

## Provincial Level Assessment: An analyst's experience of developing a detailed provincial level assessment for Afghanistan

Miss Nichola Picken

HQ ISAF IX Operational Analyst, U.K.  
e-mail: nicholapicken@hotmail.com

*Nichola obtained a B.A. Honours degree in Combined Honours (Archaeology and Mathematics) from The University of Liverpool, UK in 2001. Following this, she went on to complete an M.Sc. in Mathematical Sciences (Arithmetic and Geometry) from the University of Durham in 2002, during which she specialised in Topology, Algebraic Geometry, and Group Theory. After graduating she joined the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) in February 2003, where she was based in Fort Halstead, Kent. Her first post was as an Analyst in the Mounted Systems Assessment Group of the Land Systems Department. During this appointment, she was one of the lead analysts on the Future Rapid Effects Systems (FRES) project, specialising in the affordability and overall capability of Future Armoured Vehicles and Linear Programming. Nichola joined the Operational Analysis Branch of HQ ARRC in August 2005, taking up the role of Analyst 3 on a three-year posting. In June 2006, Nichola deployed as part of HQ ISAF IX and spent 6 months working as an Operational Analyst in Kabul.*



### ABSTRACT

In order to more accurately assess North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) mission in Afghanistan as HQ International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) IX, COMISAF directed HQ ISAF Operational Analysis (OA) to develop a provincial level assessment using a pictorial methodology. This process would assess the progress of the mission by province on a monthly basis along Security, Governance, Development and Threat Lines of Operation (LoP). Several issues had to be resolved and investigated before development could begin to avoid repetition and to develop the most appropriate and detailed assessment possible:

- COMISAF directive,

- Existing Effects assessment using the Operational Road Map (ORM), mandated for use by Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFC-B), although slightly “out of date” for the current mission,
- Existing assessments already developed for ongoing operations; which already collated existing assessments from several HQ ISAF IX Staff branches,
- Existing methodology and assessments tool, commissioned, developed and used by Combined Force Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A), which was likely to be re-implemented during HQ ISAF X,
- Requirement that no extra burden was placed on data sources, in particular Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and Regional Commands (RC),
- Completion of initial analysis within very short timescales.

This paper describes the thought processes, collaborations and decisions made by the HQ ISAF IX OA team in order to develop the Provincial level assessment, now called “ISAF Provincial Assessment (IPA)”.

## **BACKGROUND**

HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) tenure as HQ International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) IX began on the 4<sup>th</sup> May 2006 and had successfully completed expansion Stage 3 into Regional Command (RC) South in late July 2006 and Stage 4 into RC East in early October 2006, taking over command of the whole of Afghanistan.

The Operational Analysis Branch (OAB) deployed with HQ ARRC as part of HQ ISAF IX, giving rise to a 4-person OA team in theatre.

As HQ ISAF IX had adopted an Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO), OA primarily supported this process, in particular conducting Campaign and Effects Assessments. However, in addition, OA also conducted Significant Actions (SIGACTs) and Casualty data analysis, developed population perception polls and analysed population perception data.

Numerous actors also played a part in assessing effectiveness and progress in and across Afghanistan during the ISAF IX tour. These actors included: HQ ISAF, RCs, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), Combined Security Transition Command– Afghanistan (CSTC-A), Combined Force Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A), Combined Joint Task Force - 76 (CJTF-76), National Embassy’s and International Organisations (IO)/Non-Government Organisations (NGOs).

No definitive, detailed pan-Afghanistan assessment was being conducted that contained sufficient detail to analyse at both the Line of Operation (LoP) and Provincial level and collated assessments from a range of data sources. In fact, many of these actors had differing assessments within the same organisation, often with differing results.

## INTRODUCTION

HQ ISAF Operational Analysis (OA) routinely conducted Effects and Campaign Assessment every month as part of the Joint Effects Tasking Order (JETO) Cycle: the HQ ISAF IX terminology and process for conducting Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO). However, COMISAF required an additional, more detailed assessment for his planning purposes. Shortly after Stage 4 expansion, COMISAF directed HQ ISAF OA:

*“to produce a Detailed Provincial Level Assessment using a Pictorial, map-based Methodology with first analysis to be presented in December 06”.*

Although, this at first seemed like relatively routine business for OA, it was not as simple as it appeared and there were several issues and decisions that had to be made to arrive at an appropriate assessment, as directed by COMISAF. The main issues and options under consideration during the development of this Provincial Level Assessment are listed below:

- The need to fully meet COMISAF’s directive;
- An existing Effects assessment and data collection process that was already conducted by HQ ISAF OA on a routine basis, using the Operational Road Map (ORM), mandated for use by Joint Force Command - Brunssum (JFC-B);
- Several existing assessments that had already been developed for ongoing operations which collated existing assessments from several HQ ISAF IX Staff branches;
- An existing methodology and assessment tool that was being commissioned, developed and used by the US HQ, CFC-A and was likely to be re-implemented during HQ ISAF X with the introduction of a US COMISAF;
- The issue of a Pan-HQ constraint that no extra burden was to be placed on data sources, in particular PRTs and RCs;
- The need to complete initial analysis within very short time scales;
- The need to meet the requirements of several key Stakeholders, in addition to COMISAF;
- The potential loss of capability and capacity with the Relief in Place (RiP) of HQ ISAF IX to HQ ISAF X.

The remainder of this paper discusses each of these issues in turn, examining each in detail, with an assessment of the positive and negative aspects of each potential option.

## EXISTING EFFECTS ASSESSMENT

HQ ISAF IX conducted an Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO). Figure 1 shows a generic diagram of the EBAO cycle; Assessment, Analysis, Planning, and Execution.




Figure 1: The Generic Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) cycle.

The Joint Effects Tasking Order (JETO) cycle was the HQ ISAF IX terminology and process for EBAO, going through each of the Assessment, Analysis, Planning, and Execute stages, as shown in Figure 2, depicts a simplified version of the JETO cycle as used in HQ ISAF IX.




Figure 2: The Joint Effects Tasking Order (JETO).

The Assessment of Effects, conducted by OA, started the cycle and examined monthly progress along each LoP and Province, highlighting areas of success and/or failure. This was followed, in the JETO cycle, by the Joint Operational Planning Group (JOPG), conducted by CJ5 and attended by all staff branches. This meeting produced priority effects for COMISAF’s consideration (along with the effects assessment).

Further Direction and Guidance (D&G) was then provided by COMISAF on his priorities. Then through a series of Joint Coordination and Effects Branch (JCEB) Working Groups (WG) the Effects would be turned into Tasks, presented to and approved by

COSISAF and in turn COMISAF and back-briefed to the subordinates, who would then execute the order.

As previously stated, as part of this cycle OA were responsible for Effects Assessment: collecting, collating and analyzing data from a variety of sources to assess mission success for COMISAF along LoP, closely coordinating with all HQ ISAF staff branches.

HQ ARRC's higher HQ, JFC-B, through the HQ ISAF IX ORM, in part, determined the method by which Effects Assessment was conducted during ISAF IX. The ORM contains the Operational Effects (grouped by LoP) that ISAF strives to achieve, looking towards the overall mission end state and is based upon the Operational Plan (OPLAN). Under the Operational Effects, lie sub-effects and Measures of Effectiveness (MoE), which are then used to measure progress along each Effect and therefore LoP.

The ISAF IX ORM consisted of 5 LoP which are stated below:

1. Security,
2. Governance,
3. Development,
4. Coordination,
5. A Force Status indicator (ISAF Capabilities and Enablers).

This was broken down to approximately 25 Operational Effects, 65 Sub-Effects and 230 MoE (not including the Force Indicator Status LoP). These Effects and MoE were developed before HQ ISAF VIII change of command, using expertise from HQ ISAF VIII Staff, HQ ARRC Staff, OA and ultimately approved by JFC-B.

The Data collection for the Effects Assessment was complex and conducted in four separate ways:

1. A Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Questionnaire: These PRT Questionnaires should have in theory been filled out by the PRT Commander, a civilian counterpart, and a development expert (if available) within the PRT and submitted back to HQ ISAF OA by a monthly deadline. The Questionnaire contained approximately 100 questions each linking to an MoE, across all 5 LoP.
2. A Regional Command (RC) Assessment along each LoP: The RCs were responsible for collecting and collating the PRT questionnaires within their Region and in turn providing HQ ISAF with a written Regional Assessment along each LoP, based on the PRT data. The RC Assessment focused on areas of success and/or failure within each LoP and/or Province.
3. Subject Matter Expert (SME) data: In addition to the data collected via the PRT Questionnaires, HQ ISAF Staff Branches were also required to provide OA with a specific set of data, each supporting an MoE every month. Each

staff branch had a specific list of MoE again across all 5 LoP they were required to provide data for. These MoE were also different from those contained in the PRT Questionnaire.

4. SME Subjective Assessment along Sub-effect: HQ ISAF Staff Branches were also required to provide a subjective assessment on an objective scale for a set of specific sub-effects. More specifically, they were required to allocate the Sub-effect a score from 1 (good) to 5 (bad) based on their subjective judgement. Note that several branches were asked for provide assessments for the same Sub-effect.

OA then collated and analysed all this data, using an aggregation and roll-up of MoE data and sub-effects subjective assessments, to produce an Effects Assessment (a value on a 1 to 5 scale with a corresponding traffic-light colour) by Region and LoP. Figure 3 shows an illustrative example of how the MoE and Effects were aggregated to provide the assessment on a traffic light scale along LoP.




Figure 3: Example of the Roll-up methodology.

In theory, all the data collected from the 4 sources as described above, was complete, accurate, and timely and provided a detailed assessment, going down to Provincial level, if requested. The reality of this in an operational environment, such as Afghanistan, was very different to the theory stated above. PRT Questionnaires were often submitted late or in fact never completed at all. Those that were completed were very rarely completed fully and accurately. In addition, the interpretation of the questions (and therefore data provided to answer that question and MoE) varied dramatically from PRT to PRT and even internally within the PRT, depending on change over of staff.

SME Data from the HQ ISAF Staff Branches was equally inconsistent and was primarily provided for the entire ISAF AOO, rather than broken down at the Provincial level, an essential element of the Effects Assessment

In addition to a lack of accurate, reliable provincial level data, the ORM had become slightly “out of date”. As stated above, the Effects and MoE were developed before HQ ISAF IX, in approximately February 2006. This was both pre-expansion Stage 3 into RC South and Stage 4 into RC East. Thus, several effects (and therefore MoE) were inappropriate, obsolete or could no longer be measured<sup>1</sup>.

The format of the presentation of results for the Effects assessment was also not in line with COMISAF’s directive, based on a traffic-light slide bar rather than a graph-based format, as requested.

It was clear that if the existing Effects assessment was to be used to meet COMISAF’s directive for a Provincial Level assessment, it would have reduced duplication of effort and data burden, however would have required amending the format of results and would not have had great enough fidelity (due to the large number of MoE and Effects) at Provincial Level to produce an accurate assessment.

### **EXISTING OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT**

In addition to the Effects Assessment as part of JETO cycle, HQ ISAF OA had also developed Effects and Assessments for numerous ongoing operations. These assessments used primarily, existing data and assessments from HQ ISAF Staff branches and data collected through the PRT Questionnaires. The assessments also primarily used a traffic-light presentation of results. The assessments concentrated on measuring certain very specific effects depending on the objectives of the operation and only concentrated on certain geographical areas.

However, the data was deemed reliable and accurate as these Assessments used a much-reduced number of Effects and MoE than in the ORM and more reliable data source. If the existing Operations assessments had been used to meet COMISAF’s directive for a Provincial Level assessment, it would again have reduced duplication of effort and data burden and would not have required a new methodology for presentation of results. However, it would have required amending to cover the entire ISAF IX Area Of Operation (AOO) and all objectives, which could have potentially resulted in an increase in data burden.

---

<sup>1</sup> The ISAF ORM has been reviewed by JFC-B in conjunction with HQ ISAF IX to ensure it is more relevant, appropriate and measurable for ISAF X. However, implementing this review was not possible during ISAF IX, due to that fact that any trend analysis would be lost. In other words, it would be impossible to determine what had changed since the last assessment, whether we had progressed over the last 6 months and which areas had declined/progressed.

## PRT ESC INDICATORS

The PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) was a ministerial level board established to meet and discuss PRT issues and develop a common way forward for PRTs throughout Afghanistan. This group consisted of:

- Afghanistan Government Ministers,
- Ambassadors of PRT contributing nations,
- United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA),
- Commanding Officers from both CFC-A and ISAF,
- Other IOs, NGOs and observers.

As part of this, the committee required the ability to compare the situation across different provinces in terms of Security, Governance (Local and Central), and Reconstruction and Development. HQ ISAF VIII OA along with other members of the PRT ESC had developed a set of indicators to meet this requirement. These indicators covered Security, Governance, Reconstruction and Development with data primarily drawn from the PRT Questionnaire. An example of the plots that were used to display the results to the PRT ESC are shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4: Example output for presentation of indicator analysis to PRT ESC.

The initial concept behind the PRT ESC indicators matched COMISAFs directive for a Provincial Level Assessment very closely. Both required the use of limited number of indicators along each area, increasing detail at the Provincial Level, and used a map-based format to present results.

However, as with the ORM, the PRT ESC indicators used data from the PRT questionnaire, which as previously discussed was relatively unreliable and inaccurate. In addition, the indicators were developed during ISAF VIII, pre-Stage 3 and Stage 4 expansion, resulting in many of the indicators being “out-of-date” for the current situation in theatre.

### **CFC-A ASSESSMENT TOOL**

Concurrently, HQ ISAF OA had been assisting CFC-A develop an Assessments tool. The tool had been designed and developed by CFC-A CJ5 to assist in their planning processes and more specifically to use in determining primacy<sup>1</sup> in certain provinces.

The tool did not appear to be either fit for purpose or mathematically sound, using averages of standard deviations, rankings and essentially compared “apples” with “pears” and HQ ISAF OA provided recommendations on the tool to this end. In part as a response to this, CFC-A CJ5 took the tool to the RAND Corporation for a verification and validation report – which was delivered with not dissimilar recommendations from those HQ ISAF OA had suggested.

The tool was subsequently modified to incorporate these recommendations and developed into a very useful, yet complicated, Assessments tool. The tool measured progress along 4 LoP:

1. Security,
2. Governance,
3. Development,
4. Threat.

Under each of these LoP were a specific set of indicators, using a variety of different data sources, including HQ ISAF and IO/NGOs. The tool also used a map-based format to diagrammatically picture the results. An example of which can be seen in Figure 5.

It appeared at first glance that in fact CFC-A had developed a tool that largely met COMISAFs directive and could be used by HQ ISAF OA to produce an Provincial Level Assessment.

However despite the extensive modifications, there were still problems with the tool. Behind the map-based format as illustrated above, the Assessments tool used a very complex, deeply linked spreadsheet requiring a high-level of VBA expertise to use and modify. It also

---

<sup>1</sup> Handing over the responsibility for security to the Afghan Nation Security Forces (ANSF).

determined the traffic-light result using a very un-mathematical method on a generic percentage scale rather than using specific thresholds.




Figure 5: Map-based presentation of results of CFC-A Assessments Tool.

## DATA BURDEN

In approximately October 2006, a Pan-HQ request had been released by the HQ ISAF Command Group that no extra burden was to be placed on PRTs and RCs. In other words, no branch was to request further data and/or information from PRTs and RCs than currently officially requested.

For OA and the development of the Provincial Level Assessment, this had several repercussions:

- The PRT Questionnaire could not be expanded to include or modify questions, which might be used in the Provincial level assessment;
- OA could not request any other data from PRTs/RCs separate to the PRT Questionnaire;
- Therefore, the Provincial Level Assessment could only use primarily existing data.

However, across Afghanistan, data and/or assessments were available from a variety of different sources including:

- Assessments and data from HQ ISAF Staff branch Subject Matter Experts (SMEs);
- Existing data collected as part of the PRT Questionnaire;

- Assessments and data collected by CFC-A;
- Assessments and data collected by CSTC-A;
- Assessments and data collected by CJTF-76;
- Survey Data, both internal (i.e. conducted by CJPOTF) and external (i.e. conducted by external survey companies such as ACSOR or Altai Consulting);
- Assessments and data collected by IO/NGOs (for e.g. UNDSS threat assessment).

### TIME SCALES

COMISAF had requested that the initial assessment was to be completed and presented at the beginning of December 2006. This resulted in a time scale of 2 months to design and implement a methodology and format of presentation (including approval by the HQ ISAF Command Group), collect, collate and analyse all data, produce the assessment and brief the results to COMISAF. Thus, due to the time scales it was highly unlikely that a completely new assessment would be possible for the first presentation in December.

### STAKEHOLDERS

Although the original request for this new Provincial Assessment originated from COMISAF, several other members of the ISAF Command Group were very interested in this assessment and the methodology with which it should use.

### MANPOWER

Although, the methodology and initial assessment had been requested to be in place by December 2006, ISAF IX was due to change command at the beginning of February 2007 and was already undergoing a significant RiP. This resulted in a substantial change over of staff, not only in OA but also in many of the Staff branches, PRTs and RCs. This was leading to an inevitable loss of background knowledge, experience and continuity.

### THE OPTIONS

Having analysed and investigated all the issues, HQ ISAF OA now had several choices as to how to take the Provincial Level Assessment forward.

1. Top down from the Existing Effects Assessments and the ORM.
2. Bottom up from Existing Operations assessments.

3. Adapt the CFC-A tool.
4. Develop a completely new assessment.

Table 1 summaries the advantages and disadvantages for each option.

Option	Advantages	Disadvantages
1. Top down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data collection and analytical process already in place.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not enough detailed and accurate data at the provincial level.</li> <li>• Need to reduce number of MoE to a more appropriate level (from ~200 to ~50).</li> <li>• Need to update MoE and Effects to be more in line with ISAF IX and less “out of date”.</li> <li>• Requirement to amend format of results to a map-based pictorial format.</li> </ul>
2. Bottom up	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data collection and analytical process already in place.</li> <li>• Based on a reduced, specific set of indicators.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need to expand methodology to include all geographical areas.</li> <li>• Need to expand methodology to include all mission objectives and be in line with COMISAFs intent.</li> </ul>
3. Adaptation of CFC-A assessments tool	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existing map-based pictorial format of results already in place.</li> <li>• Used existing assessments from a variety of different (and reliable) sources.</li> <li>• Based on a reduced, specific set of indicators.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Based on an extremely complicated spreadsheet tool, which required advanced VBA expertise.</li> <li>• Indicators needed modifying to be more in line with COMISAFs intent.</li> <li>• Determination of traffic-light system was not mathematically sound and required significant modification.</li> </ul>
4. New Assesment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Could potentially completely meet COMISAFs directive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited timescales to design and implement an entirely new assessment process.</li> <li>• The New assessment would still have to use existing data due to the restriction on requests to PRT/RC for new data.</li> </ul>

Table 1: Advantages and disadvantages of each assessment option.

After assessing all the options, HQ ISAF OA decided to use Option 2: Bottom-up from existing operations assessments, from which to develop the new Provincial Level Assessment. However, the assessments were to be combined and modified using Staff branch expertise to exactly fit COMISAFs directive of a limited number of indicators. It was also to be expanded to all Afghanistan.

Essentially, the new Provincial Level Assessment was to be a combination of the best parts of each of the options, using the operations assessments methodology. The resulting assessment was subsequently developed and titled the ISAF Provincial Assessment or IPA. It measured progress along 4 LoP:

1. Security: Concentrating mainly on ANSF Capabilities.
2. Governance: Assessments of Local governance and the governor.
3. Development: Concentrating on development enablers.
4. Threat: Current Threat level assessments.

Under each LoP were indicators (or MoE) that would be measured for each Province. These were aggregated to give an assessment by LoP and by Province and then again aggregated to give an overall assessment of the progress of each province.

The aggregation of both the indicators and LoP was not based on a mathematical formula or weighting system as with the ORM and existing Effects Assessment process. Instead, a Military Judgement Panel, consisting of an SME from each HQ ISAF Staff Branch, determined the aggregation. The military judgement panel agreed on an assessment for each LoP and overall for the Province. This enabled the priorities of the indicators and LoP to change depending on the situation at that time.

The data for the indicators came from a variety of sources including subjective assessments from HQ ISAF Staff Branches, data from the PRT Questionnaire, assessments from Combined Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (CJPOTF), CSTC-A and United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). The indicators themselves were chosen in agreement by HQ ISAF OA and all staff branches and were approved by all members of the HQ ISAF Command Group. Although, many of the indicators, which can be seen in Table 2, are subjective assessments it was agreed by all parties that given the available data and COMISAF directive that these types of assessment, combined with objective metrics, would give the most accurate and appropriate assessment.

#### ISAF PROVINCIAL ASSESSMENT (IPA)

Table 2 shows details of the Indicators and data sources that were used for the IPA.

LoP	Indicators	Data source
Development	PRT Projects	HQ ISAF CJENGR
	GoA Programmes	HQ ISAF CJENGR
	NGO Engagement	HQ ISAF CJENGR
	Donor Engagement	HQ ISAF CJENGR
	PDC Effectiveness	HQ ISAF CJENGR
	Population Perception of Development	CJPOTF
	Development Assessment	PRT Questionnaire
Governance	Population Perception of Governance	CJPOTF
	Subj. Assessment of the quality of Local Government Leadership	HQ ISAF POLAD
	Governance Assessment	PRT Questionnaire
	Subj. Assessment of Governance established	HQ ISAF CJENGR/POLAD/CJ9
Security	Population Perception of ANP Capability	CJPOTF
	Population Perception of ANA Capability	CJPOTF
	ANA Assessment	CSTC-A
	ANP Assessment	CSTC-A
	Security Assessment	PRT Questionnaire
Threat	Threat level	HQ ISAF CJ2
	Population perception of threat	CJPOTF
	No of SIGACTs	HQ ISAF OAB
	Threat level	UNDSS

Table 2: IPA assessments and Data sources.

### PRESENTATION OF RESULTS

The results of the ISAF Provincial Assessment (IPA) were presented in two separate ways. Firstly, in spreadsheet format showing the traffic-light colour for each of the indicators for each Province individually. An example of this can be seen in Figure 6. This was primarily used to present results to the military judgement panel in order for them to determine the amalgamation. Once that had been achieved, the results were then transposed onto a map, using a wheel-based approach to presenting the results. An example of this can be seen in Figure 7.

RC(C)				
Set	Type	Branch	Assessment	Kabul
1	DEVELOPMENT	CJENGR	PRT Projects	Orange
2		CJENGR	GOA programme	Green
3		CJENGR	NGO engagement	Green
4		CJENGR	Donor Engagement	Green
5		CJENGR	PDC effective	Orange
6		CJPOTF	Populations perception of the development within each province	Red
7		PRT questionnaire	Development	Red
8	GOVERNANCE	CJPOTF	Populations perception of the governance within each province	Orange
9		POLAD	Subjective assessment of the Quality of the local government leadership	Red
10		PRT questionnaire	Governance	Green
11		CJENGR, POLAD and CJ9	Subjective assessment of governance establishment	Green
12	SECURITY	CJPOTF	Populations perception of ANP capability	Red
13		CJPOTF	Populations perception of ANA capability	Orange
14		CSTC-A	ANA	Red
15		CSTC-A	ANP	Orange
16		PRT questionnaire	Security	Orange
17	THREAT	CJ2 report	Threat	Green
18		CJPOTF	Populations perception of the threat within each province	Orange
19		OAB	SIGACTs	Green
20		UNDSS assess	Threat	Green
			<b>OVERALL ASSESSMENT</b>	Orange

Figure 6: ISAF Provincial Assessment (IPA) spreadsheet format.

### CONCLUSION

In conclusion, did HQ ISAF OA chose the right option and approach in developing to the Provincial Level Assessment to meet COMISAFs directive? The methodology and data collection process set up by HQ ISAF for this Provincial level assessment was fully supported by all Staff branches: meetings were fully attended and SMEs within the staff branches took responsibility for data inputs.

The resulting product met COMISAF’s directive and was approved by all members of the HQ ISAF Command Group.




Figure 7: ISAF Provincial Assessment (IPA) Results.

The first presentation of the results was successfully presented to COMISAF in December 2006, meeting the original deadlines. However, the most important factor in determining whether this option was correct is that HQ ISAF X continue to use the IPA, albeit now based on a 2 month period assessment, to brief COMISAF on progress by LoP and Province.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Although this paper describes the thought process behind the development of one particular Assessment, it also examines the problems of developing and using such as Assessments process in an Operational environment, such as Afghanistan. These problems and issues are highlighted and it is important when considering and developing an Assessments process that these issues are fully addressed:

- Lack of accurate and reliable Data.
- Conflicting requirements from stakeholders.
- Conflicting existing assessments already conducted in the same AOO.
- Limited time and resources.

## ABBREVIATIONS

ANSF	Afghan National Security Force.
AOO	Area of Operation.
ARRC	Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.

---

CFC-A	Combined Force Command – Afghanistan.
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command– Afghanistan.
CJENG	Combined Joint Engineers.
CJPOTF	Combined Joint Psychological Operations Task Force.
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force.
EBAO	Effects Based Approach to Operations.
ESC	Executive Steering Committee.
IO	International Organisations.
IPA	ISAF Provincial Assessment.
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force.
JCEB	Joint Coordination Effects Branch.
JETO	Joint Effects Tasking Order.
JFC-B	Joint Force Command – Brunssum.
JOPG	Joint Operational Planning Group.
LoP	Line of Operation.
MoE	Measure of Effectiveness.
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
NGO	Non Government Organisation.
OA	Operational Analysis.
OPLAN	Operational Plan.
ORM	Operational Roadmap.
POLAD	Political Advisor.
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team.
RC	Regional Command.
RiP	Relief in Place.
SIGACTs	Significant Actions.
SME	Subject Matter Expert.
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security.
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan.
WG	Working Group.