# dstl Discretion

Mike Bagwell and Sam Dudin

#### **Overview**

- Dstl were tasked by DCDC to investigate the concept of discretion, in order to gain a better understanding of the factors that influence the choices made by HM Government when deciding whether or not to take military action.
- For this study, discretion was defined as:

"Decision-makers' perceived freedom of choice over whether and how to intervene militarily"





# **Approach**

- Literature review:
  - Prevents 'reinventing the wheel' syndrome
  - Provides theoretical tools to help develop our understanding
- Historical Research
  - Previous quantitative research by Dstl correlated conflict onset with various factors, but had no predictive or explanatory capability
  - Therefore, opted for in-depth qualitative research
    - In-house:
      - Suez Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam War, intervention in Sierra Leone
      - Experience gained enables set-up of focused EMR contracts
    - EMR by



- Bosnian War, Intervention in East Timor, Gulf War
- Analysis and synthesis
- Briefings and exploitation





#### **Literature Review**

- Little existing literature explicitly focussing on discretion
- That literature which does exist tends to make a simplistic distinction between 'wars of necessity' and 'wars of choice'
- In reality, the distinction is rarely so stark: decision-making is affected by a complex range of factors which make assessment of 'necessity' a complex and subjective process
- Organisational, political and psychological factors all have significant impacts on perceived freedom-of-choice
- Simple, quantitative approaches to explaining discretion are insufficient to explain real-world decision-making





#### **Insignificance of Vital National Interests**



- US deployment in Vietnam
  - Communist gains in Southeast Asia considered serious, but not critical to US interests

- British deployments
  - British humanitarian deployments in the Balkans, East Timor and Sierra Leone primarily motivated by factors not related to vital national interests
- Cuban Missile Crisis
  - Vital interests more clearly at stake, but use of military force was still discretionary







# Players and Spectators (1)



- Expectations of allies are linked to costs of non-involvement in conflicts
  - Reputation, rhetoric, alliances, professed grand strategy and statements of ambition create an image of a nation being a player or a spectator
  - Allies will expect a self-professed player to play, raising the costs of merely being a spectator.
- Discretion diminishes once player image established
  - E.g. Britain regarding East Timor and Sierra Leone, US in Cuba
- Involvement in a conflict signals intent, and can lead to mission creep
  - E.g. Defence engagement and upstream activities in Vietnam and Sierra Leone







# Players and Spectators (2)

- The US expects allies to lead on crises in their own 'backyard'
  - E.g. UK and France in Libya and Balkans, and Australia in East Timor






- Formal alliances generate expectations, regardless of military capability
  - E.g. US pressurised New Zealand into Vietnam combat deployment
- However, creating a spectator image can minimise costs of noninvolvement
  - E.g. British non-deployment in Vietnam War





#### **Organisational Factors**

- Subordinate actors can significantly affect the discretion available to senior decision-makers
- Decisions taken by those at a senior level do not necessarily get enacted as intended



#### Cuban Missile Crisis


- Actions by junior military personnel could have significantly escalated the crisis
- The State Department failed to act on a direct presidential order to prepare the diplomatic ground for removal of missiles from Turkey
- Sierra Leone
  - Decision-makers forced to react to the consequences of subordinates acting on their own initiative and exceeding their mandate





#### Personal attributes of decision-makers


- Fundamental, and often ignored, determining factors in decision-making are the decision-makers themselves
- Personal factors that can affect decision-makers include:
  - Their personalities
  - Genuine moral and ethical considerations
  - Their personal interpretation of historical analogies when considering options
  - Their previous experience in initiating combat deployments







#### **Domestic Politics**



- Level of support in Parliament/Congress can significantly impact decision makers' discretion.
  - During the Vietnam War, a British combat deployment would likely have collapsed the Labour government
- The US election cycle has an impact on US discretion:
  - Imminent elections delayed US retaliatory action in Vietnam
  - Upcoming elections impacted on Clinton's ability to avoid a deployment in the Balkans, for fear of appearing weak





#### **Military Capabilities and Doctrine**

- Military capabilities can either enhance or constrain perceived discretion:
  - Presence of Gurkhas in Brunei enabled rapid response to the East Timor crisis
  - Lack of a realistic 'surgical strike' option in the Cuban Missile Crisis forced Kennedy to seek alternatives
- Flawed doctrine and planning assumptions can reduce discretion:
  - Planning assumptions left Britain unable to respond rapidly to the Suez crisis
  - The USAF's adherence to doctrine during the Cuban Missile Crisis exasperated Kennedy and precluded the use of airstrikes
- However, effective doctrine can enhance discretion:
  - Sierra Leone provided an opportunity to validate the concept of rapid reaction forces





## Military Advice is Often Ignored

 Often, perceived lack of military capability has little or no bearing on decision-makers' discretion





- Major ignored military advice that the MoD was not well structured for peacekeeping in the Balkans, and that 400,000 NATO troops would be required for a ground operation
- Eden pressed ahead with plans to re-take the Suez canal despite advice that the armed forces were not configured to do so
- Military advice against deployment to Northern Ireland ignored





## **Summary and Implications**

- It is misleading to assume increasing levels of discretion in the future
  - Decision-makers choose to engage in 'discretionary' conflicts for a range of factors outside of the military's control
  - Vital interests often not at stake, defence policy frequently ignored, planning assumptions often false
- UK discretion will continue to be closely linked to its foreign policy objectives
  - It should not be assumed that conflict prevention activities and closer links with allies will reduce the requirement to commit military force
- It is prudent to ensure that the MoD is best-placed to respond flexibly and effectively to a wide range of contingencies
  - Military can play a positive role in shaping the thinking of leaders









**Questions?** 

