

# ***Behavior as a Basis of Evidence for Analysis: The Pivotal Role of Perceptions and Reactions***

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# **Intro/Paper Methodology**

- **‘Case studies’ & the evolution of impact analysis methodologies 2003 – 2013;**
- **Generic metrics frameworks;**
- **ToC & Log-frames;**
- **Social science & psychology;**
- **Old ideas; new implementation – the alignment issue.**

# Evolution

- **Iraq (2003-7) – primarily project/program-oriented data**
  - CPA IMU**
  - USAID MEPPS**
  - IRMO IMU**
  - DAD**
- **Yemen (2010-2011): Stabilization Programming vs Development Programming**
- **Afghanistan (2012-13):**
  - USAID & F-Indicators**
  - DFID & AusAID: HMEP/UMEP**

# **Stabilization Programming vs Development Programming**

## **Yemen (2010-2011)**

- **Focuses on the sources of instability rather than need;**
- **Combines stability/instability factors and perception data to inform how activities are programmed in order to achieve objectives of:**
  - increasing support for the gov't;**
  - decreasing support for the spoilers.**
- **Meanwhile, Dev S&P uses needs assessments, sectoral assessments to inform objectives of long-term change & specific sectoral improvements.**

# 'Generic' Methodologies/Frameworks

**MPICE**: recognizes the utility of perception data by including survey/polling data among its methodologies.

**F-Indicators**: more about inputs and outputs, not outcomes, yet continues to be the 'default.'

**TCAPF**: uses perception data, but does not do hypothesis-testing.

# F-Indicators

Master List of Standard Indicators

The list of indicators below includes Objective, Program Area and Program Element indicators. The Objective and Program Area indicators are not necessarily attributable just to USG support and are therefore not tracked by Operating Units but through third party sources at Headquarters.

Data Reference Sheet: <http://nsidc.usaid.gov/A/F/p/ta.html>

Program Objective	Program Area	Program Element	Indicator
Peace & Security			Professionalization of Armed Forces
Peace & Security			Composite Score on Criminal Justice Sector
Peace & Security	Counter-Terrorism		Composite Score on Office of Antiterrorism Assessment Rating Tool of Countries Receiving U.S. Foreign Assistance
Peace & Security	Counter-Terrorism		Percentage of Travelers Screened by USG-Supported Terrorist Interdiction Programs (PISCES)
Peace and Security	Counter-Terrorism	Deny Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary	Number of people trained on counterterrorism finance by USG programs
Peace and Security	Counter-Terrorism	Deny Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary	Number of ports of entry supported by USG terrorist interdiction programs
Peace and Security	Counter-Terrorism	Deny Terrorist Sponsorship, Support and Sanctuary	Number of USG-funded community development projects completed within the target region/ungoverned spaces
Peace and Security	Counter-Terrorism	De-Legitimize Terrorist Ideology	Number of public information campaigns completed by USG programs
Peace and Security	Counter-Terrorism	Governments' Capabilities	Number of facilities evaluated by USG programs in order to counter bioterrorism and/or strengthen biodefense
Peace and Security	Counter-Terrorism	Governments' Capabilities	Number of people trained in antiterrorism by USG programs
Peace and Security	Counter-Terrorism	Governments' Capabilities	Number of people trained to counter bioterrorism and/or strengthen biodefense
Peace and Security	Counter-Terrorism	Governments' Capabilities	Number of USG-assisted assessments on terrorism
Peace and Security	Counter-Terrorism	Governments' Capabilities	Number of USG-assisted nations reporting bioterrorism data to international and regional organizations (Bireat reported)
Peace & Security	Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)		Adherence to RadSource Code of Conduct
Peace and Security	Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction	Counter CWMD Proliferation and Combat CWMD Terrorism	Country has developed and instituted valid export control systems meeting international standards as a result of USG activities
Peace & Security	Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform		Score on professionalization of armed forces index
Peace & Security	Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform		Armed forces capabilities measurement
Peace & Security	Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform		Percentage of countries supported by PMAWAR's program meeting their target for casualty reduction figures as defined in their country plans
Peace & Security	Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform		Percentage of illicit small arms and light weapons in circulation or at-risk of circulation addressed by USG programs
Peace & Security	Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform		Number of countries that achieved USG bilateral/in-line action goals and now are able to sustain future operations with little to no external support
Peace & Security	Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform		Number of reduction in ERW-related casualties from previous year
Peace & Security	Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform		Percentage of host government law enforcement units receiving US assistance with the capacity to conduct complex operations and provide effective law enforcement training
Peace and Security	Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform	Operational Support	Number of civilians protected by USG-sponsored armed security personnel

# CALL Handbook – TCAPF Questionnaire

## MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS


Advanced Assessment Questionnaire Card C: Rule of Law			
Province:	Date:		
District:	GPS Reference:		
Village:	Interviewee:		
Interpreter Name:	Profession:		
Interviewer Name:	Title:		
1. If you were the victim of a crime, to whom would you report it?			
	Yes	No	I don't know <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>
A. National Government	0	1	9
B. Provincial Government	0	1	9
C. Local government	0	1	9
D. The courts	0	1	9
E. ANP	0	1	9
F. ANA	0	1	9
G. International forces	0	1	9
H. Tribal leaders	0	1	9
I. Religious leaders	0	1	9
J. Local social service organizations	0	1	9
2. How effectively do you believe your crime would be investigated and resolved?			
<input type="checkbox"/> (3)	Very Effectively	<input type="checkbox"/> (2)	Neither effectively or ineffectively
<input type="checkbox"/> (1)	Ineffectively	<input type="checkbox"/> (5)	I don't know
3. If you had an economic/property disputes, where would you take it to be resolved?			
	Yes	No	I don't know <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>
A. National Government	0	1	9
B. Provincial Government	0	1	9
C. Local government	0	1	9
D. The courts	0	1	9
E. ANP	0	1	9
F. ANA	0	1	9
G. International forces	0	1	9
H. Tribal leaders	0	1	9
I. Religious leaders	0	1	9
J. Local social service organizations	0	1	9
K. Other (LIST)	0	1	9
4. Is misconduct among government officials investigated and punished?			
Always	Most of the time	Sometimes	Rarely
5	4	3	2
1	I don't know <i>[DO NOT READ]</i>		9

Figure A-4. Advanced assessment questionnaire card C

# ToC & Log-frames

- **“Theory of Change” often disconnected to the stated ‘mission strategy;’ Results Framework; and related indicators;**
- **A ToC does not always exist;**
- **Survey and polling data is not aligned to a ToC and log-frame.**






# HMEP/UMEP

- **Triangulation**
  - **Hypothesis-testing/Correlation-testing**
- ➔ Unexpected results**


# Hypothesis Testing & Behavior

Respondents agreeing that in the past 3 months, their district government has improved infrastructure and conditions to the major urban areas




Source: UMEP

Respondents agreeing that in the past 3 months, their district government has improved security alongs roads to the major urban areas



Source: UMEP

Number of times in the past 3 months respondents' household members have travelled to other district centres (Deh Rawud or Tarin Kowt)



Source: UMEP

## Finally, "What is the main reason you travel to district centres?"

1. To work
2. To purchase goods or services
3. To sell goods or services
4. To visit a government office
5. To visit relatives
6. To go to a hospital
7. To receive salary
8. Other


# Causality vs Correlation

- **Example: “Of those who agree that..., x% responded that...”**
- **“Of those who responded that..., x% agree that...”**
- **Roads-Security issue.**

# Asia Foundation Survey 2012

## Additional Insights from the 2012 Nationwide Data

Q: What is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole?\*



\*Top ten responses shown.

# Afghanistan: ANA vs ANP

“And yet, despite the many problems, and the inept, ineffectual appearance of their army, the Afghan people have high regard for the ANA soldiers. Their favorability ratings are off the charts in comparison with the [ANP]. Quite often when Afghan citizens are confronted with a law enforcement issue, they call upon the army instead of the police.”



--John M. Rosenberg, “Afghan forces, a study in contrasts,” Philadelphia Inquirer, April 3, 2013.

# Terrorist vs Sociopath/Psychopath: The Rationality Question

- Conscience
  - Identity and 'The Time Factor'
  - **Insurgent motivations** [e.g. Carter Malkesian, "Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2004–05." *Small Wars & Insurgencies*. [Volume 17, Issue 3](#), 2006] VS:
- ➔ The 'grey population'

# **New concepts to incorporate, triangulate, synthesize, synchronize**

- **Social science; Human Terrain System** [McFate, Montgomery (Ph.D) and Andrea Jackson, “An Organizational Solution for DOD’s Cultural Knowledge Needs,” MILITARY REVIEW, July-August 2005.]
- **TCAPF – USAID, 2006. CALL Handbook, May 2010;**
- **Proxy indicators;**
- **Caution: Conditions vs Impact Indicators.**



# Village Stability Operations Program (‘Leveraging the Population’)

- *“Any measures of progress against an insurgency need to be relatively easy to collect, accurately capture the community’s actions, and demonstrate a pro-active willingness on the part of the village to turn against the insurgency.”*

--“Enlisting the Population In Its Own Defense: A Village-Based Strategy to Defeat the Taliban Insurgency.”

# Demonstrating a “Pro-active willingness”

- Proxy Indicators
  - Vocational training e.g.
  - ‘Legitimate’ authority (e.g. who does one go to re justice? Dispute resolution?)

**Questions?**

# “Assessment and Measures of Effectiveness in Stability Ops”

(CALL Handbook No. 10-41, May 2010)

