Behavior as a Basis of Evidence for Analysis: The Pivotal Role of Perceptions and Reactions

Sasha Kisinchand

Cornwallis XVIII
17 April, 2013
• ‘Case studies’ & the evolution of impact analysis methodologies 2003 – 2013;
• Generic metrics frameworks;
• ToC & Log-frames;
• Social science & psychology;
• Old ideas; new implementation – the alignment issue.
Evolution

• Iraq (2003-7) – primarily project/program-oriented data
  --CPA IMU
  --USAID MEPPS
  --IRMO IMU
  --DAD

• Yemen (2010-2011): Stabilization Programming vs Development Programming

• Afghanistan (2012-13):
  --USAID & F-Indicators
  --DFID & AusAID: HMEP/UMEP
Stabilization Programming vs Development Programming
Yemen (2010-2011)

• Focuses on the sources of instability rather than need;
• Combines stability/instability factors and perception data to inform how activities are programmed in order to achieve objectives of:
  --increasing support for the gov’t;
  --decreasing support for the spoilers.
• Meanwhile, Dev S&P uses needs assessments, sectoral assessments to inform objectives of long-term change & specific sectoral improvements.
‘Generic’ Methodologies/Frameworks

**MPICE:** recognizes the utility of perception data by including survey/polling data among its methodologies.

**F-Indicators:** more about inputs and outputs, not outcomes, yet continues to be the ‘default.’

**TCAPF:** uses perception data, but does not do hypothesis-testing.
# F-Indicators

Master List of Standard Indicators

The list of indicators below includes Objective, Program Area and Program Element indicators. The Objective and Program Area indicators are not necessarily attributable just to USG support and are therefore not tracked by Operating Units but through third party sources at Headquarters.

- Data Reference Sheet: [https://example.gov/f-101](https://example.gov/f-101)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Objective</th>
<th>Program Area</th>
<th>Program Element</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace &amp; Security</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
<td>Domestically Sponsored, Support and Sanction</td>
<td>Percentage of Targets Served by USG Supported Terrorist Interdiction Programs/PSCES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace &amp; Security</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
<td>Domestically Sponsored, Support and Sanction</td>
<td>Number of targets supported by USG programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace &amp; Security</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
<td>Domestically Sponsored, Support and Sanction</td>
<td>Number of targets supported by USG programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace &amp; Security</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
<td>Peaceful Transition</td>
<td>Number of targets supported by USG programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace &amp; Security</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
<td>Peaceful Transition</td>
<td>Number of targets supported by USG programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace &amp; Security</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
<td>Governmental Capabilities</td>
<td>Number of targets supported by USG programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace &amp; Security</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
<td>Governmental Capabilities</td>
<td>Number of targets supported by USG programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace &amp; Security</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
<td>Governmental Capabilities</td>
<td>Number of targets supported by USG programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace &amp; Security</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
<td>Governmental Capabilities</td>
<td>Number of targets supported by USG programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace &amp; Security</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
<td>Governmental Capabilities</td>
<td>Number of targets supported by USG programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace &amp; Security</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
<td>Governmental Capabilities</td>
<td>Number of targets supported by USG programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace &amp; Security</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
<td>Governmental Capabilities</td>
<td>Number of targets supported by USG programs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Column Details:
  - Program Objective: Peace & Security
  - Program Area: Counter-Terrorism
  - Program Element: Domestically Sponsored, Support and Sanction
  - Indicator: Percentage of Targets Served by USG Supported Terrorist Interdiction Programs/PSCES

- Additional Indicators:
  - Peace & Security: Combatting Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
  - Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: WMD Interdiction and Combat WMD Terrorism
  - Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform: Armed Forces capabilities measurement

- Report Dates:
  - Page 1
  - 10/7/2008
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

Advanced Assessment Questionnaire Card C: Rule of Law

1. If you were the victim of a crime, to whom would you report it?
   - National Government
   - Provincial Government
   - Local government
   - Police
   - ANP
   - International forces
   - Tribal leaders
   - Religious leaders
   - Local social service organizations
   - Other

2. How effectively do you believe your crime would be investigated and resolved?
   - Very Effectively
   - Neither effectively or ineffectively
   - Ineffectively
   - I don't know

3. If you had an economic/property dispute, where would you take it to be resolved?
   - National Government
   - Provincial Government
   - Local government
   - Police
   - ANP
   - International forces
   - Tribal leaders
   - Religious leaders
   - Local social service organizations
   - Other

4. Is misconduct among government officials investigated and punished?
   - Always
   - Most of the time
   - Sometimes
   - Rarely
   - Never
   - I don't know

Figure A-4. Advanced assessment questionnaire card C
ToC & Log-frames

• “Theory of Change” often disconnected to the stated ‘mission strategy;’ Results Framework; and related indicators;

• A ToC does not always exist;

• Survey and polling data is not aligned to a ToC and log-frame.
2nd Order Goal
Increased opportunity of the population to gain a licit livelihood in agriculture or non-agriculture occupations in the private sector.
(Economic Development)

Assumption:
Population can move easily to conduct business, associate freely, without fear for the loss of life, property or from acts of impunity.
(Security/Rule of Law)

Goal
Government Institutions at all levels are seen as legitimate

Objective
Increasing state-based institutions' capacity to deliver services and govern effectively

Service Delivery
- GIROA seen as legitimate service provider (Demand)
- Population knows about services (Awareness)
- Population satisfied with level of service (Quality)
- Services seen as readily available (Access)

Governance
- Line ministries have organizational capacity to deliver services (Programme Management)
  - Sufficient resources available for Operation and Maintenance (Sustainable)
  - Capacity to conduct financial management according to standards (Accountable)
  - Line Ministries have the appropriate HRs to manage programmes (Skilled)
  - Acts on behalf of the people (Legitimate)
  - Does a Good Job (Effective)

Population sees state actors as legitimate and effective (Governance performance)

Thematic Strands
- Education
- Infrastructure
- Health
HMEP/UMEP

- Triangulation
- Hypothesis-testing/Correlation-testing

⇒ Unexpected results
Finally, “What is the main reason you travel to district centres?”
1. To work
2. To purchase goods or services
3. To sell goods or services
4. To visit a government office
5. To visit relatives
6. To go to a hospital
7. To receive salary
8. Other
Causality vs Correlation

• Example: “Of those who agree that..., x% responded that...”

• “Of those who responded that..., x% agree that...”

• Roads-Security issue.
Asia Foundation Survey 2012

Additional Insights from the 2012 Nationwide Data

Q: What is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole?*

- Terrorism: 28%
- Unemployment: 27%
- Corruption: 25%
- Poor Economy: 11%
- Education: 10%
- Suicide Attacks: 9%
- Poverty: 9%
- Taliban: 8%
- Interference of Pakistan: 6%
- Drugs Smuggling: 6%

*Top ten responses shown.
“And yet, despite the many problems, and the inept, ineffectual appearance of their army, the Afghan people have high regard for the ANA soldiers. Their favorability ratings are off the charts in comparison with the [ANP]. Quite often when Afghan citizens are confronted with a law enforcement issue, they call upon the army instead of the police.”

Terrorist vs Sociopath/Psychopath: The Rationality Question

• Conscience

• Identity and ‘The Time Factor’

• Insurgent motivations [e.g. Carter Malkesian, “Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2004–05.” Small Wars & Insurgencies. Volume 17, Issue 3, 2006] VS:

→ The ‘grey population’
New concepts to incorporate, triangulate, synthesize, synchronize

- **Social science; Human Terrain System** [McFate, Montgomery (Ph.D) and Andrea Jackson, “An Organizational Solution for DOD’s Cultural Knowledge Needs,” MILITARY REVIEW, July-August 2005.]


- **Proxy indicators;**

- **Caution: Conditions vs Impact Indicators.**
Village Stability Operations Program
(‘Leveraging the Population’)

• “Any measures of progress against an insurgency need to be relatively easy to collect, accurately capture the community’s actions, and demonstrate a pro-active willingness on the part of the village to turn against the insurgency.”

---”Enlisting the Population In Its Own Defense: A Village-Based Strategy to Defeat the Taliban Insurgency.”
Demonstrating a “Pro-active willingness”

- Proxy Indicators
  --Vocational training e.g.
  --’Legitimate’ authority (e.g. who does one go to re justice? Dispute resolution?)
Questions?