

Assessing Corruption in the Afghanistan National Police (ANP): Escaping the “Authority Minus Professionalism” Dilemma

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Agenda

- Focus
- Nature of the Problem
- Selected Findings and Recommendations
- Summary

Focus

Goals

- Characterize existing ANP training programs in Afghanistan
- Assess the effectiveness of alternative ANP training programs

Scope

- Focus on the existing and proposed ANP training efforts

Candidate Definitions of Corruption

- ... The abuse/mistrust of public office or public position for private gain
- ... impairment of integrity for financial, social, political or economic gain
- ...exercise of official powers against the public interest
- ...natural part of our lives and helps to solve many problems

Source: United Nations; World Bank; United States Institute of Peace

Context (1 of 2)

- The mission of the police in a free and open society
 - Protect people and property
 - Prevent, detect, and investigate crime
 - Maintain public order
 - Promote a positive enabling environment for economic growth
- A functioning ANP is central to the US' strategy for withdrawing from Afghanistan and fighting counterinsurgency
- The top two issues that Afghans focus on are corruption and unemployment
 - Corruption: 59%
 - Unemployment: 52%

Sources: USAID Brief on Anti-Corruption and Police Integrity; Newsweek magazine; UN Office on Drugs and Crime Report: "Corruption in Afghanistan"

Context (2 of 2)

- In 2009 Afghan citizens had to pay approximately US\$2.49B in bribes
 - Equivalent to 23% of country GDP
- Citizens of Afghanistan have to pay bribes on a routine basis when dealing with public officials
 - 52% of adult Afghans had to pay at least one bribe to a public official during the last 12 months
 - On average, victims reported they paid almost 5 kickbacks per year
- Paying bribes is a frequent experience in urban (46%) and rural (56%) areas
- The sectors most affected by bribery are the
 - Police (25%)
 - Municipal and provincial officers (25%)
 - Judges (17%)

Source: UNODC, "Corruption in Afghanistan; Bribery as reported by the victims"; Jan 2010

The Problem

- The pre-2009 training of the ANP had mixed results
- The existing ANP is widely perceived to be corrupt and ineffective
- What steps should be taken to enhance the future training of the ANP to make it respected and efficient?


Nature of the Problem (1 of 2)

- The ANP have been implicated in various abuses, including
 - Drug trafficking and smuggling
 - Extortion
 - Assault
 - Illegal weapons trafficking
- A corrupt ANP cannot provide adequate security, in certain areas, making room for other groups (e.g., insurgent, illegal, ethnic) to provide
 - Security
 - Patronage
 - “Rule of law”
- Vetting is a problem
- Lack of security directly undermines ISAF efforts

Nature of the Problem (2 of 2)

- Pre-2009 programs fell short
 - Many recruits failed the basic firearms test
 - Most recruits graduated, regardless of their shortcomings
 - They have never been inside a classroom; are mostly illiterate; 15% of the recruits test positive for drugs
 - Most of the time, they were “provided with uniforms, are given a weapon and are put on the street.”
 - The Department of State (DOS) Oversight Office was not aware if the police graduates stayed with the force after completion of the program
 - The ANP “make do” in areas they supposedly control
 - Go unpaid due to problems with international donor programs
 - Extort money from the local population
 - Deal with illegal elements to earn a living.
- Bottom line: ANP seek short-term gains, do not understand long-term role

Chronology of Pre-2009 Training Efforts



Pre-2009 ANP Training Efforts

- Major shortcomings from the earlier US training efforts

- No adequate field mentor program, lack of follow up
- ANP were incapable of conducting routine law enforcement
- Lack of community policing and civilian policing skills
- Weapons and equipment went missing
- Use of contractors did not contribute to quality of training
- Programs were understaffed, poorly supervised
- Emphasis on quantity of graduates, not quality

- Major shortcomings of European training programs

- Lack of adequate coordination with the US-led efforts
- Proper emphasis on civilian and community training, but limited geographical scope

Key Reasons for Corruption in ANP

- An explosion of narcotics trafficking -- ANP viewed as predatory; e.g., identified with demands for
 - Bribes
 - Illegal taxes
 - Human rights violations
- The training programs did not address issues such as controlling crime, protecting civilians
- Lack of adequate oversight following police graduation from the program
- Employed contractors rather than a professional police force
- Decisions made did not take local/tribal culture into account

Source: Robert M. Perito, "Afghanistan's Police", USIP Special Report 227

Selected Successful Training Efforts

- Italian-led training program conducted by “carabinieri”
 - Police constabulary force that successfully mixes law enforcement and civil relations
 - Different training methods worked better with inexperienced recruits
 - Paramilitary police units were easier to work with
- Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) complements Focused District Development (FDD) as a constabulary force that is responsible for maintaining public order; it is
 - Well trained
 - Literate
 - A national (vice regional) force
 - Trained in civilian and community operations

Rule of Law

- **Findings** -- Lack of rule of law in Afghanistan inhibits proper police work
 - The courts and the justice system are underdeveloped
 - There are practically no internal affairs mechanisms to oversee police conduct and operations
- **Recommendations** -- There should be a “bridge” between traditional and federal law
 - Respect local politics and customs
 - Build relationships with tribal and village elders
 - Build community ties

Policing

Findings

- Let police in the cities do policing
- Let rural areas do self-policing -- but provide help if it is needed
- Experimentation is key – different approaches should be considered

Recommendations

- “80% solution is acceptable” – US and international leadership should be realistic in their goals
 - ◆ Do not pay locals in rural areas who wish to provide security for their area
 - ◆ Volunteerism works, but not everywhere – that depends on the district/region/tribe

ANP Corruption

Findings

- Work on the “Afghan time”, not just “Western timetables”; approaches may take a long time to take root and produce results
- Work with what is already working and build on that

Recommendations

- ANCOP should be expanded and sent to rural areas to establish trust with the population
 - Clear: Afghan National Army (ANA)
 - Hold: ANCOP
 - Build: ANP

Oversight

Findings

US and International efforts provided police trainees with authority but did not uphold that authority once the training ended; hence, abuses of police power ensued

- Lack of proper oversight resulted in “authority minus professionalism”, leading to abuses and corruption

Recommendations

- Place ANP training program under Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) supervision, entrusting it with expanded oversight powers
- Entrust SIGAR office with personnel to
 - Oversee all ANP training program spending
 - Coordinate US and international training efforts, either by agencies or contractors
 - Establish timely reporting structure to keep SIGAR informed of training efforts

Summary

- The corruption problem in the ANP requires additional assessment
- This paper has sought to
 - Identify shortfalls in prior ANP training efforts
 - Characterize promising training efforts that might be leveraged in the future
- Additional analyses are need to address the issue of accountability and program oversight