

# Learning the Wrong Lessons? Operational Analysis during a Long Peace

1855~1905 vs. 1945~2014...


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# Introduction

- The “Methods of Instruction” slide
  - Who am I?
  - What am I about to tell you?
  - Question policy?
  - Why does this matter?

# Two periods of relative peace

- The latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, were both relatively peaceful
  - Both lacked major naval conflicts
  - Major powers fought very few actions
  - Technology raced ahead without being tested in combat
- How valid were the lessons and doctrine developed during that time?



# Parallels from the Past?

- From 1850s to 1900s, a long period with very little large-scale naval combat but massive technological change
  - 1850: wooden-hulled sailing ships with smoothbore cannon
  - 1870: iron-hulled hybrid steam/sail with rifled muzzle loaders
  - 1905: HMS *Dreadnought*, *Holland 1*, Wright Flyer

# Parallels from the Past?

- From 1945 to today, a long period with very little large-scale naval combat but massive technological change
  - 1955: USS *Nautilus* “Underway on nuclear power”
  - 1967: INS *Eilat* sunk by Styx missiles
  - 1973: Over 50 Styx missiles defeated by soft-kill
  - 1982: Op CORPORATE (SATCOM, SSNs, STOVL aircraft)

# Ships evolved dramatically... 1855






# Ships evolved dramatically... 1860






# Ships evolved dramatically... 1877



Ships evolved dramatically... 1905



# Hampton Roads, 1862




# “Lessons Learned” in the later 1800s

- Ramming was a good way to sink ironclads
  - *Cumberland* sunk by *Virginia* at Hampton Roads
  - *Re d'Italia* sunk at Lissa
  - *Camperdown* and *Victoria*
- Torpedoes were lethal
  - “Spar Torpedoes”,  *Davids, Hunleys*, Tonkin War
  - (But... *Shah* and *Amethyst* vs. *Huascar*)
- “End-on fire” essential in ship design to allow weight of fire during the approach to a ram
  - Some utterly ugly French and Russian designs...






Marine nationale Le cuirassé "Charles Martel". 


# “Lessons Learned” by 1900

- Heavy guns were to finish off cripples
  - Rate of fire in ‘minutes per round’!
  - Almost no heavy hits by US guns at Santiago or Manila Bay
- Main fighting weapon was the battery of 6” breech-loaders
  - A “hail of fire” would cripple the enemy
- Fighting range was inside a mile, might even be alongside
- “Quick-firers” (Nordenfelts, Gardners, Gatlings) expected to kill enemy gunners or force them to cover





*HMS Collingwood, 1884*



Nordenfelt gun in fighting top

# Search for the “Giant Killer”

- Torpedoes seen as “the stone in David’s sling”
- A flurry of small craft, intended to sink battleships, appeared
  - Most more dangerous to their crews than the enemy...
- French “*Jeune Ecole*” were particularly keen
  - Torpedo boats
  - Submarines


# Experience too little, too late?

- Several significant battles in the Russo-Japanese War
- Interesting technical lessons, and much studied...
  - But less influential – “older ships, poor tactics”
  - 350 Japanese torpedoes fired for 1~2 hits
  - AP shell ineffective, HE rounds very lethal?
  - Mines extremely dangerous?

# Communications Advancing



1860



1905

# One Last Grand Change

- **“All Big Gun” battleships**
  - One heavy-calibre main battery
  - No, or small-calibre, secondary armament
  - Driven by Percy Scott’s gunnery improvements
- **“Torpedo Boat Destroyers”**
  - Bigger, more seaworthy, better armed, than torpedo boats
- First appearance of workable submarines
- “I told Orville and I told Wilbur, that thing’s never gonna fly...”



# Lessons “Learned” in the Long Peace

- **“Big Guns” will sink ships at long range**
  - Turns out it’s really hard to batter a ship into submission with shellfire
- **Torpedoes are massively lethal**
  - Yes, if they hit, but other than surprise attacks they usually don’t
- **Submarines are not a serious threat**
  - ...to warships underway at speed, but if you slow down you’re in trouble
  - Unrestricted submarine warfare against merchantmen might be a “war crime” but it works terrifyingly well

# 1945 to Today

- Similar “world peace” with only limited “colonial” wars and conflicts
- Similar scale of technological change
- Similar lack of experience
- Similar lessons mislearned?







# Were the “lessons” valid?

- Who’s actually generated any experience?
  - Israel vs. Syria and Egypt
  - India vs. Pakistan
  - RN vs. Argentina
  - US vs. Libya, Iran, Iraq
- Is this helping us predict the future, or is it pointing down blind alleys like Lissa and Hampton Roads?

# Search for the “Giant Killer”

- Guided missiles seen as “the stone in David’s sling”
- A flurry of small craft, intended to sink major warships, appeared
  - Most more dangerous to their crews than the enemy...



# Are we sure we're right?

- Drawing a parallel, we've probably got some or all of our tactics, doctrine and equipment wrong
  - Should we panic?
  - Or should we be alert and ready to change?

# Are we sure we're right?

- How quickly could we learn, adapt and change our advice in the face of hard evidence?
  - How soon would we realise we'd got something wrong?
  - How quickly could we get enough data, to make an improvement?
  - How long would it take to implement it?



**Any Questions?**