then the contracting officers and logisticians rely on the surrounding communities for contracted services and procured supplies.

The training and evaluation system is central to the success of this model. An excellent program of identifying tasks, the work breakdown structure, for positions within the U.S. Forest Service has been developed, and job description manuals with required skills and training courses are also available. The primary criteria for qualification are individual performance as observed by an evaluator using approved standards. Real performance is the basis as measured on the job, rather than perceived performance measured by an examination or classroom activities. Many of the personnel have necessary skills in other than wildfire suppression, and are also certified in areas such as law enforcement; search and rescue; administration; and command, control, communications, and computers. The NWCG has provided teams for varied purposes including environmental and hazardous bio-waste disposal. There is no inherent limit on the skills that can be supported by such a system.

The participating agencies and NWCG could assemble teams to support mentoring or response tasks for reconstruction and stabilization operations, but need further guidance on exactly what is needed for overseas operations.

**Recommendation I-1A:** The PCC-RSO should evaluate how the NWCG system could be applied to reconstruction and stabilization tasks, and execute an agreement with that group to provide support when required.

**Recommendation I-1B:** The PCC-RSO should evaluate how the NWCG system could be applied more broadly to other reconstruction and stabilization tasks, and if appropriate, establish a similar system for managing the civilian reserve.

**Finding XV-3:** *The cross-sectoral sub-PCCs for Response Strategy and Resource Management and for Conflict Prevention and Mitigation have not developed cross-sectoral task lists.*

**Discussion:** Identification of the essential cross-sectoral tasks that need to be performed to plan and carry out these functions should clarify the roles, numbers of personnel, and their qualifications to accomplish them, and provide the interagency community with sufficient information to program and fund the requirement. The task lists should also enable the sub-PCC to integrate these personnel into the organizations proposed by S/CRS, and develop scaling factors to size the number of personnel to the affected nation's requirement.

The task list should clarify the rebuilding and mentoring work that is expected by the USG response capabilities at all intervention echelons: ACT-HQ, FACT (formerly the ACT-Tactical), and PRT. These additional tasks should also identify the work of the CRSG and the IPC. Because these tasks are not now available, it is difficult for agencies to determine what the requirements are and where their personnel will fit into the reconstruction and stabilization concept of operation and organizational entities. Furthermore, some of these tasks will also be carried out during transformational diplomacy operations where conflict and instability are avoided.

**Recommendation XV-3A:** The cross-sectoral Sub-PCCs for Response Strategy and Resource Management and for Conflict Prevention and Mitigation should develop a charter that describes its membership and responsibilities.

**Recommendation XV-3B:** The cross-sectoral Sub-PCCs for Response Strategy and Resource Management and for Conflict Prevention and Mitigation should develop a Cross-Sector Essential Task List (CSETL) for the full range of transformational diplomacy activities, from peacetime monitoring through reconstruction and stabilization and return of the affected nation to peer status.

**Finding XV-4:** *The multidimensional Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) maintained on standby by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) have capabilities that are needed by the FACT (formerly the ACT-Tactical).*

**Finding XV-5:** *The Office of Transitional Initiatives (OTI) has field teams that provide on-the-ground, fast, flexible, catalytic short-term assistance that promotes movement toward political and social stability and democracy.*

**Discussion:** The DART and OTI teams available to USAID have the capability to perform essential tasks that are required immediately following a situation in which coalition military force has been used to defeat an enemy force or to stabilize an insurgency. They provide the assessment and necessary linkage to humanitarian relief and restoration of local governance. The teams should be integrated with other elements of the FACT (formerly the ACT-Tactical) and military Civil Affairs units, and formed as a tactical level JIATF. When conditions permit, the tactical JIATF should hand-off its area of responsibility and remaining tasks to the PRT, which will remain after the military forces move to other tactical areas of responsibility.

**Recommendation XV-4:** S/CRS should integrate the USAID Disaster Assistance Response Teams into the FACT organizational structure as part of a tactical level Joint Interagency Task Force.

**Recommendation XV-5:** The USAID Office of Transitional Initiatives field teams should be integrated into the FACT and PRT force structures as part of Joint Interagency Task Forces at the tactical echelon and at the provincial level of government.

**Finding XVI-1:** *The cross-sectoral sub-PCC for Monitoring, Analysis, and Intelligence has not defined a task list for these activities.*

**Discussion:** Task clarification is needed for (1) rebuilding and mentoring an affected nation's civilian and military institutions and authorities; and (2) providing USG response capabilities to support the overall reconstruction and stabilization effort at all intervention echelons: ACT-HQ, FACT, and PRT. Additional tasks are also needed to inform the sub-PCC on the requirements for the CRSG and the IPC. Lack of tasks to guide agencies makes it difficult to determine what needs to be done by whom, and what skills and capabilities are required.

**Recommendation XVI-1A:** The cross-sectoral sub-PCC for Monitoring, Analysis, and Intelligence should develop a charter that describes its membership and responsibilities.

**Recommendation XVI-1B:** The cross-sectoral sub-PCC for Monitoring, Analysis, and Intelligence should develop a Cross Sector Essential Task List (CSETL) for the full range of transformational diplomacy activities, from peacetime monitoring through reconstruction and stabilization and return of the affected nation to peer status.

**Recommendation XVI-1C:** The cross-sectoral sub-PCC for Monitoring, Analysis, and Intelligence should develop the Intelligence Community's (ICs) position descriptions for all of the proposed USG planning and response organizations to enable the IC to identify resources to meet day-to-day and scalable contingency surge requirements.

**Recommendation XVI-1D:** The cross-sectoral sub-PCC for Monitoring, Analysis, and Intelligence should develop a concept of operations that identifies how the organizational elements will conduct the tasks and share information with the USG interagency community and the multinational and multilateral partners.

**Finding XV-6:** *USAID developed the Federal Foreign Disaster Response Plan in draft in 2002; however, it was not circulated for clearance and approval.*

**Discussion:** There is a continuing need to promulgate a Federal Foreign Disaster Response plan to facilitate interagency collaboration and coordination with other donors and the affected nation to achieve effective responses during future disasters. Since the draft plan was developed, there have been organizational changes, such as the Office of the Director for Foreign Assistance, and extensive experience with major events such as the recent Indian Ocean tsunami and the Pakistan earthquake. The organization changes and experience should be incorporated into the draft plan prior to its implementation.

**Recommendation XV-6:** USAID should review the 2002 draft plan, make appropriate changes as necessary, and circulate a new draft for interagency coordination, approval, and implementation.

**Finding C-1:** *The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task Lists (PCRETL) do not differentiate between tasks that are performed at a national echelon of government from those that would be conducted at provincial or municipal echelons of government, or those that would be performed by intervening authorities during or immediately after conflict.*

**Discussion:** The USG has the capacity to perform tasks that are the responsibility of the Federal echelon of government. It does not have the core competencies to conduct tasks normally conducted by provincial or municipal authorities. The study group found that this was an important distinction when evaluating the potential for Federal departments and agencies to perform the tasks listed in the PCRETL. Similar distinctions will be important for decision makers for determining the sources of skilled personnel when designing and establishing the civilian reserve.

To support this snapshot, the tasks from the original PCRETL have been arranged in hierarchical order and modified to reflect the echelon of governance at which the planning and execution of the task is appropriate. Three columns have been added to the task lists to identify the S/CRS planned echelons of organizational deployment for Advanced Civilian Teams<sup>26</sup> (ACTs):

- Advanced Civilian Team Headquarters (ACT-HQ).
- Field Advanced Civilian Team (FACT) (formerly the ACT-Tactical).
- Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT).

Using the revised task lists, the study team first identified which tasks were performed at the three echelons of government. The team then identified the Federal department or agency that had a related core competency based on a foreign mission, was assigned a similar task in the domestic *National Response Plan*, or in some cases, had actual *ad hoc* experience with reconstruction and stabilization operations during recent contingencies. The department or agency was listed in the ACT-HQ or FACT column for a task based on this assessment. Often, more than one department or agency was listed for the same task. The sub-PCC that prepared the sectoral lists will need to evaluate the capabilities and determine which agency will lead and which will support the task effort.

**Recommendation C-1A:** The sub-PCCs of the PCC-RSO should review the modified task lists in Appendix C and adapt them for use by the PCC and other departments and agencies to facilitate development and maintenance of the USG civilian response capabilities for reconstruction and stabilization operations.

**Recommendation C-1B:** The sub-PCCs should determine the department or agency most capable of leading and supporting sector tasks, and document those task assignments in the proposed *Foreign Transformational Diplomacy Plan* described in Chapter VI.

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<sup>26</sup> Information Paper – Advanced Civilian Teams in Combat Situations, Office of the Coordination for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State, 21 November 2005.

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**Finding C-2:** *The PCRETL currently embeds strategic communications tasks within the sectoral task list, but does not ensure consistency of message across sectors and target audiences.*

**Discussion:** Strategic communications can be viewed as the employment of all elements of national information activities – public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and information operations – in an integrated and coordinated manner to inform or influence key audiences in the affected nation, the region, and partner nations on the policies, objectives, and status of the operation. Unless there is unity of effort, individual sectors might promulgate information that confuses or possibly misinforms one or more of the target audiences. The experience of the Coalition Provisional Authority<sup>27</sup> is relevant, and those lessons identified should be incorporated into the work of a new Cross-Sectoral sub-PCC for Strategic Communications.

**Recommendation C-2:** The Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should establish a Cross-Sectoral sub-PCC for Strategic Communications within the PCC-RSO.

**Finding D-1:** *The existing disparate regional responsibilities of USG departments and agencies makes collaboration and coordination of transformational diplomacy operations, especially during reconstruction and stabilization contingencies, difficult and less efficient within the interagency community, and with multinational and multilateral partners.*

**Discussion:** Many departments and agencies of the USG have overseas responsibilities. The civilian regional and country-specific organizations conduct routine relations with other governments, monitor situations in their assigned areas, determine appropriate courses of action, and implement designated programs in their region according to their authorities and mandates. The United States is the only nation that establishes regional military commands with global coverage. The President assigns the area of responsibility (AOR) for each command through the Unified Command Plan (UCP),<sup>28</sup> but within the DoD, subordinate staffs and organizations often have different regional alignments. Governmental and military responsibilities are also assigned for oceans and bodies of water as well as for landmasses.

The areas of responsibility vary among the organizations and often require the development of a variety of networks when working in different countries, even if they are on the same continent or share borders. For example, Kenya falls within the AOR of the U.S. military's Central Command and within the area assigned to the DoS's African Affairs (AF) region. On the other hand, Rwanda is in the AOR of the U.S. European Command, and remains the responsibility of DoS's Bureau of African Affairs. USAID's Asia and Near East region extends from Morocco to the Philippines cutting across three Combatant Command AORs. As long as the issues remain country-specific, the networks are manageable.

These regional alignments, however, will make it more difficult to develop comprehensive regional strategies as proposed by the Secretary of State's regional diplomatic initiative and the DFA's regional focus on foreign assistance. Such disparate alignments also make it difficult to work with regional inter-governmental organizations. For example, when dealing with the African Union, two regional PCC, two regional bureaus at DoS, three combatant commands, and two USAID bureaus must be consulted, and the U.S. Ambassador

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<sup>27</sup> IDA Document D-3020, Planning for Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Learning from Iraq, 29 July 2004.

<sup>28</sup> See: Center for Defense Information at [www.cdi.org](http://www.cdi.org).

in Ethiopia has as an additional duty the responsibility to coordinate U.S. policies with the AU headquarters, which happens to be located in that country.

Realigning the USG boundaries would make the PCC for RSO more cohesive and efficient when addressing regional issues.

Recommendation D-1: S/CRS and other members of the USG interagency community involved with transformational diplomacy activities and reconstruction and stabilization operations should propose to the Secretary of State and other Principals of the National Security Council a realignment of department and agency boundaries that will make collaboration more effective and efficient within the community, and with multinational and multilateral partners.

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