

THE CORNWALLIS GROUP XIV:
ANALYSIS FOR SOCIETAL CONFLICT
AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY

Introduction to Cornwallis XIV: Analysis of Societal Conflict and Counter-Insurgency

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Alexander (Ted) Woodcock is Chair and Proceedings Editor of the Cornwallis Group. He is a private consultant and has worked for several US government entities. He is an Affiliate Professor at George Mason University (GMU) School of Public Policy. Dr. Woodcock is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Medicine in London and a Foreign Member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences. He was a Senior Research Professor and Director of the Societal Dynamics Research Center at George Mason University School of Public Policy. Previously he was Chief Scientist and Vice President at BAE SYSTEMS-Portal Solutions (formerly Synectics Corporation), Fairfax, Virginia. Woodcock is also a Guest Professor at the National Defence College, Stockholm, Sweden, and was a Visiting Professor at the Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham, England for 10 years. He is actively involved in the development and implementation of societal dynamics models of military, political, economic, and other processes for the modeling and analysis of low intensity conflict, peace and humanitarian operations, and related areas. Woodcock was Project Director for the Strategic Management System (STRATMAS®) project that produced a facility that uses genetic algorithms and intelligent automata methods for the definition and optimal deployment of civilian and military entities in peace and humanitarian operations. He is the Chair, Proceedings Editor, and a Founding Member of the Cornwallis Group. Woodcock was a Fulbright Fellow and Research Associate in Biology at Yale University. He was an IBM (UK) Research Fellow in the Mathematics Institute at the University of Warwick in England and an IBM (World Trade) Research Fellow at IBM Research, Yorktown Heights, New York. He was a Visiting Scholar in biology on sabbatical leave at Stanford University. Woodcock has a Ph.D. in Biology and an M.Sc. in Biophysics from the University of East Anglia in England, as well as a B.Sc. (with honours) in Physics from Exeter University in England. He is a Full Member of Sigma Xi.

INTRODUCTION

Titles and authors of the papers presented at the Cornwallis Group XIV Workshop on *Analysis of Societal Conflict and Counter-Insurgency* are identified as follows.

The Military Keynote presentation at the Workshop was titled: *Analysing Civil Society and Counter-Insurgency: 'Comfortable with Chaos'* and was provided by Major General (Retired) Tim Cross, CBE. This was followed by Ambassador (Retired) Robert W. Farrand who presented the paper: *What it Takes to Supervise a Community Devastated by War*; Dr. Anton Minkov presented the paper: *Counterinsurgency and Ethnic/Sectarian Rivalry in*

Comparative Perspective: Soviet Afghanistan and Contemporary Iraq; Alistair Morley presented the paper: “*Abandon All Hope – Intractable Societal Conflicts*,” Gordon Pattison presented the paper: *The British Army’s Effectiveness in the Irish Campaign 1919-1921 and the Lessons for Modern Counterinsurgency Operations, with Special Reference to C3I Aspects*; and Dr. Vincent, Dr. Eles, and Mr. Vasiliev, presented the paper : *Opinion Polling in Support of Counterinsurgency*.

The *Civilian Keynote: Challenges of Transition* was presented by Ambassador (Retired) William Montgomery. Mr. Ramjeet and Dr. George Rose presented the paper: *UK Operational Analysis Evaluation of Current Operational Campaign Effects Assessment (2008)*; Ms. Dodd and Mr. Alston presented the paper: *Complex Adaptive and ‘Inquiring’ Systems Theory for Contemporary Military Operations: A Multi-perspective Approach*; Dr. Irmer presented the paper: *A Systems Approach and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF)*; Colonel Haring presented the paper: *Conflict Analysis and Military Planning*; Dr. Dompke presented the paper: *Use of Simulation to Support the Analysis of Societal Conflict and Counterinsurgency*; Dr. Woodcock and Dr. Dockery presented the paper: *Model-based Approaches to Counter-Insurgency Planning*; Dr. van Oosterhout, Mr. Kernkamp, Mr. Bloemen, and LTC Clocquet presented the paper: *Full Spectrum COIN Modelling*; Dr. Horne and Dr. Schwierz presented the paper: *Data Farming Around the World Overview*; *Judicial Assessment Models*: Captain Taylor presented the paper: *An Ad Hoc Approach of Assessments in Fragile States*; Dr. Tomlinson presented the paper: *Engaging with Local People: More Tea and Fewer Messages*; and Dr. Müller presented the paper: *Principles, Paradigms, and Paradoxes in Civil-Military Engagement*.

ABSTRACTS OF THE PAPERS PRESENTED AT CORNWALLIS XIV

Information contained in the papers presented at the Cornwallis Group XIV Workshop on *Analysis of Societal Conflict and Counter-Insurgency* and summarized below.

Military Keynote: Analysing Civil Society and Counter-Insurgency: ‘Comfortable with Chaos’ by Major General (Retired) Tim Cross, CBE.

In his Military Keynote paper titled: *Military Keynote: Analysing Civil Society and Counter-Insurgency: ‘Comfortable with Chaos,’* Major General (Retired) Tim Cross observed that the “title is one that I would use if I ever I got around to writing a book, because if I had not learned how to become comfortable with chaos I wouldn’t have survived over the last 40 or so years. I tend to believe that the world is generally more chaos than conspiracy - and I will speak if I may for around 60 minutes on that issue - and we can then debate the matter. I have decided to set out my stall by dividing my talk into 4 parts, which together comprise my journey.”

“First, there are the early years, the years that laid the foundations – the 1970’s and 80’s, principally preparing to repel the Warsaw Pact but including N Ireland and Cyprus; secondly, the 1990’s, a period which covered 4 operational deployments; the 1990/91 Gulf War and 3 tours in the Balkans.”

“Thirdly, the final seven years or so; this is the meat of my talk, covering the 2003 Iraq war and my time in Washington, Kuwait, and Baghdad. But finally, if I may, I will then just outline what this all tells me, offering some food for thought.”

Major General Cross concludes by observing that: “*The Post Conflict Response* starts from the bottom up and the top down, and it all leads to Development Aid. The aim is to improve the standard of living – especially of the poor – but when applied externally the evidence is that generally it fails; it must be done internally. The core is to establish the Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Democracy linked to economic and physical reconstruction. It is very – very – hard and we are not good at it. You can never do as much as you think you can and what you do is never done at the speed that you hoped for. Ultimately – It’s all about Logistics, and there are 5 lessons that have been learnt and then re-learnt.”

- “1. This is all about security – nothing can be done without it and security does not equal military. It is about everything that allows individual people to live their lives as they wish – mil/police plus energy/utilities plus getting the milk delivered.
2. Planning matters. Need to understand the culture and prepare our people.
3. Manage expectations – it takes time to change.
4. Organisations do matter.
5. Money is important, but it doesn’t solve anything on its own – it takes Time, Treasure, and Talent.”

What it Takes to Supervise a Community Devastated by War by Ambassador (Retired) Robert W. Farrand, former Supervisor of Brčko (1997-2000) and The Peace Operations Policy Program, George Mason University, Arlington, Virginia, U.S.A.

In his paper titled: *What it Takes to Supervise a Community Devastated by War*, Ambassador Farrand observes that “When one looks hard at this phenomenon, however, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that not enough up-front effort goes into the selection and training of persons tapped to undertake these highly unorthodox—even hybrid—challenges. As in my case, professional diplomats, for example, are simply not groomed to take on civilian leadership roles in such unusual and often dangerous assignments. Nonetheless, the career diplomat is routinely tagged—along with the occasional retired military officer—as the default candidate to undertake leadership roles in these highly problematic and perplexing operations.”

Farrand further observes that in his “judgment, a politician, either temporarily out of office or retired from political life altogether, would be the preferred candidate to consider as leader of the civilian side of a peace operation. I believe an ex-mayor of a large- or medium-sized American city—preferably one with high rates of crime, drug use, crumbling infrastructure, poor health care, lagging schools, inner-city flight, and so on—skilled in the all-important art of coalition-building among feuding parties and groups (police vs. firefighters, Republicans vs. Democrats, social services vs. business interests, and the like) would be a far better choice to govern a collapsed, post-conflict municipality like Brčko,

Mostar, Sarajevo, Mitrovica, Baghdad, or Kirkuk than the usual suspects who are normally tapped for such functions.”

Counterinsurgency and Ethnic/Sectarian Rivalry in Comparative Perspective: Soviet Afghanistan and Contemporary Iraq by Anton Minkov, Ph.D., Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, Defence Research and Development Canada, Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

Dr. Minkov observes in the Abstract of the paper *Counterinsurgency and Ethnic/Sectarian Rivalry in Comparative Perspective: Soviet Afghanistan and Contemporary Iraq* that: “To address the question of whether the current state building and counterinsurgency strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq are capable of bringing stability in the persisting environment of inter-ethnic/sectarian conflict in these countries, this paper looks at the insurgency against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the pro-Moscow regime in Kabul during the 1980s. It concludes that the preconditions for the development of the same chaotic and fragmented political landscape experienced by Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops are in place in Iraq.”

“As a result of common ground conditions of ethnic/sectarian diversity and protracted irregular warfare, the approaches to the challenges of nation building and counterinsurgency efforts in Soviet Afghanistan and contemporary Iraq parallel each other. Modernization, associated with whole-scale imposition of alien political models, led initially to the ideologisation of the social conflict in the two countries. However, the disruption of traditional power balances eventually led to the emergence of ethnic/sectarian identities as more decisive for regime legitimacy. The Soviet and US efforts to stabilize the regimes by helping them build large national forces and poring billions in foreign aid is a strategy that ignores this reality.”

“Abandon All Hope – Intractable Societal Conflicts” by Alistair Morley, Associate Fellow and Senior Analyst, Policy and Capability Studies, Dstl, Farnborough, Hampshire, England, United Kingdom.

Morley in the Summary to his paper titled: *Abandon All Hope – Intractable Societal Conflicts*, observes that: “Societal conflicts between a government and various insurgent factions can be represented as a n-player co-operative game. The relative objectives (preferences, values) and capabilities of all factions can be encoded as a finite state system, where each state represents a feasible configuration for a “peaceful settlement.”

“The paper discusses the theoretical limits the economics literature imposes on such games and the possibility of (formally) intractable conflicts. Attention is drawn particularly to the following areas: (1) Feasible and stable configurations. (2) Feasible but unstable configurations. (3) Unfeasible configurations. A selection of real world cases indicates many long running conflicts consist wholly of the third set. The reasons for this include supermajorities and defection costs, incomplete information and signalling by intransigence, incommensurable goods and the impact of negative rents and positive externalities. The paper concludes that for many real world cases conflict resolution efforts are doomed to fail and that factions will fight to the bitter end.”

The British Army's Effectiveness in the Irish Campaign 1919-1921 and the Lessons for Modern Counterinsurgency Operations, with Special Reference to C3I Aspects by Gordon Pattison, U.K. Ministry of Defence.

Pattison, in the Abstract to his paper titled: *The British Army's Effectiveness in the Irish Campaign 1919-1921 and the Lessons for Modern Counterinsurgency Operations, with Special Reference to C3I Aspects*, observes that: "The Irish War of Independence 1919-1921, variously known as the Anglo-Irish War, The Tan War or The Troubles, was in many ways a prototype of many later counter-insurgency conflicts."

"The governing power failed to realise the strength of the Sinn Fein movement in undermining and then replacing key institutions, was unable to suppress the IRA by its military and police efforts, and carried out some security policies that gave ammunition to the insurgent's propaganda efforts. Many commentators have attributed these weaknesses to an incoherent command and control infrastructure, at the centre of which was an intelligence system that was not fit for purpose. This essay examines original data from the campaign to suggest that although slow to start, military intelligence towards the end of the campaign put severe pressure on the insurgents, although its counter-intelligence and security efforts left a lot to be desired."

Opinion Polling in Support of Counterinsurgency by Etienne Vincent, Ph.D., Philip Eles, Ph.D., and Boris Vasiliev, Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command Operational Research Team, Centre for Operational Research and Analysis Defence Research and Development Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

In their paper titled: *Opinion Polling in Support of Counterinsurgency* Vincent, Eles, and Vasiliev observe that: "An insurgency is a violent struggle between insurgents and a constituted authority for legitimacy and influence over a local population. Local perceptions and attitudes are then crucial to counterinsurgency efforts. Opinion polling offers unique insight into local perceptions towards insurgents, government, and common concerns. Of course, opinion polling is also subject to several limitations, especially when used in conflict zones, and practitioners should be mindful of those. Nevertheless, the authors advocate an aggressive use of opinion polling as an assessment tool for counterinsurgency campaigns."

"Through their involvement in the design, analysis and reporting of all opinion polls conducted to date for the Canadian Forces in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, the authors have gained rare experience of polling in this unusual context. By describing this polling endeavour in non-technical terms, this paper aims to share lessons learned and to promote an enlightened approach to opinion polling in the context of counterinsurgency. Recommendations for conducting opinion polling in support of counterinsurgency are peppered throughout this paper."

"Despite polling's great value to assessments, the authors are far from suggesting that it should replace reporting from other sources. In assessing the Canadian campaign in Kandahar Province, polling has gone from being an obscure and easily disregarded side show to being sometimes over-emphasized in important operational assessment reports. The Operational Analysts assisting the teams conducting mission assessments should always seek the development of other data collection tools to complement or confirm assessments coming from polls."

The Civilian Keynote: Challenges of Transition by Ambassador (Retired)
William Montgomery, Gruda, Croatia.

Ambassador Montgomery in his Civilian Keynote paper titled: *Challenges of Transition* commenced by observing that: “Two months ago I was asked to give an overview of the Balkan political/economic situation to the National Security Council of Bulgaria. After an hour and a half session, including questions and answers, I had a drink with the head of their Intelligence Service. He and I had known each other during my six years in Bulgaria, first in 1988-1991 as Deputy Chief of Mission at our Embassy and from 1993-1996 as US Ambassador there. He said with a twinkle in his eye and very diplomatically that he remembered me as being self-confident, very sure of my positions and somewhat arrogant. He contrasted that with my just-concluded lecture, which he believed was very different in tone. Was he right, he asked? If so, what had changed?”

The Ambassador states that: “It was an accurate observation. My experiences with Regime Change in the Balkans and its consequences have had a major impact on my worldview. To be candid, I think that the region has changed me more that I have succeeded in changing it! I think that my experiences, my disappointments, and my original expectations mirror those of many Americans dealing with democratic transition and the development of civil societies. When I look at the resumes of many present here today and the papers that you are presenting, it is likely that little of what I am about to say will strike you as either something new or especially enlightening. Frankly I hope that is the case, because it would give me more hope for the future. We need far more realism in our policies and practices than we demonstrated thus far in the Post Cold War period.”

UK Operational Analysis Evaluation of Current Operational Campaign Effects Assessment (2008) by Tom Ramjeet, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), Farnborough, Hampshire, England, United Kingdom, and George Rose, Ph.D., Sponsor, Ministry of Defence, Main Building, Horse Guards Avenue, Whitehall, London, England, United Kingdom.

The paper titled: *UK Operational Analysis Evaluation of Current Operational Campaign Effects Assessment (2008)* by Ramjeet and Rose observes that: “This study was commissioned by D Scrutiny, within the UK MoD, in order to evaluate the UK “frontline” OA community’s position on Campaign Effects Assessment (CEA), based on their experience up to the end of 2008.”

“The aim of this study is to advance the OA capability to contribute to CEA in support to operations and exercises, and maximise the value that OA can make to the assessment process. This report summarises the study’s findings, outlining the view of the UK “frontline” OA community on the techniques that have utility, capturing best practice, and making a number of recommendations to lead to improvements on current practice.”

Complex Adaptive and ‘Inquiring’ Systems Theory for Contemporary Military Operations: A Multi-perspective Approach by Lorraine Dodd and Anthony Alston, Centre for Applied Systems Studies, Cranfield University. Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham, Wiltshire, England, United Kingdom.

In their paper titled: *Complex Adaptive and 'Inquiring' Systems Theory for Contemporary Military Operations: A Multi-perspective Approach*, Dodd and Alston observe that: "Traditionally, military Command and Control (C2) research is focused on problem solution and direct support to decision-taking. Techniques and methods typically involve finding optimal solutions to bounded problems whose objectives span a finite set of options. Such methods are very suitable when the problems under consideration can be represented in closed-process form, when it is meaningful and acceptable to bound the system of interest and de-couple it from its wider operating environment for the purposes of achieving a solution or a decision-action."

"Contemporary military operations present a major challenge to C2 theory and methods as they tend to be carried out in theatres and environments where there are increasing degrees of open-endedness (particularly in terms of the extent of effects and consequences of actions) and complexity (both in terms of unpredictability and social diversity). Is it enough to extend and adapt existing methods or do the challenges demand a return to holistic, inquiring systems thinking; such as proposed by Churchman and Ackoff? The latter will require a transformation from objective functions towards subjective representations and a move from preparing for the probable to being able to engage with the possible; such as proposed by post-Keynes economist Shackle."

"The paper discusses approaches that are proving to be useful for addressing complex problems, where it is necessary to adopt different perspectives and multiple viewpoints. A conceptual framework is presented from which analytical frameworks can be drawn such that the methods used for problem analysis have sufficient degrees of freedom and requisite variety to match the characteristics of the challenges posed by contemporary military operations. A recent case study to address Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) in Afghanistan will be used to illustrate the conceptual and analytical frameworks."

A Systems Approach and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) by Cynthia Irmer, Ph.D., Senior Conflict Prevention Officer, Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS), Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Irmer concludes her paper titled: *A Systems Approach and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF)* with the following observations: "Successful countering of insurgency by the USG and other governments requires nothing short of this paradigmatic shift in perception; expanding or retooling existing diplomatic, military and development approaches is insufficient. Recent introduction of concepts such as transformational diplomacy, irregular warfare and conflict sensitive development exemplify the fact that a new frame of reference is a fundamental precondition to successfully assessing, planning and engaging others in pursuit of US national and global security. The ICAF is an approved tool that assists senior- and working-level public servants in abandoning the problem/solution frame and adopting a more useful perspective for interacting with complex, adaptive systems."

"The ICAF's policymaking applications include development of recommendations for senior officials in DC and the field compiled by a broad-based group of USG and other experts who apply the ICAF to an emerging, continuing or receding incidence of insecurity, including the destabilizing contributions of an insurgency. For the military, particularly those engaged in "irregular warfare," application of the ICAF assists in framing, assessing and

engaging situations from a perspective other than problem/solution, opening up possibilities to genuine, sustainable human security. Applications of the ICAF assist the development assistance community as a way of moving away from contractor-based design and implementation of projects toward joint discovery with local populations the complex dynamics masking available and ready-to-support local resilience sufficient to overcome destabilizing influences.”

“The ICAF is approved, tested and available for use. It is one mechanism for beginning to move the USG away from the current, counter-productive problem/solution frame into a challenging yet promising possibility of engaging a complex, adaptive system from within.”

Conflict Analysis and Military Planning by Colonel Ellen L. Haring, RES
USAR USARC.

Colonel Haring in the Abstract of her paper titled: *Conflict Analysis and Military Planning*, observes that: “Military planning doctrine teaches Commander’s to develop operational design concepts and planners to operationalize these concepts via executable plans. Military doctrine fails to provide a framework for understanding the dynamics of conflict and this failure results in operational campaign plans that do not address the root causes of conflict. Current military doctrine has no method for understanding the dynamics driving conflict and some of the key doctrinal concepts used during planning are grossly flawed. Specifically, the doctrinal concept of center of gravity identification addresses symptoms rather root causes of conflict, thus directing military efforts toward short-term conflict reduction measures. The recently approved Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) is a tool that, if used properly by military planners, will significantly improve operational design and center of gravity identification and help the military community conduct operations that will lead to durable and sustainable peace. This paper examines how the military should utilize the ICAF to inform its planning efforts and improve prospects for long-term peace.”

Use of Simulation to Support the Analysis of Societal Conflict and Counterinsurgency by Uwe Dompke, Ph.D. NC3A CAT 1, P.O. Box 174
2501 CD, Den Haag, The Netherlands.

The Abstract of the paper by Dompke titled: *Use of Simulation to Support the Analysis of Societal Conflict and Counterinsurgency* observes that “GAMMA is a simulation system developed at the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) in The Hague. It is developed as an analysis tool for irregular warfare on the operational level to support operational planning and the assessment of Courses of Action (COA). With its representation of societal factors to measure a given situation regarding stability and its development over time and aims and objectives as part of a counterinsurgency strategy to change a given situation to the better it serves very well as a tool to support analysis of societal conflict and counterinsurgency.”

“The paper will cover three main aspects: 1. The concept behind GAMMA as an open architecture tool with an own object store which allows the modelling of military and non-military objects and their interactions easily without requiring program changes; 2. The modelling approach used in GAMMA to simulate the creation of incidents in a given scenario (agent-based) and the multi-criteria decision making and system dynamics based approach to incorporate societal data into the analysis of stability operations; 3. Experience gained from the use of GAMMA in different scenarios (exercise scenarios Zoran Sea Crisis

and Cerasia, MNE 4 (Afghanistan) and a US DARPA (Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency) experiment with Nigeria and Chad). A summary including a short note on a concept for the validation of the models will conclude the paper.”

Model-based Approaches to Counter-Insurgency Planning by Alexander E. R. (Ted) Woodcock, Ph.D., Chair, The Cornwallis Group and Scolopax International Consultants, Burke, Virginia, U.S.A. and John T. Dockery, Ph.D., Reston, Virginia, U.S.A.

Woodcock and Dockery in their paper titled: *Model-based Approaches to Counter-Insurgency Planning* observe that: “Planning requires the timely application of identified resources and capabilities in order to achieve required outcomes and goals. Production and use of prototype models can provide insight into the dynamics of situations of interest and how new levels of understanding can support counter-insurgency planning. This paper describes development and use of models to examine the dynamical behavior of infectious disease processes and of critical infrastructures such as electrical and water utilities and airline transport systems. These activities have provided some understanding of the impact of disease on a population and of terrorist or insurgent attacks on those infrastructures.”

“A prototype infectious disease model has been developed and used to assess the impact of timely public health intervention on disease transmission, infection, and recovery. An enhanced model has been produced with a stochastic mechanism describing the process of infection that may resemble, at least notionally, some of the processes associated with anthrax-like infection. Prototype notional recovery mechanism models for attacks on critical infrastructures have provided facilities for assessing the impact of recovery rate on the overall functioning of those infrastructures. These models are notional models of the disease process and should not be assumed to represent any actual disease process; no medical and public health consequences should be assumed based on the output behavior of those models.”

“A prototype electrical utility security model describes the notional generation and transmission of electrical power to four cities. The model incorporates an ability to simulate the impact of terrorist or insurgent attacks on an electrical generator facility and the electrical power that it produces to the four cities that can occur at user-selected times and intensities. Notional recovery mechanisms are also modeled in which recovery from the notional attacks can take place at user-selected rates. The model could provide the basis for production of enhanced representation of the effects of the loss of power on key societal facilities and activities, for example.”

“A prototype water utility security model describes processes associated with the collection, purification, distribution, and consumption of water to the population of a notional city. The model permits the user-selection of terrorist or insurgent attacks on the notional water purification and storage facilities. Also incorporated in the overall model is an infectious disease model. Low levels of availability of purified water can cause disease outbreaks, the magnitude and severity of can be determined by user-selected infection, recovery, and mortality rates.”

“A prototype airport security model has provided an environment for studying the impact on passenger arrival, check-in, processing, security screening and departure from a notional

airport of positive-positive, positive-negative, and negative-positive security events. Security events can be associated with the security screening process activities, or with the activities of the airlines. While the numerical values of all the model-based processes are purely notional, use of more realistic numbers would be expected to generate behavior that might reflect actual behavior.”

Full Spectrum COIN Modelling by A.W.G. van Oosterhout, Ph.D., A.C. Kernkamp, M.Sc., RO, A.A.F. Bloemen, M.Sc., and LTC J.B.R. Clacquet, TNO Defense, Security, and Safety, The Hague, The Netherlands.

Dr. van Oosterhout and his colleagues in the Abstract of their paper titled: *Full Spectrum COIN Modelling* observe that: “This paper discusses two approaches to model counterinsurgency. It deals with COIN’s complexity by addressing its full spectrum. The model can be used as a decision support tool for planning operations on both the operational and tactical level. COIN is a complex endeavour because of its mix of difficult and dangerous military fighting missions, military support activities, and various civilian reconstruction and development aid activities. A model of this complex whole may elucidate its internal structures, and so help research and planning. It is foreseen that a complete and reliable model would, itself, be complex.”

“In order not to get lost in COIN’s maze, a two-step approach is followed: first build a simple model, test it, learn, then build a second, more complex model. The first approach uses literature and doctrine to compile a list of about 50 main factors (insurgents, the legitimate government, the military, the local population, their main activities and interactions between them), distributed over three areas: security, governance/rule of law, and economic and social development. Between these factors, about 100 links have been defined, which together make up the model. The model is divided into two symmetric halves, one representing the government to be supported, the other representing the insurgency to be repressed. The links form a dense web of internal relations, which is also seen in the 480 indirect causal loops found in the model.”

“This model was implemented in MARVEL (Method to Analyse Relations between Variables using Enriched Loops). It captures a sense of the dynamics, mutual influence, and complexity of the actors and activities that make up COIN. After the development of the first approach into a COIN model, its limits were uncovered and the discussion of its results led to the development of a second approach. This approach consists of a more generic model which shows the interactions in the full spectrum of COIN Operations. The civilian and non-fighting military activities relevant in COIN are now given their proper due, as are the relevant organisations involved in them, the different time scales, and their various interrelations. This approach is still work in progress, and more research is needed to work out the model into more detail and build a proper social sciences basis for it.”

“The relation between the two COIN modelling approaches as presented and an *implicit thought construct* that describes state and nation building is discussed. It is suggested that this implicit thought structure is also used in the Dutch Comprehensive Approach and other reference documents. Here, too, much more work is needed. The paper ends with discussion items and suggestions for fruitful directions for further work.”

Data Farming Around the World Overview by Gary E. Horne, Ph.D., SEED Center for Data Farming, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California,

U.S.A. and Klaus-Peter Schwierz, Ph.D., System Design Center Germany, European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company (EADS), Friedrichshafen, Germany.

Dr. Horne and Dr. Schwierz in the Abstract of their paper titled: *Data Farming Around the World Overview* observe that: “Data Farming, a question based process, combines the rapid prototyping capability inherent in a certain class of highly abstract, fast running simulation models with the exploratory power of high performance computing to rapidly generate insight into questions.”

“The Data Farming process focuses on a more complete landscape of possible system responses, rather than attempting to pinpoint an answer. The focus is on a continuum of solutions, looking for (unknown effects) and interrelations, the analysis of a variety of possible progressions and a consequent application of optimization theory. Thus Data Farming allows decision makers to more fully understand the landscape of possibilities and also consider outliers that may be discovered. Over the past decade, an international community has formed around these ideas dealing with modeling of non-linearity, intangibles and co-evolution.”

“In the fall of 2008, International Data Farming Workshop 17 took place in Garmisch Partenkirchen, Germany and workshop number 18 was held in spring 2009 in Monterey, California, USA, where the SEED Center for Data Farming at NPS is the home base of Data Farming. In addition to a summary of the two last workshops, this paper will present an overview of the process that has developed to include the development of both methods and applications in the International Data Farming Community.”

Judicial Assessment Models: An Ad Hoc Approach of Assessments in Fragile States by Captain Stacy J. Taylor, US Army Reserve.

Captain Taylor, in the Introduction to her paper titled: *Judicial Assessment Models: An Ad Hoc Approach of Assessments in Fragile States* observes that: “Over the past thirty years, the United States government’s foreign policy objectives have increasingly focused on stability and reconstruction. Since September 11th 2001, the primary tools utilized by the U.S. government for this effort have expanded from the previously exclusive domain of civilian agencies into the current state of the military being the lead U.S. agency. This is particularly true in Iraq and Afghanistan, resulting from the deteriorating security situation in those nations. As this paradigm shifted, friction points have arisen between the Department of Defense (DOD) agencies and other U.S. government civilian agencies on how to measure progress and success. The focus of this paper is to discuss some of the assessment models utilized by the military and the various civilian agencies in their assessments of the judicial sector. Illustrative emphasis will be placed on judicial development assessments and operations by these agencies within the Horn of Africa, Iraq, and Afghanistan.”

“The US government is not treading new ground in assessment frameworks and judicial reform. Ambitious efforts were spearheaded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Ford Foundation, and private donors to reform judicial systems in Africa, Asia, and Latin America were undertaken in the 1970s. At the time, the predominant belief by putative reformers was that the law was central to the development process, and lawyers and judges could serve as social engineers when properly educated about rule of law. Critics of this movement pointed out, “the most significant reason for the

failure of the law and development movement was the naïve belief that the American legal system...could be easily transplanted to developing countries.” The program was declared a failure by the early 1980s. A lack of empirical data connecting development and reform, as well as the continued disagreement amongst reformers over priorities and strategy, has led some critics to conclude that the same mistakes seen in the law and development movement may be repeated today. Further criticism included the detrimental pressure to produce measurable results quickly works directly against the slow pace of legal and social reform that is necessary to insure its eventual success. The echoes of those lessons sound in our current efforts today. ...”

“This paper examines judicial assessment tools developed by the World Bank, USAID, and the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). When examining the variety of approaches taken by these agencies, the fundamental differences in their organizational philosophies generate striking differences between their various assessment models.”

Engaging with Local People: More Tea and Fewer Messages by Kathryn Tomlinson, Ph.D., Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, England, United Kingdom.

EDITORIAL REMARK: Dr. Tomlinson’s paper: *Engaging with Local People: More Tea and Fewer Messages* was selected by the participants as the Best Paper presented at The Cornwallis XIV Group workshop: *Analysis of Societal Conflict and Counter-Insurgency*. Congratulations Kathryn!

Dr. Tomlinson, in the Introduction to her paper titled: *Engaging with Local People: More Tea and Fewer Messages* observes that: “Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the difficulties of maintaining support from non-adversary local people while countering the threat from various adversary groups. Dealing with this threat is further complicated because the distinction between adversary and non-adversary groups is sometimes hard to identify, as well as being fluid over time. Within this complex system of related groups, the actions of any external actors, including military, will have an impact on groups beyond those that we are seeking to influence. Any short-term success in countering adversaries has the potential to undermine long-term success and stability if military actions alienate wider groups of local people.”

“The need to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of local people has long been claimed to be central to success in counter-insurgency and stabilisation operations. But this is difficult to achieve without a sound understanding of just how the local people live and interact in groups, and how their support might best be achieved. This paper argues that the social sciences provide valuable insights into how people, anywhere, operate and change. The first part of the paper provides examples of the kinds of theories that help build such understanding. It begins by looking at the nature of people and how people interact, before moving on to groups and their relationships, how change happens, and the nature of political organisation. In the second part of the paper, a selection of these approaches are taken further, as the theoretical basis for understanding how to engage successfully with local people.”

Tomlinson concludes by observing that: “it is clear that extensive engagement already occurs between UK Armed Forces and local people in theatres of operation. However, it is

usually seen to be valuable only when it brings immediate benefits to the military. Such outcome-focussed engagement is not ideal for building cooperative relationships, and may alienate people rather than building their trust. Improving military engagement with local people requires building relationships before expecting outcomes from them, a commitment to avoid coercion and persuasion wherever possible, and to work towards enabling people to identify with a goal in common with the Armed Forces. It involves worrying less about the content of our ‘messages’ and taking more time to create personal relationships with those who live in the countries in which we work, not least by drinking tea together.”

Principles, Paradigms, and Paradoxes in Civil-Military Engagement by Kurt E. Müller, Ph.D., Futures Concept Developer, Jacobs Technology, USSOCOM/SOKF J-9C.

Dr. Müller, in his paper titled: *Principles, Paradigms, and Paradoxes in Civil-Military Engagement*, frames the environment by observing that: “War has fallen out of fashion. It became so calamitous in the 20th Century that statesmen in first-world countries no longer wish to take the responsibility of declaring it.”

“Unfortunately there are more initiators of conflict than the national legislative bodies that traditionally declare war. And the fear that disputes will spread to engulf an entire region has led heads of government to seek cease-fires as if they were solutions to the dispute. Enforcing them requires an intervention, and these are usually conducted predominantly by military forces. Anytime troops are deployed, we speak of military operations. But military interventions range from benign, as in humanitarian-aid missions, to the destructive type most identify by the old name for armed conflict. The middle of this spectrum is inhabited by an assortment of operations with names such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building, counterinsurgency, and occupation, the latter now also a taboo term.”

“As to combat itself, with several notable exceptions, the progress of Western military conflict exhibits a long tradition of developing the doctrine of non-combatant immunity, now routinely ignored by non-state belligerents. Along with the particular circumstances of industrial-age warfare, that tradition has led military planners to focus on opposing forces, to seek to avoid interacting with the civilian populace, and to be surprised when armed activity arises among non-combatants. There are obvious exceptions to this pattern, e.g., advocates of air power may find this doctrine a nuisance. When deployed, all military forces may hire civilian labor to provide services the force can acquire more reasonably or more extensively on site.”

Müller concludes that: “... Finally, the statesman considering an intervention needs to look beyond immediate end-state goals to project the future interaction among the players concerned. It is difficult enough to preserve yesterday’s friends as tomorrow’s allies. If it is too much to hope that yesterday’s enemy become tomorrow’s friend, we can at least expect to transform him into an economic partner, lest our victory be short-lived. Although Clausewitz started his analysis with the metaphor of a match between two fighters, the belligerents do not act only on each other. The result of inter-state relations always affects more than the two states involved.”

The Moral Responsibility of the Analyst: The Cautionary Tale of David Li.
After-Dinner Remarks by Paul Chouinard, Ph.D.

Dr. Chouinard provided an essay that captured his remarks at the formal dinner at the Workshop. He presented a “personal view on the moral responsibility of the analyst to not only stand by the quality of his or her work but also to speak out against inappropriate uses of that work. The cautionary tale is a real one about a real analyst, David X. Li taken from a story about Dr. Li published in Wired Magazine.”

“Some might believe that our moral obligation ends with the presentation of our analysis to the decision maker, since the decision is literally theirs and not ours to make. However, my personal belief is that it never ends. We not only work in a politico-, socio-economic domain, but we live in that same domain. As politico-, socio-economic beings we belong to that domain. We have no more special right to be wrong than any other being in that shared domain. Every bit as much as anyone else we must deal with the consequences when we are wrong.”