

IPATCH: Collection and Fusion of Maritime Piracy Data

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24th July, 2015 32 ISMOR

Modern Maritime Piracy





Modern Maritime Piracy





Countermeasures





Are they working?

- Has piracy declined?
- Which countermeasures are best…?



IPATCH

Intelligent Piracy Avoidance using Threat detection and Countermeasure Heuristics

 Co-funded by the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme (FP7)

Started: April 2014

Duration: 3 years

Budget: €5m



Consortium






















OR Objective

Conduct a rigorous analysis of reported piracy incidents to determine - and ideally quantify the different ways pirates operate, and how effective different countermeasures are under different conditions




On-board System Concept





On-board System Concept






Analysis Scope







Raw Data





Raw Data

"Details of the Incident" (IMO):

"While underway, a suspected mother vessel disguised as a fishing vessel deployed six high speed skiffs which chased the ship. The suspected pirates on board the skiffs, who were armed with guns, circled around the ship and attempted to board it. The Master raised the alarm and made call to General Quarters (GQ), following which the water spray system was activated, speed was increased, evasive manoeuvres taken, while continuous security messages were also broadcast. Furthermore the Philippines Navy was contacted for assistance. Upon hearing the Philippines Navy's response, the skiffs aborted the attempted attack and moved away. Alarm raised and Master made call to General Quarters (GQ). Water spray system activated, speed increased, evasive manoeuvres taken and continuous security messages broadcast."

"Twelve pirates armed with guns hijacked the ship during ship-to-ship operations"



Rationalisation

Six pirates armed with guns and RPGs in a skiff approached the tanker underway from the STBD beam and started firing. [...]

[...] The ship sustained some damage to accommodation, superstructure and one liferaft.



Rationalisation

Six pirates armed with guns and RPGs in a skiff

approached the tank underway from the Sactivated, evasive beam and started firiting manage with guns [...] The ship [...] Alarm raised, fire pumps activated, evasive

[...] The ship sustained some mmodation, and one liferaft.

[...] Alarm raised, fire pumps activated, evasive manoeuvres made and armed team made their presence known. The skiff later stopped their approach and the tanker continued her passage. [...]



Rationalisation

Six pirates armed with guns and RPGs in a skiff approached the tank [...] Alarm raised, fire pumps underway from the S activated, evasive beam and started firi

[...] The ship sustained some mmodation, and one liferaft.

The vessel was en route from Adabiya, Egypt, to Singapore and carrying 19,475m of steel cable and a crew of 21 on board. [...]

[...] Four crew were badly injured.

skiff later stopped

ch and the tanker

er passage. […]




manoeuvres made and armed

team made their presence









Final Database

830 incident records

- July 2010 to April 2014
- East and West Africa

99 variables



Challenges

- Labour-intensive process
- Low data quality
 - missing/incomplete data
 - vague descriptions
- Varying granularities of data



Challenges

- Reporting bias
 - unsuccessful/near-misses not reported
- Non-reporting
 - successful attacks may not be reported

...weak mathematical foundation



Early Results

Goal: predict <u>probability of success</u> and <u>level of harm</u>

- Selection of 'good' variables
- Basic frequentist 'probabilities'
- Logistic regression




'Good' Variables


Dimensions	Variables
VA/In a ma	Geographical area
	Geopolitical context
Where	Distance to sea coast
	Sea routes
Who & How	Weapon used
	Number of craft used
	Mothership
	Ship Type
Whom	Ship status
Whom	Service speed
	Gross tonnage
When	Period of the day

- Utility: relevance in determining the threat of a pirate attack
- Completeness: low number of missing values



Examples: Where








Example: Impact on crew


Consequences to crew in connection with geographical area





Example: Impact on vessel

Types of ship consequences in connection with vessel status





Logistic Regression

	Т	E.S.	Wald	Signif.	e ^B	Odds
Atlantic_Ocean	1.649	.369	19.924	.000	5.201	420%
Arabic_Sea	.329	.261	1.591	.207	1.390	
Gulf_Aden	885	.411	4.635	.031	.413	-59%
Red_Sea	998	.424	5.542	.019	.369	-63%
SeaRoutes2	198	.276	.516	.473	.820	
GeopoliticalContext	330	.202	2.683	.101	.719	
m12	740	.210	12.442	.000	.477	-52%
d12_200	958	.299	10.273	.001	.384	-62%


Ref: Indian Ocean, > 200 NM, M-L risk (Geopolitical context), M-L sea routes

	Drahahility of avecage	Distance to sea coast			
	Probability of success	<12	12-200	>200	
ल	Atlantic Ocean	64%	59%	79%	
hic	Arabic Sea	26%	14%	42%	
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Logistic Regression

Attack Details

	e ^B	Odds
Weapons Used:		
- Knives or others	36.49	+3,549%
- Guns	1.983	+98%
- RPG	n.s.	n.s.
Number of Craft Used:		
- Two	n.s.	n.s.
- More than two	0.313	-69%
Mothership Used:		
- Yes	n.s.	n.s.

Ref: 'No weapons', 'One craft', 'No'

Countermeasures

	e ^B	Odds
Access_control	1.399	
Alarms	.538	-46%
Information_sharing	.915	
Manoeuvres	.005	-100%
Other	.076	-92%
Physical_barriers	.334	
Guards	.005	-99%
Citadel	1.705	
Upper_lighting	.074	-93%
Watchkeeping	1.855	



Conclusions (so far...)

- Support 'common knowledge'
- Early warning is good in all cases
- Approach has potential...
 - ...but suffers from under/non-reporting
 - IPATCH will look at semi-automated reporting



Future Work

- Analysis complete end of July
- Input to Threat Detection
 - contextual information
 - Bayesian networks and decision trees
- Input Decision Support
 - derive rules for Rete network



Thank you

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