ALIGNING CONCEPTS, OPERATIONS AND GOALS IN FRAGILE STATES
## SOME QUESTIONS FOR THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN

A presentation by Daryl Liskey and Tom Blau

Reporting on work in progress.

Plenty of creative thinking

"ONE TRIBE AT A TIME"
WITH MAJ. JIM GANT, U.S. Army Special Forces

$ AAWS

M. Yunus,
micro-lender

# Stabilization -- Once Again a National-Security Goal

Then

- Stabilize Underdeveloped States
- Goal: Counter Wars of National Liberation

Now

- Stabilize Fragile States
- Goal: Deny Terrorists Sanctuary

Early "Modernizers": The Progressives

Root Causes, Problems	Rational-legal Responses	Objectives
Corruption	Nonpartisanship	Good governance
Personal relations, patronage	Technical standards, regs	Good gov't management
Lower-class lifestyle, poverty	Public aid (welfare)	Change, into middle class

Progressive Responses and Unintended Consequences

Nonpartisanship	**Reduce party role in transmitting voters' goals**
Technical standards, regs	**Rule by professional classes like administrative lawyers; decisions neither politically nor economically efficient**
Public aid (welfare)	**Dependency**

Can you name this statue?

Progressivism to Modernization

OBJECTIVES

Progressives   **Modernization theorists**

Good Governance   Democratic Governance

Better Administration   Build Civil Capacity

Public aid (Welfare)   Economic Development

LDC's **+** Cold war **=** Stab ops vs. wars of national liberation

Modernization and Unintended Consequences

	Objectives	**Unintended Consequences**
Progressives	**Modernization**	**1960s and 1970s**
Good Governance	**Democratic governance**	**Retreat of Democracy/ Authoritarian regimes**
Better Administration	**Build Civil Capacity**	**Little increase in capacity**
Poverty	**Economic Development**	**Little or no economic development, less stability**

Reasons for unintended consequences?
- **Difficulty to know root causes; ethnocentricity**
- **Effects arise over the *longue duree***

A. Pinochet

Aligning Stabilization Objectives Post NSS-2002

Military-led
Stability Operations

Objective: Peace to enable civil authority in short term

Overarching Objective: Establish civil security

Sub-objective:
•Dissuade Violence
•Build Security Capacity
•Gain support of population (hearts and minds)

Interagency
Phase IV/R&S

Objective: Viable Peace in short term

Overarching Objective: Conflict transformation by mitigating root causes of conflict and build resiliencies

Sub-objectives:
•Establish civil security
• Mitigate root causes of instability
• Build civil & security capacity

Civilian-led
Development Assistance

Goal: Enduring stability over long term

Overarching Objective: Mitigate root causes of instability

Sub-objectives:
•Democratic Governance
•Build Civil Capacity
•Economic Development

Phases	Civil Security	Viable Peace	Enduring Stability
	Stability Operations	Stabilization Phase	Development Assistance

In Practice: On the Ground in Afghanistan

Concerns

Aligning Operations on the Ground

Time needed for transformation

Reliably Identifying and mitigating root causes

Relationship of long term transformation and short term goals.

1. Civil development assistance ⟺ civil-security

2. Aligning objectives for unity of effort

3. Short- ⟺ long-term objectives

Does Development Assistance = Support of Population in Patron-client Societies?

Patron-Client Societies	**Legal-Rational Societies**	**Implications**
		Getting support for development assistance
Support through patronage	**Support from providing public goods**	
Personal relations		**Legitimacy embedded in social relations**
	Impersonal good will	
Reciprocal obligations		**"$ as ammunition" can buy support**
	Invisible hand	

Issue: Aligning Stabilization Objectives Where Patron-client Relations Prevail

Aligning objectives for civil-security and more transformational efforts

What's feasible in near term?

Root causes as an objective during Phase IV/RS stabilization operations?

Challenge of mitigating or reliably identifying root causes during Phase IV/R&S for unity of effort.

Cohering military and civilian led efforts?

Civilian long term development, working with with transformation

Room for Improvements?

1. Use $ against hostilities, <u>first</u>? How much?
2. Trade-off: dealing with few authorities vs. $ widely distributed?
   - Muhammad Yunus model: micro-projects?
3. Can we accept more of the local mores, e.g. patron-client relations, as part of the human terrain, and work with it?

Bottom line

- **Tailor and sequence efforts to the context ("human terrain")**
- **Who what when where how; e.g.**
  - **$ AAWS and patron-client relations**
  - **Some tribes, some ways, some places . . .**